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Abstract
Human rights denials have more characterised Rwandan history than their promotion and protection.
When the Rwandan State emerged from Tutsi domination and colonialism, many Rwandans hoped
that the era of liberty had at least dawned. But the reality has been a total disappointment and
replicas of earlier abuses have emerged, despite the ratification by Rwanda of most international
human rights instruments. This dissertation is premised on the assumption that Rwanda has failed
as a democratic constitutional State, and the whole socio-economic-political system has gone wrong.
Chapter one argues that disequilibrium was built into the Rwandan system before colonisation and
evangelisation. There was a 'consensus' that Tutsis were a superior minority race, able to govern
and dominate, well organised and accepted by their Hutu subjects. The colonists and the Catholic
Church exploited this injustice for their indirect rule. In a world evolving towards the international
human rights system, this had a very precarious foundation in Rwanda. Indeed, poor management of
changes due to evangelisation, education and market economy led to the denial of human dignity. It
exacerbated division in favour of Hutus rather than reinforcing national unity.
Chapter two considers the Hutu regime as a failure of a democratic constitutional State in the post-
colonial era, despite the promise to serve the interests of all Rwandans through democracy and
respect for human rights. In a one-party State, a handful of Hutus have monopolised power and
resources. The institutional infrastructure for the management of the State and protection of human
rights was set up to safeguard the interests of the ruling group only and oppress the rest of the
population. The Hutu government, particularly, took revenge on Tutsis that they killed, forced into
exile and denied access to public affairs. Hutu opponents, real or imaginary, and people from other
regions than that of the President were also denied such access. Separation of powers was
purposely just a theory, whence a non-independent judiciary, interference of the executive in the
functioning of other branches of government and abuse of legislative power became the reality. In
order to perpetuate the ruling group's hegemony, civil society was hindered, while states of
emergency were used to deny the right to life, liberty and the security of the person. Many other
rights were also denied regardless of whether the denial was a legacy of the past or just a result of
the undemocratic nature of the State and the underdevelopment of the country. The Hutu regime's
failure to promote national unity resulted in a genocide which took the lives of many Tutsis and
Hutus.
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The author nonetheless argues that respect for human rights and establishment of the rule of law are
still possible through a process of reconciliation and reconstruction.
Whereas the current Tutsi government presented itself as committed to democracy and human
rights, Chapter three argues that it was a mutatis mutandis replica of the Hutu rule. Indeed, the State
system and resources have been captured by a group of Tutsis while other Tutsis have been left
without hope and Hutus have become second-class citizens, whence justice and national unity are in
jeopardy. By avoiding to tackle the fundamental issue of nation-statehood, the United Nations have
failed to maintain peace and security. The failure to condemn Ugandan aggression against Rwanda,
the forced repatriation of refugees, and the non-prosecution of Tutsis involved in crimes against
humanity have proved the demise of international law and the maintenance of the culture of impunity
in Rwanda.
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Opsomming
Die geskiedenis van Rwanda word meer deur die miskenning van menseregte as erkenning en
beskerming daarvan gekenmerk. Toe die Rwandese Staat onder Tutsi oorheersing en kolonialisme
uit verrys, het baie Rwandese gehoop dat die tydperk van vryheid ten minste aangebreek het, maar
die werklikheid was algeheel teleurstellend en weergawes van vroeëre misbruike het weer tevore
getree, ten spyte daarvan dat Rwanda die meeste internasionale werktuie vir menseregte bekragtig
het. Hierdie verhandeling berus op die aanname dat Rwanda as 'n demokratiese grondwetlike staat
misluk het en dat die sosio-ekonomies-politieke stelsel geheel-en-al verkeerd geloop het.
Hoofstuk een argumenteer dat 'n wanbalans voor die kolonisasie en evangelisasie van die land
reeds in die Rwandese stelsel ingebou is. Daar was 'konsensus' waarvolgens Tutsis beskou is as 'n
superieure minderheidsras wat in staat was om te regeer en te oorheers, wat goed georganiseer
was en deur hul Hutu onderdane aanvaar is. Die koloniste en die Katolieke Kerk het hierdie onreg
ten voordeel van hul indirekte heerskappy uitgebuit. In 'n wêreld wat op pad was na 'n internasionale
menseregtestelsel was die grondslag wat hiervoor in Rwanda gelê is uiters onseker. Swak bestuur
van veranderinge wat deur evangelisasie, opvoeding en 'n mark-ekonomie teweeggebring is, het in
werklikheid tot miskenning van menseregte gelei. Dit het skeiding tot voordeel van die Hutus
vererger, eerder as om nasionale eenheid te versterk.
Hoofstuk twee kyk na die Hutu regime as 'n mislukte demokratiese konstitusionele staat in die
postkoloniale era, ten spyte van die belofte om die belange van alle Rwandese deur demokrasie en
eerbied vir menseregte te dien. In die eenpartystaat het 'n handjievol Hutus die mag en hulpbronne
gemonopoliseer. Die institusionele infrastruktuur vir die bestuur van die Staat is opgestel om die
belange van die heersersgroep te beveilig en die res van die bevolking te onderdruk. Die Hutu
regering het hul veralop Tutsis gewreek deur hulle te vermoor, tot ballingskap te dryf en hul toegang
tot openbare sake te weier. Hutu teenstanders, werklik of vermeend, en mense vanaf ander streke
as die waarvan die President afkomstig was, is ook van sodanige toegang weerhou. Die verspreiding
van mag was doelbewus niks meer as teoreties nie, vandaar die nie-onafhanklikheid van die
regbank, inmenging by die funksionering van ander vertakkings van die regering deur die
uitvoerende gesag en die misbruik van die wetgewende gesag. In die poging om die regerende
groep se hegemonie te bestendig, is die burgerlike samelewing belemmer en is daar van
noodtoestande gebruik gemaak om die reg tot lewe, vryheid en die veiligheid van die persoon aan te
tas. Baie ander regte is ook geweier, ongeag of die weiering daarvan as gevolg van die nalatenskap
van die verlede of die ondemokratiese aard van die Staat en die onderontwikkeldheid van die land
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moontlik was. Die feit dat die Hutu regering ten opsigte van die bevordering van nasionale eenheid
misluk het, het gelei na In menseslagting wat die lewens van vele Tutsis en Hutus geëis het.
Terwyl die huidige Tutsi regering homself as verbonde tot demokrasie en menseregte voordoen,
argumenteer Hoofstuk drie dat die regering bloot 'n mutatis mutandi weergawe van die Hutu regering
is. In werklikheid is die staatsisteem en die hulpbronne deur 'n groep Tutsis gebuit, die res van die
Tutsis is sonder hoop gelaat en die Hutus is tot tweederangse burgers gemaak, wat vrede en
sekuriteit in gevaar stel. Met die ontwyking van die grondliggende kwessie van nasieskap, het die
Verenigde Volke ten opsigte van die handhawing van vrede en sekuriteit gefaal. Die onvermoë om
Uganda se aggressie teenoor Rwanda te verdoem, die gedwonge repatriasie van vlugtelinge en die
gebrek aan vervolging van Tutsis wat skuldig is aan misdade teen die mensheid het die
afstanddoening van internasionale wetgewing en die ondersteuning van die kultuur van
straffeloosheid in Rwanda bewys.
Desnieteenstaande argumenteer die skrywer dat respek vir menseregte en die instelling van
regsoewereiniteit nog steeds deur middel van 'n proses van versoening en heropbouing in Rwanda
moontlik gemaak kan word.
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General introduction
From the inherent dignity and equality of all human beings from birth, it follows that fundamental
rights and freedoms of the human being are important to society and must be legally inalienable and
mprescriptible.i The State can regulate but not abrogate them.
On the basis of these premises, the international community of states and non-state actors like non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) have gradually been giving moral, political and legal force to the
content of such fundamental rights and freedoms and to their relationship to the rule of law. In great
part, though, this effort has proceeded only by linking the cause of human rights to world peace.
Thus, when the United Nations Organisation whose job is ultimately to promote and maintain peace
was created, its assignment was "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small>
as an objective integral to keeping the peace and in recognition of the argument that democratic
states tend to cause fewer wars than do abusive and absolutist regimes.
This dissertation examines why and in which ways international human rights standards and the rule
of law have not been given effect and protection both on paper and in practice in Rwanda.
It is the author's contention that human rights are not deep-rooted in Rwanda, whence the failure of
international human rights standards both in theory and in practice. First, the pre-colonial and
colonial legacies of absolutism and unfair and unequal treatment among Rwandan people have had
an enormous impact on human rights in the post-independence period. Second, successive
governments have not been committed to the promotion and protection of human rights. Third, the
scope and content of rights guaranteed by Rwandan laws have been inadequate. Fourth, the
institutional infrastructure for the protection and enforcement of human rights has been ineffective.
Lastly, several social, economic, cultural and political factors have had a negative impact on human
rights.
Rwanda, formerly Ruanda as part of Ruanda-Urundi under Belgian colonisation, is a three-ethnic
country of almost seven million people, located in the Great Lakes region of central Africa. It attained
its independence from Belgium in 1962 under the leadership of President Grégoire Kayibanda and
1 Villan Duran, C., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: a landmark history - a vision for the future, (Strasbourg:
International Institute of Human Rights, 1998), p. 2.
2United Nations Charter, Preamble and Article 55.
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2his Party, PARMEHUTU (Parti pour l'Emancipation de la Masse Hutu). While the colonial authorities
based their rule on highly centralised, bureaucratic and quasi-military structures, the constitutions
introduced at independence were founded on the principles of Western-European constitutionalism,
with its characteristics of separation of powers, checks and balances, limited government, and the
protection of individual rights and of minorities. In short, the price paid for independence was the
acceptance by the new State of the principles of European liberal democracy as it emerged during
the nineteenth century. This is a strikingly common feature of the transition from colonial rule to
independent statehood in Africa.' In fact, Rwanda's self-government Constitution provided for a
multi-party system of government, a bill of rights, an independent judiciary and formal separation of
powers of government. However, these principles were abandoned soon after independence in
favour of the introduction of an executive presidency and of single party rule incompatible with
human rights. The author argues that the attitude of Rwandan leaders after independence did not so
much constitute a rupture with the colonial past they rejected but rather its continuation and
aggravation.
Rwanda reverted back to the instituting of multi-party rule in June 1991, as a result of international
pressure and claims from internal forces. A new Constitution replacing the one-party Constitution
came into effect on 10 June, 1991, but a multi-party democracy failed to come into being: there have
been no multi-party elections since 1963.
There are many reasons why a case study of Rwanda is important. First, Rwandans live in one small
territory, have one single culture and speak one language, but politically tear one another apart. The
study of Rwandan nation- and state-building provides an opportunity to demonstrate how the politico-
social organisation and the polarisation and politicization of ethnicity during the pre-independence
period instilled a culture of inequality and political exclusion among Rwandans. In particular,
Belgian's misuse of its mandate powers over Rwanda under the League of Nations (supposed to
prepare Rwandans for self-government) left Rwanda with a destabilised and feared state apparatus
at the time of independence.
Not surprisingly, Rwanda has experienced ongoing political instability, like many other countries in
Africa. From 1962 to 1999 it was ruled by five Presidents with weak and unstable political
machineries leading to assassinations, ethnic civil wars and routine abuse of - or disregard for -
3Panter-Bryck, S.K "Quatre constitutions Africaines, deux rnodeles" in: Dynamiques et finalités des droits africains, Paris,
1980, p. 434. Giekel, J., Le présidentialisme négro-africain, p. 701. Cadoux, C., "Le statut et les pouvoirs des chefs d'Etat
et de gouvernements", in: Les institutions constitutionnelIes des Etats d'Afrique francophone et de la République
Malgache, (Paris: Pénant, 1978), p. 69.
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3human rights. In particular, this instability resulted in the frequent imposition of states of emergency,
which proved to be periods of legalised disregard of basic human rights. These repeated states of
emergency and other forms of instability resulted in repeated ethnic hunting and cycles of revenge
that culminated in 1994 in the widespread killing of Tutsis by Hutus. Most recently, and precisely
because of the gravity of the genocide, the human rights practice of the new Tutsi government has
not received the scrutiny given to the former Hutu government and to other countries such as
Burundi, Congo, Kenya, and Nigeria. As a result, Hutus have been regarded as bad guys and Tutsis
as good guys. The Tutsi government has considered itself to be, and has been viewed by the
international community, as a benevolent liberator struggling against impossible odds to do what is
best for its people. We see this oversimplified view contributing to the United Nations' efforts to
prosecute the perpetrators of genocide and other gross human rights abuses in 1994 in the fact that,
to date, only Hutus have been prosecuted.
The foregoing account shows that human rights have no roots in the Rwandan society, that the
failure of the State itself has resulted in the lack of commitment to their promotion and protection,
and that the situation is likely to remain chaotic in the absence of radical changes.
Certain analysts describe the war and the genocide as a result of the hatred Hutus have for Tutsis-
Such an approach does not consider the fact that the war and the genocide are episodes of the
struggle for the control of political power that has been shaking the Rwandan society since around
the sixteenth century. In fact, to date the bad governance has manifested itself through exclusion,
discrimination, restriction or preference based on ethnic affiliation or regional origin. As a
consequence, human rights and fundamental freedoms have been denied in political, economic,
social and other domains of public life regardless of whether the majority Hutu or the minority Tutsi
have been in power. The conditions of equality have never been adequate. In that country with
limited resources, the struggle for power has often hidden the struggle for access to those resources
as well as the domination of mechanisms and channels for their social distribution. Ethnic
bipolarisation and automatic reflexes of solidarity developed by successive oligarchies have been
factors of permanent tension within the society. Ethnicity and regionalism have always been the main
evils at the origin of the deviation in the governance of Rwanda. They have expressed themselves
through egocentric appropriation of political power and national resources and have been the source
of chaos and of the disintegration of the country. Therefore, the respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms requires an unbiased critical analysis of the socio-economic-political history of
4 Shyaka, A., La philosophie du génocide, Bukavu: Rset, 1995; Karegyeya, T., "Du sang a coulé', Rwandanet, 14 July
1996.
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4Rwanda in order to make proposals for a politically realistic and lasting solution.
Studies exist that are descriptive of power and law in Rwanda while others are limited to a few
isolated issues of human rights violation. While Reynljens,5 Nkundabagenzi,6 LemarchancP and
others' describe how power was exercised and how various institutions were put in place by holders
of power, this dissertation makes a critical analysis of how and why those holders of power and their
successors failed, through those institutions, to promote and protect human rights in the country.
From the "how" and "why", a "what" is also dealt with, which prepares the reader for legal and
doctrinal understanding and recommendations for the amelioration of the problem therefrom.
While Nsengiyaremye9 focuses on the description of a good deal of tricks that were played between
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Habyarimana regime towards the genocide, this
dissertation analyses and criticises those tricks through their background and their aftermath in the
context and development of the state's system.
This dissertation also tries to go far beyond studies by Campbeliw, Cohen», DesForges12, Human
Rights Watch13 and Prunler-, and other studies on the Rwandan genocide because, although most
of them are accurate on the matter, their confinement to the genocide does not reveal the state of
human rights as a whole, as they do not address the issue of democracy and the rule of law in the
nation-statehood context. This dissertation shows how the genocide is one (though the most
horrible) of many human rights denials and one of the results of the failure of the Rwandan State to
fulfil its prime task of promoting the civil, political, social and economic development of its citizens
5 Reyntjens, F., Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, Tervuren: MRAC, 1985; L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en Crise - Rwanda,
Burundi: 1988-1994, Paris: Karthala, 1994.
6 Nkundabagenzi, F., Evolution de la structure politique du Rwanda, thesis, UCL, 1961; Rwanda Politique 1958-1960,
Bruxelles: C.RI.S.P., 1962.
7 Lemarchand, R, Rwanda and Burundi, New York: Praeger, 1970.
B Codere, H., The biography of an African society: Rwanda, 1900-60, Annales series in 8, MRAC, Tervuren, No. 79,
1973; Hertefeit (d') and Coupez, La royauté sacrée de I' ancien Rwanda. Texte, traduction et commentaire de son rituel,
Tervuren: M.RCA, 1964; Lacger (de), Le Rwanda ancien et Ie Rwanda moderne, Kabgayi, 1959; Newbury, C., The
cohesion of oppression. Clientship and ethnicity in Rwanda 1860-1960, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.
9 Nsengiyaremye, T., Rwanda: The unknown tragedy, Lusaka: Kanyama, 1997; Sellstrëm, T. and Wohlgemuth, L., "The
International Response to Conflict and Genocide from the Rwandan Experience" in: Journal of Humanitarian Assistance,
March, 1996.
10 Sellstrëm, T. and Wohlgemuth, L., "The International Response to Conflict, 1996.
11 Cohen, Andrew J., "On the trail of the genocide", New York Times (7 September 1994).
12 DesForges, A., Leave none to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, Human Rights Watch Report, February 1999.
13 Human Rights Watch, Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in Rwandan War, New York,
January 1994; "Immediate Communiqué", June 6,1994; The Aftermath of Genocide in Rwanda, September 1994.
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5and their protection on an equal footing.
This dissertation also tries to fill the lacunae found in a number of writings that are descriptive of
press freedom» and some aspects of women's riqhts.» Indeed, the isolation of these writings does
not allow them to explain what went wrong and what is to be done about the system of human rights
and the rule of law itself even though Rwanda is party to most international human rights
instruments.
All those studies do not provide an illuminating discussion of the ways and means of developing
human rights roots in that country. They have ignored the fact that the failure of human rights in
Rwanda is a consequence of the failure of the whole system. The author argues that, at
independence, Rwandan people had not been prepared for the task of statehood by the time
independence became a reality. As a matter of fact, there was a completely inadequate state
system. There was not really a Rwandan nation-state. And the conditions have not changed yet. The
failure of Rwanda as a democratic constitutional state lies in the fact that many things have gone
wrong. These include, but are not limited to, the fact that the state formation itself has gone wrong,
civil society has never flourished, and the various institutions and structures for the control of the
exercise of power have never been adequate in promoting and fostering human rights. Not
surprisingly, we saw the dramatic failure with 'respect to the genocide and many other human rights
denials before, during and after the genocide. In terms of what had been happening since 1990
through 1994 and subsequently, many Rwandans are less prepared now. There is more fear, more
distrust, less reconciliation. There is more selfishness among Rwandan leaders, more absolutism
and less democracy.
Nevertheless, other analysts and politicians recommend well-meant remedies such as the creation of
an exclusive Hutuland and Tutsiland and reconciliation. However, Hutuland and Tutsiland
advocates» do not suggest ways and means of operation, mostly because they do not sufficiently
14 Prunier, G., The Rwanda Crisis. History of a Genocide, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.
15 Urumuli rwa Demokarasi, No. 120, 1973; Kinyamateka, April 1885; Sibomana A., Gardons espoir pour Ie Rwanda,
Desclée De Brouwer, 1997; Reporters Sans Frontiêres, Rapport sur la liberté de Presse au Rwanda, Paris, May 20,
1998.
16 Ntampaka, C., La décennie des Nations-Unies pour les femmes et la situation des droits de la femme au Rwanda,
Revue Juridique du Rwanda, 1987/2, p. 111-151; L'évolution des droits de la femme au Rwanda, Penant, 1988, p. 43-
74; L'apport de la lol du 27 octobre 1988 sur les droits de la femme au Rwanda, Revue Juridique du Rwanda, 1990/1-2,
p. 32-39; La Femme et la fille dans leur familie d'origine, Kigali: Haguruka, 1993; Kamanzi, S., Le droit rwandais et la
Femme, Dialogue, No. 193 October 1996, p. 21-25.
17 Rutsindura, K., "Partition as a Way of Restoring and Maintaining Peace in Rwanda", Working Paper, Nairobi, June
1997; Karegyeya, C., "The Final Solution", Rwandafor, 1996. Griggs goes further by proposing partition of the entire
region (Burundi, Eastern Congo and Rwanda) into a Hutuland and a Tutsiland. Griggs, R., The Great Lakes Conflict:
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6consider the context and development of the Rwandan problem, and the protagonists for
reconcilatlon» do not explore the underlying philosophy and the outcome of the reconciliation
approach in order to prevent the repetition of violence, eradicate the culture of impunity and establish
a true state of law. In particular, they fail to explain how to improve the already-failed Arusha Peace
Agreement that they rely on to avoid a vicious cycle of human rights abuses. The critical analysis
and proposals in this dissertation fill these lacunae. Beyond a few proposals on truth and
reconciliauon», a new way of thinking about ends and means of democratic government as a
guideline for the building of a viable state is offered. However, it should be understood that the
conceptual framework in terms of which the author focuses on the bill of rights is part of a broader
picture of the failure of the State in Rwanda.
This dissertation is divided into chapters and a conclusion. In Chapter one, the author argues that
the Rwandan nation-state was built on a consensus that not all Rwandans are fundamentally equal
by birth, despite statements to the contrary in the constitution. This chapter accounts for the pre-
colonial and colonial roots of the contemporary Rwandan State which remain highly relevant for
understanding the Hutu-Tutsi problem as one of the reasons for the failure of the post-independence
state itself and thus of human rights in Rwanda. The pre-colonial legacy consists in the institution of
Tutsi superiority and Hutu inferiority status supported and aggravated by colonial rule, which also
established repressive legislation and abuse of human rights.
In Chapter two, the human rights provisions in the Constitution and the extent to which they have
been respected or violated in practice are examined. The states of emergency declared in 1963,
1965,1973,1982, and from 1990 on had a tremendous impact on human rights and democracy. The
author also considers the impact of the one-party state on the protection of human rights with
particular focus on the reasons for the establishment of one-party rule, the concept of party
supremacy, the relationship between party organs and government organs, freedom of association
Strategies for Building long-term Peace, Center for World Indigenous Studies 4 World Atlas, 1997.
18 See particularly RDR, Plateforme Idéologique du Rassemblement pour le Retour des Refugiés et la Démocratie au
Rwanda, Paris, 23 August 1998. See also "Comments in the Discussion of the Paper by the Minister of Justice", in
Newick Park Initiative, Rapport de Ja Conférence tenue ilKigali du 19 au 21 aout 1997; "What is understood by Justice in
Rwanda today? What can be justified in Rwanda today by reference to lack of means, technical and human and what
cannot? Paper presented by Gerald Gahima, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Justice", in Newick Park Initiative;
RUKEBA, C., UNAR. Communiqué de Presse, 15 décembre 1997; Forces De Resistance Pour La Democratie, Plate-
Forme Politique, Brussels, March 1996, p.72; Rwanda Pour Taus, Communiqué de Presse, Brussels, 21 November
1995; GASANA, J., Lettre au Président de la République Rwandaise, Brussels, 21 March 1996; The Detmold
Confession, Dialogue, n° 195, January 1997.
19 See for example Vandeginste, S., Truth and Reconciliation Approach to the Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity in
Rwanda, Working Paper, Antwerp, 1998.
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7and assembly, the pre-eminence of the Party and Republican President, elections to public office,
and freedom of speech within Party organs. The basic argument in this chapter is that human rights
have failed because of the scant regard shown by post-colonial leaders who have not been fully
committed to the bill of rights and the fact that the one-party ethnically-based State they established
is not compatible with the effective protection of human rights. Moreover, the undermining of the
creation of civil society by Rwandan rulers has resulted in the denial of the opportunity for Rwandans
to actually participate in the democratic process through expressing their choices. Furthermore, the
judiciary and the legal profession have failed to protect human rights even within the limited realm
left by the states of emergency. In particular, it is argued that the lack of independence of the
judiciary, training for judges and lawyers, human rights education and legal assistance for the public
were important with regard to the failure of the judges and the bar.
Lastly, Chapter three considers alternative ways of protecting human rights and how the existing
machinery can be reinforced, after examining, in some depth, whether the recent experience of
genocide, intervention of international organisations and the attention of non-governmental
organisations, and the behaviour and presence of the international criminal tribunal for Rwanda, may
be able to shift the legacy onto a more helpful path. The author argues that these factors do not
seem likely to shift the legacy. The post-genocide state is a one-party Tutsi-lead state, excluding
about 90% of the population from the management of public affairs. The transition to a human rights-
based constitutional democracy has proved not to be on the political agenda and the desire for
lasting peace is likely to go unheeded. In this regard, the international system itself has failed to
maintain peace and security, yet the most important task of the United Nations Organisation, and
also the far more direct and the far more obvious way, is to protect basic human rights and
freedoms. The Organisation of African Unity has been ineffective and the African Charter of Human
and Peoples' Rights, which has succeeded nowhere, cannot, as it stands, playa successful role in
Rwanda. We are actually facing the demise of international law as regards human rights and the rule
of law in Rwanda. What is urgently needed, is truly national reconciliation and the construction of a
peaceful society and a viable state with a negotiated bill of rights, directive principles of state policy,
improved access to the legal system, the ombudsman institution, a human rights commission,
education and other devices and measures for the promotion and protection of human rights.
This dissertation covers the period from pre-colonial Rwanda up to July 1999, that is, from the birth
of the Rwandan nation-state through colonisation and the post-independence era up to 5 years after
the 1994 genocide. The period provides a clear view on human rights roots in Rwanda and an
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8assessment of the prospects for the future, as post-genocide rulers have promised to establish "the
bases for democracy and human rights" within 5 years after the seizure of power.
Chapter One
The Formation of the Rwandan State
1.1 Introduction
What is needed ... is .., studies of aspects of public law set in their historical, political and
economic context so that, first, the role the law has played, is playing and may in the future play
in the development of the polity may begin to be perceived, and secondly, the way the polity has
developed, is developing and may in the future develop, may to some extent be seen through the
perspective of the law.20
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the history of nation-state formation in pre-colonial and colonial
Rwanda, not for reasons of historical curiosity, but because, as Cardozo once asserted, "history in
illuminating the past, illuminates the present, and in illuminating the present, illuminates the future".»
Moreover, it has been said that any "worthwhile study of the problem of government and politics of
Africa must necessarily take account of its past forms of political, social and cultural organisations."22
The aspect the author wishes to analyse is the build-up of indigenous social and political structures
towards the end of the pre-colonial period. In examining the role of custom in pre-colonial Rwandan
politics we will see how the Tutsi caste manipulated values, norms, beliefs, symbols and ceremonies
to develop a political organisation and means to gain dominant power as a minority regime over the
overwhelming (Hutu) majority of the Rwandan population. These processes show how Rwandan
society evolved through particular perceptions and claims that predicted ongoing conflict, denial of
human rights and absence of constitutionalism and the rule of law in the future.
20Ghai, Y. P. And Mc Auslan, J. P. W. P., Public law and political change in Kenya, Nairobi: Oxford University Press,
1970, p. vi.
21 Cardozo, B.N., The Nature of the Judicial Process, 1921, p. 53.
22Elias, Government and Politics in African Context, 2 ed., 1963, p. 1.
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91.2 Pre-colonial era: Development of ethnic polarisation
1.2.1 The settlement of Rwanda
The population of Rwanda comprises three ethnic groups: Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. The Twa are related
to the Pygmies of the Congo forest and probably settled in the area a very long time ago. The Hutu
are related to the Bantu of the other inter-lake kingdoms, but there is no indication whatever
concerning their place of origin, which some say is in East Africa and others say is in Central Africa.
The only fact recorded by historians is that they settled in the area before the arrival of the Tutsi, who
are reported to have come from the north and who adopted the language and culture of the already
settled populations,»
Around the beginning of the twentieth century, and perhaps a little before, the wave of Bantu
migration, from sub-Saharan savannahs, had spread into the green and fertile Great Lakes Region.24
According to Kayitare, some immigrants had continued along their route towards the south while
others had stayed on. Amongst the latter were some Hutu ancestors who had established
themselves in the "region of thousand hills" that they, later, made into Rwanda. In the mountain and
savannah forests, which then covered the Rwandan territory, they found the Twa hunter populations
already established. To appropriate lands to be cleared for cultivation in the Twa hunting territory,
Bantu immigrants either came to a friendly agreement with them and paid some tribute, or simply
established themselves by force.»
Maquet has observed that these Bantu immigrants were grouped in solidly organised communities
with, at least in some cases, a supra-clanship command based on the monarchic model called
rayauté sacrée (holy kingship).26 According to d'Hertefelt, Bantu monarchies built on an almost
identical model existed not only in the inter-lake region, but also up to a thousand kilometres further
south, particularly in present day Zirnbabwe.» This suggests that they maintained their traditional
23For a detailed study on the settlement of Rwanda, see Vansina, J., L'Evolution du Royaume Rwanda des Origines a
1900 (XXVI),
24This inter-lake region is situated between Great Lakes Albert, Edward, Kivu, Tanganyika, Victoria and Kyoga.
25Kayitare, L'Organisation politique dans Ie Rwanda Traditionnelle, working paper, Kigali, June 1997, p. 8.
26Maquet, M., Le Systérne des relations sociales dans le Rwanda ancien, Tervuren: M.R.C.B .• 1954, p. 10. Maquefs
assertion finds its justification in d'Hertefelfs observation that the traditional Bantu monarchies of "holy kingship" type had
inherited their political traditions from a sub-Saharan Bantu founder which in turn, had inherited them before from Kouch
and Pharaonic Egypt old kingdom. Hertefeit (d'), M., Cours d' Histoire de I' Afrique, des origines a la fin du Xvllé siécle,
Butare, n.d., p. 19.
27Hertefelt (d'), Cours d' Histoire de I' Afrique, des origines a la fin du XVlle siécle, at 19.
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political organisation during their migration and re-established it after their journey.
This monarchic hypothesis helps to explain the rapidity of the migration to the south along the Great
Lakes chain of certain Bantu communities. d'Hertefelt goes on to affirm that the combination of the
strength of their numbers, the robustness of their race, their iron arms, a specific technical
organisation, trained warrior forces and centralised authority, ensured them migratory success»
During that period, Rwanda's agricultural and pastoral civilisation prospered and resulted in
substantial demographic expansion. Its use of iron technology also contributed to its prosperity,»
Before the arrival of Tutsis, there were about 50 Hutu monarchies of which names still indicate their
particular regions: Nduga, Bugesera, Mutara, Buyaga, Busigi, Ruhengeri, Bushiru, Busozo, Bukunzi,
Bukonya, Buhoma, Rugamba-Kiganda, Kingogo, Budaha, Bwishaza, Marangara, Busizi, Bulembo-
Ivunja, Buliza, Ntonde-Karama, Kagogwe, Muhinga-Nyabitare. According to certain traditions, the
three monarchies of Rwanda have been those of Basinga, with Barenge as dynastic lineage; that of
Bagesera and that of Bazigaba.30 History has left reminiscences of the last petty Hutu kings, heads of
small principalities based on the clan, representatives of the ancestors, and magicians having power
over the earth's fertility31, who "had the power to make rain fall, to chase away the crop-destroying
insects, to pass on a germinating power to seeds, to ward off insects and cattle parasites, and to
cause numerous and healthy calves to be born thanks to their occult science".» Davidson observes
that, afterwards, these principalities were conquered and annihilated by the Tutsi mvaders.»
However, little is known about the Hutu civilisation as such, mostly because its memory has been
erased by the Tutsi arrival and Rwandan history does not say much about the earlier period.
The Tutsi were said to be related to the Hima who made up the ruling caste in all the inter-lake
kingdoms, from Bunyoro in southern Uganda to Buha in western Tanzania. Historians suppose they
came from countries situated to the east of Lake Victoria and their earliest origin has been traced to
Ethiopia. The immigration of the first Ethiopids took place before the fifteenth century» Little by little,
these early Hima, nomadic herders, settled in the country, enslaved the natives and founded several
28lbid.
29lbid.
30ld., at 24; Delmas, Généalogie de la noblesse du Rwanda, Kabgayi, 1950, p. 153.
31They were called "Abahinza", meaning "those who make grow"
32d'Hertefelt, M., Cours d' Histoire de I' Afrique, at 24.
33Davidson, I., L' Afrique avant les blancs - Découverte du passé oublié de l'Afrique, Paris: PUF, 1962, p. 212.
34Kayitare, L'Organisation politique dans le Rwanda Traditionnelle, at 10.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Il
small states without much internal cohesion.» As a justification for the Hutu ousting, Davidson puts it
that those who are the most experienced in nomadic life always win when two parties are equal in
number and in power. He elaims that, though technically more primitive, the nomads were militarily
stronger because of their way of life as well as their organisation, this being the reason why they
subjugated and used, to their profit, the sedentary capacity for work and production of cultivators,
potters and blacksmiths. He concludes that the Bantu were defeated, "and their civilisation's
development was [held] up to ridicule and came to its end".» In the Great Lakes Region, and
particularly in Rwanda and in Burundi, the "invaders" who penetrated first to parts of current Uganda
were called Tutsi. Some of them established themselves there, whereas others progressed to the
south, some infiltrating Rwanda, others the intermediate region between Rwanda and Lake
Victoria.37
After the arrival of the Hima, the Bunyoro kingdom disintegrated under the shock of a Nilotic invasion
from the north and the invaders became masters of the kingdom. Probably in the fourteenth century,
several Ethiopic kingdoms and principalities occupied eastern Rwanda. The oldest ones were
Karagwe, Bugufi and Mubari. Afterwards, Ndorwa, Bugesera and Gisaka were established. At the
time of Gihanga, the first mythical king of Rwanda, these states were occupying the entire eastern
portion of present-day Rwanda.38 Although this is based more on myth than on history, one can _
deduce that Rwanda, for a long time, was a small chieftaincy on the shores of Lake Muhazi. A Tutsi
elan, Basindi or Banyiginya, travelled past the Ndorwa and continued to the south, first penetrating
35d'Hertefelt, Cours d' Histoire de I' Afrique, at 31.
36Id., at 213.
37Kayitare, L'Organisation politique dans Ie Rwanda Traditionnelle, at 10."Batutsl', in the plural form, would mean "those
who arrive" (from "gutuka": to arrive, to get to). In kiganda (one of the Ugandan languages), "ututse wa?" means "where
do you come from?". In complete agreement with Davidson, Habimana asserts that the hamitic clans' invasion in the
region and in the whole East Africa came to, little by little, dislocate the groups, interrupt the trends of ancient relations,
and soon compel the iron Bantu civilisation to isolation first, and then to fade away. In order to date the first hamitic
penetrations in Rwanda, he refers, on one hand, to the chronological list of clans' chiefs, then that of the Tutsi kings, as
reported by the Tutsi oral tradition; and, on the other hand, to approximate chronologies finalised in neighbouring
countries of Uganda and Burundi. See Habimana, C., The Bantu population, Dare-es-Salaam: Kasege, p. 80. Certain
chroniclers of Rwanda, influenced by the neighbourhood of the last Tutsi kings, had dated the first hamitic penetrations in
the twelfth century, and even around the year 1,000, suggesting, as historical, about twenty legendary and mythological
kings, and calculating their length of service on the basis of an average reigning period of 30 years. Nevertheless, soon
after, the legendary kings were effaced from the list, and the reigns' duration was reduced to an average of 20 years.
This way of dating leads to dating the establishment of the first Tutsi clan in Buganza, in east-central Rwanda, around
the second half of the fourteenth century. Patemostre de la Mairieu, B., Le Rwanda, Son Effort de Développement,
Antécédents Historiques et Conquêtes de la Révolution Rwandaise, Kigali: Editions Rwandaises, 1972, p. 26.
38Gihanga crossed Mubari and settled in Gasabo at the south-western tip of Lake Muhazi, between Gisaka and
Bugesera. Bugesera and native principalities extended westward from the lake; the main one was the Renge kingdom,
which supposedly bequeathed the customs regarding the organisation of the State and the divine royalty to Gihanga.
The dynastic genealogy names eleven mythical successors who supposedly succeeded Gihanga in Gasabo. Histoire et
Chronologie du Rwanda, Kabwayi, 1955.
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Mutara. They met the Hutu monarchy of Bazigaba and, according to the tradition, became united
through inter-marriage. It is probable that the Banyiginya adopted certain monarchic customs from
the Hutu of Mutara before they pursued their progression and were finally established in the south of
Buganza, where they were placed side by side with the Hamitic clan of Bahondogo, established, in
the meantime, in Bugesera. The Banyiginya chose Gasabo, south of Lake Muhazi, as the centre of
their establishment in Buganza. However, their pastures, soon after, were taken over by the Hamitic
clan of Ndorwa in the north and, in the southeast, by the Hamiticised monarchy of Bagesera-Bahinda
(Bazirankende) of Gisaka. In order to avoid being absorbed, they had to move to the west.» Towards
the end of the sixteenth century, they extended a hold, to one side, over the rest of Buganza, and, to
the other side, over the Bwanacyambwe, Buliza, Bumbogo, Buyaga and Busigi. According to de
Lacger, it is from the Hutu king of Busigi that they conquered the Ka/inga (or sacred royal drum)
which they later made the symbol of their political power. The particularity of the Tutsi Kalinga was its
decoration with the testicles of vanquished Hutu princes.s
The pressure exerted by the diverse Tutsi clans on the whole of Eastern Rwanda provoked the
displacement of numerous Hutu populations to the mountainous and forest regions situated in the
west. Thus, when the Tutsi clan of Bahondogo was established in Bugesera, numerous Hutu
refugees of that region emigrated to Busozo and Bushiru in the west, whence they scattered all over
the country.« Habimana explains this displacement by the fact that these Hutus, who were not used
to domination, were running away from Tutsis for fear of being subjugated under a somewhat feudal
system developing in the reqion.v But they did not escape. Tutsis conquered almost all the Hutu
kingdoms. Remaining Hutu principalities were no obstacle whatever to Rwanda and were absorbed
into the kingdom one after the other. As a result of these conquests and, unlike in other African
countries, Hutus and Tutsis were spread almost evenly throughout Rwanda and have been living
mingled on the hills. Neither has created their own particular land.»
39See Pages, Un royaume hamite au centre de l'Afrique, Bruxelles: IReB, 1933, p. 82; d'Hertefelt, Les clans du Rwanda
ancien, Butare: INRS, 1971, p. 43; Delmas, Généalogie de la noblesse du Rwanda, at 105; de Lacger, Le Rwanda
ancien et le Rwanda moderne, Kabgayi, 1959, p. 104.
4°de Lacger, ld.
41Delmas, Généalogie de la noblesse du Rwanda, at 144
42Habimana, The Bantu population, at 97.
43The only notable exception was the northern region (Ndorwa, Mutara, Mulera), where the Tutsi never accounted for
more than a tiny fraction of the total population.
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1.2.2 The germ of oligarchy
When state leaders and strongmen confront one another in the contest for ascendancy, "each
reverts to a typical repertoire of stratagems and tactics, one of which is to modify the regime format
of the State" along a variety of dirnensions.« Against the background of about fifty local monarchies
mentioned in the oral tradition, one may wonder whether Rwanda did not experience any period of
strong centralisation during the somewhat "1500 years" of Bantu predominance, a centralisation
which would have been favoured by the mountainous relief of the country and historical vicissitudes
as a measure against the political balkanisation, which ended up in the formation of that mosaic of
local monarchies and clans. Unfortunately, no research has been conducted into this and the only
observation made by Karemano is that, around the sixteenth century, the Hutu monarch of "Grand-
Nduga", called Mwami or Muhinza, had under his dependence not only the Nduga, but also
Marangara, Ndiza, Kabagali, Rukoma, Bwanamukari, Nyaruguru, and Mayaga, in short, the whole of
Central Rwanda. On the other side, he argues that the culture, religious beliefs, political customs and
the language of the Rwandan population in the sixteenth century presented such social unity, such a
"weight" of community, that Tutsis adopted it entirely.«
Regarding the concept of "holy kingships", the institution of kingship was the pivot of the political
structure and a focal point of political, religious, legal, economic and symbolic authority and practice.
The power of the Hutu monarch was an absolute power, though limited "by the custom and tempered
by the opnion".« As in many other Bantu kingdoms, the king did not function in an environment
without constraints, the most important of which were located in the administrative system. An
informal council of confidential and trusted advisors provided the first check on arbitrary rule. A
second check was ensured because the ruler consulted a wider, more representative, formal body of
advisors, the ward heads, and finally, the public assembly of all adult men. In these assemblies
everybody spoke, even to the effect of overruling decisions reached in earlier consultations.
However, this was not a common occurrence and the meetings generally served as a public forum
where complainants aired their grievances, authorities sought and conferred public consent, and
44duToit, P., State-building and democracy in Southern Africa, Pretoria: HSRC, 1995, p. 28.
45Karemano, Rwanda Traditionnel, Kigali: Printerset, 1988, p. 22.
46 In order to evaluate the nature of the king's power, both Davidson and Du Toit refer to the situation in Zimbabwe. Bolh
agree that the monarchs of Zimbabwe were not free to legislate out of the law and tribal custom and had probably to be
killed or deposed if they failed in an equitable government. Id., at 261; du Toit, State-bui/ding and democracy in Southern
Africa, at 29. Davidson goes on even to argue that the populations of Zimbabwe "chose their king to govern them with
equity". Davidson, L' Afrique avant les blancs, at 181. However, whether the rule at that epoch may be called democratic
in the contemporary sense remains unclear.
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people reached consensus on matters of public policy.v
According to the "sacred" or providential concept of royal power in the Great Lakes region, the health
and the behaviour of the Mwami (king) had their repercussion in the joy and prosperity of his people.
His role was that of an intercessor with divine providence. He possessed for his subjects the
beneficial virtue of crop fertiliser, ritually inaugurated the first fruits, provided rain, and protected
crops from natural scourges such as drought, disease, grasshoppers, parasites, etc.«
This socia-political system, characterised by hierarchy as well as by limited, male, public participation
and consultation and by limited consent within the given hierarchical social and political system,
consolidated Hutu positions up to the era of contact with the Tutsi settlers who took over from them.
Observers affirm, however, that when the Tutsi adopted the organisation of the Hutus' "sacred
kingship", they added a new characteristic that corresponded with their own traditions and their
warlike practice of power: kingship became autocratic and ruthless. Everything fell under its
dependence as a property at its discretion. Moreover, the Tutsi kings had, on one side, the
consultative committee grouping of War Chiefs and, on the other side, the hereditary Abiru
committee in charge of royal rites.« The administration of diverse regions occupied by the Tutsis was
entrusted by the king to the Batware b'intebe or Great Chiefs, representative of the old warlike power
of the chief of the nomadic elan. Sometimes, especially in times of crisis, the king summoned them
and they were consulted on the sltuatlon.» However, it seems that the patterns of behaviour in the
face-ta-face relationships with an authority, particularly the supreme one, were such that an opinion
opposed to that of the Mwami was very unlikely to be voiced.e Consequently, the main use of that
council appears to have been for the king to explain what he wanted to do and to elicit suggestions
on the means of carrying it out. Moreover, each of these chiefs, at least those of the frontier zones,
was responsible for a permanent armed group, composed of 150 to 200 male youths.s In case of
important warlike enterprises the troops were increased to inelude not only all the Tutsis capable of
combat service, but also an increasing number of Hutus. One can say that, at a certain moment, all
the Hutus in the hamiticised regions, with their cattle, were attached to an army, either as combat
471d.
48Vansina, L'Evolution du Royaume Rwanda, at 77.
49Abiru means "custodians of the knowledge of royal rites called ubwiru. Ibid.
50See Maquet and d'Hertefelt, Elections en Société Féodale, Une Etude sur I' Introduction du Vote Populaire au Rwanda-
Urundi, 1959, p. 4.
51Maquet, Le Systéme des relations sociales dans Ie Rwanda ancien, at 157.
52lbid; De Lacger, Le Rwanda ancien et le Rwanda moderne, at 109; Paternostre de la Mairieu, at 54.
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auxiliaries or as porters»
Those Great Chiefs with general unlimited competence had two parallel managers under their
command. First, the Banyabutaka (Chiefs of Agricultural Lands), sometimes Hutus, but, in the final
years, almost always Tutsis because, as already seen, Tutsis were successors to Hutu power and
were progressively substituted for Hutus; then, the Banyamukenke or Chiefs of Pastures, always
Tutsis. They acted as representatives of the ancient civil power of the chief of the Tutsi clan, with its
specific implications of War Supply Corps. These two managers concurrently exercised, in the same
region, similar administrative powers of justice and policing, one on agriculturists and their lands and
the other on shepherds and their pastures.s Below these spread a vast network of subchiefs from
whom tribute was exacted for the higher chiefs and the kings. How much power the chiefs and sub-
chiefs claimed for themselves, and for how long, was entirely dependent on the Mwaml's grace.
They were "bureaucrats", as Lucy Mair noted, "in the sense that they did not claim their position by
right of inheritance or by virtue of any prior connection with the area to which they were appointec",»
but by the Mwami 's will.
The Abiru were the highest ranking dignitaries of the kingdom, had different tasks and were strictly
ranked in a fixed hierarchy. Their activities, in general, however, were concerned with the
preservation of ritual knowledge and the accomplishment of ceremonies essential to the existence of
Rwanda and its government. This knowledge and activities were kept secret from everybody who
was not a mwiru.56 They were under the king's authority in the sense that he could create new offices
of mwiru and he could dismiss anyone who was disloyal. The royal control was limited to this. It was
53Paternostre de la Mairieu, Id., at 54.
54lbid. See also Kagame, A., Le code des institutions politiques du Rwanda précolonial, Brussels: IRCB, 1952, p. 119.
The king levied on each inzu (family community), through his decentralised agents, taxes in kind on one hand (cattle,
agricultural and craft produce), drained to his residence in each chieftaincy, and labour taxes, on the other hand. To the
total of taxes due to the king, each decentralised authority added, for his own salary, one fourth, to which he also added
taxes and privileges not included in the quota: abatora (regular taxes of banana bunches already marked in each banana
plantation); indabukirano (gift due to the authority during his nomination); gutora (the taking of certain areas from
agricultural or pastures lands belonging to the citizens); and the right of pasture in the citizens' falloffs. In case the
authority's cows were interested in a pasture, it was an offence for a farmer, however poor he might be, to chase them
back. As for the work taxes due by each family, they came to two days out of five, which is 146 days per year. In total,
each male had to devote around one third of his work to maintain "the beneficiaries of the tax system that were the king,
his wives, his favourites, and the administrative chiefs". d'Hertefelt, Cours d' Histoire de I' Afrique, at 16. Apart from those
fiscal resources, the king collected pastoral taxes from his "Great chiefs" who were, at the same time, his important
clients, as will be indicated later. They had to send milk and beer to him alternatively and without interruption and to fill
his garret of provisions; cows brought from war raids; and, each year, a fully-grown bull, a sterile cow, bull-calves and
rams for the sacrifice, the divination or the butchery. Nayigiziki, S., and Maquet, S.S., Les droits fonciers dans Ie Rwanda
ancien, Bruxelles: BAC, 1957, p. 49.
55Mair, L., Primitive Government, Harmondsworth and Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1962, p. 153.
56Singular of biru
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really the minimum, without which Abiru would have been completely independent of the king. The
offices were hereditary and even when a mwiru had been dismissed one of his sons succeeded
him,57Their domains were exempt from any interference by the land chief or the cattle chief.
The Abiru had to memorise secret rules governing, for instance, the order according to which queens
were to be chosen from different descent groups, the ritual to observe in the case of the spreading of
cattle disease, lack of rain, warlike ceremonies, celebrations of the sorghum harvests, etc» The
Abiru institution safeguarded the interests of the great groups of Tutsi descent. This function is seen
clearly in the determination made for several reigns in advance of the secondary lineages and clans
from which the queens could be chosen successively. The Abiru, as representatives of their kinship
groups had, as it were, established the order in which the interests of different clans and lineages
would be favoured in turn.59 The most striking fact was that not one mwiru knew the entire body of
customs. That knowledge was divided into parts, the remembering of each being entrusted to a
mwiru, that is to say a descent group, as the office was hereditary,« In this way it may be said that
the exclusive knowledge of a part of the most important Rwandan ritual had virtually become the
property of one of several great Tutsi descent groups.
A second function of the Abiru institution was to secure the continuity and the prevalence of the
tradition that could have been endangered by the very considerable powers of the king.61 That
traditional body was not unlike a constitution in a modern state and the Abiru institution could be said
to have had a role similar to that of a supreme court judging whether a new rule is compatible with
the fundamental charter of the country. Of course, they explicitly had neither such a task nor such
institutionalised means to prevent the king from establishing new rules, but the disapproval of an
innovation by the Abiru was not to be taken lightly as they represented the great Tutsi kinship
qroups.« Even though they may not have had any control over a particular course of events, they
alone had the authority to sanction political change. In this respect, perhaps no other institution did
more to keep alive the "myth" of the monarchy, or, for that matter, to thwart any innovation likely to
endanger its primeval purity.
57Maquet, Le Systéme des relations sociales dans Ie Rwanda ancien, at 127.
58lbid.
59lbid.
6°lbid.
61lbid.
62Mbonimana, G., Critique Historique, Lecture, Butare: UNR, 1984, at 40.
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According to ancient customs, justice was applied by that hierarchy of political authorities. The king
reserved the right to settle very important lawsuits. The "Great Chiefs" reserved this right with regard
to matters relating to cattle, since the latter was now shared out, in the clientship system, among
both agricultural and pastoral populations. Generally, for the most serious offences (murders,
mutilations, etc.) there were both civil and penal judgements and punishing was under the
competence of the police power of chiefs-judges. For less serious offences (assault and battery,
certain thefts, etc.), only the civil aspect was judged (i.e. compensation). In addition to
compensation, the guilty party had to pay an indemnity to the judging authorities who grew rich from
their judicial activity. This practice resulted in serious abuses: the payment of an indemnity to the
chief could allow the guilty party to neglect the compensation due to the victim. Furthermore, the res
judicata principle was not known, since the authority could change his decision according to the
mood of the day. Generally, jurisdiction under Tutsi power, at the beginning of the twentieth century,
presented serious defects: arbitrariness, partiality and venality of judges, and non-execution of
judgements. As a consequence, relatively few people lodged appeals for the resolution of olsputes.»
The most striking fact was that the non-separation of political and judicial power was a real curse as
political authority was based in and sought to maintain itself as a minority rule perceived by Hutus as
foreign rule over the local majority of Hutus. The chief judge became a political judge and was
therefore in a good position to impose his full domination. Karemano concludes that Tutsi power
always remained a power of conquest. Authorities and notable people behaved as "in conquered
country", and the Hutu populations of progressively subjugated regions were deprived of every
access to the traditional political power that they had lost little by little.64 All power was exercised
exclusively by some Tutsi clans, especially the Bega and the Banyiginya. But how extensive and
effective were the controls exercised by the upper caste? What were its relationships to the
subordinate qroups?» The most convenient approach to the patterns of dominance is the one
suggested by the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, in his use of the term "egemonia", hegemony. For
Gramsci, hegemony was characteristic of an order "in which a certain way of life and thought is
dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and
private manifestations, informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political
63lbid.
64Karemano, Rwanda Traditionnel, at 70.
65 Plausible answers to these questions are suggested by M.G. Smith's definition of pluralism: see Smith, MG., The
Plural Society in the British West Indies, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965. But see also Bryce-Laporte, R.S.,
"M.G. Smith's version of pluralism: The questions it raises", Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. X, No.1,
October 1967, p. 116. For an outstanding contribution to the theory of social pluralism, see Leo Kuper and M.G. Smith,
Pluralism in Africa, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.
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principles, and all social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral connotations".» In this
sense, the Tutsis formed a "hegemonic" caste, whose values were "diffused throughout society in all
its institutional and private manifestations". In addition, it will be seen, in section two, that their power
would be so magnified by colonial authorities as to acquire almost unlimited scope over subordinate
groups. This situation suggests a form of institutional control that made it virtually impossible for the
monarchy to dissociate itself from the principle of Tutsi hegemony. Monarchic rule and caste
hegemony were so intimately intertwined that any attempt to bring about a status reversal through
democratic means would be bound to be interpreted by the Tutsi as a threat to the institution of
kingship. It will be seen that, conversely, the abolition of monarchic rule came to be viewed by the
Hutu elite as a sine qua non of equality, as their marginalization developed profoundly rooted
frustration and complexities which would surface during the crisis of the Tutsi regime.
Meanwhile, it is one thing to note that political control ultimately rested in the hands of an oligarchy,
but another to mention that their regime did not benefit all the Tutsls« because, apart from the
favoured Tutsis, a mass of impoverished Tutsis was formed, and their fate became similar to that of
Hutu population. In view of the limited and unequal distribution of political power among the Tutsis,
the numbers of Tutsis eligible for power and office through their clan membership seem to have been
very large. Clan membership was the basis, not only of the social situation in which claims for high
status were made by those whose wealth and power were not enough to establish themselves, but
also of a viciously competitive political situation in which many Tutsis could see themselves in high
positions and offices, on condition, of course, that the present incumbents, as was quite possible,
were somehow removed. In the most detailed study of Rwandan clans to date, d'Hertefelt68 provided
the 1960 percentage distribution of the Tutsi in the eighteen Rwandan clans. While it is impossible to
know whether the distribution was the same at the turn of the century and at the beginning of
European influence, it would be very difficult to find reasons to argue for any substantial changes.
The two clans known historically to have furnished the men who held many of the highest offices and
the greatest number of high positions were the Abanyiginya and the Abega.69 In 1960, these two
clans comprised almost 40% of the Tutsi population and they were by no means the only clans in
which membership conferred unusual eligibility for high office, although the only clan that furnished
66 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, at 32.
67 We will see in Chapter two that this was all the same for Hutus whose power benefited some groups of Nduga and
Kiga people respectively, leaving the mass of other Hutus uncared for.
68 d'Hertefelt, Les clans du Rwanda ancien, at 53.
69 Codere, H., The Biography of an African Society, Rwanda 1900-1960, Based on Forty-eight Rwandan
Autobiographies, Tervuren: MRAC, 1973, p. 377.
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the Mwami was that of the Abanyiginya. The addition of other clans considered to be of the highest
nobility (the Abashambo, Abatsobe, Abasindi, Abakono, and Abaha) would bring the total
percentage to over 60% of the Tutsis. Add to this already extraordinary picture the fact that eligibility
on the basis of clan membership, or preferential eligibility, in some cases, on the basis of some
special patrilineage within the clan, were not fixed requirements for any high offices other than those
of the Mwami, the Queen Mother, and certain court offices, but that many offices could be gained
through favouritism, and the degree of competitiveness built into the Tutsi power system seems
overwhelrninq.» As a result, a good number of the "petits Tutsi" would later unite with their Hutu
fellows to organise the great 1959 revolution»
1.2.3 State management in a subsistence economy
1.2.3.1 Subsistence economy
The population of Rwanda is 96% peasant, practising subsistence economy in which each family
exploits its patch of land without respite. In the essentially agricultural tradition of Rwanda, land
organisation and cattle ownership constituted a basic element of political and social life. In the
beginning, Rwandans did not conceive of ownership as a private and exclusive right to the various
uses to which a thing may be submitted. They regarded each of the uses as "the object of a
particular right". It was not thought necessary that one person should be endowed with the sum of
the rights affecting one object.72 On the contrary, it was usual that "different persons could claim
different uses of the same thing". For instance, one person could have the right to sow a plot and to
collect the harvest and another to use it for grazing purposes at another time of the year.» Neither of
them was considered as the owner allowing somebody else to use his property as a pasture or as
ground for cultivation.
It follows that arable land and pastures did not belong to individuals, but to family groups. According
to Paternostre de la Mairieu, in the non-forest regions, due to the easy scattering of families on
different hills, they belonged to the relatively limited "inzu" qroup», whereas, in the forest regions, the
70 ld.
71See Murego, D., La Révolution Rwandaise 1959-1962 - Essai d'interpretation, Louvain: Publications de I'lnstitut des
Sciences Politiques .et Sociales, 1974.
72 Sadin, J. B. Folie de Grandeur, Paris: Djil et Cie., 1976, p. 39; Ruhashyankiko, N., Le Droit Foncier Rwandais, Butare:
UNR,1977.
73Ruhashyankiko, p. 44.
74The collective domain was then called "ingobyi y' igisekuru"(the ancestors' cradle).
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lands generally belonged to the umuryango (extended group of the sub-clan).» However, as a result
of the growth in the numbers of members of the clans that were clearing the forest, the forest domain
crumbled and the power of the clan chiefs was weakened, thus opening the way to the Tutsi policy of
conquest. Hutus made contractual agreements with Tutsis to lease the latter's cattle and, thus, broke
away from their former patrons. The new masters did not hesitate to lay claim to their clients' land in
default of heirs, emigration or banishment and to turn this land into a purely personal domain that
they used as they wished with regard to new clients.» This, slowly but surely, began the peaceful
revolution which resulted in a new custom according to which the king became the owner of the land
and then, as a consequence, of all those people earning their livelihood from it. On each pasture,
cultivated plot or forest area, the king had a right similar to the dominion eminens of Roman law, the
kind of public ownership that a state has over the land within its borders. But he also had the right, if
he chose, to prevent somebody from using a particular tract of land in any way at all, which amounts
to saying that the king had a right potentially superior to that of anybody else over land. The king's
rights could be opposed to "private rights",17
Another new custom that developed was the igikingi type of land holding, that is "granted" land,
given by the king or by Tutsi lineage to abagaragu (clients). Theoretically igikingi land was for
grazing, but in practice the "legal" determinant (i.e. the fact that it was given and could be held either
..
in freehold or as undivided "clan" property in the way of ubukonde) became the determining factor
when considering this type of land, which in fact was often used aqriculturally.» The generalisation of
igikingi increased the capacity for pressure from the political authorities on the inferior Hutu people
and pétits Tutsis. It also contributed to a strengthening of ethnic feelings, both at the top and at the
bottom of society. Neglecting the poorest strata (mostly Hutus and Twas, with a sprinkling of Tutsis)
judging, perhaps, that the middle class (made up of Tutsis and a few Hutus) was reasonably happy
with the situation as it was, the Mwami and his chiefs thought that several elements could be
integrated in the ruling group, that is the Tutsi élite, depending on their capacities, their wealth and
their potential for exploiting useful blood connections. To open up access to the new igikingi
holdings, many people had to be "Tutsified", something which many authors called "accession to the
nobility"79,an expression which blurs the distinction between the few high-ranking Tutsi lineages and
7SPaternostre de la Mairieu, at 39.
76lbid.
77lbid.
78Newbury, C., The Cohesion of Oppression, at 82.
79Nkurikiyimfura, J.N., Le Gros Bétail et la Société Rwandaise. Evolution Historique des Xlléme-XIVéme Siécles a 1958,
Paris: L'Harmattan, 1994, p. 96; Maquet, Le Systéme des relations sociales dans Ie Rwanda ancien, at 171.
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the ordinary Tutsis. But this "ennoblement" prevented the birth of a distinct Hutu chieftainly stratum
which could have become a privileged intermediary between the court and the larger population. As
a result, Hutus could not be included in the royal chieftainly élite. The extension and hardening of the
new centralised system caused them to slide from a status of inferiority balanced by complementarity
into that of a quasi-rural proletariat. By the end of the nineteenth century the vast majority, if not the
totality of the Hutu peasants, were in a position where they had to sell their labour, first as a social
obligation, and then as a monetarised commodity in the colonial system» In that way, there was
continuity between the late nineteenth century evolution of the Rwandan State and society and the
further transformations during the colonial period. This is one of the elements of an answer to Vidal's
interrogation: "How can we explain that, within only two generations, a simple form of social
antagonism has turned into violent racial hatred, widely shared way beyond its initial nucleus of
tanatics?» This evolution will be clarified by the effect of colonisation as studied in the next section.
Regarding cattle, property in the Western sense was split into three aspects. There was a global
right over all Rwanda cattle, even sheep and goats, by which the king could claim actual possession
of any of them. The Tutsi king used this right more frequently over cattle than over land. An important
chief indulging in intrigues regarded as dangerous by the king might find himself dispossessed of all
his cattle. A second kind of right was the ownership without usufruct. The person who had it was not
in possession of the cow but could at any time claim possession of the animal and the heifers
produced by that beast since the time when the possession had been transferred. This was the right
of the lord. In contrast, there was the usufruct right with respect to cattle. The person endowed with it
could dispose of the milk, the male increase of the cattle, and the dead cows. This was the typical
right of the client. Sometimes the same person possessed both these rights (bare ownership and
usutrucf).s
These aspects, in which the lord was a Tutsi and the client almost always a Hutu, evolved into a
caste system called ubuhake, which was used by Tutsis for their socia-political domination in
Rwandan nation-state building and in which Hutus in theory were not allowed to have cattle, a sign of
wealth, power and good breeding. Ubuhake denoted the relation which existed between a person
called umugaragu (client) and another called shebuja (lord). That relationship found its origin in the
80Vidal, C., "Economie de la société féodale rwandaise", Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, vol. 14, no. 1, p. 350-84.
81Vidal, C., Sociologie des passions, Paris: Karthala, 1991, p. 26.
82For a detailed study of the contractual relations, see Ruhashyankiko, N., Le droit de propriété en droit coutumier
rwandais, 1981. See also Vanhove, J., Essaie de droit coutumier du Rwanda, p. 48-51, for still other, but less important,
rights over cattle.
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situation in which an individual, Hutu or Tutsi, of inferior social prestige and less well provided with
cattle, offered his services to and asked protection from a person whose status was higher and
whose wealth was greater. In short, it can be defined as an agreement by which the client obtained
the use of the lord's cattle (i.e. usufruct) and, in turn, rendered personal service to the owners. A
wealthy lord was by definition a powerful man, and since a client's rights were largely dependent
upon the solicitude of his lord, it was obviously to his advantage to seek the protection of the
wealthy. Inferentially, the wealthier a patron the greater were the chances that he might also be a
chief.
Since the Hutus were not allowed to have cattle, it was not only an economic gift but also, in some
rare cases, a form of upward social mobility for the cow could reproduce, and the subsequent calves
would be shared between the lord and the client. This could be the beginning of an upward social
climb where, once endowed with cattle, the Hutu beneficiary would become icyihuture (de-hutucised
or tutsified).83 In any case, much depended on the lord, since a large number of clients, who, in the
meantime, had many social and economic obligations towards their lords, would never get anywhere
at all with this arrangement.
As in any agreement, the ubuhake system generated rights and obligations on both sides. The rights
the client enjoyed over the cattle granted to him were those of usufruct: he had full rights of
ownership over milk, the male increase of the cattle, and the meat and skin of a cow which had died
or had to be slaughtered. The female increase of the cattle remained at his disposal but were to be
taken back to the lord ad nutum. The interesting fact was that the cows received from a lord could be
granted by the client to somebody else by a sub-ubuhake agreement in which the original client
became a lord.« The lord granted protection to his client, including, but not limited to, support in
lawsuits: when one was to be judged by the king, it was usual and very useful to be accompanied by
one's lord whose presence impacted on the ruling to be given. Moreover, the lord extended help to
his client if the latter was in a state of poverty. According to Maquet, if the client was murdered and
his lineage was too weak to do anything about it, the lord had to demand justice from the king or
even avenge his death by blood feud; and if, after the client's death, his widow and children could
not be taken care of by his brothers or parallel cousins, the lord was supposed to help them.85 In turn,
83Similarly some poor Tutsis who lost all their cattle and had to cultivate the land would in due course become umwore,
meaning fallen or hutucised. Marriage would tend to reinforce either trend, the children of the successful Hutu marrying
into a Tutsi lineage and the children of the impoverished Tutsi marrying into a Hutu family.
84See Atterbury, M.e., Revolution in Rwanda, Occasional paper No.2, University of Wisconsin, African Studies Program,
p. 12.
85Maquet, Le Systéme des relations sociales dans Ie Rwanda ancien, at 130.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
23
the client had to pay his respects to his lord. This included personal service, which required the
presence of the client at the lord's home for a certain period for accompanying the lord when he was
travelling; carrying his messages; building or repairing his enclosure. In the process, in fact, there
was discrimination in the treatment of the few Tutsi clients and the mass of Hutu clients on whom
only services such as tilling the lord's sailor joining the night watch in his enclosure were irnposed.e
What was important, in operation, was that the ubuhake agreement tended to be permanent: a son
would inherit his father's obligations to a given lord and it was almost impossible to change from one
lord to another.v This virtual inability of a dissatisfied client to escape his lord increased the
exploitative potential of the ubuhake institution. However, this institution appears to have kept the
people together, an important fact in the building of the Rwandan nation-state. This lord/client
relationship involved reciprocal bonds of loyalty and exchange of goods and services. It provided a
place, a status, within a hierarchical system» As seen, the patrons were mostly Tutsis, but clients
could be Hutus or Tutsis of inferior social status. One person could be a client as well as a patron.
Even Tutsi patrons of Hutus could be clients of yet another Tutsi. Theoretically, the only person
ultimately not a client of this system was the king himself. Thus, most Tutsis were clients and very
few Hutus were patrons.» The relevant fact to be mentioned, however, is that there always were
Tutsis at the top and Hutus and/or Twas at the bottom. This institutionalised relationship would be
reinforced under colonial rule and would grow from bad to worse, thus increasing the frustration of
Hutus.
1.2.3.2 State management
The social control which ensured state predominance over society in continental Europe entailed
infrastructural power, the ability of the state to penetrate society and to use the infrastructure of the
state to direct and co-ordinate societal actions. Effective social control requires the capability to
extract resources from society and to regulate social relationships, which in turn allows the further
ability to appropriate resources and penetrate society. Indicators of social control include compliance
(getting people to behave differently from the way they would prefer to), participation (repeated
voluntary action within institutions run or authorised by the state) and legitimacy (voluntary
acceptance of the myths and symbolic imagery with which the State justifies its rules of behaviour)
86See Sandrart, G., Cours de droit coutumier, Astrida: Groupe Scolaire, 1930, p. 152.
87d'Hertefelt, Les clans du Rwanda ancien, at 48.
88Maquet, Le Systems des relations sociales dans Ie Rwanda ancien, at 130.
89lbid.
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and are the product of rewards, sanctions and symbols which, taken together, offer "strategies for
survival" that are supposed to be relevant to the particular conditions people confront in everyday
life.9o
In the dominant organisation of the Rwandan society, the king was the apex of a complex pyramid of
political, cultural and economic relationships. Very closely associated was the queen mother. It was
essential that this role should be fulfilled. If the death of the king's mother occurred when her son
was still living, he had to be given another "mother". The queen mother had no special task, but she
shared the royal prerogatives. She lived at the king's capital where she had her own court, and her
protection was eagerly sought. She had herds of cattle and clients. But her role should not be
regarded as independent of that of the king. Therefore, it can be said that the same kingship was
realised by two persons at the same time, without any division of responsibilities of privileges. This
was expressed by the term often used to designate the king together with his mother: "abami",
meaning "the kings". In that partnership the king, however, held a predominant position: when he
died, his mother lost her powers completely»
Typically, as in all traditional societies, including Europe until around the fifteenth century, the three
levels of human action, Le. political, cultural and economical, were deeply enmeshed and could not
be prised apart. As already indicated, apart from the central government, there were under the king,
in each district, the chief of land holdings, the army chief and then the chief of pastures. These three
functions could be concentrated in a single person for a certain area, but in a difficult or rebellious
area, the king could separate all three positions and give them to different men according to the
principle of "divide and rule". The military chiefs were given full control over the frontier districts and
their functions were both offensive and defensive, carrying out cattle raids on neighbouring groups,
as well as protecting the frontiers. It frequently occurred that the "Great Chief' was also named an
army chief. Nyrop has observed that over 95 percent of these administrative posts were held by
Tutsis and, in order to make everything even more complicated (something the king rather relished),
the same man could be "chief of men" and of grazing lands on a certain umusozi (hill) and have to
put up with a rival as the chief of pastures on "his" hill, while at the same time also being the military
chief for a couple of different hills where the rest of the power was held by third parfies.s These
chiefs, like all the administrators of all governments, were there basically to play two roles: controlling
90du Toit, State-building and democracy in Southern Africa, at 22-23.
91For a detailed study on the kingship, See Mbonimana, Critique Historique, p. 23.
92Nyrop, F.R., et ai, Area Handbook for Rwanda, Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1978, p. 8.
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and extracting. The controlling role varied: close to the central core of the kingdom it was very tight,
but it became ever looser as one approached the periphery. The role of extracting took several
forms. In addition to in kind taxes, peasants had three straightforward duties: maintaining the chiefs"
enclosures», working the land» and minding the cattle. 95
This development is central to an understanding of social stratification favouring a minority rule. It
would be fair to conclude that the very fact that a lucky Hutu who successfully made his way up the
social ladder should ipso facto be considered socially to be on the same level as the ordinary Tutsi
who had no property (he could, for example, marry a Tutsi woman from an ordinary family) shows
that as a group, the Hutus were inevitably destined to remain in an inferior position.
Polarisation of groups within a society implies the presence of both bonds and cleavages. Even in
plural societies dominated by minorities and characterised by extreme discontinuity between social,
ethnic or religious groups, there are nevertheless many harmonious relationships which transcend
the sectional divisions.e Kuper has defined the process of polarisation as "a process of the
attenuation of the bonds linking together members of different groups, and the accentuation of the
divisions between them" .97 In structural terms, polarisation can be defined as "the increasing
aggregation of members of the society into mutually exclusive and hostile groups. It is associated
with a simplification of the social structure and a corresponding simplification of issues into
ideologies, which portray the society as polarised into antagonistic groups with incompatible and
irreconcilable interests that render inevitable the resort to violence".»
93Called kwubaka inkike.
94Called gufata igihe.
95Called ubushumba bw'inka. In the late nineteenth century a new form of compulsory work not previously known to the
peasants, called uburetwa, was introduced. This is undoubtedly a late introduction since there is no "kuleta" verb in
Kinyarwanda (the Rwandan language) from which such a substantive could be derived (the wa suffix indicates a passive
form). But there is indeed such a verb in Kiswahili where kuleta means "to bring". So the abaletwa are "those who are
brought" and ubuletwa is the situation of being brought for the disposal of the master. And Kiswahili was the new grinding
language which began to reach Rwanda along with the advance of the coastal Swahili merchants from Zanzibar in the
nineteenth century. See Mworoha, E., Peuples et Rois de l'Afrique des lacs, Dakar: Les Nouvelles editions Africaines,
1977, p. 232-3; Newbury, C., "Uburetwa and Thangata" in Centre de Civilisation Burundaise (ed.), La civilisation
ancienne des peuples des Grands Lacs, Paris: Karthala, 1981, p. 138-47. Uburetwa was supposed to be for works of
"public interest". It was spread by King Rwabugiri, as he extended his dominions in the late nineteenth century, and was
seen everywhere it came as a hated symbol of centralist oppression. Later, the Belgian colonisers would greatly favour it
and abused it, thus, deepening the frustration of Hutus.
96Newbury, ld.
97Kuper, L., The pity of it all: Polarisation of Racial and Ethnic Relations, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1977, p. 247. It can be argued, as Hoglund supports it, that polarisation is a process which may be traced at the different
levels of organisation, of ideology and of interaction. Hoglund, B., Concept of conflict, Report NO.2, Department of peace
and conflict research, Uppsala University, 1970, Cho 2.
98Maquet, Le Systéme des relations sociales dans Ie Rwanda ancien, at 165.
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Many factors contributed to the polarisation of the Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda, but the catalyst was
the violence precipitated by the struggle for power in the movement for independence. The author's
concern here is the social basis of the polarisation that is to be found in the traditional structure of
the caste society. In this regard, Lemarchand emphasises the significance of common values in
maintaining this structure. He writes that "the caste structure of Rwanda was based on a shared and
"culturally elaborated" image of society, involving a combination of exclusiveness and reciprocity, of
inequality and solidarity'» For Maquet this premise of inequality was based on the concept that
"people born in different castes are unequal in inborn endowment, physical as well as psychological
and have consequently fundamentally different rights". He argues that the acceptance of inequality
was a basic principle influencing the whole structure of Rwandan life.1Oo
Other scholars have pointed out that it is difficult to estimate the significance of different elements in
the structure and culture of a society in the ordinary course of social life, and that it is moments of
crisis, of disjunction, which illuminate the normal, and make it more comprehensible.v Since the
picture presented by Maquet was of traditional Rwandan society, it is important to refer to the period
after independence, when crises occurred, to show how the famous premise of inequality was
undermined by the introduction of human rights and democratic principles in the Rwandan
philosophy, as it was in other developing societies.
The rapidity of the polarisation in Rwandan society may suggest that acceptance of the premise of
inequality was not so deeply rooted, or that it was coloured by much ambivalence. The premise of
inequality represents an underlying system of ideas which functioned as one of the elements
integrating Tutsi pastoralists and Hutu agriculturalists in the traditional society. There was, as already
seen, a variety of other structures also serving integrative functions: the carrying of similar clan
names by Tutsis and Hutus, suggesting some minimal solidarity; the participation of Hutus in the
army; membership in the same Ryangombe religious sect; a system of clientism linking individuals in
a unified economic system through which agricultural and pastoral products were distributed
throughout the society; a plurality of structures in which individuals were affiliated; and the role of the
ruler, the Mwami, as representative of the deity, and as king, father and protector of the country .102
99Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, at 34-35.
100Maquet, Le Systérne des relations sociales dans Ie Rwanda ancien, at 165.
101See the discussion of this point by Jan Mejer in his dissertation, The May Events: A Theory of Disruptive Crisis,
University of California, Los Angeles, 1976: Cho 1.
102Maquet, Le Systérne des relations sociales dans Ie Rwanda ancien, at 148.
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The fact remains, nonetheless, that Rwandan nation- and state-building was accomplished through
Tutsi minority domination over the remainder of the population and the philosophy of this domination
gave birth to the polarisation of ethnic relations.
1.2.4 Factors for the Hutu-Tutsi polarisation
Apart from the ultimate control of a most valuable resource, namely cattle, the difference between
the equipment of Tutsis and Hutus was not very considerable. As observed by Maquet, it is possible
that, when the Tutsis first came into the country, the difference was greater than during the period
that followed. It was not, however, to be compared, for instance, with the difference existing between
the material cultures in Central Africa of the Europeans and of the Africans during the nineteenth
century and at the present time. A large and complex material culture is one of the most important
factors, not only in conquest but also in the maintenance of a dominant group's superiority. Motor
vehicles, permanent dwellings, electric power are so fundamentally different from the traditional
Central African means of transportation and habitation that it is easy for those who have the almost
exclusive use of them to maintain high prestige and great power.w Except for cattle, Tutsi material
equipment did not allow them to impress the idea of their superiority on Hutu minds to a comparable
extent. Certainly they had more spacious compounds, they were better dressed than the Hutus, they
drank better beer and when travelling, instead of walking, their Hutu or Twa servants frequently
carried them on a litter. All these differences, important as they were, however, were only differences
of quantity and degree, characterising two strata with unequal access to the good things of life,
rather than essential differences. By "essential" here is meant that the Tutsi equipment did not
include elements such as steam machines, electricity or gun-power, which, when possessed
exclusively by one group, are sufficient to secure an easy physical domination and thus a related
cultural (mental) domination of such a nature that the dominated come to see that domination as
natural.
The second factor was demographic: the ratio of Tutsis to Hutus. As there was no census, it is not
possible to know that ratio very accurately. However, as affirmed by some observers, it most likely
was "never greater than ten or fifteen per cent. This fact was important, because an economic
exploitation of land tillers for the benefit of cattle raisers would have been impossible if the Tutsis had
numbered much more than this percentage of the total population". 104 If, for instance, the Tutsis had
1031bid.
104See Paternostre de la Mairieu, at 45; Delmas, Généalogie de la noblesse du Rwanda, at 110; Maquet, Le Systéme
des relations sociales dans Ie Rwanda ancien, 201 ..
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constituted fifty per cent of the population, the Hutus would not have been able to provide them with
the foodstuffs and labour necessary for comfortable subsisience.w
The third factor, which made the second so crucial, was the type of economy. Because of the
relatively poor soil, the irregularity of the rains in some regions, and the exploitation of land without
respite, there was little surplus. Having to subsist on a limited national income, the rulers had to
organise a way of life with insufficient means to meet needs. This emphasised the importance of
compulsory labour and tributes, of regular and efficient collection, and of an apportionment of levies
that did not let any prospective taxpayer escape. Although limited national resources may be
adverse to the centralisation efforts of a government that usually requires a complex machinery -
agencies, army, messengers, civil servants, local delegates, etc. - such an organisation was
nevertheless built up in Rwanda.
The fourth factor was biological - the difference in appearance between Tutsi and Hutu. Significant
characteristics were, for the Tutsi, to be slender, tall, and light-skinned; for the Hutu, to be short,
stout and dark with coarse features. However, to conform to one of these types was not sufficient to
make of a man a Tutsi or a Hutu, because there were Tutsis and Hutus who did not possess the
physical characteristics of their caste.w It is immaterial whether the stereotypes are verified in the
majority of cases, or only quite rarely. What is important is that
They provide a basis on which many moral, psychological and occupational characteristics are
crystallised and form a simple picture. This picture, haunting the imagination of those it is
supposed to represent as well as of the others, makes everyone extremely conscious of his group
participation and of the differences that separate his group from the oihers.v
The fact that a group is characterised by a physical type that differentiates it from the others is a
factor which may act both ways from the standpoint of social and political power: as Sadin and
Maquet observe, a minority endowed with a stereotyped physical appearance will have great social
1050ne wonders whether this demographic factor was a purely natural fact completely beyond Tutsi control or whether
they tried to maintain that fortunate proportion. According to Maquet, Tutsi made it difficult for a Hutu to enter their caste,
but this should not mean that they favoured a restriction in the number of their group and an increase in the Hutu group.
Maquet, Le Systéme des relations sociales dans Ie Rwanda ancien, at 145. The fact that they shared with the Hutu a
high valuation of fertility and appreciated families with numerous offspring is enough to support such a way of thinking.
Moreover, it should not be forgotten that, if a decrease in population would have contributed towards giving each
member of the Tutsi caste a greater share in the wealth of the group in an imperceptible degree, for the individual to
have many children was a way to obtain also a greater share of wealth in a very perceptible manner. It is to be suspected
that the latter consideration was much clearer than the former for any Tutsi. It is also questionable whether the bringing
about of the first situation would have been psychologically compatible with the attitude of self-assertion of a domineering
caste of warriors. At all events, up to now the demographic situation of Rwanda has been a factor favouring, even
making possible, economically unfair exploitation of a majority by a minority.
106Sadin, Folie de Grandeur, at 44.
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visibility. If that minority is at the bottom of the hierarchy, its members are constantly despised, and
develop attitudes characteristic of those who are looked down on by those with whom they have to
live. If, on the contrary, that physically stereotyped minority is at the top of the power structure, it
avails itself of its appearance, regarded as "beautiful", to support its claims to an innate superiority. lOB
Whereas, for the Twa, their physical stereotype stressed all the features which could be interpreted
as "ape-like", Tutsis have been able to use the three different stereotypes of the physical
characteristics of the Rwandan castes as a confirmation of their superiority: they have convinced all
Rwanda that to be slender, tall and light-skinned is much better than to be stout, short and dark.log
They used the stereotypes as a proof of their different nature and entitlement to rule and as a
guarantee against social mobility: because a Hutu was usually not endowed with the Tutsi physical
characteristics he could not "pass" as a Tutsi even if he managed to increase his economic power.iw
The fifth factor comprises the Rwandan extent and orographic configuration. The country is small,
about 250 kilometres from north to south and 324 kilometres from west to east. But its relief is "that
of a maze of hills, many of them very steep, separated by deep valleys". It is traversed, from north to
south, by a chain of mountains that separates the Congo and Nile basins and is covered with dense
forests. It is obvious that a centralised government needs good communications for the king to
remain, as much as possible, in constant contact with all the regions of his country, for tribute to
reach the capital regularly, for armies to arrive rapidly in any place threatened by an external enemy,
and for local authorities not to be left isolated lest they become too independent. The small extent of
Rwanda was indeed an asset from this point of view, but this was largely neutralised by the
geography, which made communications extremely difficult. Notwithstanding these unfavourable
physical factors, the king was able to establish and maintain his political network connecting all the
subordinate authorities of Rwanda to himself.
The aforementioned factors may be said to be the only ones that underlined the domination system
of the Tutsi. In section two, it will be seen that the Europeans, when they arrived in Rwanda,
favoured this domination instead of opening the minds of Rwandan people by educating them on the
impact this big difference was going to exercise on democratic rule and human rights in modern
Rwanda.
107Id.,at 51.
lOBIbid.;Maquet, Le Systéme des relations sociales dans le Rwanda ancien, at 146.
lo9This was even aesthetically translated in the patterns used in the ornamentation of baskets: they manifested a
preference for slim elongated forms.
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1.2.5 Polarisation and national unity
In order to retain the dominant position for their caste and its rulers, the Tutsi had to monopolise
social and political power without preventing Rwandan society from existing and functioning as a unit
and to realise an equilibrium between the necessities of social life and the necessities of the
permanent dominion of a group.
In their case, specifically, it was how to resolve antinomic issues: how to maintain a caste society
and promote the cohesion of the society as a whole? How to both exploit and protect the lower
stratum? How to manage a centralised and absolute government but delegate powers to subordinate
authorities?
1.2.5.1 Caste society and social cohesion
In order that the members of a dominant and hereditary group may keep their privileges, it is
necessary that what gives prestige remains exclusively under their control. As already indicated, in
Rwanda the basis of social power and prestige lay in the effective disposal of cattle: the feudal
system permitted the Tutsis to keep complete control of all Rwandan cattle, as the whole of a client's
cattle was always liable to be confiscated by the lord under any pretence. Moreover, outside the
ubuhake structure, the king had the pre-eminent right over all Rwandan cattle. Even if he did not
frequently use his rights against Hutus, they were not forgotten: the very cows which were not
received from a lord but acquired by one's own efforts and over which the possessor had usufruct
plus bare ownership, were called "inka z'umwami" (king's cows).
As Sadin has observed, an upper caste usually shows its superiority by, among other things, its
leisure and pleasant life. It has to enjoy a greater share of the good things of life than the
commoners do and it has to get this apparently without effort, rather as a right than as a reward for
specific tasks.in It would be fair to say, again, that the ubuhake made it possible for the Tutsi caste
to enjoy "gracious living" becoming to its high social status. The man in control of a herd of cattle
could, through the clientele institution, live without having to participate in the manual work of the
production processes. However, it was the lack of internal coherence ("all men are born equal"
versus "political and economic power is restricted to those who are descendants of the conquerors")
which rapidly resulted in a caste system. This caste system evolved into a class society. It is
110lbid. In a few cases, however, a Hutu who had a certain number of cattle could be allowed to marry a woman from a
pétit Tutsi family but could not accede to a political position. Rwandans call this type of Hutu "icyihuture".
111Sadin, Folie de Grandeur, at 61.
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probable that the Tutsi adopted it, not only for consistency's sake, but because it is more efficient,
more easily understood and accepted, particularly when different physical traits are characteristic of
each caste. This does not mean that Tutsis, one day, made a conscious choice among various
possible ideologies. But once a caste system operates, the patterns of political domination and of
economic exploitation require people to behave as if the upper caste members were by nature
different from that of the lower caste, and when the "idea behind" these behaviours is made more or
less explicit, as in tales and proverbs, it is rationalised in terms of inequality.w
A third requirement for the maintenance of caste identity is the preservation of the group's esprit de
corps and traditions and their transmission from one generation to the next.i» This was done in the
kinship groups, mainly by the grandparents, particularly paternal grandfathers. But a multiplicity of
kinship group agents cannot be entrusted with a function as important for the caste as the
socialisation of its young members and their training in the qualities and virtues that had permitted
their forbears to obtain power. Consequently, formal institutes of education and instruction were set
up in Rwanda by Tutsis. The intore companies in which every young man of the Tutsi caste spent
several years, fulfilled these functlons.o-
The tendency that leads a powerful group to constitute a closed caste, to maintain jealously its
advantages, and to try to increase them, cannot be left without something to counter-balance it.
Each caste, as Linton observes, is a society in itself. If the caste accentuates the characteristics
which make it a socially complete group, isolated in the society of which it is only one layer too much,
the cohesion of that society may be destroyed. Consequently, powerful factors of cohesion are
needed to check the tendency towards social disintegration that exists within any caste structure.ie
Solidarity factors have already been described. They may be summarised here .
... First, there are certain groupings in which Tutsis and Hutus were to be found together. Names of the
Tutsi and Hutu clans were similar. This suggested a certain solidarity among the bearers of the same
clan name, however minimal. A comparable kind of Hutu participation existed in the armies. It is
possible that the fact of having been commonly associated in dangerous circumstance gave a
deeper feeling of unity to Hutus and Tutsis. The Ryangombe religious sect was open to Hutus and
Twas, as well as to Tutsis. Rwandans still say that Ryangombe himself has addressed his invitation
1121d.,at 37.
1131bid.
114For details about this subject, see d'Hertefelt, Les clans du Rwanda ancien, 39.
115Linton, R., The Study of Man, New York, 1939, p. 130.
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to join to every Rwandan, explicitly calling the Tutsi, the Hutu, the Twa, the men and the women.w
As initiation rituals took place among kinsmen, however, there was no real inter-caste mingling in the
ceremonies. It may be said that clan, army, and sect were only nominally and superficially "national".
Notwithstanding, these associations between Hutus and Tutsis probably had some limited
significance from the standpoint of social cohesion.
In that connection, ubuhake is a much more important factor. Through the clientele institution,
Rwanda constituted a unified economic system that distributed agricultural and pastoral products
among the totality of the population. The personal bond with a privileged caste member and access
to possession, however precarious, of cattle, seem to have been essential from the point of view of
national solidarity.
A third integrative factor was the "accession to the nobility", even as limited as it was in Rwanda. It
has been noted that the number of Hutus assimilated with Tutsis because of their holding of political
offices or because of their wealth has always been very tiny. In this regard, Maquet observes that the
possibility of being accepted into the superior group, even if it is illusory for almost all the members of
the inferior group, has a very great integrative influence in many societies. He refers to the situation
in the United States of America where, during the first quarter of this century, the fact that a few men
among the wealthiest of the country had been born poor, greatly contributed to the psychological
solace of a considerable mass of men and women who personally had no opportunity to achieve
such brilliant successes. In addition to individual comfort, the belief that there was no intrinsically
insuperable obstacle (such as having been born outside a closed hereditary group) helped
Americans to feel that they were all members of the same nation regarded as not significantly
sfratfied.w This does not imply that the social ascent of a few Hutus has played a similar part in
Rwanda. Firstly, there was no egalitarian ideology, which makes the fact that one is obliged by birth
to live in an inferior social group almost unbearable; secondly, cases of inter-caste mobility were
116DeLacger, Le Rwanda ancien et Ie Rwanda moderne, at 257. The part played by religious sanctions - in particular by
the cult of Ryangombe and the Kubandwa sect, to which it gave rise in promoting inter-caste cohesion - was significant.
In his work on Rwanda, Luc de Heusch advances the hypothesis that the Kubandwa sect, by ritualistically reversing the
established hierarchy among castes, inaugurated at periodic intervals a kind of fictitious egalitarian order which, in turn,
served as a safety valve for accumulated tensions and antagonisms among castes. "The Kubandwa introduces a
democratic religion which negates the divisions of the real society founded on the ownership of cattle .... The author
does not accept the functional interpretation offered by Maquet, according to which the Ryangombe cult would only serve
as an additional factor of cohesion, uniting into a single belief system members of different castes .... The ritual of the
Ryangombe rested on a mystical and radical negation of the established order": Luc de Heuseh, Le Rwanda et la
Civilisation Interlacustre, Brussels: Institut de Sociologie, 1966, p. 172. This interpretation of the Kubandwa sect, as
providing its adherents with a rite d'inversion through which a temporary flight from reality could be achieved, is
challenged by Claudine Vidal in "Anthropologie et Histoire: le cas du Rwanda", Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie, Vol.
XLIII, 1967, p. 143-57.
117Maquet, Le Systéme des relations sociales dans Ie Rwanda ancien, at 171.
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extremely rare in Rwanda. Nevertheless, these cases were a proof for Hutus that, although not
belonging to the upper stratum, they were members of the Rwandan nation together with Tutsis.
"They did not feel that they were out-group people,":»
A fourth factor that counterbalanced the socially disintegrative influence of the caste system was the
plurality of the structures with which any Rwandan was affiliated. Through several structures,
subjects were much more efficiently bound among themselves and to their rulers than in a single
hierarchy. Almost any Rwandan was dependent on the king through two hierarchical channels: via
his hill chief (who himself was subordinated to the cattle chief and the land chien and via his army
chief. In addition, the feudal system integrated him into a set of personal loyalty relations such that
the person occupying the superior position in one of these relations is himself an inferior in another
relation. It should also be mentioned that any Rwandan was a member of three kin groups: primary
and secondary patrilineages and clan. Of course kinship affiliations as such did not cut across caste
lines, but as many of these kinship groups had been established for so long in Rwandan territory,
they were certainly a supplementary link between the individual and his country. The network of
relations woven by the political and client systems was particularly important in a country where
there were no clear-cut groupings based on co-residence. This has led some observers to believe
that "Rwandans were living in a kind of social vacuurrï'.w On the contrary, a Rwandan was never
isolated: his social links connected him with the authorities and were ramified, if not in the whole
territory, at least in a large area of it.
The last factor of social cohesion to be mentioned here was the ideology developed around the
monarchic institution. The Mwami was regarded by all as the king of all Rwanda and not only of the
Tutsi. His divine origin, which separated him from men, bestowed on him an authority that no
commoner thought to question. He was, as seen, closely connected with Imana, conceived as a
supreme god, rather remote, but benevolent. The Mwami, representative of Imana, was the father
and protector of all Rwandans.w Was it not enough to assume towards him a filial attitude and to
1181bid.
1191bid.See also Meisel, J.H., The myths of the ruling class, Michigan: Ann Arbor, 1958, p. 32.
120The nature of the Mwamt's power was sacred rather than profane and he physically embodied Rwanda. For example,
when Count von G6tzen shook hands with the King, all the courtiers were terrified: not only had the bizarre stranger
actually "touched" the Mwami without his authorization, but the shaking of his arm might cause an earthquake since he
was the personification of the hills of Rwanda. Even the vocabulary relating to his daily life was special, with special
words to mean "the King's speech", "the King's bed" and so on. He was "the father and the patriarch of his people, given
to them by Imana (God). He is the providence of Rwanda, the Messiah and the savior. When he exercises his authority,
he is impeccable, infallible. His decisions cannot be questioned. The parents of a victim he has unjustly struck bring him
presents so that he does not resent them for having been forced to cause them affliction. They still trust him, because his
judgements are always just. Whatever happens, he remains Nyagasani, the only Lord, superb and magnificent" De
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feel one's dependency upon him? As in many cultures in which a king is a paternal and divine
image, the Rwandan monarch certainly contributed towards creating, in Rwandan individuals, a
feeling of belonging to a unit which presented some similarities to a family.
This was, it seems, curiously, how the Rwandan political and feudal structures by their complexity
succeeded in maintaining an equilibrium between the tendencies towards social disintegration that a
caste system necessarily produces, on one hand, and on the other, the minimal cohesion necessary
for the maintenance of a social unit such as a nation.
1.2.5.2 Exploitation and protection of Hutus
According to Schutyser, the Tutsis were confronted with the dilemma that all conquerors must solve
when they settle a new territory with the intention of staying on permanently: are they going to draw
upon the natural resources of the country themselves, using their own labour and equipment, and
remove from the area the aboriginal inhabitants by pushing them further on and even exterminating
them as a people, or are they going to let them stay and use them as cheap labour? Europeans who
settled in North America adopted the first solution; they did not attempt to use Indian labour but
rather expelled the native population from their hunting areas and began to cultivate their country
using imported slaves from Africa. The second method was chosen in most parts of Africa south of
the Sahara where Europeans settled.v' Whether Tutsis explicitly considered this problem is
immaterial here. In fact, they adopted the solution which was most advantageous to them: being
pastoralists and not numerous (in comparison with the Hutu peasants), they had no interest in
expelling the Hutus. If this had been done, they either would have had to till the land themselves or
to dispense with beer, peas, sorghum, etc. It was preferable for Tutsis to adopt what Oppenheimer
calls the "bee-keeper's policy" (as opposed to the "bear's policy" who, for the purpose of robbing the
beehive, destroys it),122that is to say, to keep peasants in the country in order to permanently exploit
their productive work.w
Lacger, Le Rwanda ancien et Ie Rwanda moderne, at 119. For description of the nature of the Rwandan monarchy, see
Pages, A., Un royaume hamite au centre de /'Afrique, at 491; Maquet, Le Systême des relations sociales dans le
Rwanda ancien, at 146-7 and 178-80. For a view of the place of the Rwandan royal myths and rituals within the
interlaeustrine cultures, see Mworoha, E., Peuples et rois de /'Afrique des Lacs, 1977.
121Schutyser, L., People and social domination, Nairobi: Djima, 1975,p. 83; Maquet, Le Systême des relations sociales
dans Ie Rwanda ancien, 10.
1220ppenheimer, The State, New York, 1922,p. 65.
123This is also one of the reasons why the RPF will spare a number of Hutu during the massacres preceding,
accompanying and following the 1994genocide perpetrated by Hutu elements on Tutsis, when, as indicated in Chapter
two, everything will result in a take-over of the ruiership.
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As seen, the country's surplus resources were drained and concentrated in Tutsi hands through the
political and feudal structures. From that point of view, it is important to distinguish two categories. In
the first, there is the king, the court, the intermediary military and administrative chiefs, who can be
called the rulers; in the second, the ordinary Tutsi. The rulers received tributes and labour through
the military and administrative channels; the second received fewer consumption goods directly, but
mainly labour by the ubuhake. Thus, the satisfaction of the needs of the superior caste was not
obtained by economic means but by social pressure and political power.
But how heavy were these services in labour and in kind for the Hutu caste? Maquet remarks that it
was not too painful an obligation for nine-tenths of the population to support one-tenth. But one
should not forget that it was an economy based on rudimentary techniques and did not yield a large
surplus. Moreover, the standard of living of the dominant group was much higher than that of the
inferior castes; one may thus safely assume that Tutsis consumed much more than a tenth of the
total productlon.>
One can imagine that the social and political power enjoyed collectively by the Tutsi caste was so
great that it must have been a permanent temptation for them to increase their demands on the Hutu
group. Such a situation was indeed at the same time both advantageous and dangerous, as it
carried in itself the seeds of its own destruction. For if the Tutsis exceeded a certain limit of
measures of the impositions (and the technological and environmental circumstances made the
margin very narrow), the subordinate group would be weakened and its productivity would diminish.
Eventually, it might be made to leave the territory or to revolt. To prevent such detrimental events
was all the more difficult as each Tutsi was endowed with so much individual social power that he
might be inclined to misuse it.
This threat was dealt with, firstly, by a universal distribution of the levies obtained through the military
and administrative structures. Every familial unit of production was obliged to contribute - certainly
not equally -, but the mere fact of having universal impositions tended to prevent considerable
differences, because a sufficient return was secured and rules were established. These rules were
not as fixed and publicised as were the fiscal laws in Western society, yet the mere fact of their
existence ensured certain guarantees, like the lord's protection. For the client services, what each
client had to give or do was less clearly determined and depended more on the lord's wlshes.w
124Maquet, Le Systérne des relations sociales dans Ie Rwanda ancien, at 111.
125Fordetails, see Karemano, Rwanda Traditionnel, at 149-198.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
36
However, when one belongs to a single structure, there is only one immediate superior.
Consequently, everything has to be obtained from him and is owed to him. In a plural system, there
are several immediate superiors of approximately equal rank who are not necessarily interdependent
though belonging to the same group. Consequently, it is possible to have the support of one chief (or
his complicity even) when resisting another. This is what happened in Rwanda. Ruhashyankiko
explains:
Suppose a Hutu had inherited cattle granted by a lord to his grandfather who had also received
cows from his army chief, and who had acquired other cattle by exchange of goods (imbata), and
because his present lord was too exacting, our Hutu wanted to change and become the client of
another important man. He knew that his lord would try to seize all his imbata and choose the
best cows among his other cattle. By some gifts, he obtained the support of his army-chief.
Before entering into discussion with his lord, he and his army-chief had agreed that all the best
cows he had at his disposal and all his imbata would be said to have been received from the
military chief. They were removed and put on grazing grounds directly protected by the army-
chief. Then when the lord claimed more cows than his client wanted to return to him, he had to
settle the matter not with a man of very limited power but with the army-chlef.:»
Of course this required clever handling of the situation, but in cases where it succeeded, it secured
efficient protection against extortion.
It should be added that the recourse of a subject to a higher authority within the same hierarchy was
"approved and even encouraged" in Rwanda. This was another means of putting a check on the
exorbitant demands of immediate superiors. This, however, did not play an important part in the
feudal system because there were no socially recognised ties between a client and his lord's lord.
Feudality was not a ranking system in the same sense as was the political structure. "Each lord had
his personal following; he was not as such the representative of a higher authority. "m
Briefly, the political and client structures simultaneously secured the economic exploitation of the
Hutu and protected them against an exaggerated pressure which could have led to disaster for the
upper caste.
1.2.5.3 Delegation and centralization of political power
Before the European occupation, the kingdom's population was already numerous. It was estimated
at about 2,000,000 inhabtants.w The orographic configuration of the country made communication
126Ruhashyankiko, Le Droit Foncier Rwandais, at 151.
1271bid.
128Maquet, Le Systérne des relations sociales dans Ie Rwanda ancien, at 138.
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difficult. In that non-literate culture, an efficient collection of tributes required almost a face-to-face
acquaintance between the subject and his ruler. These circumstances necessitated a delegation of
authority to many intermediary chiefs who would be the local representatives of the rulers.w
But such an unavoidable system was dangerous for the central government. Its subordinated agents
frequently having authority over a rather numerous population which could provide them with
abundant supplies (if nothing was sent to the court) could be tempted to isolate themselves
completely from the capital and become independent. The military structure and the feudal system
would have facilitated such a course of action. Some important chiefs were, indeed, authorised to
raise an army. Moreover, any military chief whose army was encamped near the border, in a district
far from the capital, could gain such ascendancy over his warriors as to win over their allegiance to
himself.13o
The ubuhake was still more dangerous because, as in any feudal system, it created personal bonds
of allegiance between the client and his lord. As such, that bond of loyalty did not extend beyond the
lord. One had to obey one's lord because he was one's lord and not because he was a king's
representative. This is why "any feudal system has always been so dangerous for a central
government". Independence and revolt against the king have been recurring events in the areas
where a feudal system existed.»
Rwanda's rulers were able to check these tendencies towards political fragmentation, first, by the
ritual character of royal power. To revolt against the king, identified with Rwanda and supported by
God, was sacrilege. It is not claimed that such a theory was sufficient to secure the kings" effective
power indefinitely. Elsewhere similar ideologies of absolute and divine power of the monarchs did not
prevent some of them from being stripped of their real authority, whereas their divine prerogatives
were still respected.w Secondly, the king kept at his disposal the coercive force of the armies. Even
if the rebel had the support of one or two armies, the king had all the others. But the main factor that
1291bid.
130Fora detailed study on the Rwandan army, see Kagame, A., La poésie pastorale au Rwanda, Elisabethville, 1947, p.
791-800.
131Sadin, Folie de Grandeur, at 241.
132Schutyser, People and social domination, 105. The ritual sanction does not seem to have had a primary importance in
the maintenance of submission to the Rwandan kingship. In 1896 or 1897, a young king, Mibambwe IV Rufalindwa, was
assailed and eventually lost his life in a revolt instigated by the brother of the queen mother. That queen mother was not
the mother of the king but another wife of his father. Her clan, the Abega, wanted a son of hers as king. This shows that
when the king lost effective control of power, ritual sanctions were not an effective safeguard for his prerogatives, or even
for his life. This is why it has not been thought necessary to expand on the ritual aspect of Rwandan kingship. But it
certainly was a factor that contributed to the obedience of the Rwandan nobles.
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probably prevented local authorities from asserting their independence from the central government
was the plural character of the political and feudal organisation. In connection with the maintenance
of the effective power of the central government, this plurality of structure was a very effective means
of maintaining misunderstanding, hostility, and jealousy among the subordinate chiefs. It is certain
that the lord, in the example given by Ruhashyankiko in the preceding section, would have been only
too glad to denounce to the king the army-chief if the latter was indulging in suspicious manoeuvres.
The co-existence of chiefs of almost the same rank who were constantly induced by their subjects to
take sides in disputes was sufficient to create mistrust among them. Moreover, conflicts were
numerous, particularly when two chiefs had the same territorial power (as in the case of the cattle
and land chiefs). To settle conflicts, they had to resort to the superior authority's judgement and this
increased the ruler's power over his suborclnates.w
This applied not only to the political organisation but also to the feudal structure, which had
potentially the most disruptive action on a centralised government. Indeed, the subject-client often
had to ask for protection and support from his political chief against his lord and from his lord against
his political chief. Consequently, relations were often very tense between the important lords, even
those who were not themselves prominent in the political hierarchies, and the political chiefs.
Moreover, as the very important lords who could have attempted to resist the central government
-
held political offices at the same time, they were directly enmeshed in rivalries and jealousies.w
Engendered by the hierarchic plurality, the mistrust which prevented the subordinate chiefs from
uniting against the central government, which led them to spy on each other and to inform the king of
anything suspect, was the main check against tendencies towards local autonomy in Rwanda. Even
if the hostility between important Tutsis happened to express itself openly and violently, the central
government was always able to restore peace as long as troubles remained localised and did not
threaten the regular collection of taxes and the authority of the king.135
1.2.6 Polarisation and consolidation of the political organisation
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Rwandan political organisation was an instrument of
social immobility. It was not a force of expansion meant to increase the Tutsi dominion over the
country, but machinery that succeeded in maintaining a difficult equilibrium between the antinomie
133Ruhashyankiko, Le Droit Foncier Rwandais, at 86.
134lbid.; Mbonimana, Critique Historique, at 57.
1351bid.
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tendencies that have been reviewed. Despite Schutyser's observation that "any institution in which
divergent tendencies meet and are kept balanced bears in itself the principle of its own
disinteqration'w, the equilibrium problem in Rwanda had been so efficiently solved that it may seem
that an optimum point had been reached. What was "immobilised" by the political organisation was
the almost exclusive control of power of the Tutsi caste and rulers. They used it for exploitation, by
which is meant here the satisfaction of needs; not by economic production, but by expropriation of
results. The writer here closely follows Oppenheimer's distinction between economic and political
means. Both have the same end, he writes, the satisfaction of needs. But when this end is obtained
by one's labour and the equivalent exchange of one's own labour for the labour of others, one may
speak of economic means, while the unrequited appropriation of the labour of others, through
taxation, for example, is "political rneans".:»
It would, of course, be completely misleading to assume that Rwandan political organisation had as
its only function the preservation of Tutsi exploitation. The ipferior castes enjoyed security through
the political structure. Collectively, peasants were protected against raiding expeditions by
neighbours and against an unlimited and too arbitrary exploitation. Maquet found that, individually, in
the difficult or dangerous events of life, a Hutu could rely upon the protection of his lord, of his army
chief, and of his administrative chiefs, if he could not or did not wish to ask for the aid of his
lineage .138
In short, this political system opened grounds for injustice, for it was a means of maintaining a certain
social order in which the group of rulers and their caste appropriated for their consumption a
considerable part of the country's goods without having to use their labour in the production
processes. The success of this system was due to a number of stratagems that nibbled at the roots
of the Rwandan State. The most fundamental include the following:
1.2.6.1 Politics
Between the development of statehood, on one hand, and the pattern of nationhood, on the other,
136Schutyser, People and social domination, at 110.
1370ppenheimer, The State, at 25. This should, however, be qualified in the ubuhake where the client received the
usufruct of cattle.
138Maquet, Le Systérne des relations sociales dans Ie Rwanda ancien, at 137. In his analysis, Kayitare speaks of a
counterpart and interprets the Tutsi privileges as a retribution for the care of the commonwealth and public order. He
defends the thesis that the political organisation in Rwanda fulfilled different functions (Kayitare, L'Organisation politique
dans Ie Rwanda TraditionnelIe, at 12). However, the foregoing discussion has shown that one function is not the
counterpart of the other merely because it benefited different groups. It just so happened that two different functions were
fulfilled by the same set of institutions.
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comes the acquisition of political rights that are binding on agents of the government by the
members of the nation within the subject population. In this regard, the king - who also assumed the
functions of judge and supreme court - and all army chiefs were Tutsis, and so almost without
exception were the cattle chlefs.w As regards the army, although it had a multi-"ethnic" composition,
it was clearly stratified in that all higher military offices were held by Tutsis, followed by Hutus, and
finally, Twas in the lowest ranks. Moreover, by the end of the nineteenth century, many areas of the
Rwandan kingdom had developed a complex and highly-organized administrative structure
encompassing provinces, districts, hills and neighbourhoods. Tutsis administered all these entities
except in some cases where the "chief of land" was a Hutu.w There was no real power-sharing in
the State's activities, for these were the monopoly of "mono- or uni-'ethnic' Tutsi'v: and, indeed, as
Codere aptly puts it,
Based on the case of Ruanda the position arrived at ... is that power can be held and
exercised by a minority against the interests and without the consent of the governed; that this
state of affairs can last for long periods of time; that power is a factor ... capable of shaping a
kind of social order that becomes the only kind known to the people; and ... that revolution is a
possibility.w
From this observation and earlier developments, one can remark that the problems of traditional
Rwanda - general problems of livelihood, security of life, from want, disease, or the violence and
destructiveness of other men, for example - lay in an interrelated system of physical, social and
ideological problems which were set in their particular forms by the fact of political power in Tutsi
hands, which is to say that there was no political problem as such for Rwanda as a whole, but a
political condition that determined the contents, the form, the degree of severity or solubility of
problems, and their ordinal place in solution priorities. Tutsi political power, which was redundantly
organised and ruthlessly enforced, determined that the problems of living, for all Rwandans, be
considered first of all in Tutsi terms, and solved first of all for the Tutsi through their capacity to
command not only their own activities but also those of others and, most particularly, the Hutu
majority of the population. The enforced priority of Tutsi solutions to Tutsi problems gave positive
support in its turn to Tutsi political power by feeding its material, organisational and motivational
resources. To illustrate: Tutsi political power operated through multiple lines of command in which
139Vanhove, Essaie de droit coutumier du Rwanda, at 67.
140Vansina, L'Evolution du Royaume Rwanda, at 89; Pages, Un royaume hamite au centre de l'Afrique, at 140; de
Lacger, Le Rwanda ancien et le Rwanda moderne, at 73; Kagame, La poésle pastorale au Rwanda, at 400; and Maquet,
Le Systérne des relations sociales dans Ie Rwanda ancien, at 105,106.
141Lema,A., Africa divided - The creation of "ethnic groups", Lund: Lund University Press, 1993.
142Codere, H., Power in Ruanda, in: Anthropologica, 1962, p. 51-52.
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inferiors obeyed orders out of fear of punishment and hopes ranging from those of minimal to those
of great rewards; this required wealth far beyond Tutsi subsistence needs for redistribution to
obedient underlings; this wealth was gained primarily from the command of Hutu services and a
proportion of the goods produced by Hutus who thereby had less time for production on their own
behalf and less enjoyment of their own production; the problem of the Tutsi need for wealth being
solved, the wealth acquired maintained the power that came from the ability to command others to
punish the disloyal or disobedient, and to obey out of fear and out of hoped-for material rewards.
As far as Tutsi hegemony was concerned, the system of power was watertight, guaranteeing Tutsi
superiority and Hutu inferiority.
1.2.6.2 The concept of unlimited hierarchy in the society
Superiority and inferiority were foci of the Rwandan social structure to such an extent that, as soon
as they entered as a component in the content of social intercourse, other components were
regarded as less important and were coloured by the hierarchical situation of the two actors. "In
western culture, relationships of inferiority are defined not only as regards the people taking part in
them but also as regards the matters concerned."143A business executive may give orders to one of
his employees only within very well-defined limits of competence and time, but he cannot oblige him
to accept his views on, for instance, artistic or political questions. In Rwanda, on the contrary, when
one of the persons involved in a dyad was superior to the other from a certain point of view, the
superiority was diffused, as it were, through the whole relationship. For his subject, a chief was chief
in whatever matter. As a consequence, inequality was conceived as essential. When two persons
are considered unequal by nature, the superiority of one over the other cannot be limited to a certain
sphere. We see in this ideology the tendency of Tutsis to behave as superiors and masters and
Hutus to adopt an inferior position. Since conceptions about inequality seemed to be socially
accepted, those who occupied the superior positions in most of the social relations in which they
were involved tended to develop permanent authoritarian behaviour. This is characterised by what
Russell calls "a propensity to command, to be self-assertive, arrogant, protective, and
compassionate". Chiefs, rulers, and other superiors try to extend not only the size or range of their
power (the number of people controlled) but its density (the degree of control of the subordinates).w
Any independence manifested by the inferior will be resented as rebellious. The superior's opinions
should never be opposed by the inferior who is always and everywhere expected to manifest his
143Maquet, Le Systéme des relations sociales dans Ie Rwanda ancien, at 166.
144SeeRussell, B., Power, London, 1938, p.165.
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dependence by attitudes of compliance. Furthermore, there was no private sector in the life of the
inferior vis-a-vis his superior. The superior has the right to control the whole of his subordinate's
activities. This is not resented by the inferior as unbearable meddling. On the contrary, it is expected
by the inferior who feels that such interference is a proof of the interest his superior extends to him. If
a subordinate were to refuse his superior's interference on the grounds that he should not be
concerned with his private affairs, such a pretension would be regarded as, at least, a definite lack of
respect even in case the superior is mala fide.145 The author agrees with Maquet when he compares
this situation to that between a father and his little son where "there is no field in which a father could
be wrong and his son right".146Indeed, obedience in everything must be required but one has every
reason to assume that this could prevail as long as the little son remains little, that is, as long as
Rwanda remains completely traditional without any possible influence capable of opening the minds
of Rwandan people to other ways of socio-political life.
To sum up, Rwandan nation- and state-building started and developed through a caste system in
which the components of the Rwandan society were organised into an immutable hierarchy, each of
them being predominantly endogamous, having specific traditional occupations and being almost
exclusively composed of individuals born from parents belonging to the group themselves. Tutsi
pastoralists, although a minority, held all political power, controlled most sources of wealth, and
exploited their agriculturist Hutu and Twa subjects who were receivers of orders and norms, not
norm-makers. Despite the imbalance in numbers and the evident inequality in the society, social and
political cohesion was assured through value consensus cattle clientship and a complex system of
administrative arrangements. The most striking of these mechanisms has been the consensus that
all Rwandans are not by birth fundamentally equal. Such value consensus implied an acceptance on
the part of the dominated that some (Tutsis) are born to rule and exploit, while others are born to
obey and serve. Projected to the epoch of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and
related instruments (1966), this situation suggests that the Rwandan society as it is organised in this
section is not in the least able to accommodate the principle of equality without discrimination.
Unless fundamental changes are made to the socio-political order, the reception of democratic
principles itself is not likely to succeed, mostly because of the rigidity of the system. In this regard, it
is important to analyse the colonial impact, since it is during colonial rule that important changes
occurred.
1451bid.
146Maquet, Le Systérne des relations sociales dans Ie Rwanda ancien, at 166.
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1.3 Human rights during colonial rule
In this section, the author analyses the continuation of nation- and state-building and the state of
human rights during the period of colonial rule in Rwanda. It is important to examine that period
because the colonial experience has had a profound impact on the failure of the State and the
manner in and extent to which human rights were respected in the post-independence period. The
author argues that part of the absolutism and abuse of basic human rights that have characterised
the post-independence era are legacies of colonial rule but it is also necessary to realise how the
colonialists built upon and extended the ethnically based system of domination that was in place
prior to their arrival.
A brief account follows of how the territory was colonised and administered by Belgium and the
influence of the Catholic Church, as well as the state of human rights during that period is examined
here in order to show how colonial rule was influenced by the preconception of inequalities between
Hutus and Tutsis and was not carried out in the interests of Rwandans. The author will also consider
the factors that led to the incorporation of a bill of rights in the self-government constitution of 1962,
in order to show the influence of colonial rule on the conception of post-colonial rule which, as
argued in Chapter two, failed to promote and protect human rights.
1.3.1 German occupation and rule
The first European to come into the territory was the German Count von GOtzen who traversed the
country in 1892.147 He was followed by a small contingent of German officers with African soldiers
who arrived in 1894, to set up a camp in Kinyaga, "the first region of Rwanda to experience
European occupation".« Initially, Rwandan authorities attempted to resist by force of arms. When
this failed, they later collaborated with the German authorities who established a military post in
Shangi and colonial rule in the country from 1898. The Residence of Rwanda in Kigali, of which Dr.
Richard Kandt had been the first incumbent, was created only in 1907. The military posts, which later
became the Regierungssitze, had been established in Kigali (centre), Cyangugu (west) and Gisenyi
(north-west). The colonial apparatus that emerged involved the interaction of two complementary
. systems of power. Through superior force, prestige, and wealth, the colonial authorities persuaded
and often coerced the Tutsi elite to serve as intermediaries for the colonial administration, thus
147Fordetails about the arrival of Europeans in Rwanda, see Kandt, R., Caput Nili, Berlin, 1921; Vansina, L'Evolution du
Royaume Rwanda, 7; Louis, R.w., Ruanda-Urundi 1884-1919, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963.
148Newbury, C., The cohesion of oppression, at 53.
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establishing a form of indirect rule. However, Germany applied a system of indirect administration of
its own creation and not copied from the systems applied by other colonial powersw, since the
central idea was not to intervene fundamentally in the organisation of the social and political
institutions of Rwanda. Besides, it would have been difficult to do much more than to protect the
Rwandan king Yuhi Musinga and his indigenous organisation, since Germany had only five civilian
authorities for the whole of Rwanda.w
Never, in reality, comprising more than a handful of soldiers and administrators, German rule did not
change the nature of the Rwandan State; it remained the coercive instrument of Tutsi rule as
described in the preceding section. In 1914, there were just six German civil servants in Burundi, and
five in Rwanda, making a total of eleven officials for a territory twice the size of Belgium. Having
discovered that the existing Mwami kingdoms already functioned as fully-fledged nations before the
arrival of the Europeans and also, undoubtedly, because of a shortage of colonial personnel, the
Germans decided from the very beginning to favour the policy of indirect rule. "This meant that full
use was to be made of the existing political systern".» The occupation came about through
protectorate "treaties" negotiated between the Germans and the king.152The 1898 occupation began
with the establishment of a military post at Shangi, and the Germans pursued an administrative
policy of indirect rule, not only because the centralised political system was admirably suited to it, but
because they realised that any attempt to displace king Musinga would probably have met with
considerable resistance from the local population. Moreover, a new government would have required
far greater numbers of European administrators than were available at the time, whereas studies
show that, of all colonial administrations, Germany's was among the most understaffed. "As late as
1913 the whole of German East-Africa was administered by only seventy European officials" .153 In
the process, the Tutsi aristocracy was viewed with considerable sympathy by the German officers on
the spot, many of whom, according to Linden, were Prussian noblernenw, thus favouring ethnic
discrimination in the management of public affairs.
Since the Germans had earned Musinga's trust and loyalty, they made every effort to strengthen and
consolidate the position of the crown. Musinga used German forces to extend Tutsi hegemony to the
149Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, at 200; Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 38.
150ld., at 204.
151Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, at 200.
152Reyntjens, L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en Crises, 1994.
153Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, at 201.
154Linden, I., Church and revolution in Rwanda, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977, p. 11.
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north. For example, Lieutenant Eberhard Godowins was enlisted to lead a punitive expedition
against northern opponents in 1912. The northerners were brought into the kingdom and Musinga
gave the Germans his loyalty in return for their assistance and support. The punitive expeditions
served also to reinforce the absolutism of the monarchy, and consequently the hegemony of the
ruling caste. Little was accomplished, however, in the realm of civil administration, because the
entire period of German rule was largely devoted to those punitive expeditions. It has been reported
that the administrative machinery set up by the Germans did not amount to more than a few
strategically located police posts.»
However, Germans had pacified Rwanda, opened the country to trade, methodically explored the
region, favoured the establishment of religious missions as centres of sanitary, economic, social and
civilising development; they had effectively abolished slavery, put the rupee into circulation and
introduced a poll tax. Particularly, they introduced coffee, tobacco, and rice cultivation as commercial
crops, which they believed would provide revenues that would enable Africans to pay taxes. Central
to the German economic development programme was colonisation and modern transportation,
especially the railway. "The Germans believed that the railway would bring trade, trade would
produce money, and money would enable Rwandans to pay taxes".156Rail transportation would also
reduce costs of exports from Rwanda. While the Germans planned for the economic future of the
country, they failed entirely in economic development, primarily because the war intervened before
development plans could be fully implemented. Finally there were too few competent people to
initiate development plans, and the Administration could not depend upon Musinga to control his
subjects, since "his power declined in direct proportion to the distance away from his capital at
Nyanza. Rebel chiefs could easily incite the latent hostility of the Hutu against the Tutsi". But these
were moot concerns because Rwanda fell during April and May 1916, as the German forces
withdrew before the concerted attack of superior Belgian and British forces. With the German defeat
went the imperial vision and hope for a railway.157
1.3.2 Belgian occupation
In accordance with the Berlin Agreement of 1885 proclaiming the neutrality of the independent State
of Congo, which had, since then, become Congo BeIge, and German colonies, the Belgian
government had, after the invasion of metropolitan Belgium by Germany, instructed the governor
155Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, 131.
156Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 133.
1571bid.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
46
general to adopt a defensive attitude.158Hostilities in Europe, however, had aroused new colonial
ambitions in Germany, where the possibility was seen of realising the dream of a big empire in
Central Africa.159However, these ambitions were disproportionate to the military possibilities of
Germany who, especially in East Africa, could, at most, lead a campaign, since its troops comprised
only 24 officers and non-commissioned officers and 152 askaris (indigenous soldiers under colonial
troops).» In the process, Belgian troops, backed by British logistics, progressed rapidly and
captured Kigali on May 11, Nyanza on May 23, Bujumbura on June 6, and Tabora on September 19,
1916. In this regard, Belgian troops occupied a vast territory of about 200,000 square kilometres
from Lakes Kivu and Tanganyika to Lake Victoria and from northern volcanoes in Rwanda to Tabora
along the Dar-Es-Salaam - Kigoma railway.
One problem to be solved apparently was how to manage the administration of these territories. But
it should be noted that Belgium had clearly indicated their intentions since before the offensive: they
were not interested in an occupation of German East Africa as such, but wanted to use it as a
guarantee for a share they wanted to negotiate during the peace talks that were going to start after
the victory of the allied forces.v In fact, the establishment of military rule through Ruanda-Urundi in
1916 was not only a normal epilogue to Belgium's victories in East Africa, but a necessary condition
for the realisation of its ultimate political objectives. "One of the of our military effort in Africa", said
the Belgian Minister of Colonies, Jules Renkin, in 1916, "is to assure possession of German territory
for use as a pawn in negotiations. If, when the peace negotiations open, changes in possession of
African territories are envisaged, the retention of this pawn would be favourable to Belgian interests
from every point of view".162Thus, Belgium agreed with the British government, their territorial
competitor, to consider this occupation as provisional and temporary and to wait until the end of
hostilities for a final settlement, whence occupation and administration of German East African
158De Lacger, L., Ruanda, Gitarama: Kabgayi, 1961, p. 447.
159See Louwers, 0., Le Congo Belge et le pangermanisme colonial, Paris: Emile Larose, 1918.
160Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, at 210-211.
161This policy was clearly expressed in a long letter dated March 27, 1916 addressed by the Minister of Colonies, J.
Renkin to the superior commandant of Belgian troops in the east, General Tombeur. Renkin wanted the retention of that
guarantee to be to the advantage of Belgian interests, if, at the moment when peace talks opened, modifications to the
then territorial status were envisaged. He stressed the necessity of occupation of conquered territories by Belgium to the
exclusion of any foreign authority and wanted these territories to be as extensive as possible. He contended that it would
be of the highest interest that their occupation attain, at least in one point, the western shore of Lake Victoria, which
would, thus, present a very particular value in terms of size. He underlined the evidence that it would not be necessary to
increase the occupation centres to justify their claim, but that they just had to retain, in each region, either the
administrative centre that the enemy possessed there, or the most important strategic point. Archives Africaines, AE/II
No 1844 (3287).
162Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, at 216.
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territories were precartous.:» It should also be noted that prior to the Peace Conference, the
Belgians had cast aside four territorial concessions from Portugal, on the southern bank of the
Congo River, in exchange for the territory they had conquered during the East African campaign.
Besides, the margin of initiative left to the occupant by international law, particularly The Hague
conventions, was not large. The provisions of section III of the annex to the 4th Hague Convention,«
ratified by Belgium, were dominated by the principle that, if the occupant could assure their own
security, they had also to attend to the interests of subjugated populations. Article 43 of that
convention provided that the occupant "will take all requisite measures depending on him to restore
and assure, as much as possible, order and public life, respecting the laws in force in the country,
except where it was absolutely impossible". Some other limits were added to those of international
law, particularly "those of discretion and moderation". Minister Renkin explained that, since their
occupation was not definitive, they did not have to stop hic et nunc the regime that would most
assure the the progress of those regions. He explained that they had to confine themselves to
providing for momentary interests and to dealing with urgent situations, and that their activities in
their new colony should not be intense. He stressed that, until a decision on its fate was made, they
could let the colony lie dormant= The same principles required that the colonial administration and
the administration of the occupied territories be distinct and separated. The administration was thus
assumed by the metropolitan power directly through the Governor General of Congo Beige. Minister
Renkin specified that the Governor General acted ... as royal delegate, as the king was the chief of
the Belgian Government and that the conquest was accomplished in his name. The Governor
General was therefore subjected to the orders and authority of the Governrnent.w
Administrative measures taken at the beginning of the occupation conform to the precarious status
of occupied territories. This is illustrated by Article 9 of the ordonnance-Ioi No 2/5 of April 6, 1917
which provided that in matters where the decrees of the royal commissioner did not provide for the
powers and attributions of the employees and junior officers in the administration of occupied
territories, the latter would conform to the rules and traditions established by the German
163 Murego, La Révolution Rwandaise, at 350; Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, 36.
164 Act of the 2nd Hague Conference of October 18, 1907, 4th Convention on Laws and Customs of War, in K. Strupp,
Documents pour servir a I'histoire du droit des gens, Berlin: Hermann Sack, 1923, t11, p.687.
165 tetter dated October 1916 from Minister Renkin to General Tornbeur. quoted in Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au
Rwanda, at 64.
166 Undated note (to be sent towards the end of 1916) from Minister Renkin to the governor general of Congo Beige and
the royal commissioner of occupied territories, Archives Africaines, AE/II No 1844 (287), reproduced in Reyntjens,
Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 36-38.
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adrnlolstranon.w The first years of the occupation were marked by the influence of the Germans - for
example the reliance on Tutsi traditional rulers to establish control under difficult conditions with a
minimum of administrative personnei.w The preamble of statutory order no. 2/5 of 1917 stated that
"for the interest of a good administration, it is advisable to respect, within the realms of possibility,
the state of affairs existing before the Belgian occupatlon'.w Belgian representatives were inspired,
"in conformity with international law and depending on circumstances, by the line of conduct followed
earlier by the German authorlty'.w Besides, the German substantive law remained widely
applicable. When it was a matter of infractions of common law, the court-martial applied the penal
law of the colony to the employees of the occupation corps, and the provisions of German law to
European nationals of occupied territories. The courts, magistrates' courts and "police" courts
applied the provisions of German legislation in force in East Africa to the offenders, but they were
also allowed to consider the Congo BeIge penal law as a guide in accordance with the latitude left by
the German colonial law for courts to depart from the provisions of law, or to extend them to cases
not provided for, in order to adapt criminal justice to local necessities, when it was a matter of
infractions perpetrated by indigenous people.vi Similarly, in civil matters, the German law most often
remained in use. Thus, as an example, the ordonnance-loi No. 13/59 of March 11, 1919 for unifying
the provisions relative to succession rights and to the settlement of successions'», provided in Article
1 that the provisions of the decree of the Imperial Governor on November 4, 1893 would be applied,
either to the successions of European nationals of occupied territories, or to those of the indigenous
people.v- One has every right to wonder how competent Belgian officers and employees were in
Congolese or Belgian legal matters, since they were not jurists and their knowledge of the German
167 Article 9 reads: "Dans les matieres ou les Ordonnances du commissaire royal ne déterminent pas leurs pouvoirs et
attributions, les fonctionnaires et officiers préposés il /'administration des territoires occupés se conformeront aux regies
et aux traditions établies par /'administration allemande". a.O.R.u., 1924, NO.4, suppl., p. 4-5.
168 The German attitude is presented succinctly in this statement by the Duke of Mecklenburg: "The fundamental principle
is the same with all Residents. It is designed to strengthen and enrich the sultan and persons in authority, and to
increase thereby their interest in the continuance of German rule, so that the desire for revolt shall die away, as the
consequences of a rebellion would be a dwindling of their revenues. At the same time, by steadily controlling and
directing the sultan and using his powers, civilising influences would be introduced. Thus, by degrees, and almost
imperceptibly to the people and to the sultan himself, he eventually would be nothing less than the executive instrument
of the Resident". Duke of Mecklenburg, In the Heart of Africa, 1910, cited in Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, at 145.
169 Reproduced in Reyntjens, Pouvair et droit au Rwanda, at 37.
170 Report on the Belgian administration of occupied territories of German East-Africa, especially Ruanda-Urundi in 1920
and 1921, presented to the Chambers by the Honourable Minister of Colonies, Brussels, 1921, p. 7.
171 Id., at 14.
172 B.O.R.U., 1924, No.4, suppl., p. 13.
173 Reyntjens, Pouvair et droit au Rwanda, at 38.
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legal system was not so great.174 Although the case law is silent in this regard, one can conclude that
Belgium started the organisation of Rwanda with a precarious position.
The political and administrative organisation that Belgian occupants found in Rwanda was
rudimentary and everything was to be done since Ruanda-Urundi had scarcely managed to be the
subject of a methodical administrative action, because of its eccentricity, and the Belgian
government therefore had to plough a virgin soil.175 The charge of occupied territories was entrusted
to a royal high commissioner appointed by the Belgian king, with residence first in Kigoma and then
in Bujumbura. He was directly linked to the Minister of Colonies in Brussels and was not answerable
to the Governor General of Congo-BeIge in Boma. The first commissaire royal was General J.P.
Malfeyt, while the residence of Ruanda, with headquarters in Kigali, was entrusted to Major J.F. De
Clerck.176 For the purpose of resupplying the troops, Rwanda had been subdivided into two zones
during the military campaign: the western zone with Gisenyi as headquarters, and eastern zone with
Kigali as headquarters. Even after the troops had progressed over Tabora the Kingdom maintained
that division into two zones, each subjected to the political direction of a chief of zone. The lack of
co-ordination of the action of the chiefs of zone with that of King Musinga implied a long-term risk of
political division in the kinqdorn.v' In fact, the king's authority showed the effects of that measure
aggravated again by military requisitions and at the beginning of 1917 most of Tutsi chiefs
demonstrated the vague desire for independence, which menaced Ruanda into total anarchy.:» As a
consequence, by his ordonnance No 2/5 of April 6, 1917 the commissaire royal re-established the
former German territorial organisation and restored the unity of direction of Musinga kingdom.
The residence of Ruanda, created in May 1917 was divided into three areas during the same year,179
and from 1921 in four territories: the west territory with headquarters in Rubengera; the north territory
with headquarters in Ruhengeri; the Nyanza territory with headquarters in Nyanza; and the east
territory with headquarters in Kigali.180 Initially, the adminisfrative responsibility was entrusted to
174 Ibid.
175Marzorati, A. S., Governor of Ruanda-Urundi, before the permanent commission of mandates: report of the sixteenth
session, November 6-26, 1929, p. 56; Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 38; Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, at 200.
176 Major De Clerck arrived in Kigali on April 30, 1917. Since May 17, 1916, Captain Scharfes had acted as resident, but
his duties had been mainly military. Archives des Peres Blancs, Rome.
177 Malfeyt, J.P (commissaire roya~, Note on the political report of Ruanda, Kigoma, January 3, 1919, in Archives
Africaines AEIII No 1847(3288).
178 Rapport 1921, p. 11.
179 Summary of the situation in East Africa, p. 9 in Archives Africaines, AE/II No. 1847 (3288); Report 1920-21).
180 Eede, V.D., Note on the current political situation in Rwanda, Brussels, July 26, 1621 in Archives Africaines, AE/II No.
1847 (3288).
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servicemen and it took some years for Rwanda to have full administration. The initial concern was to
provide for peace and public order and this was done by maintaining the existing balance among
indigenous qroupinqs.w The return to civil administration was delayed until the beginning of 1919,
mostly because the state of war persisting in German East Africa had obliged the Belgian high
command to take military measures, such as requisition of food and levy of porters. Moreover, the
occupying government had to assure the transport of troops and ammunitions through conquered
territories and to provide for their re-supplying. It is in May 1919 that Major De Clerk handed over
power to the first civil resident, E. Van Den Eede.182
By Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles signed on June 28, 1919, Germany renounced all rights
over its overseas possessions, including German East Africa, in favour of the "principal Allied and
Associated Powers" (United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan), the contracting parties to the Treaty.
The United States had not ratified the Treaty and was not in that group. As Belgium was not a
principal power, it was excluded from the first sharing out of German colonies decided on May 6,
1919 by the supreme council of Allied and Associated Powers.:» It was decided that Great Britain
would receive the mandate over the whole of German East Africa. Belgium protested vigorously to
the Council of the four powers and started negotiations with the British government, which resulted in
the Orts-Milner Agreement signed on May 30, 1919, before the Treaty of Versailles.184 According to
this agreement, Belgium and Great Britain committed themselves to request the supreme council to
grant Belgium the right to administer Rwanda and Burundi, and Great Britain to administer its lion's
share, the rest of the former German territory. The supreme council accepted this proposal on
August 21, 1919.185 Although Belgium had to give up three-quarters of the territories it occupied, it
pulled through honourably, since, at the beginning, it was to be excluded from the partition. On the
other hand, however, the acquisition of Ruanda-Urundi was, to use Louis' words, "one of the biggest
ironies of African colonial history".186The Belgian hope to acquire the southern bank of the Congo
River failed and Belgium kept Ruanda-Urundi, a territory which apparently did not interest it.187
"Belgian statesmen thought it rather meagre compensation for their contribution to the war effort".188
181Rapport1920-1921, p. 7.
182ld., at 8.
183Heyse,T., LemandatBelgesur le Ruanda-Urundi,Brussels:LaRenaissancede l'Occident,1930, p. 5.
184Fordetailsaboutthose negotiations,see Louis,Ruanda-Urundi,at 238-51.
1851bid.
186Louis,Ruanda-Urundi,at 255.
187Reyntjens,Pouvoiret droit au Rwanda,at 42.
188Lemarchand,Rwandaand Burundi,at 63.
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Whether they would be committed to the establishment of democratic values for a post-colonial
Rwanda is a matter to be considered in the next subsection.
1.3.3 Belgian administration
Rwanda's colonial period encompassed the reigns of three African rulers - Yuhi Musinga (1896-
1931), Mutara Rudahigwa (1931-1959) and Kigeri Ndahindurwa (1959-1962) - and the colonial rule
of Germany (1898-1916) and Belgium (1916-1962).189 The main characteristic of this administration
was the reliance on Tutsi superiority over Hutus by both the Catholic Church and the administration
and failure by the colonists to prepare Rwandans for their self-administration and the observance of
their rights.
1.3.3.1 The colonial mandates
The colonial mandates system was established in Versailles by the members of the League of
Nations. The covenant of the League of Nations (Treaty of Versailles), which in 1920 established the
League and served as its Constitution, provided that the tutelage of the peoples inhabiting these
colonies - "peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the
modern world" - should be entrusted to advanced nations who were willing and able to undertake this
responsibility, to be exercised by them as mandatory on behalf of the League of Nations. The
covenant contained no general provisions dealing with human rights. The notion that human rights
should be internationally protected had not yet gained acceptance from the community of nations,
nor was it seriously contemplated by those who drafted that treaty. The covenant did, however,
contain two provisions (Articles 22 and 23) that bear on the development of international human
rights law. The League also played an important role in helping with the implementation of post-
World War I treaties for the protection of minorities. The system was based on three principles stated
in the preamble and in Article 22 of the Treaty: that the system applies to countries inhabited by
peoples who are considered still incapable to govern themselves and enforce the observance of their
rights; that the tutelage of those peoples is entrusted to advanced nations that, by reason of their
resources, their position, can best undertake this responsibility as mandatory on behalf of the
League of Nations; and that the well-being and the development of those peoples form "a sacred
trust of civilisation" of which it is important to assure some guarantees.190
189Linden, Church and revolution in Rwanda, at 1-5.
1900rts, P., Le Systerne des mandats de la Société des Nations, in: Revue de I' Université de Bruxelles, 1926-27, p. 506-
507.
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The Covenant made provision for three types of mandate according to the stage of development, the
geographical location of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances.
Those three types, according to Article 22 of the Covenant, are defined as follows:191
Mandate A: Applied to communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire (Mesopotamia, Syria,
Palestine). These communities "have reached a stage of development where their existence as
independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative
advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone".
Mandate B: Especially for African communities (Cameroon, Togo, German East Africa), the
Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will
guarantee freedom of conscience or religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and
morals, the prohibition of abuses, such as the slave trade, the arms traffic, and the liquor traffic, and
the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training
of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal
opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.
Mandate C: For territories such as South West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands which,
owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres
of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other
circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its
territory, subject to the above-mentioned safeguards in the interests of the indigenous population.
The mandate on Rwanda-Urundi, as Rwanda and Burundi formed one territory, was a mandate of
type B and was entrusted to Belgium by the "Principal Powers". This decision was confirmed on July
22, 1922 by the Council of the League of Nations that had to define it on August 31, 1923. By the Act
of October 20, 1924192, Belgium agreed with the League to administer these territories pursuant to
"the principle that the well-being and development of peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation ...". It
also undertook to provide the League with annual reports bearing on the discharge of its
responsibilities. These reports were to be reviewed by the Mandates Commission of the League.
The Mandates Commission gradually acquired more power in supervising the administration of the
Mandates and the manner in which the native populations were treated.193 The dissolution of the
1915ecretariat of the League of Nations, The League of Nations and the Mandates, Geneva, 1924.
192B.O. R. U., 1925, NO.1, p. 1.
1935ohn, L. & Buergenthal, T., International Protection of Human Rights, 1973, p. 337-373.
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League ended this development. In its stead, the United Nations established the UN Trusteeship
System, which was entrusted with supervisory power over the remaining Mandates and other non-
self-governing territories. Ruanda-Urundi was put under that system in 1946.
Article 23 of the League of Nations Covenant concerned human rights in that it dealt, inter alia, with
questions relating to the "fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women, and children." It also
envisaged the establishment of international organisations to promote this objective. That function
was assumed by the International Labour Organisation, which came into being at about the same
time as the League. The ILO survived the League and is now one of the Specialised Agencies of the
United Nations. The legislative activities and the supervisory machinery established by the ILO to
promote and monitor compliance with international labour standards have over the years made
important contributions to the improvement of the conditions of work and the development of
international human rights law.194
Although the author will not extend his comments to the European economic exploitation of Africa
through colonisation he supports Van Maanen-Hemer's observation that Africa and the Pacific
Islands have had no independent history, for their affairs have been so closely linked with European
developments as to be rather a manifestation of the latter than imbued with an integral character of
their own. Indeed, "their territory has been transferred as the result of wars and transactions in
Europe; the slave trade and slavery have been checked as the result of anti-slavery agitation in
Europe; their commercial development was started to supply raw materials and markets to Europe;
protecting and civilising of their native inhabitants have been undertaken as the result of enlightened
sentiment in Europe".195The author says this to prove that it is to Europe rather than to Africa that
one must look for the causes which led to the establishment of the mandate system. Perhaps the
main factors in the history of the past hundred and fifty years, as observed by Van Maanen-Helmer,
have been the development of industrialism and the development of individualism.196 As a result of
the Industrial Revolution the individual has tended to become a unit merely in the great economic
machine of production, distribution and consumption; as a result of the French Revolution, he has
1945ee Jenks, C.w., Human rights and international labour standards, 1960; Landy, E.A., The effectiveness of
international supervision: Thirty Years of ILO experience, 1966.
195VanMaanen-Helmer, E., The Mandates system in relation to Africa and the Pacific Islands, London: P. S. King &
Sons, 1929, p. 1.
1961bid.
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tended to realise that he is more than a mere unit in anything, i.e. that he is an individual with at least
a right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.r"
These two factors have a direct effect on the relations between "advanced and backward peoples".
On one hand, in commercial exploitation, the "backward peoples" have been regarded simply as
agents in the production and consumption of articles of commerce. On the other hand, in the
movement for the protection of the natives, they have been regarded as entitled to the rights of
human beings.
In the realm of practical politics, the commercial point of view, being strongly backed, was too often
allowed to dominate. The power of commercial companies, and the fact that members of their boards
in many cases were officials in Colonial Offices, either simultaneously or subsequently, together with
the fact that the company often carried on the government in the early days of a colony198, led the
general way to the identification of their interests with colonial policy. In the background, however,
there always was a strong humanitarianism, so characteristic of the nineteenth century, working
vigorously for the welfare of weaker peoples and from time to time making itself felt in Government
policy. Adherents of both movements united in realising, nevertheless, that the commercial
exploitation of "backward" territories without the protection of their inhabitants would be unwise, while
the protection of the inhabitants without any parallel programme of commercial development would
be irnpossible.w The writer will focus later on the extent to which the colonisers fulfilled their
obligations with regard to promoting and protecting human rights and the rule of law in Rwanda.
1.3.3.2 The Tutsi superiority theory
The Mututsi of good race reveals nothing of the Negro, apart from his colour. He is usually very
tall, 1.80m at least, often 1.90m or more. He is very thin, a characteristic which tends to be even
more noticeable as he gets older. His features are very fine: a high brow, thin nose and fine lips
framing beautiful shining teeth. Batutsi women are usually lighter-skinned than their husbands,
very slender and pretty in their youth, although they tend to thicken with age .... Gifted with a
vivacious intelligence, the Tutsi displays a refinement of feelings which is rare among primitive
Hutu people. He is a natural-born leader, capable of extreme self-control and of calculated
goodwil1.20o
The Europeans were quite smitten with the Tutsis, whom they saw as definitely too fine to be
197Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 171.
1985eeThe British South Africa Company and the Royal Niger Company.
199VanMaanen, The Mandates system in relation to Africa and the Pacific Islands, 1929; Paternostre de la Mairieu, 21.
200 Ministeres des Colonies, Rapport sur l'Administration beige du Ruanda-Urundi (1925), p. 34. Quoted in Harroy, J.P.,
Le Rwanda, de la féodalité a la démocratie (1955-1962), Brussels: Hayex, 1984, p. 28.
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"negroes". Since they were not only physically different from the Hutu201, but also socially superior,
the racially-obsessed nineteenth-century Europeans started building a variety of hazardous
hypotheses on their "possible", "probable" or, as they soon became, "indubitable" origins. The man
who started it all was John Hanning Speke, the famous Nile explorer.w He presented what he called
his "theory of conquest of inferior by superior races". After observing the "foreign" origin of some
ruling groups in several of the inter-lake kingdoms, he deduced from this fact a theory linking the
monarchic institutions he had found in the area with the arrival of a "conquering superior race",
carrier of a "superior civilisation". He decided without a shred of evidence, that these "carriers of a
superior civilisation" who were the ancestors of the Tutsi were the Galla of southern Ethiopia,203 a
opinion later shared by other nineteenth-century explorers such as Sir Samuel Baker and Gaetano
Casati and by twentieth-century missionaries such as Father van den Burgt, Father Gorju and John
Roscoe> Father Pages, on the other hand, thought that they were descendants of the ancient
Egyptians, while De Lacger saw them as coming from either Melanesia or Asia Minor. Some of the
authors could become rhapsodic about their "superior race": "We can see Caucasian skulls and
beautiful Greek profiles side by side with Semitic and even Jewish features, elegant golden-red
beauties in the heart of Ruanda and Urundi".205
201The description of the Hutu was not muchmore prepossessing:"The Bahutu display very typical Bantu features (... )
They are generally short and thick-set with a big head, a jovial expression, a wide nose and enormous lips. They are
extroverts who like to laugh and lead a simple life." Ministere des Colonies, Rapport, quoted in Reynljens, Pouvair et
droit au Rwanda.
202Speke,J.H., "Historyof the Wahima",Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile, London, 1863.
203They are called today by their real name, "Ororno". In Amharic "Galla" means "savages", hardly a term to call a
"superior civilization" coming from the Abyssinian group traditionally linked with the monarchic institution. The Oromo
were a nomadic Cushitic group which had persistently fought the Abyssinian kingdom(s) since the sixteenth century
before being finally partially culturally assimilated and partially subjugated in the nineteenth century. Prunier, The
Rwanda Crisis, at 7.
204Ibid.
205Father van den Burgt, DictionnaireFranqais-Kirundi,p. 1, xxxv. Quoted in Mworoha, Peupleset Rois de I'Afriquedes
lacs, at 25. Le Roi adds that "The Bahima (a Tutsi clan) differ absolutely by the beauty of their features and their light
color from the Bantu agriculturistsof an inferior type. Tall and well-proportioned,they have long thin noses, a wide brow
and fine lips. They say they came from the North. Their intelligent and delicate appearance, their love of money, their
capacity to adapt to any situation seem to indicatea semitic origin."Mgr Le Toy in Piollet, J.B., Les Missions catholiques
franqaises au XIXeme siecle, Paris: Les Missions d'Afrique, 1902, p. 376-7. Note "love of money" as proof of Semitic
origin! Jamoulle adds that "they resemblethe negro only in the colour of their skin" Jamoulle, M., "Notre mandat sur Ie
Ruanda-Urundi", in: Congo, 1927, p. 487; and according to de Lacger, ''Avant d'être négritisés, ces hommes étaient
bronzés"; .... "His stature resemblesmoreclosely that of a white person rather than that of a negro - in fact, it would not
be an exaggeration to state that he is a Europeanwho happens to have a black skin .... " De Lacger, Ruanda, at 56;
Gahama, J., Le Burundi sous administration Belge, Paris: CRA- Karthala- ACCT, 1983, p. 14; Adekanye, J.B.,
Rwanda/Burundi:"Uni-ethnic" dominanceand the cycle of armed ethnic formations, Oslo: InternationalPeaceResearch
Institute,1995, p. 11. Prunier finds that most respectedanthropologistsof the time such as Ratzei, Paulitschke, Meinhof,
Sergi and Seligman competed with each other to give those "scientific" theories not only credence but also wide
publicity."(Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, at 36).
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"Everything of value in Africa had been introduced by the Hamites".206The Tutsi and related groups
such as the Masai came from a "primordial red race". They had "an absolutely distinct origin from the
negroes" which they considered as "belonging to an absolutely inferior order". They came from India
- or even, as the Dominican Father Etienne Brosse suggested, from the Garden of Eden.207Some
years later, the Belgian administrator Count Renaud de Briey coolly speculated that the Tutsi could
very well be the last survivors of the lost continent of Atlantis.208
The importance of this type of consideration will be perceived in the following subsections where it
will be shown how it conditioned the views and attitudes of the Europeans regarding the Rwandan
social groups they were dealing with. It also became a kind of unquestioned scientific canon that
governed the decisions taken by the colonial authorities. Furthermore, it had a massive impact on
the natives themselves. Indeed, for Europeans, the attractiveness of this superiority hypothesis lay in
the fact that it allowed linking physical characteristics with mental capacity: "Hamites" were supposed
to be born leaders and, in principle, had the right to history and a future almost as noble as that of
their European "cousns".» The result of the attribution of highly value-laden stereotypes for some
sixty years would end by inflating the Tutsi cultural ego inordinately and crushing Hutu feelings until
they coalesced in an aggressively resentful inferiority complex. If these subjective feelings are
combined with the objective political and administrative decisions of the colonial authorities favouring
one group over the other, the reader can begin to see how a very dangerous social bomb was
almost absent-mindedly manufactured throughout the "peaceful" years of foreign domination.
1.3.3.3 The influence of the Catholic Church
The study of the role played by the Church as, in principle, a multi-class and multiracial institution
and as a source of ideology is essential to explain the way the human rights conscience was
acquired by Rwandan minds. The most important ingredient in this new philosophy was the White
Fathers in the sense that they not only outlived two colonial regimes, but their presence had a far
more immediate impact on the lives of individual Rwandans than the few colonial admlnlstrators.w
206Sanders, EP, "The Hamitic Hypothesis: its origin and functions in time respective", Journal of African History, Vol. X,
NO.4, p. 521.
207For a detailed study of the "scientific" literature of the Tutsi origin, see Chrétien, J.P., "Les deux visages de Cham" in:
Guiral P., and Témime, E., (eds), L'idée de race dans la pensée politique franqaise contemporaine, Paris: CNRS, 1977,
p. 171-99.
208Comte Renaud de Briey, Le Sphinx noir, Brussels: Albert De Witt, 1926, p. 62.
209Linden, Church and revolution in Rwanda, at 2.
210Codere, H., The biography of an African society: Rwanda, 1900-60, Annales series in 8, MRAC, Tervuren, No. 79,
1973.
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Furthermore, the Catholic Church in Rwanda grew into a type of "First Estate" which both nobles and
Belgians had to accornmodate.m This can be explained by the fact that a necessary prerequisite for
membership of the élite of the new Rwanda the Belgians were creating was to become a Christian.
Many priests were delighted to see the country's élite suddenly flock to them rather than the social
outcasts, their clientele. By 1930, Father SoubielIe was writing of what he termed "a massive
enrolment in the Catholic army": "Our Batutsi have finally made up their minds and, having done so,
they have immediately taken the lead in the movement'vv Some of the other Fathers were less
enthusiastic about the motivations of their new converts, such as the anonymous writer of the laza
Mission diary who wrote on 19 November 1931: "Their motives are perhaps not the most
disinterested, but with the help of God's Grace, they will be turned into good Chrisfians'v» From that
moment on, the Catholic Church became an important element in the Belgian reorganisation of
Rwanda.214
But the Church had been in Rwanda since the beginning of the German occupation, and when the
Belgians came they found the often francophone priests (mostly White Fathers) expert and highly
knowledgeable about the country and thus a godsend. While the administrators came and went, the
Fathers remained, staying on for their whole lives. They were almost the only whites to speak
Kinyarwanda well, and the only ones, too, who wrote about "native customs". Some of them, such as
Father Pages or Father Pauwels, were considered as almost absolute authorities on matters
Rwandan, and Mgr Classe, who had arrived in Rwanda as a simple priest in 1907 and became Vicar
Apostolic in 1922 (he survived till 1945), almost was a national monument. Before 1927 the Church
had lacked firm grounding in Rwandan social reality, but by 1932 it had become its main social
institution, presiding over hundreds of thousands of converts, including the king himself.215 The
Church had an impact on many aspects of Rwandan society. First of all, it imparted a strong
moralistic streak to the African way of life. Polygamy was evil and adultery was a sin, thrift and hard
work were encouraged, and social displays of conventional piety were required from all. Rwandan
society under the influence of the Church became, if not truly virtuous, then at least conventionally
hypocritical. It will later be seen that this social hypocrisy would be carried over from the Belgian
211 See Linden, Church and revolution in Rwanda, at 2.
212 Quoted in De Lacger, Ruanda, at 519-20.
213 Quoted in Linden, Church and revolution in Rwanda, at 189.
214 This is somewhat paradoxical since Belgian cabinets often contained strongly anti-clerical socialist ministers. See
Kalibwami, J., Le catholicisme et la société rwandaise, Paris: Présence africaine, 1991; Des Forges, A., "Kings without
crowns: The White Fathers in Ruanda" in MacCall, D.F., and Bennett, N. (eds), Eastern Africa History, New York:
Praeger, 1969, p. 176-207.
215 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, at 32.
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colonial microcosm into the new politically independent Rwandan Republic.
Meanwhile, an effect of the christianisation of Rwanda that is less often discussed was the quasi-
disappearance of the kubandwa216 possession cult and the changes it brought to the spiritual and
cultural life of the country. Kubandwa had been an element of social cohesion because it was home-
grown, trans-ethnic and highly personal. Christianity was also trans-ethnic, although definitely Tutsi-
dominated during the colonial years, but it was foreign and rather abstract. As the reasons for
converting to Christianity were fundamentally social and political, Christian values did not penetrate
deeply, even if Christian prejudices and social attitudes were adopted as protective covering.
Catholicism not only became linked with the highest echelons of the State but became completely
enmeshed in Rwandan society from top to bottom. "It was a legitimising factor, a banner, a source of
profit, a way of becoming educated, a club, a matrimonial agency and even at times a religion."217But
since it was all things to all men, it could not have any real healing power when faced with the
deepening ethnic gap which, as indicated in the next section, the Belgian authorities kept digging
absent-mindedly. Christianity did not transcend social fractures, it reproduced them in many different
dimensions and (albeit unwittingly) exaggerated their effects. According to 8erge(218,"in Rwanda, as
elsewhere, the themes of symbolic reversal and institutionalised disorder may serve to reinforce
rather than to challenge the classificatory categories of society".219On the contrary, however, the
moderate institutionalised Christian order, socially hegemonic but almost totally missing the
internalised moral underpinning of Christian values, proved to be an element in the violent challenge
of these same categories.
The Church also had a monopoly on education, which ensured fairly good quality teaching, but a
limited spread of school education, since attendance was paid for and not compulsory. And since the
Tutsis were the "natural-born chiefs" they had to be given priority in education, so that the Church
could enhance its control over the future élite of the country. The particular position taken on the
matter by Monsignor Leon-Paul Classe, the Vicar Apostolic to Rwanda was of considerable
influence. In a letter dated September 21, 1927, he wrote to Georges Mortehan, the Belgian
Commissaire Résident, explaining that, if Belgians wanted to be practical and look after the real
interest of the country, they should find a remarkable element of progress in the Tutsi youths. He
216Kubandwa cult is a personal cult, providing psychological safety valves for its adepts but with a limited or even non-
existent social and political content when compared with Catholicism. Ibid.
217ld.
218Berger, I., Religion and Resistance: East African kingdoms in the pre-colonial period, Butare: INRS, 1981, p. 82.
219In its fight against "paganism" the Catholic Church also destroyed another social practice of great importance, the
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said that, being eager to learn, desirous to know what came from Europe, as well as to imitate
Europeans, and enterprising, these youths were a force for the good and for the future of the
economy. He contended that Hutus preferred not to be given orders by their own tribesmen whom
they considered uncouth but rather by noble Tutsi because the latter were born chiefs and, thus, had
a knack for giving orders. According to him this quality was the secret of how Tutsis had managed to
settle in Rwanda and hold it in their grip.220Faced with what he saw as "hesitations and foot-dragging
of the colonial administration regarding the traditional hegemony of well-born Tutsi", Monsignor
Classe issued a stern warning in 1930, stating that the greatest mistake the government could make
would be to suppress the Tutsi caste. He stressed that such suppression would spark a revolution
and lead the country into anarchy and viciously anti-European communism, which was far from
achieving proqress.v
Effectively, the Vicar Apostolic's intervention put an end to the "hesitations and foot-dragging" of the
administration and, together with the Church, gave preferential treatment to Tutsis when recruiting
indigenous people for various jobs and places in education. Amongst other consequences, illiteracy
rates remained high, alongside the promotion of good quality higher education.w To obtain any kind
of post-secondary education, the Hutus had no choice but to become theology students at the
practice of kunywana, the blood-pact ritual which could-bind together people of different social origins.
220The letter reads: "Si nous voulons nous placer au point de vue pratique et chercher I'intérêt vrai du pays, nous avons
dans la jeunesse mututsi un élément incomparable de proqrés, que tous ceux qui connaissent le Rwanda ne peuvent
sous-estimer. Avides de savoir, désireux de connaitre ce qui vient d'Europe, ansi que d'imiter les Européens,
entreprenants, se rendant suffisamment compte que les coutumes ancestrales n'ont plus de raison d'être, eonservant
néanmoins le sens politique des anciens et le doigté de leur race pour la conduite des hommes, ces jeunes gens sont
une force pour le bien et I'avenir économique du pays. Ou'on demande aux bahutu s'ils préférent être commandés par
des roturiers ou par des nobles, la réponse n'est pas douteuse; leur préférence va aux batutsi, et pour cause. Chefs nés,
eeux-ei ont le sens du commandement .... C'est le secret de leur installation dans le pays et de leur mainmise sur lui."
De Lacger, Le Rwanda ancien et le Rwanda moderne, at 523.
221"... le plus grand tort que le gouvernement pourrait se faire a lui-même et au pays serait de supprimer la caste
mututsi. Une révolution de ce genre conduira le pays tout droit a I'anarchie et au communisme haineusement
antieuropéen. Loin de procurer le proqrés, elle annihilera I'action du gouvernement, le privant d'auxiliaires nés capables
de le comprendre et de le suivre .... En regie générale, nous n'aurons pas de chefs meilleurs, plus intelligents, plus
actifs, plus capables de comprendre le progres et même plus acceptés du peuple, que les batutsi". Classe, L., Pour
moderniser Ie Ruanda, in CEssar colonial et maritime, No. 489, December 4, 1930.
222The possibilities of most Hutu were further limited by the discrimination introduced in the Catholic schools, which
represented the dominant educational system throughout the colonial period. Tutsis who had resisted conversion
became increasingly enrolled in the Catholic mission schools. To accommodate and further encourage this process, the
Church adjusted its educational policies and openly favoured Tutsi and discriminated against Hutu. For example, in
Astrida College, in 1932, Tutsi pupils were 45 and Hutu 9; in 1945; Tutsis were 46, while Hutus dropped to 3; in 1954
Tutsis were 63, while Hutus were 19 including 13 from Burundi. Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, Chapter 4. In the
late 1950's less than 30 percent of the children in primary school in Rwanda were Hutus; in secondary schools, less than
10 percent were Hutus. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Report of the UN Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories in
East Africa, 21st Session, Supp. NO.3, T/1402 (September 18-0ctober 10, 1957), par. 268. Although the 10 percent
figure does not take into account Hutu seminarians (who received education comparable to that of the regular secondary
schools), still the proportion of educated Hutus did not approach the proportion of Hutus in the population. Atterbury,
Revolution in Rwanda, at 31.
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Kabgayi and Nyakibanda seminaries. After graduation they tended to experience difficulties in
finding employment corresponding to their level of eeueaten= Moreover, the few Hutu chiefs and
sub-chiefs in place were removed and replaced by Tutsis and a policy favouring protection and
strengthening of the Tutsi hegemony was thus vigorously pursued. Therefore, and given that Hutus,
and even Twas, had traditionally exercised some political power, albeit at lower levels, the
Tutsification of the 1930s resulted in a monopoly of political administrative power in the hands of the
Tutsis. It will be seen that, with the abolition of the threefold hierarchy of the chiefs (army chief, cattle
chief and land chief) to be replaced by one single chief, this policy accentuated the ethnic divisions.
It was also reinforced by the introduction of identity cards in 1933 according to which every Rwandan
was thenceforth registered as Tutsi, Hutu or Twa.224This discriminatory treatment often embittered
and frustrated Hutus, something that was to play an important role in the 1959 social upheaval.
Alongside this discrimination, the fact that the Church was teaching that all men were equal before
God was a revolutionary concept in a society with such a rigid class structure and this was going to
be one of the most catalytic factors for the demands for "equality".
1.3.3.4 Belgian politics
When, in 1916, Belgium occupied Rwanda-Urundi, the two kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi had
only been marginally administered from Berlin (via Dar-es-Salaam) since 1899. Belgium adopted the
policy of indirect rule that had existed elsewhere prior to colonisation in Africa. The Romans had
applied it in their conquests and recently the British had utilised it in India, Egypt and Malaysia.
Imposed, first, by colonisation constraints, particularly limited means of personnel and money for
administration, the method of indirect rule became a theoretical concept of indigenous policy.225As
defined by Sir D. Cameron, indirect rule is
the principle ... of adapting for the purposes of local government the institutions which the native
peoples have evolved for themselves, so that they may develop in a constitutional manner from
their own past, guided and restrained by the traditions and sanctions which they have inherited
(moulded or modified as they may be on the advice of British officers) and by the general advice
and control of those officers.w
In practice, the representative power recognises indigenous political institutions that it assists in their
223 A number of them worked in the mines and industry. Newbury, C., The cohesion of oppression, at 181.
224Reyntjens, Pouvair et droit au Rwanda, at 106.
225Lord, L., The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, London: Frank Cass, 1965.
226 Cameron, D., Principle of Native Administration and their application, Dar-es-Salaam: Government printer, 2nd ed.,
1930, p. 6.
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adaptation to the functions of local governmenP27 The Ordonnance of April 6, 1917 on the territorial
and administrative organisation of the occupied territories stated that, under the authority of the
Resident Commissioner, the sultans (kings) exercised their political and judicial powers to the extent
that these were in accord with indigenous customs and the instructions of the Royal Commissioner.
The Loi of 21 August 1925 for regulating the government of Ruanda-Urundi entered into force on
March 1, 1926 when Belgium legally put to end the occupational regime.228
The legal existence of indigenous areas and authorities was recognised by the Ordonnance-Loi No.
347/A./.M.O of October 4, 1943. Articles 1 to 4 provided that the country was headed by a supreme
chief appointed according to the custom under the name of Mwami (king), the chefferie headed by a
chief and the sous-chefferie headed by a sub-chief. Article 5 granted juristic personality to the State
and the chefferie. As for administration, Article 30 provided for these three organs to be administered
according to custom, but subject to the provisions of the Ordonnance-Loi and to the fact that the
customs could not be contrary to the rules of public law, the legislative provisions and the
regulations.
It is noteworthy that customary authorities were those determined by custom, but here again, on
condition that the representative authority explicitly gave its agreement. Thus, according to Article 31
of the Ordonnance-Loi, the Mwami was the indigenous person determined by custom as the most
qualified to exercise this function after investiture by the governor. Likewise, Article 32 provided for
the chiefs and sub-chiefs to be appointed by the Mwami according to the custom, but that the chief
had to be appointed by the Governor and the sub-chief by the Resident. In case the chief or the sub-
chief were dismissed and the Mwami did not appoint the successor within two months, the Governor
appointed the chief and the Resident the sub-chief.
Some other provisions demonstrate the "quasi-intégration" of customary authorities into the
framework of the political and administrative organisation of the colonial power»; Article 33 provided
that the three authorities had to solemnly promise to conform to the instructions and legal orders of
the colonial authority: the promise was given to the Governor by the Mwami, while the chief made it
to the Governor or his representative, and the sub-chief to the Resident or his representative. In
case of vacancy, Article 33 provided that the Mwamts attributions were exercised ad interim by the
Resident. According to Article 35, which provided for customary taxes due to the Mwami, chiefs and
227 Perham, M., Some Problems of Indirect Rule in Africa, Journal of the African Society, 1936, p. 4.
228ld.
229Reyntjens, Pouvair et droit au Rwanda, at 44.
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sub-chiefs, these taxes were determined by the Mwami, after the governor's approval.
Regarding the indigenous political organisation itself, there had been no legal regulations but only
administrative decisions, most often with an ad hoc character. It was not until 1943 that the
ordonnance /égis/átive no. 347/A./.M.O of October 4, 1943 for the first time legalised the powers that
the administrative authority had given itself, such as the power to fix and modify the limits of
chefferies and sous-chefferies, to regulate the censuses and transfers, to forbid the settlement of
indigenous people from certain regions, to conduct the investiture of kings, chiefs and sub-chiefs, to
inflict disciplinary punishment to the same authorities, to determine the number of staff members, to
give instructions related to the execution of forced labour, etc. As can be observed, this legislative
order did not create anything new, it only recognised the existing structure and already established
powers.»
1.3.3.4.1 The State apparatus
Belgian colonial territories could be termed Administrative States: the structure of the administrative
hierarchy was, in effect, the Consunmon.» But the political organisation under no colonial system in
Africa was based on such principles of constitutionalism as the separation of the branches of
government or checks and balances. The fundamental law governing the Belgian Congo from 1908,
and Ruanda-Urundi from 1925 onwards, is a case in point. Enacted on August 21, 1925, this law
provided for an administrative union between the newly acquired Belgian mandate and the Congo
colony. Commenting on the practical implications of the merger, the Belgian representative to the
Permanent Mandates Commission stated in October 1925 that "Ruanda-Urundi will take its place on
a footing of the most complete equality side by side with the four Congo provinces and will enjoy all
the benefits of the large measure of decentralisation possessed by those provinces .... The Belgian
government thought it good, in the interests of the population of Ruanda-Urundi, not to double the
already large central services and the technical and medical services established at Barna, but,
thanks to the administrative union, to extend the working of these services to the mandated territory".
Although Ruanda-Urundi was now for all intents and purposes an appendage of the Belgian colony,
five or six more years would elapse before it could enjoy the full benefits of a civil adrninistration.w In
230 Ibid.
231 Read Paulus, J.P., Droit Public du Congo-Beige, Brussels: Institut de sociologie Solvay, 1959, p. 393; .Morris, H.F.
and J.S., Indirect rule and the search for justice, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, p. 287.
232 The first systematic attempt towards the introduction of a uniform system of administration was made in 1929, when,
at the request of the Minister of Colonies, a series of general administrative inquiries was conducted in each of the
administrative subdivisions (territoires) of Rwanda and Burundi. As a result, a set of general instructions was issued by
Vice-Governor General Voisin, in 1930, which specified the goals of Belgian policies in Ruanda-Urundi in these terms:
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the meantime, the day-ta-day tasks of administration remained largely in the hands of the military
and at first did not extend very far beyond the immediate requirements of peace and order.
Many reasons can explain Belgium's slow pace in initiating administrative reforms. The customs and
institutions of the indigenous societies of Ruanda-Urundi were unlike any found in the Congo; their
social and political organisation seemed unusually, perhaps unnecessarily, strange to the Belgian
officers on the spot; the latter, moreover, by virtue of their training and background showed little
concern for the social and political problems connected with the tasks of colonial administration. In
addition - and this is a point which Belgian officials repeatedly stressed before the Permanent
Mandates Commission - the administrative machinery Germany had left behind was so rudimentary
and inadequate that it could serve only as a makeshift arrangement pending the introduction of a
new system. One Belgian spokesperson carried the argument a step further, intimating that the
German record in Ruanda-Urundi did not show a single creditable achievement, and that,
consequently, Belgium had been forced to make a completely fresh start: "The Belgian mandate had
been set up in a country which had for practical purposes never really come under European
supervision - where there was but the embryo of an administrative occupation and no European
business interests at all. It was the only mandated territory whose history had commenced for all
intents and purposes with the inauguration of the mandate, and where the mandate experiment was
not influenced by any colonial past">
To some extent, the effect of legislation was actually to reduce the Mwami, the chiefs and sub-chiefs
to the rank of simple executive agents of territorial administration since these customary authorities
had to abide by the complete assent of colonial authorities. This assertion is supported by the fact
that, under the Charte Coloniale of October 18, 1908, an Act of the Belgian Parliament, which, for all
practical purposes was the Constitution that remained in force until independence, the ordinary
legislator was the Belgian king (meaning in fact the Minister of the Colonies). It was confirmed by
Article 7 of the Loi on the government of Ruanda-Urundi. This eminent legislative power was
conferred on the metropolitan legislator by the Belgian Constitution which did not allow any obstacle
to the legislator's freedom and it was not limited by the Colonial Charter since the latter emanated
(1) To respect and reinforce native authority insofar as it is exercised in harmony with civilizing directives. (2) To exercise
a close check on possible abuses regarding customary tithes (présentations) and compulsory labour (corvées). (3) To
replace incapable chiefs with candidates designated with the accord of the Mwami. (4) To regroup chiefdoms in such a
way as to suppress the dispersion of fiefs and make the administration easier and more efficient. The European
personnel must realize that without the collaboration of native authorities the occupying power would be impotent and
faced with anarchy. Translated in Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, at 64. See also Histoire et Chronologie du Ruanda,
at 25.
233 League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, 16 Session, 1929, p. 68-9.
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from the same leqislator.> Except for budgetary matters, the intervention of the Belgian Parliament
was not required, and Members of Parliament have always shown remarkably little interest in
colonial affairs until right at the end when things started to heat up. The King's legislative acts, called
decrees, merely required the advice (but not the consent=) of the Conseil Colonial which consisted
of fourteen members (six elected by the Belgian parliament and eight appointed by the king). Already
in 1928 Buell pointed out that one of the most striking features of the Belgian colonial system was
the absence of any real consultative machinery external to the colonial system itself.236
All the executive power was vested in the King of Belgium who, according to Article 22 of the Loi of
March 29, 1911237, was assisted by the Minister of Colonies and, in certain cases, by the Minister of
Foreign Affairs. In practice, the power was usually delegated to the Governor General and to the
Vice-Governor General who was the Governor of Rwanda-Urundi and who exercised it by orders.
According to the décret du Roi of January 11, 1933, regulating the administrative organisation of the
colony, the powers and attributions of Belgian administrative authorities were those of the
corresponding authorities of Congo-Belge.238 The districts were administered by the district
commissioner (Résident) who controlled and supervised the composing territories on the spot. The
territorial administrators were under his authority and, according to Article 36 of the 1947 décret, their
attributions were to maintain or increase the authority and prestige of indigenous chiefs, to foster and
promote indigenous institutions; to facilitate relations between Europeans and indigenous people,
between the administration and the population, and to facilitate the penetration of civilisation and
commerce and progressive exploitation of the territory.
However, one would notice a sort of parallelism between these two sets of rulers: the King of
Belgium, the Resident and the Administrator, and on the other side the Mwami (king of Rwanda), the
Chiefs and Sub-Chiefs. Ryckmans observes that the relations with Chiefs in Rwanda were made on
two parallel lines, that is, there was actually a European administration and an indigenous
administration, each having its own hierarchy. This observation is nonetheless purely theoretical
since, in practice, there was a single government in which the native chiefs had well -defined duties
and their status was inferior to that of the European official. The line of decision and execution was,
234 Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 53.
235 In fact, however, only once did the Minister of the Colonies bypass the advice of the Conseil on the occasion of the
granting of a mining concession in 1940. Ibid.
236 Buell, R.L., The Native problem in Africa, New York: MacMillan, 1928, Vol. II, p. 460.
237 B.O., 1911, p. 358.
238 B.O., 1933, p. 488; B.A., 1947, p. 1276.
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as Reynljens points out, Resident-Administrator-Chief and Sub-chiefs. Even the hierarchic
relationship was not respected; the Administrator was, if he judged it appropriate, in direct
relationship with the sub-chiefs. 239 Otherwise it would not have been possible for the Belgian
administration to impose its authority to the Rwandan people.
Clearly, there was nothing remotely resembling a system of representation. Although in the
framework of the transition from indirect rule to internal self-government, advisory councils were
established with the Bami (kings) of Rwanda and Burundi in 1952 and these councils were indirectly
elected at all levels from 1956 onwards, the first direct legislative elections were organised only in
September 1961, a mere nine months before the two countries" accession to independence on July
1, 1962.240
As regards the relations between the executive and the legislative branches of government, the
image was one of a monolithic exercise of power by an unfettered colonial government, be it the
King of Belgium and his Minister of Colonies in Brussels or the Governor General in Léopoldville as
represented by the Vice-Governor General in Bujumbura. The consultative or censorial organs were
appointed by the Governor General (the Conseil du gouvernement in Léopoldville) or by the King of
Belgium and an uninterested Parliament (the Conseil colonial in Brussels). Therefore, the opinion of
Robert Martin for Commonwealth Africa certainly was also valid for former Belgian Africa and
remained so up to independence. He rightly stated that three attributes of legislatures in liberal-
democratic constitutional theory were absent in early colonial Legislative Councils:
First, the executive was in no way responsible to the Legislature .... Secondly, the legislature was
not even formally representative of the people for whom it was making laws .... Thirdly, the
Legislative Council was neither a supreme nor a sovereign body .... 241
The Judiciary was regulated by Ordonnance-Loi No. 45 of August 30, 1924 amended by the July 5,
1948 omomence»: There were two types of judicial organisation. On the indigenous side, there
were the Tribunal de Chefferie, the Tribunal de Territoire and the Tribunal du Mwami. These courts
were competent to judge civil cases opposing indigenous people that were not settled by the
application of statutory law, and criminal matters repressed by the custom or by a codified norm
giving explicit competence to indigenous jurisdictions. Judgement was delivered according to
239 Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 168.
240 See infra, The Vicious Circle in Movement: Hutus in, Tutsis out.
241 Martin, R., Legislatures and economic development in Commonwealth Africa, London: Public Law, 1977, p. 50.
242 For the study of the amendments, see B.O., 1948, p. 856.
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customary law as long as this law was not contrary to "public order and good rnorals't= The most
striking aspect, like in the political structure was that these courts were staffed by Tutsis. In fact,
except for some extremely rare cases which did not amount to more than 0.5%, all the
autochthonous staff of indigenous jurisdictions were exclusively composed of Tutsi members:
judges, assessors, registrars, all appointed and dismissed according to the discretion of the Mwami,
a Tutsi, or by the chefs de chefferie, all Tutsis. 244
In certain cases, however, indigenous people were also subject to colonial jurisdiction, which applied
colonial law to civil and criminal matters. The composition of these jurisdictions shows, however, that
the judicial system was in effect part and parcel of the executive branch. The judge of the Tribunal
de Police was the territorial administrator, while the Tribunal de District had the district commissioner
as sole judge. The Tribunal de Parquet, the single most important court with general civil and
criminal jurisdiction, was staffed by a member of the public prosecutor's office (Ministere Public)
which was part of the executive branch. Moreover, the territorial officers were allowed to preside over
all the so-called native courts in their jurisdiction, and all judgements of these courts were subject to
review by the Tribunal de Parquef.245
In time some of the policies adopted in the Congo provided a new pole of attraction for the testing
and sorting out of native institutions. This is best illustrated by the introduction of the above-
mentioned "native tribunals" in 1936. Despite the disastrous results of earlier experiments along
these lines, it was assumed that the native tribunals would become the most effective instruments of
indirect rule in the context of the mandated territory. In the mind of the Belgian Resident, the native
court system would provide the master key to every problem of native administration. The native
tribunals would act at one and the same time as "a safeguard of traditions and a brake upon their
evolution", as "a melting pot in which past and present tendencies (would) coalesce", and as "the
means whereby a progressive and progressionist, yet slow and smooth, assimilation could be
243 ld.
244 Minani, F., Evolution des institutions rwandaises, in Les constitutions et les institutions administratives des Etats
nouveaux, Compte rendu de I'Incidi, Brussels, 1956, p. 125. Minani claims that the consequence of that unilateral
composition was "partiality and corruption of indigenous tribunals". This partiality was without appeal since the courts of
appeal had the same composition as the courts of first and second instance. The Hutu peasant whose rights had been
infringed was driven either to take the law into his own hands or to give up his rights. However, no concrete example has
been available to support Minani's assertion, but one could suppose that, in case a Hutu was wronged by, say, a
privileged Tutsi (a chief or sub-chief), the Tutsi judge would be inclined not to rule in favour of the Hutu especially if one
is to consider the inferior status of the Hutu in the then society.
245 For a detailed study of Rwandan courts during the colonial era, see Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 153-
160.
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achleved".» In fact, these tribunals became the instruments through which the ruling Tutsi oligarchy
not only retained but abused its privileges. Their function was not so much to dispense justice as to
legitimise abuses and wrongdoing. Since they were in every case headed by Tutsi chiefs it is difficult
to imagine how they could have served a different purpose. Although the Mwamfs tribunal was
intended to serve as a court of appeal the long delays resulting from the accumulation of pending
litigation often amounted to a denial of justice. Thus, with an average of only sixty cases handled
each year, the Mwamfs tribunal was faced with a backlog of some 900 untried cases by 1949, a
situation described by the Résidence as "clearly alarming".247 If further evidence were needed to
dispel illusions about the true nature of the Rwandan court system, the following statement by a
former Belgian official would suffice:
The native tribunals never played a moderating role because they were intimately linked to the
political authorities. In many cases these tribunals were the organs used by the Tutsi to give a
semblance of legality to their exactions .... The only way to redress these injustices was to seek
the annulment of iniquitous decisions from the Parquet, but the number of applications was so
great that it was impossible to examine each dernanc.=
Furthermore, Tutsi participation in the judicial system as clerks, interpreters, and assessors enabled
the Tutsi to manipulate the courts to their own advantage. Gravel provides a description that
illustrates this point. He finds that even after "feudal" agreements had been formally abolished, Tutsi
lords still managed to enforce feudal obligations, through the Belgian courts. The Tutsis would bring
to court Hutus who refused to perfOOorm the "customary duty" of mending the Tutsi lord's fence. Not
realising that this obligation was the primary symbolic manifestation of the fealty relationship, Belgian
judges would rule in favour of the Tutsi.249This shows us how our bomb was being activated by
arbitrariness and partiality of the indigenous justice.
On the other hand, this brief account suggests that the use of Paulus' use of, "administrative State",
as applied to the Belgian colonial state, is adequate: at the imperial level, the Minister responsible for
the colonies had only a nominal responsibility toward a parliament not very interested in overseas
affairs, while the Governor General was subject to no local control at the terrltorlal level.w The denial
to the indigenous people of the right to participate in political life up to the last days of colonial rule is
246Résidence du Ruanda, Rapport Annuel, Kigali, 1938, mimea., Part II, Chapter 2. Translated in Lemarchand, Rwanda
and Burundi, at 75-6.
247Id.,1949, at 78.
248Anon., "Note sur les causes des troubles du mois de Novembre 1959 au Ruanda", unpublished document. Translated
in Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, at 77.
249Gravel, P., Life on a Manor in Gisaka in Journal of African History, vi, 3 (1965), p. 331.
250 Paulus, Droit Public du Congo-Beige, at 393.
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certainly one of the most striking Ofeatures. The intentional character of this state of affairs is well
illustrated by what Paulus wrote as late as 1959:
... presently, social problems exist ... but these have no political character whatsoever. The
Belgian authorities must ensure not to be overtaken by events that would transform social claims
into political programme. These territories are not ready yet for these questions ... Blacks have no
notion allowing them to understand our political reasoning .... 251
This statement is consistent with the ideology of colonial rule, which never claimed to uphold
democratic values. Based on unfettered rule by an alien power, it is in fact the antithesis of
representative government and thus of respect for fundamental human rights. Having learned it
during colonial rule, Rwandan rulers would apply this system, mutatis mutandis, for post-
independence government.
The lack of commitment by Belgium to promote the development of democracy in her Central African
territories explains the very late emergence of political parties in Rwanda, Burundi and Zaïre (now
Democratic Republic of Congo). Created during the second half of the 1950s, they generally were
based explicitly on ethnic solidarity. In Zaïre, the only national party, the Mouvement National
Congolais, was founded in October 1958, less than two years before independence. The short
experience with parties as vehicles of mobilisation and communication explains the ease with which
President Mobutu, after his assumption ofpower in 1965, was able to resume the political style of his
Belgian colonial predecessors. The Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR) created by him in
1967 did not show the slightest autonomy from the government and was simply part and parcel of
the administration in which it was integrated rather than the other way round as was claimed by
Mobutu.252 It was exactly the same process for the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour Ie
Développement (MRNO) of President Habyarimana of Rwanda and the Union pour Ie Progrés
National (UPRONA) of President Bagaza of Burundi. As regards the MRND, as explained in detail in
Chapter two, it was a party-state created by Habyarimana to safeguard the interests of a tiny minority
of Hutus from Gisenyi region to the detriment of the Tutsi minority and the remaining Hutu majority.
This would not have been the case if the colonists had prepared Rwandans for "self-government and
observance of their rights'.
251 Ibid.
252 President Mobutu in Agenee Zaïroise de Presse (AZAP), December 8, 1982, quoted by Callaghy, T.M., The State-
Society Struggle: Zaïre in Comparative Perspective, New York: Columbia University Press, 1984, p. 219-220.
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1.3.3.4.2 The rights of indigenous people
Indigenous interests can be analysed through the scheme adopted for their protection by Belgian
authorities. In his confidential memorandum, the Minister of Colonies advocated the support of
customary institutions and Tutsi rolers=. He explained that their policy was based on the
maintenance of indigenous institutions and that Europeans were there to guide and educate. He said
that this policy excluded direct administration and suited countries with ancient and remarkable
organisation in which the ruling class provide proof of evident political talents. He stressed that the
colonial administration would maintain the royal authority and reinforce it according to tradition, but
added that the administration would see to it that, on one side, its assistance would be needed by
the royal authority and that, on the other side, the role of feudal lords should not be reduced or
annihilated. As regards the Hutus, he said that the administration had to protect them against
arbitrary acts of which they were victims and assure them peace, the security of their properties and
jobs, and justice. However, he made it clear that the bases of the traditional political institutions
should remain intact, since the Tutsis had been established long before and were the only ones who
were intelligent and capable of ruling.254
This position contradicts itself since the Minister of Colonies did not clarify how Belgian authorities
were going to respect and develop indigenous institutions simultaneously. Neither did he explain how
they were going to manage to protect Hutus without affecting the very essence of the pre-colonial
indigenous political regime. Indeed, the proposed balance was too subtle and theoretical to be put in
action, and the colonial administration formulated for itself "one of the contradictions inherent in a
policy of indirect rule".255This confusion remained until 1951 when the Congolese legislation on
indigenous "immatriculation"256, as amended by the May 17, 1952 decree in the sense of a policy of
253Ibid.
254The memorandum reads: "... cette politique a pour base Ie maintien des institutions indigenes. Elle fait de l'Européen
le guide et I'éducateur. Elle exclut I'administration directe. Elle est parfaitement réalisable dans les pays dont
I'organisation est ancienne et remarquable et dont la classe dirigeante montre des talents politiques évidents .... Notre
administration maintiendra I'autorité royale et la renforcera, conformément a la coutume, lá ou elle se serait trop affaiblie.
Mais elle veillera d'une part a ce que cette autorité ait besoin de notre concours, d'autre part a ne pas réduire trop ou
annihiler Ie role des grands féodataires .... A cóté de nos obligations de politique générale, nous avons des devoirs
envers les Wahutu. Nous devons les protéger contre les actes arbitraires dont ils sont souvent victimes, et leur assurer la
paix, la sécurité de leurs biens et de leur travail et la justice. Mais nous n'irons pas plus loin: il ne s'agit pas, sous
prétexte d'égalité, de toucher aux bases de I'institution politique; nous trouvons les Watuzi établis d'ancienne date,
intelligents et capables; nous respecterons cette situation." Official Memorandum from the Minister of Colonies, Franck,
L., dated June 15, 1920, Archives Africaines, AEIII No. 1849 (3288).
255Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 66.
256The cultural assimilation was proved by a registration certificate issued to indigenous by the colonial administration
and enabling them to enjoy rights reserved for Europeans.
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cultural assimilation, was made executory in Ruanda-Urundi. In the process of ensuring for Africans
"a gradual development towards European juridical status", the colonial government had created in
1948 the "carte du mérite civique" which assured its holder of a certain assimilation to Europeans.
On reading the decree, we find the following preamble, which explains the precise significance of this
doctrinal reform:
Immatriculation, according to the Colonial Charter, is an instrument by which certain indigenous
people are assimilated. with non-natives in regard to their civil status by being made subject to
civil laws of the European pattern. According to the explanatory statement, the immediate aim of
the decree is to grant the benefits of immatriculation only to those of the native élite who have
genuinely adopted the Western form of civilisation... . This policy implies that the legal
assimilation of ... immatriculés with non-natives is carried into effect not only in regard to civil
status but in all spheres of the law where common rules of life require it.
Amongst other conditions, the applicant was required to have reached the age of 21 years and to
show, by his or her education and way of life, that s/he had reached a stage of civilisation at which
s/he was capable of enjoying the rights and fulfilling the duties laid down in the written law.257 In order
to define these criteria clearly, the report of the Colonial Council pointed out that it was not sufficient
to have a European education; the applicant had to show by his or her actions that s/he was guided
by that education and followed its tenets. It was not sufficient to live more or less in the European
style; a training which would enable him to understand civic life as regulated by the law was
necessary.e The application was submitted to the President of the Tribunal de Premiere Instance
who, assisted by four assessors, conducted the interrogation that enabled the Court to acquaint itself
personally with the personality and maturity of the applicant. A successful applicant who then
became immatriculé was allowed to become subject to the system of civil law and to be assimilated
among Europeans in matters of juridical organisation, procedure and competence, movement at
night, access to certain areas, and other rnatters.» This brought about a discriminatory legal system
in which the "immatriculés" as well as Europeans were subject to the statutory law only, whereas the
"non-immatriculés" were subject to customary law as well. As the colonists had already marked their
preference for the Tutsi ruling class on the basis of the "Hamitic" theories, one can imagine that
Tutsis would normally be given preference to Hutus. Although no documentation on concrete cases
of immatriculation has been available, the incident of Fathers Bernard Manyurane (Hutu) and Gerard
Mwerekande (Hutu) is worth discussing to show the unfairness of the law on immatriculation. In
2571952 Decree, art. 2. Brausch, G., Belgian administration in the Congo, London: Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 20-
28.
258 Conseil Colonial, 1952 Rapport, reprinted in Lumumba, P., Congo My Country, London: Pall Mall Press, 1961,p. 52.
259 For details about the "immatriculation", see Brausch, Belgian administration in the Congo, at 20-28.
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August 1955, both priests were detained for 24 hours in Karubanda prison for having entered Hotel
Ibis in Butare to greet Charles Kabayiza, their former secondary school classmate, a Tutsi office
clerk at the Chefferie of Nyabisindu. The custom was that "a non-immatriculé was not allowed to
enter Hotellbis".260 Although this example does not suffice to generalise the Hutu marginalisation as
regards immatriculation, one may wonder who would be more "civilised" than a priest. It would not be
unfair to consider priests de facto assimi/é simply because they were the first élite in the country; first
élite because, from the onset of the process of colonisation, the native priests, although very few,
had been the only Africans to receive a complete higher education, and because they had lived side
by side with the Europeans for many years, in contrast to the secular élite who lived on the other side
of the barrier. Their eoucanon= was provided by Europeans and, together with their character and
way of life, it had undoubtedly brought the native priests to a degree of civilisation equal to that of the
European priests whose life they shared.v and it seems that there was little justification for
subjecting them to the same procedure as the ordinary Rwandans whose level of development may
be in doubt as far as immatriculation is concerned.
Moreover, although the number of "immatriculés" was very insignificant because of cultural reasons
and, therefore, just about the entirety of the population remained subject to customary law in civil
matters, the fact remains that, beside this legal duality private law (customary law and European
law), even public law was divided in such a way that indigenous rights were very reduced. As
indicated, an indigenous political organisation existed beside the colonial organisation; common law
jurisdiction operated alongside indigenous jurisdiction and certain penalties were applied specifically
to indigenous people; and in labour law, the regime of the work contract was different according to
whether one was indigenous or nOp63Commenting on this discrimination in comparison with the
British colonies, Rubbens contends that "the most ferocious Anglo-Saxon colour bar had never
produced such discriminatory laws, neither had it enacted discriminatory measures as rigid as those
of the Belgian frusteeship".« In the light of the politico-social relations prevailing in Rwanda, these
discriminatory measures would, to some extent, be another reason for revolution.
The Charte Coloniale explicitly declared some rights and freedoms of the Belgian constitution to be
260Interview with Kazigaba, 12 July 1998.
261Twenty years of study, including 6 years of primary education, 6 years of secondary education, 3 years of philosophy
and 5 years of theology. Abimana, T., Mission Catholique au Rwanda, Nyakibanda, 1989, p. 8.
262Same residence, same table and other things of every day life. Id., at 15.
263Vanderlinden, J., Essai de Synthése in Gilissen, J., Le pluralisme juridique, BruxeIJes: Editions de I'Université, 1971,
p.41.
264 Rubbens, A.S., Le Colour-Bar au Congo-Belge, in Zaïre, 1949, p. 503.
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applicable in overseas territories. Articles 7, (1) and (2), 8 and 9 guaranteed individual freedom with
the principles "nul/urn crimen sine lege" and "nul/a poena sine lege"; Article 10 guaranteed the
privacy of the home; Article 11 protected the privacy of property; Article 12 forbade the penalty of
general deprivation of property; Article 13 abolished the civil death (as a deprivation of all rights);
Article 14 guaranteed the freedom of religion, whereas the freedom of conscience was guaranteed
by Article 15 and the freedom of opinion by Article 16,1; Article 17.1 provided for the right to
education, and 21 guaranteed the right to address a petition to public authorities; Article 22
guaranteed the secret of correspondence and Article 24 assured the prosecution of public officers in
connection with their administration. Moreover, Article 2 of the Colonial Charter provided that no
measure concerning the press could be taken in violation of norms regulating the press, and Article 3
forbade forced labour.
In practice, however, the scope of rights enjoyed by the indigenous people was limited. For example,
in the changes envisaged by the administration, the first measure was taken in 1917 by the Resident
in his letter No. 791/AS/53, stating that a Tutsi stripping a Hutu of his crops would pay double; a Tutsi
grazing his cattle in the Hutu plantations would pay double the damages; it was not allowed to
notables to require services not provided by custom. First, the formulation in purely ethnic terms is
striking: the Administration operates in a framework of a very simple stereotyped hypothesis in which
all the Tutsi are lords and cattle herds-men while all the Hutus are the subjects and agriculturalists.
Second, respect for these rules proved difficult to implement, particularly as the administrators, when
forced to choose between protecting the weak and consolidating the powerful, opted in general for
the easiest way: supporting the authority of the powerful.> This has been confirmed by Bourgeois
who put it that "we have most often considered Tutsis as excellent elements who had our forced
labours well executed in their areas, closing the eyes on the abuses that they made on their citizens,
violating the common law and the prescriptions of the custom that we have amended."266
The Administration took on the existing corvées due to Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs by Hutus with
reluctance. The most terrible corvee was the "uburetwa" which consisted of a set number of days of
labour per week. Mwarni Rwabugiri (1860-1895) introduced the uburetwa after a defeat during a
military expedition against the Nkore. As he wanted to punish Hutus for their misbehaviour during the
battle, he ordered that they would have to work 2 days for the Tutsis and 3 days for themselves as
265 Des Forges, A.S., Defeat is the only bad news: Rwanda under Musiinga 1896-1931, Dissertation, Yale University, p.
238.
266 Bourgeois, R., Témoignages, Tervuren: MRAC, T1, 1982, Cho 5.
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the traditional week counted 5 days.267When the Belgian occupation started, each family worked two
days out of 3, or 146 days per year. The improvement made by the Belgians was the introduction of
the European week (7 days) and the maintenance of the two days in 1924 when the uburetwa was
reduced to 42 days per year.268They established registers to control the regularity of the days
worked by everyone. Moreover, this reform would result in an increased burden for a number of Hutu
males, since what was an obligation for a group became an obligation for an individual weighing on
every male adult, and recalcitrants were lmprlsonec.w The administration considered that it would
have been difficult to go further in the reduction of the required work, which would be seen as a
disruption of the politico-social organisation of the country. The 1927 Rapport stated that if the chief
or the sub-chief were deprived of the right to force Hutus to work for them, they would have neither
prestige nor power.w
A second reform was made in 1938 when, following the suggestion by the League of Nations to
suppress the uburetwa, the administration allowed the indigenous people employed in European
companies to redeem the uburetwa by paying one franc per labour day, or 13 francs per year. This
measure was discriminatory: the category of indigenous allowed to enjoy that right comprised civil
servants, workers in private companies or for European individuals; catechists; pupils in the second
level of primary school; rich Tutsis owning at least 10 cows; and seasonal migrants absent from their
chiefdom for at least nine months a year.271However, this measure concerned the indigenous able to
pay the required amount, or those who were out of customary areas; or those who were
economically active in a field which would suffer from repeated absence or all the three categories
combined. This shows that the administration had to see to it that the Belgian economic interests
would be maintained, especially in the mines and plantations.se
The colonial era was a period of duress. Other kinds of labour were also imposed on the population.
The Ordonnance-Loi of October 4, 1943 allowed the Governor to impose unpaid works considered
as of public interest. This was the case of the akazi consisting of road building, and the execution of
267See Rwabukumba, J. & Mudandagizi, V., Les formes historiques de la dépendance personnelIe dans l'Etat Rwandais,
in Cahiers Etudes Africaines, 1974, p. 22.
268Rapport 1924, p. 7.
269Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 134.
270Rapport 1927, p. 37.
271Rapport 1938, p. 75.
272 Reyntjens, L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en Crise at 137.
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certain other works considered to be in the community's interest or workers" interest,273 By that
legislation, people were required to involve themselves with salaried work and productive
plantations, the reforestation, anti-erosion work, etc. However, it should be noted that these works
were introduced during the transition from a subsistence economy to a market economy and one has
to remember that the ubuhake system studied in section one was supported by the Belgian
administration as profitable for their indirect rule. Finally, the individual peasant, in most of the cases,
was actually unable to support all those demands and saw himself exposed to unceasing
punishment. As a consequence, many people emigrated to neighbouring countries. "At the end of
the twenties, around 50,000 Rwandans or one male adult out of six emigrated each year."274Reports
show that a missionary estimated that, in some parishes, up to 75% of young men were leaving in
1949 and in 1959, before the revolution, 350,000 Rwandans had already left to Uganda, 35,000
having gone to Tanganyika,275 and an unknown number to the Congo (which was also under Belgian
rule) where there was, at least, no ubuhake system.
But, if some people managed to escape the forced labour and the taxes, the situation was worsened
for those who remained at home, since neither the indigenous authorities, nor the Belgian
administration, gave consideration to that exodus to review their demands. As a consequence, the
remaining people were subjected to carrying the full burden as manpower had decreased=
Contrary to the ideas of universal human rights, which forbade slavery and forced labour (except as
part of a criminal sentence), the colonial regime maintained the personal bonds of ubuhake and
forced labour systems in which the most miserable people were the Hutu, whose situation became
worse than it was before the occupation. However, by accumulation of even a little monetary income,
the "Hutus gradually acquired the confidence and economic basis enabling them to envisage
changes".277 In the last section of this chapter, this observation will be elaborated, together with other
factors, to assess the concept of human rights consciousness, as well as the way changes were
made.
As regards education, to reconcile the Tutsi political monopoly with the needs of a modern and
273See also Ordonnance No. 52 of November 7, 1924; Reglement du Résident du Rwanda No. 89 of August 17, 1931,
No. 11 of December 22, 1944 and Ordonnance No. 70/A.I.M.O of November 20, 1944.
274Des Forges, A.S., Kings without crowns, at 335.
275For a more detailed study, see Chrétien, J.P., Des sédentaires devenus migrants: les motifs des départs des
Burundais et des Rwandais vers I'Uganda 1920-1960, in Culture and Developpement, 1978, p. 71-101.
276Ibid.
277 Latham-Koening, A.L., Ruanda-Urundi on the threshold of independence, in The World Today, 1962, p. 289-290.
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rational administration, it was necessary for the administration to train notables. According to the
principle of indirect rule, this training was reserved for Tutsis. Major De Clerk had already tried to
convince the Chiefs and the court to send their young men to mission schools. The Mwami and a
number of feudal lords resisted because education was considered a poison (uburozi) which
destroyed traditional beliefs, so they sent only clients" sons, bastards or under-gifted children that
represented no threat to the Tutsi nobility to the Christian schools. When the Administration became
aware of this practice, Major De Clerk and the White Fathers explained to Musinga that the
Administration intended to employ more and more trained young people to hold the commanding
posts. As a matter of fact, if the court refused to allow young Tutsis from important families to acquire
the required competencies, these commanding posts would be distributed to trained Hutus or Tutsis
from poor families. Mwami Musinga understood this danger and explained to the commissaire royal
that his objection concerned the religious nature of the established schools and promised to send
Tutsi children to schoot=
As indicated, Belgians, when assuming control in 1916, continued the policy of reliance upon Tutsis.
Their belief that the Tutsis were naturally gifted rulers helps to explain why the Tutsis could resist any
change in their status. In order to ensure that the existing elite would be educated, the Belgians
favoured Tutsis when recruiting students for the administrative schools. There was fear that
educating the non-ruling classes would result in disturbances such as had occurred elsewhere in
Africa, where newly-educated youths refused to recognise the authority of their traditional rulers.w In
its report commenting upon the invidious effects of educating non-ruling groups, the Ministry of
Colonies stated:
Their spirit of independence grows, whereas prestige and authority decrease; little by little respect
for indigenous institutions disappears and the traditional social organisation collapses before new
controls have been imposed.280
This shows how the policy of indirect rule favoured discrimination against Hutus. The Belgian
administration refused to recognise that traditional social organisation would have to be significantly
altered to adapt to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The 1924 report corroborated their
refusal by stating that the Minister of Colonies had noted with pride that almost all of 932 students in
278 Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 107-108.
279 Gouta gives examples of Burkina Faso and Sénégal where the "new generation" considered themselves as French
and "refused to abide with traditional rulers such as opposing excision and refusing the authority of chefs in conflict
resolution beside common law courts". Gouta, N., Post-colonial state-nations in West Africa, Douala: KUN, 1986, p. 141.
280 Rapport sur l'Administration du Rwanda-Urundi, 1924, p. 29, as translated by Atterbury, Revolution in Rwanda, at 20.
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school that year were Tutsis.»
The Belgian attitude in this regard is blameworthy because of its short-sightedness. The reliance of
Belgian authorities upon the Tutsi superiority indeed was not a preparation of Rwanda for democratic
rule and respect of human rights standards. The 1938 report explains:
The Government is convinced that it must attempt to maintain and consolidate the traditional
cadre of the ruling Tutsi class, because of their outstanding qualities, their undeniable intellectual
superiority and their talent for command.w
As a consequence, the civil and military structures operated to keep the Hutus in a subordinate
position politically, economically, and socially.
Deprivation of individual rights and freedoms was common during the colonial era in the areas of
human endeavour, from economic activity to politics. Apart from the inequality between Hutus and
Tutsis, Rwandans in general were not allowed to enjoy equal rights with Europeans. For example,
the Rugina v Governor case shows how indigenous people were deprived of their freedom of
religion. The case was judged by the Tribunal de Premiere Instance du Ruanda-Urundi in 1943.283 In
this case, a Hutu member of the Jehovah's Witnesses was prosecuted for possessing five books
entitled "Délivrance" and two books entitled "Jehovah". He was convicted by the Tribunal de Parquet
du Ruanda. He appealed on the grounds that his arrest was inconsistent with Belgian legislation,
which recognised freedom of religion for the indigenous. Second, he argued, the arrest was arbitrary
because "any act in deprivation of the use of these books by the indigenous of this territory is an
infringement of, or at least a non-compliance with, the terms of the Royal instructions, which impose
on the Governor a duty to promote religion among indigenous people".
On the first ground, the court accepted that the Belgian law applied to Ruanda-Urundi but held that
"the application of Belgian law to a colonial territory did not restrict in any way the power vested in
the local authority to take action for the peace, order and good government of the territory. It was
permissible for the local authority to take action which might not be compatible with the principles of
Belgian law, as what might be appropriate in Belgium might not always be expedient in an African
colonial dependency." The court held that religious matters were "subject to the control of the local
281 ld., at at 22. The official doctrine regarding education provides further evidence of Belgian fear of disturbances:
"Education ought to convey only knowledge which the natives will find useful in the social role which each of them is
called to play. To act contrary to this rule is to risk creating a class of ill-adapted and uprooted persons who cannot avoid
being a disruptive element". Id., at 29.
282 ld., at 21.
283 Mweya, L., Faith in the last days, Lusaka: MacMillan, 1989, p.21.
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authorities if, in their views, such matters required some control." It distinguished between matters
that were fundamental to freedom of worship, like the Holy Scriptures, and those that did not go to
the root of worship, and whose curtailment would not diminish the enjoyment of the freedom of
worship:
... when, however, the case involves books containing politico-religious teachings of a kind
noticeable in those under review, the matter assumes a different complexion. Politico-religious
discussion among the educated invariably excites controversy, and its propaganda among
primitive people may lead quite feasibly to misconception. Consequently, the court is not
prepared to say that the deprivation of literature of this order is an interference with any principle
of natural justice.>
Regarding the second ground for appeal (incompatibility with Royal instruction) the court held that
"the prohibition of politico-religious teaching was justified as such teaching had the potential to
undermine peace and order in the territory." The court concluded that "the arrest was valid and was
within the power and duties entrusted to the Governor" and the sentence to three years'
imprisonment was maintained.
Although this case is the only one available, it shows, to some extent, that indigenous people, or at
least Jehovah's Witnesses, did not enjoy freedom of religion, since, as Mweya explains, two
churches were burnt in Remera and Rubavu.285 The rights of indigenous people were subordinated
to the overriding need to preserve law and order, which was the principal preoccupation of the
colonial government.
The administration had yet another powerful instrument at its disposal for maintaining order and
preventing political action. The executive branch held wide-ranging powers of arrest for breach of the
public order. A decree of 3 June 1906286 authorised arrest without warrant and detention for up to a
month by any agent exercising a territorial command. The decree of 5 July 1910 further empowered
the Governor General, the provincial governors and the district commissioners "to relegate
undesirable persons", who could be banished or deported without any judicial remedy being
available to them. In deed it provided that any native of the colony who by his conduct endangered
public tranquillity could be forced to stay away from a certain area or to reside in a specified place.
Finally, when action taken against individual hotheads appeared insufficient, the decree of 31 July
284 Translated in Mweya, Faith in the last days, at 31.
285 ld., at 44.
286 Kundt, L.K., Colonization or Dictatorship?, n.p, n.d, p. 6.
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1920287 allowed for collective punishment. Occupation of a village or group of villages could be ruled
upon if they were "in a state of collective lack of submission", characterised either by the systematic
dispersal of the population at the arrival of European agents, or in case (a majority on the population
refused to execute the duties imposed by laws, decrees or ordinances. The costs of the occupation
by a territorial agent accompanied by a contingent of the Force Publique were to be borne by the
occupied village, which, in other words, financed its own punishment.
As regards press freedom, the provision in the Charte Coloniale to the effect that no measure should
be taken in press matters, except in conformity with the laws and decrees governing the press in fact
left the area wide open to discretionary intervention by the Executive. The basis for this discretion
was laid by the Ordonnance-Loi of March 5, 1922, confirmed by the decree of August 6, 1922, which
purported to regulate the introduction, circulation, publication, sale and distribution in the colony of
newspapers and periodicals. The ordinance was extended to Ruanda-Urundi by the décret of June
10, 1929. The need to legislate on this matter had been prompted by the fact that "certain seditious
pan-negro pamphlets, printed in America, were distributed in some countries including Congo and
began stirring trouble among some black readers'v= The 1922 text allowed the Governor General to
forbid the introduction and circulation of newspapers or periodicals published abroad. It further
required a prior authorisation by the Governor General for any newspaper or periodical to be
published in the Congo or Ruanda-Urundi. This authorisation couldbe withdrawn at any time. Over
the years, dozens of publications were thus banned, most of them on the grounds that they were
communist, pan-Africanist or indecent (e.g. the Belgian Communist Party daily "Le Drapeau Rouge"
and the U.S. produced "The Negro World').289 Measures that restricted the freedom of the press
considerably were maintained until the last days of colonial rule.
According to Pétillon, who was later to become Governor General:
If the draftsmen of the Charte Coloniale have not guaranteed the freedom of the press to the
inhabitants of the Colony, it is because they feared the abuses that such a freedom could
engender in a country whose primitive populations constitute an easy prey for the subversive
activities of elements intent on disturbing established order. The draftsmen's concern was
therefore to apply an adequate regime to the situation of a colony that had not yet reached a
sufficient maturity to enjoy the freedoms that are the hallmark of civilised peoples gained for the
287 ld., at 7.
288 Paulus, Droit Public du Congo-Beige, at 387.
289 See for instance the banning of "Quinze" and "Congo" in 1956: Van Bilsen, A.A.J., Vers I'indépendance du Congo et
du Ruanda-Urundi, second edition, Kinshasa: Presse Universitaire du Zaïre, 1977, p. 96-99.
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cause of order, after a slow and long evoution.w
The problem was that there was no substantial evolution towards "maturity", as the colonists took no
significant measure to eradicate inequalities between Hutus and Tutsis and to implant democratic
values in the minds of Rwandans. The colonists apparently did not regard democracy and human
rights as a priority.
Similar reasons to those regarding the press were advanced to subject the freedoms of association
and of assembly to stringent control by the executive branch. Here again, Pétillon explains the
reason for the denial:
... the Governor General needs far-reaching powers because he is responsible for maintaining
the security and peace of populations whose credulity, passions and heterogeneous composition
constitute, for agitators, elements of revolt that are much more docile and manipulative than those
of civilised countries.»
Preventive measures were thought necessary, and they were in fact widely applied, for instance, in
relation to trade union action and organisation. Not only the law stood in the way of trade union
activities: Van Bi/sen notes that even the white workers and employees of private enterprises "were
jugulated by an all-powerful capitalism, which eliminated the "trouble-makers" by sending them back
to Belgium".292As late as in 1957293the creation of trade unions was subject to prior approval
("agréation'j by the Governor General, and the Executive retained the discretionary right to dissolve
an approved organisation if "it severely contravenes its by-laws, the legislation or the public order".
The creation of federations of black and white trade unions was forbidden, thus preventing the
emergence of class-consciousness over the race barrier. More generally, an ordinance of 11
February 1926294provided that no association of natives could be formed without the authorisation of
the district commissioner. Provincial governors were empowered to dissolve associations, and
dozens actually were disbanded, mainly in the field of religion, where messianic organisations like
Kitawa/a were banned for being "anti-white".295
The justification of the gap between Europeans and indigenous people as given by Pétillon is highly
significant. He contended that the draftsmen of the Act of October 18, 1908 had wished to maintain
290Pétillon, L., Des habitants et de leurs droits, in: Les Novelles, Droit Colonial, Brussels: Larcier, Vol. I, 1932, p. 189.
291Id.,at 191.
292Van Bilsen, Vers I'indépendance du Congo et du Ruanda-Urundi, at 96-99.
293Decree of 25 January 1957, B.O. 1957.
294Kundt, Colonization or Dictatorship?, at 7.
295The effect of the hindrance of civil society will be analysed in Chapter two.
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the principles of birth and race, in order to ensure the supremacy of the whites over the blacks so as
to allow the former to exercise the civilising role assigned to them.296 This shows, as a consequence,
that discriminatory legislation was not contrary to the Charte Coloniale. Thus, a décret of 24 July
1918297made certain acts an offence if they were committed by natives (e.g. every disrespectful act
done or declaration made toward a European agent of the public authority). For example, under the
ordonnance of 7 April 1937, it was an offence for the natives, but not for the Europeans, to be out of
doors between 10 p.m. and 4.30 a.m. in the urban areas. The number and scope of distinctions
generally made between the races in many areas of the law (e.g. labour law) made an author
complain wearily about the "colour bar" in the late forties.298
We see now that the visions of the colonists did not remain intellectual abstractions, but were
translated into perfectly real administrative policies. These policies, in fact, dovetailed perfectly with
the inner dynamics of the royal system in the late nineteenth century - which was logical since it was
their source of inspiration. The Belgian administrative system systematised and rationalised the
policies that had been pursued by the Rwandan Tutsi kings. This did not contradict the fact that,
during the Belgian administration, the king's power had to be politically reduced because the
Belgians had become the real political substitutes of the old kings, whose "descendants were kept
merely as ceremonial symbols"> At the same time, the system became not only politically
dominant, but also culturally hegemonic, 'and its version of the past became the generally accepted
vision because it "explained" the present much better than the real complexities of history. Thus,
through the actions, both intellectual and material, of the Europeans, myths had been synthesised
into a new reality. And that new reality had become operational, with its heroes and its tillers of the
soil. Feelings and social actions would henceforth take place in relation to this reconstructed reality
because by then it would have become the only one. The time bomb had been set and it was now
only a question of when it would go off.
296Pétillon, L., Des habitants et de leurs droits, in: Les Novelles, Droit Colonial, Brussels: Larcier, Vol. I, 1932, p. 191.
297Kundt, Colonization or Dictatorship?, at 7.
298See Rubbens, Le Colour-Bar au Congo-Beige, at 503-513.
299Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, at 38.
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1.3.4 The vicious cycle in movement: Tutsis out, Hutus in.
1.3.4.1 A contentious end to the deep-rooted order
Ruanda-Urundi was put under Belgian trusteeship on 13 December 1946300,according to Article 75
of the UN Charter, signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945, which provided for the establishment
of an International Trusteeship System. The basic objectives of the International Trusteeship System
were laid down in Article 76 of the United Nations Charter. They included the furthering of
"international peace and security" and the encouragement of the "respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion", as well as the
encouragement ofthe "recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world."301Article 3 of
the Trusteeship Agreement provided for periodic visits to the trust territory by the UN Trusteeship
Council as a matter of collaboration between Belgium and the UN. The first UN Visiting Mission in
1948 stipulated that evolution towards self-government in the "Territory" would have to be
accompanied by progressive changes in the distribution of political power. The Mission's report
urged the Administration to "democratise the whole political structure as far as possible and as
speedily as circumstances permit. The masses must by degrees be led to take part in the choice of
their leaders, and in sanctioning important decisions, the final aim being to achieve an increasingly
widespread electoral systerrï'.w
This and further pressure for change from the United Nations represented a weakening of power for
the Belgian Administration. It will shortly be seen how, with the advent of United Nations supervision,
both Hutus and Tutsis could plead their case through petitions to the General Assembly and the
Trusteeship Council's Mission when it visited the Territory at three-year intervals after 1948. Belgium,
placed on the defensive, had to justify its policies in Ruanda-Urundi before the forum of world
opinion. Political reform in Rwanda became unavoidable, thus leading to a weakening of power for
the Tutsi oligarchy.
300See Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, Approved by the General Assembly of the UN on 13
December 1946, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 8, 1947, p. 106-117. Came into force on 13 December 1946, date of
approval of the Agreement by the General Assembly of the UN. Res. 63 (/).
301UN Charter, art. 76 (a) and (c), reprinted in H. Duncan Hall, Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship, London:
Wtevens & Sons Ltd., 1948, p. 336.
302U. N Trusteeship Council, Report of the Visiting Mission T/217 (1948), p. 13. Translated by Atterbury, Revolution in
Rwanda, at 34. Criticising the paternalistic attitude of the Administration, the 1948 Mission held that "It is possible that
Belgian officials might not all be conscious of this attitude of paternalism reminiscent of the father whose very solicitude
prevents him from seeing that his children are growing up and that the possibility of their emancipation has become a
reality". Report, at 15.
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Belgium's assignment to initiate reform would be stringently limited by the internal situation in
Rwanda. Throughout the colonial period, the Tutsis continued to be socialised to believe in their own
superiority. "Any action by the Administration which threatened this superior status would be
regarded as betrayal".303It was thus not surprising that the first major political reform did not seriously
threaten Tutsi supremacy. A 1952 decree provided for a system of indirect elections and
appointment to select advisory councils at four levels of the Administration: the introduction of
councils at the district and sub-chiefdom levels (conseils de territoire, conseils de sous-chefferie)
represented an innovation; councils at the country and chiefdom levels conseil supérieur, conseils de
chefferie) had existed since 1943, but had not been selected by an elective process.> Although this
broadening of political participation marked an important change, it mainly benefited the Tutsis: the
complicated system of electoral colleges insured that almost no Hutu reached the councils at the
highest levels of administration.se
The decision to abolish ubuhake had a greater impact than the 1953 reorganisation of councils. In
1954, the Mwamfs Conseil Supérieur06 (High Council) was led to take formal action to end ubuhake
contracts in Rwanda. Since the High Council was composed almost exclusively of Tutsis, this
decision seemed to indicate a trend toward flexibility among the Tutsis. However, this impression
largely was an illusion, because, in the first place, the action to end ubuhake was calculated to
impress the 1954 United Nations Visiting Mission, which was present when the High Council acted
on ubuhake.307 Secondly, the measure abolishing ubuhake had serious deficiencies: it made no
provision for land reforms that were needed to provide pasture land for Hutu cattle. Consequently,
abolition of ubuhake and the resulting distribution of cattle among Hutus created grave problems
involving land shortage. The failure to initiate land reform gave Hutus additional cause to resent their
Tutsi overlords, and increased unrest in the rural areas, thus adding fuel to Hutu protests.w
303Atterbury, Revolution in Rwanda, at 35.
304 Maquet and d'Hertefelt, Elections en Société Féodale, at 18.
305Members of the councils were chosen through a complicated system of electoral colleges. The councils were not
representative in the sense of being responsible to the population; this was reflected in the fact that members of the
electoral colleges at the sub-chiefdom level were appointed by the sub-chief. Since almost all the chiefs and sub-chiefs
were Tutsi, opportunities for Hutu to participate in electoral college voting were practically non-existent. Maquet and
d'Hertefelt, Elections en Société Féodale Id., at 22-25. Nevertheless, these reforms were hailed by some as progress
towards democratization. For example, see Muller, N., "Une étape vers la démocratie (Ruanda-Urundi)" in Problemes
d'Afrique Centrale XIX, 1953, p. 117-123.
306Also referred to as Conseil du Pays. Atterbury, Revolution in Rwanda, at 34.
307Id., at 36.
308Ibid. The effects of the 1954 measure were far-reaching. By December 1958, 218, 000 cattle had been distributed in
Rwanda. This figure may be compared with the mere 700 that were distributed in Burundi. Belgium, Chambre des
Représentants, Rapport du Groupe de Travail pour /'étude du probleme politique au Ruanda-Urundi, No. 342, 1958-
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By far the most significant reform came in 1956 when Rwandans had their first opportunity to
participate in direct elections. The scope of the elections was limited, since only posts in the sub-
chiefdom electoral colleges were to be filled by popular vote; all other councillor positions would be
filled, as before, through the indirect system of electoral colleges. Nevertheless, the experience with
direct election had a strong impact: both Hutus and Tutsis knew that, as a result of the 1956
elections, twenty percent fewer Tutsis sat on the sub-chiefdom electoral colleges than had been the
case in 1953.309
As nationalist movements were growing in other parts of Africa, both the Belgian authority and the
Tutsi oligarchy in Rwanda experienced power weakening. The weakening, of course, was relative to
the protests being levelled against the existing state of affairs. The fact that there was vocal protest
in Rwanda meant that some action would have to be taken. Fifty years of European contact had
intensified, not ameliorated, the problem of inequalities in Rwanda. Distribution of these inequalities
largely along ethnic and caste lines provided ammunition for protesters against the status quo, while,
as Atterbury put it, "it diminished chances for a democratisation which would not threaten Tutsi
heqemony'.w
Under these conditions, response in the decision-making arena would be crucial, for the nature of
the response would determine whether protesters-could be satisfied within the existing framework, or
whether they would attempt to destroy the established system and reconstruct one more amenable
to their aspirations. Unfortunately, colonial rule in Rwanda had done little to prepare the system to
meet the demands that would be placed upon it during the period 1956-1959.311
In 1957, Hutu educated elite issued a document, "Le Manifeste des Bahutu"312 in which the
1959, p. 25, no. 21, and p. 27.
309 Atterbury, Revolution in Rwanda, at 36.
310 ld., at 38.
311 In Rwanda, as in the Congo, Belgium misjugded the amount of time left for preparing the colony for independence.
For example, Antoine Van Bi/sen, a critic of colonial policy, proposed a thirty-year plan for the gradual decolonisation of
the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. But Belgian authorities regarded even thirty years as much too short a time. Although
Van Bi/sen misjudged the amount of time left for Belgium to initiate reforms, he did recognise the precarious nature of his
country's position in Africa. He emphasised the need for consensual rule in the colonies, and noted that a small country
like Belgium, militarily weak, would be unable to overcome serious (violent) challenges to its authority. Moreover, world
opinion would not sanction the brutal application of force. He argued that "A single mandate justifies colonisation -that is
consent, the attachment of the indigenous population to those who are their educators, to those who have brought them
the key to a new and better world, of well-being and liberty". Van Bi/sen, Vers I'indépendance du Congo et du Ruanda-
Urundi, at 175. In 1957, Van Bi/sen issued a warning concerning the Hutu problem: "We must make a concerted attempt
to emancipate the Hutu, to educate the rural population, to replace clanic solidarity with social interaction". Van Bi/sen,
A., "P/aidoyer pour /e Plan de Trente ans" in: Vers I'indépendance du Congo et du Ruanda-Urundi, p. 231.
312 The text, written in French under the title "Le Manifeste des Bahutu" can be found in Nkundabagenzi, F., Rwanda
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signatories argued against eliminating legal distinctions among Tutsi, Hutu and Twa. Only by
maintaining the distinctions could one determine (in statistical terms) the extent to which progress
was being made toward more egalitarian political structures. The Hutus, calling for an end to the
Tutsi monopoly of economic, social, and political power in the country, issued a warning:
It is not as revolutionaries (in the pejorative sense of the word) but as collaborators, aware of our
social duty, that we have sought to warn the authorities of the dangers which will inevitably be
created sooner or later by the de facto maintenance - even if only in a negative fashion - of a
racist monopoly over Rwanda.w
What was mostly underlined was the importance of the European presence, and the signatories
were asking the Belgians to "not leave the country to self-government, until the inequalities in the
system have been removed">
It has been remarked that from 1956 to 1959 the protests were mainly verbal - carried out through
activity in the press, and through requests addressed to the incumbent authorities. There were no
demonstrations or riots. It is important to recall here the important but ambiguous role played by the
Catholic Church. On one side, it contributed to the maintenance of the status quo by supporting the
principle of indirect rule, thus favouring the ruling class in education and evangelisation. On the other
side, on the basis of the principle of equality, there were important exceptions to that practice, which
enabled a number of Hutus to study in seminaries. These variations in the attitude of the Church
resulted in the development of two types of elite with different historical terms of reference, different
ethnic bases and different social orientations. The Church had even opened journalism to educated
Hutus who wished to rise on the social ladder. As a number of Hutu élite had been educated in
mission schools, access to mission presses was an important factor in their ability to publish
complaints against the systern.»
Prior to the visit of the United Nations' Working Group to Rwanda from April 22 to May 7, 1959, Hutu
leaders, Gitera and Kayibanda, had issued a joint Communiqué proclaiming that their groups only
demanded equal rights for the inhabitants of Rwanda, and that they had no personal grudges
against the Tutsis. It declared that the crucial problem in the country was the monopoly of political
power by one "race", the Tutsi, the political monopoly being the basis of an economic, social and
Politique 1958-1960, Bruxelles: C.R.I.S.P., 1962, p. 20-29.
313 U. N. Trusteeship Council, Report of the Visiting Mission, T/1402 (1957), Annex I. Translated by Atterbury, Revolution
in Rwanda, at 49.
314 Ibid.
315 Id., at 49-50.
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cultural monopoly; and it proposed a number of reforms, including redistribution of land, for the
democratisation of the country.w The Tutsis issued a bitter response. Their conservative forces
launched a campaign of denigration against Hutu leaders, especially Kayibanda, MunyangajLf317and
Gitera, whom they accused of selling out to the Belgians, and of taking bribes to oppose the
monarchy and the autonomy of the country.»
The reaction of the Tutsi élite to these developments was highly defensive. Starting in 1954, they
went on an open counter-offensive, first of all against the liberal Tutsis such as Chief Prosper
Bwanakweri and his group of young Tutsis from Astrida (now Butare). These were young educated
Tutsis of the best families who, as observed by Prunier, not only sympathised with "progressive"
ideas, but also thought that they should be used in the reform of their own society, as well as against
the colonisers.w After the 1953 elections, Chief Bwanakweri, who was trying to liberalise social
relationships in his own chieftaincy, was targeted by the Mwami, who asked the Belgians to "deport"
him as a "dangerous" and "subversive" element. 320 He was sent no farther than Kibuye, where he
was detained, but his political marginalization nipped in the bud any possibility of reform from within
the systern.»
Meanwhile, parties were being formed on an ethnic basis, beginning with the Mouvement Social
Muhutu (MSM). Founded in June 1957 by Kayibanda, who later became President of the Republic of
Rwanda, the movement was committed to a programme indistinguishable from that of the
Manifesto.322 Due to differences in political perspectives, two national political parties were formed.
Gitera, one of the signatories of the Manifesto, left the MSM in November 1957 to create the
Association pour la Promotion de la Masse (APROSOMA). Although the objectives of this party were
to mobilise the common people, both Hutus and Tutsis, in a programme of social and political reform,
316CRISP, Courrier Africain, NO.3, CRISP, No. 51, p. 13.
317Aloys Munyangaju, a native of Save in Butare was an active journalist. In 1958 he became editor of Temps Nouveaux
d'Afrique, a missionary newspaper published in Bujumbura, Burundi. In 1959 he published a tract defending the Hutu
position (/'Actualité politique au Rwanda). Munyangaju favoured liberalisation of the system through abolition of caste
distinctions and introduction of democratic reforms. U.N., Trusteeship Council, Report of the Visiting Mission, T/1538,
1960, par. 149. In October 1959, Munyangaju became President of the APROSOMA party after Joseph Gitera left.
CRISP, Courrier Africain No.3., CRISP No. 51, p. 13.
3181bid.
319Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, at 46.
320Atterbury observed that Bwanakweri was an "outspoken advocate of agrarian reform" after the ubuhake was
abolished, and had started taking "action in favour of the less privileged". Atterbury, Revolution in Rwanda, at 52.
321Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, at 46.
322See Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, at 151.
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the practice showed that it attracted almost no one but Hutus.323 These two parties confronted the
Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) founded in 1959 and which, although ostensibly dedicated to
"the union of all Rwandans for the purpose of achieving true progress in all spheres", and under the
nominal presidency of a Hutu, Franqois Rukeba, was clearly intended to serve as the instrument of
Tutsi supremacy. Its members were mainly Tutsi notables known for their nationalist tendencies.> It
was "strongly monarchist and hostile to the Belgians, and defended the idea of immediate
independence've Unexpectedly, but logically within the Cold War context of the late 1950's, UNAR
began to receive money and diplomatic backing from the Communist countries in the United Nations
Trusteeship Council. The result was to deepen the antagonism between the Tutsis and the Belgian
authorities immediately. As the last Belgian Vice-Governor General wrote in his memoirs:
From then on, the unspoken agreement which the administration had made in the 1920s with the
Tutsi ruling caste in order to further economic development ... was allowed to collapse, also
tacitly. The Tutsis wanted independence and were trying to get it as quickly as possible by
sabotaging Belgian actions, whether technical or political ... The administration was forced to
toughen its attitude when faced with such obstruction and hostility coming from chiefs and sub-
chiefs with whom we had collaborated for so many years.w
As the Belgians wanted to counter UNAR they had released Chief Bwanakweri who, in September
1959, had created the Rassemblement Démocratique Rwandais (RADER). This moderate party was
hampered by several difficulties. A mainly Tutsi party, it was frowned upon by the monarchist die-
hards, while the Hutus never quite managed to trust its liberalism. Also because of its initial Belgian
sponsorship, it was constantly accused of being "a government plan in the polltlcal lanoscape't= As
a consequence, Chief Bwanakweri always remained on the fringe of the real action, and liberal Tutsi
opinion never had a serious chance of prevailing.
Meanwhile, in order to show a break-off of relations with the monarchy, Grégoire Kayibanda had
transformed his movement and in October 1959 the MSM had become the Mouvement
Démocratique Républicain/Parti du Mouvement et de l'Emancipation Hutu (MDR-PARMEHUTU).
The word "Parmehutu" was retained because it contained "Hutu" as an attraction for the majority of
the population. Other parties were formed, but because of failing to make significant impact, they
would leave the field to the two protagonists in this process of polarisation, UNAR and
323 Rushayija, S., Le Rwanda en état de révolution. Pladoyer pour la démocratisation in Revue Nouvelle, 1960, p. 507;
Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, at 47.
324 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, at 158.
325 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, at 47.
326 Harroi, J.P., Rwanda, du féodalisme il la démocratie (1955-1962), Brussels: Hayez, 1984, p. 241.
327 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, at 48.
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PARMEHUTU, known respectively as the parties of Tutsi dominance and of Hutu challenge.328
Unlike in pre-colonial Rwanda where ethnic polarisation had the appearance of common agreement
by both Hutus and Tutsis, there now was a new polarisation marked with tensions. From their efforts
to eliminate the growing discrepancy between egalitarian values on one hand, and traditional values
and institutions on the other, a .kind of social disequilibrium was developing between the norms of the
traditional society and the aspirations of the new group of emancipated Hutu intellectuals. The most
important thing to mention is the ideological polarisation accompanying the political parties and
accentuating the predisposition to engage in violence. In the PARMEHUTU manifesto, the Hutus
declared that they had no hatred for the Tutsis and that the concern was to up-lift the Hutus who had
been kept backward under feudalism. "They would combine their efforts to aid their brothers, but
they would be happy to collaborate with those Tutsis who loved Rwanda and recognised the
injustices suffered not only by the Hutus, but also by "the petits Tutsis". On the other side, UNAR
appealed to all Rwandans regardless of ethnic, social, or religious differences "to defend a common
cause seeking the political, economic, social and cultural emancipation of the country"; it presented
itself as sensitive to the problems of group relations, and as committed to the fight against all forms
of provocation to racial hatred.>
Kupe(330 has made a very important observation by which one could prove that the future of Rwanda
was looming dark and predict the trend of the post-independence State. First, whereas the
PARMEHUTU manifesto was concerned with ethnic discrimination against Hutus and sought the
eradication of inequality and the establishment of a democratic and egalitarian society», the UNAR
manifesto ignored the issues of discrimination against Hutus and of Tutsi hereditary privilege,
concentrating on a wide series of reforms and measures for development. According to Kuper, there
was a commitment to democratic conceptions, and to universal suffrage, but this did not easily
accord with elitist reservations in its Foundation Charter, to the effect that "Rwandan society was
composed of individuals of very unequal values, that it was not equitable to give the same weight to
the vulgar thought of the ordinary person as to the perspicacious judgement of the capable man; that
328 For details about political parties in Rwanda, see Nkundabagenzi, Rwanda Politique, 1962; Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit
au Rwanda, 1985.
329 Nkundabagenzi, F., Evolution de la structure politique du Rwanda, thesis, UCL, 1961, p. 95-101.
330 Kuper, The pity of it all, at 178-179.
331 The PARMEHUTU manifesto is reproduced in Nkundabagenzi, Rwanda Politique, at 113-121. The PARMEHUTU
program originally did not call for abolition of the monarchy, but for a constitutional monarchy which would favour the
introduction of democratic structures. It called for the democratization of administrative structures (Le. allowing Hutu
access to official positions), promised the vote to women, and expressed the desire that there be five to seven years of
experience with democratic institutions in the country before independence should be granted.
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universal suffrage would inevitably result in the subordination of the lettered minority by the
uncultivated majority, a situation which would prolong slavery; but that it was nevertheless
impossible to deny universal suffrage to the Hutus and that manifest opposition would provide the
colonialists with more ammunition".332 In its discussion of human relations in its Manifesto, "UNAR's
real concern was with ethnic relations between Black and White, and not with the issues of Hutu-
Tutsi relations raised by PARMEHUTU333,that is, the problem concerned Belgians and not Hutus.
In terms of immediate major objectives and the main concern being the liberation of the people, the
PARMEHUTU manifesto argued the necessity for abolition of the colonisation of Black by Black
being a necessary condition for true independence, whereas UNAR, committed to immediate
independence, denounced the idea of internal autonomy as a "ridiculous, destructive, divisive
collaboration". These ideological differences were part of the struggle for power between traditional
authorities hoping to maintain their existing dominance in an independent Rwanda and a new elite
seeking radical change in the political structure under Belgian tutelage as a preliminary condition to
independence, in which they might hope to rule as representatives of the enfranchised maiority.>
On November 1, 1959, ethnic violence broke out as a result of a leader of the PARMEHUTU party,
Dominique Mbonyumutwa, being attacked along his way by young UNAR militants. As rumour had it
that he was killed, groups of Hutus organised demonstrations in Gitarama, which culminated in a
jacquerie throughout the country. With Tutsis reacting, hundreds of people died, houses were burnt
and about ten thousand people went into exile.335Meanwhile, the Belgian government responded by
sending troops to the country and a decree on a state of emergency, initially enacted for Congo-
Beige, was extended to Rwanda.336Contrary to contemporary expectations, however, the Belgian
military did not attempt to crush the Hutu revolt, but adopted a de facto pro-Hutu policy through the
installation of a military-led administration and the appointment of more than 300 Hutu chiefs and
332The Foundation Charter of the UNAR, adopted in a meeting held on August 15, 1959 reads: "Bien que la société
rwandaise soit composée d'individus de valeur tres inégale, et qu'il n'est pas équitable d'accorder la même valeur il la
pensée vulgaire de I'homme ordinaire qu'au jugement perspicace de I'homme capable; Bien que le suffrage universel
aboutira infailliblement il I'asservissement de la minorité lettrée par la majorité inculte, situation qui prolongera
l'esclavage ... II est cependant impossible de refuser le suffrage universel aux Bahutu. Une opposition manifeste
donnerait un argument de plus aux colonialistes .... Si la minorité Tutsi est vraiment capable et il la hauteur des
événements, elle doit, par son energie, influer sur I'opinion publique, étonner le monde par son organisation, son
endurance, sa discipline .... L'organisation immédiate de notre parti ... s'empressera de mater la sottise et la trahison
commune aux êtres incapables de la plus élémentaire abstraction. Murego, La Révolution Rwandaise, at 821; Reynljens,
Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda.
333Murego, Id., at 821.
334 Kuper, The pity of it all, at 179.
335For details about the jacquerie and its consequences, see Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 260-264.
336B.O.R.U., 1960, p. 759. It was extended by OR.U. No. 221/109 of 10 May 1960 (See B.OR.u, 1960, P. 759).
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sub-chiefs to replace the Tutsi incumbent after their flight, transfer, resignation or physical
elirnination.w As the territory was under a state of emergency, it became difficult for the Belgian
military authority to transmit orders and messages to the population in the customary order of
Mwami-chief-sub-chief. Colonel Logiest, the Special Resident, decided to appoint Hutus in the
vacancies that were created and in many others after dismissal of a great number of Tutsis.338 He
considered that in such a situation of Hutu revolt, Hutu chiefs and sub-chiefs would be better
understood and obeyed by the population than Tutsis, mostly since Tutsis were chased by the same
population and that it was the duty of the colonial administration to restore public order and
security.w
In reaction, the Mwami protested against the changes. He sent a telegram to the Belgian parliament
and to the Minister of Congo-Beige and Ruanda-Urundi requesting the rehabilitation of the dismissed
Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs, but to no avail.340 Colonel Logiest now promoted the political
emancipation of the Hutu. As the Mwami, his court and the UNAR were deprived of Tutsi chiefs and
sub-chiefs, they had lost their traditional power over the population. According to Logiest, there were
two options: either to keep supporting the Tutsi structure or opening the country to democratization.
He considered that the first option would not serve the interests of the majority of the population,
while the second would imply a rapid lndependence.si This contention was indeed logical but
incomplete since, as far as Tutsis and Hutus were concerned, it lacked proposals as to what could
be done to ensure that Tutsis would not be persecuted and that their fundamental rights and
freedoms would be respected.
By the decree of 25 November 1959342, the sous-chefferies became communes, juristic persons with
a chairperson assisted by a council whose members were elected for 3 years by 150 adults each.
The chair was appointed by the Mwami upon proposition made by the council and the advice of the
Resident. He had authority to make administrative and police regulations. As can be seen, the
337 Out of 45 chiefs in place before the revolt, 23 had lost their position whereas out of 489 sub-chiefs, 158 had lost their
positions. Nkundabagenzi, Rwanda Politique, at 157.
338 In May 1960, the Belgian authorities confirmed the new policy through the setting up of a military territorial guard of
650 men, based on ethnic proportionality, with 85% Hutus and 15% Tutsis. Newbury, The cohesion of oppression, at
197.
339 Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 268-269. On March 1, 1960, about 50% of chiefs and sub-chiefs were Hutu,
and APROSOMA, PARMEHUTU, or RADER militants had replaced most of UNAR members. Kagame, A., La poésie
pastorale au Rwanda, at 279.
340 Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 270.
341 Logouts, G., A Propos de "Le Rwanda, son effort de development", in: Chronique de politique étrangere, 1972, p. 669.
342 Decree regulating the political organization of Ruanda-Urundi, B.O.R.U., 1960, p. 372.
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traditional administrative duality between the colonial administration and customary organization was
in the process of suppression, mostly since the commune was almost becoming autonomous from
the central administration. That is, incumbent Hutus were becoming more important than the Tutsi
sub-chiefs were.
On 6 February 1960, a national council composed of 2 members from each of the four main political
parties (APROSOMA, PARMEHUTU, RADER and UNAR) was established as a government,
replacing all the traditional central structures. Although the Mwami was the head of this government
under the supervision of the Resident, he protested against the new structure, arguing that it would
destroy the country by its economic, social and administrative reforms.» Again, there was no
reaction to the Mwamfs protest. The people now fond themselves to be in the presence of a
monarchic regime in which the king became the legalized dignitary while the political and
administrative activities fell under the power of the government and the Resident, who was about to
step down. On the other side, however, it would have been an opportunity for Hutus and Tutsis to
discuss their fundamental problem under the chairmanship of the Mwami and the supervision of the
Resident and, probably, the United Nations, but, unfortunately, no one made such a proposal at this
stage.
1.3.4.2 Establishment of a suspicious order
Communal elections were scheduled for 27 June 1960.344 However, on 23 March 1960, under the
conseil national, the four political parties submitted proposals for pacifying the country to Mwami
Kigeri V. According to their document, the Mwami would become a constitutional monarch and
symbols of the traditional regime would be suppressed. In particular, one person in a cabinet
appointed by the Mwami would represent each party; the council would approve all the decrees
enacted by the Mwami; and abiru as well as Kalinga would be suppressed. However, the king
rejected these proposals= on the ground that they were "contrary to custom and a provocation to the
monarcby'.» In reaction, APROSOMA, RADER and PARMEHUTU agreed to form a common front
and informed King Baudouin of Belgium and the Minister of Congo-Beige and Ruanda-Urundi that
they were dissatisfied with and no longer collaborating with the Mwami, since he had "refused to
343 Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 276.
344 O.R.U No. 221/73 of 10 March 1960 (B.O.R.U, 1960, p. 425) as modified by O.R.U., No. 221/134 of 3 June 1960
(B.O.R.u.p. 958)
345 See letter dated 23 April 1960 reproduced in Nkundabagenzi, at 201-202.
346 Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 276.
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collaborate with his people". They requested a "ministerial" decision on that rnatter.w On the other
side, the UNAR had decided to stand aside. It ordered its members to resign from the conseil
national and announced its refusal to participate in the planned communal elections. Any member
taking part in the national council and/or in communal elections "will be excluded from the party".348
Moreover, UNAR appealed to the United Nations Organization to cancel the elections because they
were "undemocratic", but this was not the view of the United Nations according to whom the
elections were the prerequisite for democratization of institutions as they would enable Rwandans to
freely choose their leaders, as it would also be an occasion for political parties to prove their actual
power.349The traditional sociopolitical organization of the country was now falling into decline, mostly
since even the Résident Général declared to have received order "to put an end to the feudal
structure and to replace it by democratic siruciures'.» Moreover, as the territory was under the state
of emergency following the jacquerie, no public meeting was allowed and official information was the
only means of informing the population. As a consequence, it was not possible for UNAR to boycott
the elections. Another factor in the decline of the traditional organization was the colloquium that
Belgium agreed to organize in Brussels from 30 May to 7 June 1960, according to the
recommendations of the United Nations Visiting Mission of March 1960. It was supposed to gather
the Mwami and representatives of political parties, but the Mwami and the UNAR did not attend.»
Despite this absence, important decisions were taken: the administration would organize a campaign
of information regarding Kalinga and the abiru; the national council would have more power; and
inciting the population to abstain from voting would become an oftence.w These decisions were
important because they concerned a new step of political evolution. But they were also contrary to
the interests of the Mwami and UNAR, who were absent. This absence marked the gap between the
colonial administration and the Tutsis as far as changes were concerned, a gap which was becoming
greater while Hutus were getting closer to power, which, apparently would be mono-ethnic. The
intransigence and indecision of the Mwami and the Tutsis during that crucial time did not give chance
to the search of a peaceful transition to the formation of a viable state, which would probably have
347Telegram dated 30 April 1960 reproduced Nkundabagenzi, Rwanda Politique, at 202.
348 The message was issued by foreign-based UNAR. In fact, after the jacquerie, a number of party leaders had gone
into exile, especially in Tanganyika, from where they led the Rwanda-based UNAR. Reynljens, Pouvair et droit au
Rwanda, at 277.
349Report of the Conseil de Tutelle, 26th Session, 1120th meeting, 1960, p. 24.
350 Ruanda-Urundi 1960, in: Bulletin d'information infor-Congo, 1960, NO.4, p. 11. Author's translation.
351 One should note that the colloquium was composed of the members of the national council minus UNAR
representatives.
352 For more details about the symposium's decisions, see Nkundabagenzi, Rwanda Politique, at 262.
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safeguarded the monarchy and avoided persecution of Tutsis.
Despite the boycott organized by the UNAR, and joined by RADER353,the first "democratic" elections
took place between 26 June and 30 July 1960 and 229 burgomasters and 2896 communal
councilors were elected. Overall, the MDR-PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA obtained the absolute
majority in 211 communes, while the RADER had the majority in 6 communes and the UNAR in one
comrnune.« In their plans to boycott the elections, the UNAR and RADER had portrayed the
elections as "anti-démocratiques," arguing that the Belgian administration was behind the
PARMEHUTU terrorism. They warned that a civil war would break out if UN forces did not replace
Belgian troops.« This reliance on external forces to solve the political crisis shows the distrust Tutsis
had in the Belgian administration and the fear of losing their dominance over Hutus. But it also
shows that Rwandans were not prepared to solve their own political problems from the beginning of
their "democracy". This inability would reappear during successive periods of ethnic strife through
1993 when Rwandans would be led by foreign powers to negotiate their own peace, which would fail
and lead to genocide.
Meanwhile, as the Tutsi power was in abeyance, communal elections gave Hutus an opportunity to
monopolize all indigenous political and administrative power at a crucial level: the local level of daily
contact with the population. Contrary to the United Nations' report that the elections "offered
sufficient guarantees ... "356,this sudden disintegration of the ancien régime without an adequate
transitional period during which Rwandans could learn political tolerance led certain Hutu leaders to
retaliate instead of to adopt a policy of unity. Throughout this period, the ethnic confrontation not only
continued, but escalated in certain areas, with mainly Tutsis being killed, expelled or exiled, while
others were arbitrarily arrested, pursued, and/or forced to buy PARMEHUTU membership cards; in
certain communes, Tutsis were dismissed from their jobs in the administration, arrested, and had
their houses burnt and pillaged, without any reaction from the Belgian admlnlstratlon.w King Kigeli V
himself opted to leave Rwanda on June 29, 1960, officially to attend independence celebrations in
the Congo. However, he, together with a number of other opposing Tutsis, never returned.«
353RADER withdrew from the common front in July on the ground that the MDR-PARMEHUTU was terrorist and
intimidatory. Reynljens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 281.
354 For details, see Reyntjens, Id., at 283.
355Ibid.
356Kundt, Colonization or Dictatorship?, at 11.
357Gravel, P., Remera: A Community in Eastern Rwanda, Paris: Mouton, 1968, p. 53.
358King Kigeri V lives now in refuge in the United States of America. He is appealing to Rwandans to let him go back
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After the elections, the national council was abolished and a provisional council of forty-eight
members and a provisional government were establlshed.w After consultation with principal political
parties, the Resident nominated the members of the council: thirty-one from PARMEHUTU, nine
from RADER, seven from APROSOMA, and one from AREDETWA.360 Grégoire Kayibanda was
nominated as the head of the government. As King Kigeri V had left the country361,he protested
against the establishment of the provisional government. In his two telegrams to the United Nations
Secretary General and King Baudouin of Belgium he stated that the government was based on
communal elections imposed by the Belgian government: "... les élections communales
préfabriquées par le gouvernement Belge sous la terreur de /'occupation militaire .... '362 Within the
United Nations' General Assembly, Belgium was facing criticism regarding its policy in Ruanda-
Urundi. From December 1960 to June 1962, the United Nations called for reconciliation with both the
Mwami and imprisoned Tutsi representatives on different occasions. However, these protests had no
effect and the disintegration of the ancien régime proceeded, with appointment of Hutus as deputy
administrators of the territory who would later become préfets.363
Another colloquium was organized by Belgium in Gisenyi from 7 to 14 December 1960 in order to
prepare internal autonomy and legislative elections scheduled for January 15, 1961. It gathered 6
representatives of the provisional government and thirteen delegates of political parties, seven from
MDR-PARMEHUTU, two from APROSOMA, two from RADER and two from UNAR. Amongst other
issues on the agenda was the date of elections. The UNAR and RADER opposed the 15 January
date on the ground that it was too early for the pacification of the country, while MDR-PARMEHUTU
and APROSOMA clung to that date on the ground of it being the "deadline for lndepencence".» This
divergence of views was also reflected in the plans presented for the 15th session of the United
Nations General Assembly. The UNAR and RADER called for the direct intervention of the United
Nations to realize unity in the country; the suppression of Tutsi war-displaced camps in Nyamata and
Kibungo; the reintegration of refugees and compensation for their lost properties; the immediate
withdrawal of Belgian troops; the dissolution of both the provisional council and the government; and
home to restore the monarchy as a solution to the human rights problem in the country. Letter dated April 23, 1998,
Rwandanet, Thu, 21 May 1998.
359 Ordonnance Législative No. 221/275 of October 18,1960, B.O.R.U., 1960, p. 1780.
360Ordonnance No. 221/276 of 18 October 1960, B.O.R.U., 1960, P. 1820.
361The kingship was however not legally suppressed.
362 Reprinted in Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 285.
363 Paternostre de la Mairieu, at 225.
364 Higiro, J., La décolonisation du Rwanda et le role de I'ONU 1946-62, Thesis, University of Monréal, 1975, p. 160.
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the organization of democratic legislative and communal elections by the United Nations. MDR-
PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA called for the deposition of King Kigeri V; the immediate and
unconditional abolition of the monarchy, the abiru and Kalinga; the organization of elections under
the control of the United Nations, and the institution of a government and an elected Republican
Presldent.» After the Visiting Mission of the United Nations' Trusteeship Council, the UN General
Assembly adopted resolution 1579 (XV) on the future of Ruanda-Urundi: it recommended a
conference gathering representatives of political parties and UN observers at the beginning of 1961,
before elections, in order to reconcile the differences among the parties and to realize national
harrnony=: and the postponement sine die of the elecuons.w Regarding the Mwamiship, it
recommended that Belgium should organize a referendum under the supervision of the UN
Commission for Ruanda-Urundi.se As can be seen, the UN resolutions favored UNAR and RADER,
as a result of which a situation arose in which the UN supported the losing party on the ground
(Tutsis), at least in its claims, while the rising party (Hutus) was supported by the Belgian
administration which was supposed to carry out UN decisions. The greatest weakness of the UN was
that they did not manage to find ways to realize the possibility of national harmony contained in
Resolution 1579. The entire job was left to Belgium369, who believed that the country should be given
internal autonomy and that the republic should replace the monarchy in the nearest future, without
assessing the viability of the subsequent State. In particular, the fundamental question whether
Hutus and Tutsis were prepared to live together in peace in the envisaged Republic was not given
particular attention. But the Hutu-Tutsi antagonism was quite obvious throughout the Rwandan
history, which Belgians knew better than any other foreigner, and the ethnicization of political parties
on which the United Nations and the Belgian government were basing their attitudes was not
conducive to reconciliation. With power about to be handed over to Hutus who had no experience of
democracy in a country whose population had developed along ideas of Tutsi supremacy and
strangeness, as well as colonial absolutism, any expectation with regard to the promotion and
365 United Nations' Organization, Fourth Commission, Report of the 15th Session, 1065th-1 067th meetings, p. 401-418.
366 UN, A/RES/1579 (XV), 20/12/1960, Section 4, reproduced in Décolonisation et Indépendance du Rwanda et du
Burundi, in: Chronique de politique étrangére, 1963, p. 569-570.
367 Id., section 7.
368 UN, A/RES/1580 (XV), 20.12.1960.
369 It happened as if the United Nations had no authority over Belgium in Rwandan matters. For example the Belgian
administration was intransigent on the question concerning the return of King Kigeri who had left the country in June
1960. By resolution 1580 (XV), the UN General Assembly had requested the Belgian administration to withdraw its
decision on the suspension of the powers of the King and to facilitate his return to Rwanda and allow him to keep his
functions until the referendum. Belgium returned back the request from Nyerere, Prime Minister of Tanganyika, to allow
Kigeri to land at Bujumbura airport. The UN Commission recognized that Belgium's refusal was a violation of UN
resolutions but failed to find a remedy. For details, see Higiro, La décolonisation du Rwanda et Ie role de I'ONU, 1975.
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protection of human rights in the forthcoming State would have no basis. A fortiori, the results would
have been the same, or perhaps even worse, should the situation have developed in favor of the
Tutsis, if one is to believe that "you cannot give what you do not have".370It is against this short-
sightedness that elections were prepared, that the "Republic" was established and that Hutus took
over from Tutsis.
Meanwhile, from 7 to 12 January 1961, Belgium had organized a colloquium according to Resolution
1579 (XV) in Ostende, where all political parties were represented. It was decided, inter alia, that
elections should be postponed but held before the end of the year.371 Belgium, however, granted
internal autonomy on 15 January 1961372and recognized the powers and attributions of the
provisional Gonsel/ du Rwanda and the government, both composed almost entirely of Hutus. On 28
January 1961, the Prime Minister, Grégoire Kayibanda, announced the deposition of King Kigeri V
and the abolition of abiru and Ka/inga. Moreover, the red, yellow and green flag became the symbol
of the new Rwanda, which was now a Republic= The Minister of the Interior invited political parties
to present candidates for presidential elections and only MDR-PARMEHUTU, APROSOMA,
AREDETWA and APADEC participated, since the UNAR and RADER had decided to withdraw from
the electoral process.v- Dominique Mbonyumutwa, a PARMEHUTU candidate, was elected
President of the Republic at 83% and the assembly, as well as the government, was also almost
exclusively Hutu375, as the traditional State was exclusively Tutsi.
This "seizure of power from above" was indeed supported by the Special Resident, Colonel Logiest,
who had assured the provisional government that, in case the Republic was proclaimed, he would
facilitate its organization and do everything to appease his superior authorities in Brussels and the
United Nations in New York. According to him, these initiatives were not contrary to the Belgian
policy, which was to set Rwanda on the road to independence under dernocracy.w Although there is
no evidence that Belgians aided and abetted Hutus in killing Tutsis, expelling them from their
traditional positions and/or forcing them into exile, the fact that the Belgian administration had the
monopoly on armed forces suggests that the "Hutu revolution" would not have taken place without
370Jimmy Cliff song, 1979.
371Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 288.
372 Ordonnance Législative No. 02/16 of 15 January 1961, B.O.R.U., 1961, p. 228-243.
373Paternostre de la Mairieu, at 299.
374Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 290.
375Except for the Ministries of Defense and External Relations which were held by Belgians. Kagame, La poésie
pastorale au Rwanda, at 309.
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the support of Belgium. The revolution itself could be defended inasmuch as it was aimed at
eradicating a form of internal oppression, but the fact that it was mainly supported by a foreign power
which, paradoxically, had just previously been the main supporter of the ancien régime, and that, in
any case, civil society was not given a chance to flourish, was not predictive of a successful post-
colonial state.377
However, the United Nations adopted a different attitude. While the Belgian administration vaunted
the victory of PARMEHUTU as that of a "parti populaire" that had won more than 70% of the seats in
communal councils and expressed the impatience of party leaders for undelayed political chanqe=,
the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 1605 (XV) according to which resolutions 1579 (XV)
and 1580 (XV) were maintained and parliamentary elections would be organized in August 1961,
with universal and direct suffrage for adults. Moreover, it recommended the institution of a broad-
based transitional government while awaiting the elections and appointed a Special Commission to
help and advise the administrative authority with regard to the implementation of its resolutions.
However, due to the lack of common agreement between the different political parnes=, the Belgian
administration enacted a laVfl80suspending the Hutu-based transitional government and assembly
and conferring their attribution to the colonial administration. This, however, was mere hypocrisy,
because Hutu ministers and burgomasters kept their positions and material benefits.381As a result,
intimidation and violence from the two main parties, MDR-PARMEHUTU and UNAR, accompanied
the election campaign. In mid-September 1961, it was reported that 150 people had been killed, 300
houses burnt down and 22,000 people forced into exile in Astrida (now Butare).382 However, the two
parties were not dealt with on an equal footing with regard to the criminal activities of their members:
assassinations and other violence committed by UNAR members were sternly punished and
influential party members were arbitrarily arrested, whereas crimes committed by PARMEHUTU
members, who most often were burgomasters and communal councilors, were not punished.
According to the United Nations Commission, a PARMEHUTU dictatorship was establishing itself
376 Reyntjens, Pouvair et droit au Rwanda, at 294.
377 For details about civil society in Rwanda, see Chapter two.
378 See for example the preamble of the Ordonnance Legislative of 15 January 1961, B.O.R.U., 1961, p. 228.
379 Reyntjens says without specifying that the UNAR and RADER required key ministries while the PARMEHUTU was
not ready to relinquish and wanted them to take peripheral ministries. Reynljens, Pouvair et droit au Rwanda, at 298.
380Ordonnance Législative No. 01/256 of 5 August 1961; Ordonnance Législative No. 01/260 of 7 August 1961.
381U.N.O., Rapport 4/4994, No. 129.
382Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, at 195.
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and a repressive regime was replacing the other.383
Election results showed that the PARMEHUTU had won with 77.5% (thirty-five seats), UNAR
obtained 16.8% (seven seats) and APROSOMA 3.5% (two seats); and that the monarchy and King
Kigeri V were ruled out by 80% of the voters.> These results were confirmed by Ordonnance
Législative No. 021322 of 10 October 1961, and after Grégoire Kayibanda was elected President of
the Republic by the new National Assembly, he presented his cabinet containing no UNAR
rnember.w Although the UNAR petitioned the PARMEHUTU before the United Nations for its
inclusion in government and that PARMEHUTU agree to surrender two rnlnistrles=, as well as a
number of posts of secretary of State, prefects and sub-prefects proportional to UNAR's number of
seats in parliament (Le. two prefects and two sub-prefects), the sociopolitical power of Tutsis had
come to an end. More important is that there, again, was an appeal to an external authority to solve
the problem of internal division among Hutus and Tutsis, which points to the failure of the Belgian
mandate to "prepare Rwandans for their self-government and enforcement of their rights". Hutus and
Tutsis were not ready for political cohabitation yet, since they had not had time to do so during the
colonial era and a fortiori during the pre-colonial era. It is not surprising that the PARMEHUTU did
not keep its agreement to integrate Tutsis in the local and national government. In fact, a number of
posts supposed to be surrendered to UNAR remained in the hands of PARMEHUTU.387 This reveals
the lack of faith of the PARMEHUTU agreement and it will be seen that PARMEHUTU members
would even occupy the 2 UNAR ministries. After the Hutu regime, it would also be seen that Tutsis
would use similar faithless strategies to exclude Hutus from rule. Meanwhile, despite the
uncertainties that related to the viability of the post-colonial State, Rwanda became independent on
1 July 1962, without a constnunon.» Accordingly, the Charte Coloniale became null and void, and
the relations between Belgium and Rwanda became those between sovereign States. However,
Colonel Logiest was appointed Belgian Ambassador to Rwanda while the top Belgian civil servants
who had been under the authority of the Rwandan government since the granting of internal
autonomy continued their services as technical assistants according to the accord on technical
383UN, Interim Report of the Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, Doc. A/4706, P. 51.
384 Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 303.
385Kagame, La poésie pastorale au Rwanda, at 328.
386During the reshuffle of May 1962, UNAR was given the Ministries of Agriculture and Public Health. Reyntjens, Pouvoir
et droit au Rwanda, at 305.
387Kagame, La poésie pastorale au Rwanda, at 331-332.
388Id., at 341.
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cooperation between the two counfries.w
It now was clear that the support previously given to Tutsis - being the superior race, able to govern,
well organized and accepted by their subjects - was transferred to Hutus as a result of the policy of
indirect rule. It does not seem that Belgians, at the beginning of colonization, had planned to, one
day, hand over the power to Hutus. It is obvious that the administration thought that some changes
would take place, but the policy of maintaining the traditional system and the protection of Hutus
from exploitation was itself ambiguous and Belgians did not know exactly what to do in order to, one
day, assist Rwandans to be able "to govern themselves and observe their rights". That a number of
legal and political measures were taken in order to "civilize" Rwandan is undeniable. But if Belgians
were really committed to a democratic Rwanda, they let themselves be cheated by the appearance
of everything going well, and the belief that Rwandan people were able to absorb those influences
so quickly. Belgians did not know how to instill tolerance in Rwandan minds. After all, there was no
assurance that the traditional system - apparently agreed upon - under which Hutus and Tutsis had -
been living for about six centuries was not going to be altered within the fifty years during which it
was supported by the colonists.
One can also agree that, although the Belgian support had increased the Tutsi authorities' capability
to exploit, Hutus had become confident through education, international evolution and the
progressive awareness that the system no longer fulfilled its functions.w On one hand, however,
there was no guarantee that Tutsis would be treated on an equal footing, or even as politically
inferior, to Hutus. On the other hand, there was no evidence that Hutus would accept sitting at the
same table with their former "oppressors". Overall, the colonists did not think about peaceful
cohabitation of both Hutus and Tutsis in a viable state. That is the main reason why the jacquérie
took place in 1959, in fact opposing Hutus - who were confident of their numerical force and
supported the colonial administration - to Tutsis - who were in search of their traditional legitimacy.
The colonists just considered that, as independence was around the corner, one of the protagonists
would take power and they gave preference to the numerical majority, mostly since, according to
Colonel Logiest, Tutsis had become intolerant and incapable of ruling:
lis s'en sont montrés incapable. lis n'ont pu admettre I'entrée des Hutu, sur pied d'égalité, dans la
vie publique. lis sont restés prisonniers d'une conception politique et sociale pértmée.»
389 Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 310.
390 Ibid.
391 Colonel Logouts, quoted in Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 315.
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1.4 Conclusion
The foregoing analysis has shown that disequilibrium was built into the Rwandan system even
before the arrival of Europeans. In pre-colonial Rwanda, the political organisation was an instrument
of social immobility and the machinery for maintaining the difficult equilibrium between conflicting
tendencies in Rwandan society. But the problem had been efficiently solved to such an extent that
an optimum point seemed to have been reached. The political organisation that sustained the
system of domination could be perpetuated for as long as forces external and/or internal to the
system itself remained constant. Obviously, this foundation was not viable, considering that, in
human life, the roles and responsibilities of individuals are not static, especially when there are signs
of inequality. The situation had the nature of a time bomb because several factors, including external
force, the osmosis of new ideas and religions, the effects of conflict and the concept of equality and
democracy, in particular, did disrupt the status quo.
The few changes introduced during the colonial period not only created new problems but also
exacerbated problems that already existed. Indeed, a strong executive power, the refusal of political
participation to an "immature population", and the limitations put on the enjoyment of a number of
fundamental rights - all considered essential by the Belgians as late as 1959 - were bad signs for a
state supposedly being prepared for democratic rule. Besides, colonialism did nothing to suppress
ethnicity and centrifugal features in the process of state formation that are represented in the
phenomenon examined in this Chapter. Indeed, the exercise of colonial authority through Tutsi rulers
sharpened those features, thereby making ethnicity into an instrument of political antagonism. Tutsi
elite thought that, in being offered privileged access, however limited, to what was essentially the
domain of the colonizers, they were being prepared to "take over", should colonialism come to an
end. They would, some thought, be well prepared to run a stable and dynamic system. Then the
process of post-colonial state formation suddenly developed in favour of Hutus at the crucial moment
of the handing over of the state apparatus to nationals at the end of colonisation. Within just two
years, the country was handed over to Hutu republican authorities, thanks to a revolution
paradoxically supported by the real holders of power, the autocratic, despotic, and repressive
government based largely on the principle of the "divine right of elites". This, indeed, was at the
height of the predisposition to engage in violence which stemmed from the long-standing polarisation
of ethnicity, unless post-colonial leaders could engage tremendous efforts to stop such violence.
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Unlike in other African countries, the Rwandan revolution was not a reaction against European
colonial rule, but a collaborative effort with the European coloniser aimed at the abolition of an
indigenous form of imperialism. In a sense, nationalism in Rwanda was little more than a misnomer
for "tribalism", a tribalism which, to use Lemarchands words, drew its sustenance from an "unholy
alliance with Belgium".392 In such conditions, nationalism has some peculiarly freakish overtones.
What was left in the way of alternatives was essentially the myth of Hutu solidarity, a myth that was
invested with political as well as moral values. Because Hutu solidarity implied a common adherence
to democracy, it had become a major ingredient of progress; and just as in the past the myth of Tutsi
supremacy tended to be associated with a normative view of society, Hutu solidarity was now
regarded as the moral foundation of republicanism. Now, as before, the tendency was to twist the
past in order to justify the future, in order to give an aura of legitimacy to the ideals of justice and
equality. One is reminded of Tocqueville's words: "Though they had no inkling of this, they took over
from the old regime not only most of its customs, conventions and modes of thought, but even those
very ideas which prompted our revolutionaries to destroy it".393
Since, normally, the essence of a revolution lies not only in the overthrow of the State but in the
fundamental transformation of the economic and social structure of society, the Hutu revolution can
be considered as being at its very beginning. After this first phase remained the more fundamental
task of social and economic reform, one that presupposed the alteration of age-old attitudes and
modes of behaviour. That is, the Rwandan revolution must be regarded, at this stage, as "a partial,
merely political revolution, leaving the pillars of the building standing".394
At this stage, it seems that to be successful, the post-revolution state is liable to undergo the test of
developing an ability to effectively impose social control by prescribing and enforcing rules of social
behaviour. The imperative for such control over the population should arise from the need to survive
in a system where the rate of elimination through civil war is likely to be very high. The State's
capacity to organize the population, to extract taxes from it, and to enforce the law without
discrimination on a continuous basis should outstrip the comparative ability of ethnic or other
societally based organizations to control people. Furthermore, the special purpose organizations of
392 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, at 285.
393 Ibid.
394 Karl Marx, The Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, in Lewis S. Feuer, ed., Marx and Wingels: Basic Writings,
Garden City: Doubleday, 1959,passim.
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the state should not only be efficient but also highly distinctive through the "disciplinary methods of
power" contained in their standard operating procedures.395
The post-revolution State is also liable to penetrate the Rwandan society and to use the
infrastructure of the State to direct, and to co-ordinate societal actions. This view originates from
Migdafs argument that "effective social control requires high capabilities from states to extract
resources and the penetration of society".396 Successful social control should be reflected by three
indicators: compliance (getting people to behave differently from the way they would prefer to),
participation (repeated voluntary action within institutions run or authorized by the State) and
legitimacy (voluntary acceptance of the myths and symbolic imagery with which the State justifies its
rules of behaviour).397 The rules of behaviour of the new Rwandan State should be constructed from
rewards, sanctions and symbols which, taken together, would offer strategies of survival that are
supposed to be relevant to the particular conditions Rwandan people have to confront in everyday
life. These rules of behaviour run counter to the one-party state, abusive states of emergency,
hindrance of civil society, denial of basic rights and freedoms and other stratagems used by absolute
regimes such as the one in place in Rwanda during the post-independence period.
395 See Mitchell, T., "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist approaches and their Critics", American Political Science
Review, vol. 85, March 1991, pp. 77-96 at 92, 93.
396 Migdal, J.S., Strong Societies and Weak States - State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 4, 5, and 30-33.
397 Ibid.
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Chapter Two
The Failure of the Post-Independence State
2.1 Introduction
Rwanda now entered a challenging era. The "majority" was in power, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights would soon become an integral part of the Constitutions" and Rwanda would ratify
most of the international human rights instruments.39B Was ethnicity in the process of being solved or
aggravated? Was the Hutu regime open to democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law as
claimed by the revolutionaries? What was the status of human rights standards?
In this chapter it is argued that the one-party State, de facto in the First Republic and de jure in the
second, has failed to address the Hutu-Tutsi problem, has denied individual rights and freedoms to
most Rwandans regardless of their ethnic affiliation, and has led to one-man rule in which the
legislature has been a mere rubber stamp for the party. Moreover, it has made it difficult to change
government in a constitutional way and has therefore not been conducive to democratic stability.
The contention is that human rights and the rule of law are more vulnerable in a one-party ethnically
based State than in a multi-party State, for various reasons. First, there are few, if any, effective
checks on the Executive because of its overwhelming dominance over other organs.
Second, because all the Members of Parliament belong to one party, the government can with ease
pass any legislation it wants to, including amending the bill of rights, in any way it sees fit. Although
this may happen whenever there is a super majority even in a multi-party State, there is a greater
trend to abuse in a one-party State in which the minority is not accommodated, while in a multi-party
State critics from the minority may impact on the majority's behaviour. Generally, one-party States
are characterised by the total subordination of the legislature to the Executive which is dominated by
an all-powerful President who has autocratic powers.
Third, the absence of strong independent organisation such as opposition-parties and interest
397 Self-government Constitution, art. 13.
398 See Marie, J.B., 'International Instruments Relating to Human Rights. Classification and status of ratifications as of 1
January 1998', HRLJ Vol. 19, No 2-4, Strasbourg, 1998; Gallagher, A., International Instruments of Human Rights,
Strasbourg, 1998, p. 21.
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groups, means that the government's infringement of human rights will often go unchallenged.
Fourth, one-party regimes are often characterised by the absence of an independent press that
could expose and criticise violations of human rights. This is because most, if not all, of the print and
electronic media are under government control or influence.
Fifth, because a one-party State is essentially undemocratic and generally maintained through
repression, there is an absence of a critical public opinion, which in Western democratic societies
plays an important role in checking abuse of power by the government.
Lastly, the judiciary, which is considered a sentinel of liberty in democratic societies, fails to protect
human rights in a one-party State because of the lack of independence often coupled with
intimidation, as well as the fact that it has no natural allies (Le. free press, critical public opinion,
opposition parties, etc) that could support it in the event of a showdown with the executive.
The author will show the impact of the one-party ethnically based system on political rights and
democracy through the analysis of the political background to the establishment of one-party rule,
the structure of government and the relationship between party and government organs in the one-
party State. He will also show how the one-party ethnically based State led to serious erosion of
such rights as the right to life, freedom from discrimination, freedom of assembly and association and
freedom of expression. Particular attention will be paid to the hindrance of civil society and the abuse
of emergency powers by Hutu absolutist rulers in order to maintain their hegemony. The impact of
the one-party State on democracy, particularly with regard to the right of Rwandans to choose their
own leaders, will also be examined.
2.2 Background to the establishment of the one-party State
and absolute regime
2.2.1 Political intolerance
At independence Rwanda had thirteen political parties. In March 1963 President Kayibanda assured
the nation that Rwanda was embarking on a multiparty democracy in which the less powerful parties
were going to disappear. At the time of parliamentary elections in 1965 the PARMEHUTU was the
only party to win seats in the National Assembly and to propose candidates. As regards the elections
of the local government in 1963, the PARMEHUTU had won 1166 of the seats for communal
councillors out of 1192 (97.8%) and 140 seats of burgomasters out of 141 (99.3%), whereas the
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UNAR had won only the mayoralty of Nyabisindu and 24 seats of communal councillors, the
APROSOMA only two seats of councillors, and the RADER had won no single seat and
disappeared.399 Ten years later, the Office of the President issued a publication stating that the 1963
elections had convinced the Tutsi for good that they should not nourish hope of ruling any more.
According to the publication, the Hutu had won and the entire world had recognised that victory and
the elections had brought shame on the UNAR and its supporters. It added that, on that day, the
MDR-PARMEHUTU had suppressed all the other parties.4oo
From the almost dominant party that it was in 1960, the PARMEHUTU had de facto become a
unique party within less than five years. However, Article 10 of the Constitution provided for a multi-
party government:
Les groupements remplissants les conditions légales concurrent a /'expression du suffrage. lis se
forment et exercent leurs activités librement a condition de respecter les principes démocratiques
et ne pas porter atteinte a la forme républicaine de l'Etat, a l'intégrité du territoire national et a la
sécurité de /'Etat. L 'Etat reconnaft I'opposition constructive mais réprime /'agitation destructive.
The reasons for the demise of other parties, at least inside Rwanda, was different for the three main
opposition parties. Concerning the APROSOMA, it was mainly due to the personality of its founder,
Joseph Gitera. He was, according to Reynljens, a "mediocre" organiser, lacking precise and
coherent political ideas, in permanent conflict with his lieutenants, and reckoning on charismatic
legitimacy of "umwami des Hutu" (king of Hutu). The divisions he created within his party finally led to
its destruction: as he suddenly wanted to plead the cause of immediate independence on the eve of
the elections, he changed the name of the party into the Union des Hutu du Ruanda-Urundi
(UHURU) which also meant "independence" in Swahili. Some days later, he ordered Nzeyimana,
one of the leaders of the party, to resign. Nzeyimana agreed, but became a member of the
PARMEHUTU.401 Some days before the parliamentary elections of September 1961, Gitera caused
a new split in the party. He founded the APROSOMA-RWANDA-UNION, while Munyangaju and
Gasingwa continued to campaign under the appellation of APROSOMA. Besides, he founded other
ephemeral parties in 1960-61, UNAFREUROP and APROBAMI in particular, which did not facilitate
coherence for the APROSOMA campaign, all the more so since Gitera pretended to have dissolved
399 Vérité et Dialogue, The Rwandan Tragedy. What people should also know, Kinshasa, 1995, p. 4.
400Thepublication reads: " Les éléctions de 1963 ont a jamais convaincu les Tutsis qu'ils ne devaient plus nourrir I'espoir
de gouverner. Les Hutus avaient gagné et le monde entier avait reconnu cette victoire; ces élections ont couvert de
honte I'UNAR et ses partisans. C'est ce jour-lá que le MDR-PARMEHUTU a supprimé tous les autres partis (...)".
PREZIDANSI YA REPUBULlKA, Ingingo z'ingenzi mu mateka y'u Rwanda. Imyaka cumi y'isabukuru y'ubwigenge
1/7/1962-11711972, Kigali, Ibiro by'amakuru muri Prezidansi ya Repubulika, 1972, p. 80.
401Leller dated 27 August 1960 with copy to Grégoire Kayibanda, national president of the PARMEHUTU.
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it. After the creation of APROSOMA-RWANDA-UNION in August 1961, Gitera left the presidency of
APROSOMA to Gasingwa and took charge of the new party. Gasingwa and Munyangaju were the
only members of APROSOMA to be elected Members of Parliament while APROSOMA-RWANDA-
UNION won no seat. Gitera quitted the political scene until 1967 when he became member of
PARMEHUTU. In 1969 he was elected as a PARMEHUTU member of parliament. Gasingwa and
Munyangaju remained APROSOMA members of parliament until the 1965 elections, and afterwards
they became passive members of the PARMEHUTU.402 The author will show later that, apart from
these internal divisions, the PARMEHUTU played an important role in the erosion of the
APROSOMA.
Regarding the RADER, as has been seen, its position between the PARMEHUTU and the UNAR
was not very comfortable and its possibilities for mobilising and attracting people were limited by the
fact that its most prominent leaders were Tutsi. It did manage to establish itself as a progressionist
and anti-racist alternative. From 6.6% of votes in the 1960 communal elections, the party dropped to
0.3% in the 1961 parliamentary elections and had disappeared from the political scene by the time of
the 1963 communal elections. Its supporters had already joined the PARMEHUTU and the UNAR.403
As the UNAR was the creation of great Tutsi chiefs together with the Court of King Mutara and aimed
at the restoration of the pre-Revolutionary socio-pollteat order, its erosion was different from that of
the other parties. As it relied on the support of an ethnic minority, the hope to conquer political power
through the ballot box after the revolution was tiny. At the 1961 parliamentary elections it won seven
seats out of 44, which was more or less the ratio of Tutsi to Hutu in the country.404 From February
1962 to February 1963, there were two UNAR ministers in government. Its members of parliament -
particularly Rwagasana and Rwangombwa (until he went into exile in May 1962) - were active in the
national assembly by their "excellent and constructive interventions".405 As indicated, the party had
won 25 seats of communal councillors and one of burgomaster in the 1963 elections. It should also
be pointed out that the UNAR was handicapped by its division into two wings, one operating inside
Rwanda, the other one led abroad by Tutsis who had fled the country following the 1959 revolution.
406The influence of the latter was important and very negative for a long period until independence.
402Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 447-448.
403Id.,at 448.
404Verité et Dialogue, The Rwandan Tragedy. What people should also know, Kinshasa, 1995, p. 4.
405lbid.
406Id.,at 6.
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They, for example, attempted to boycott the 1960 communal elections by launching an attack from
Burundi and the Hutu reacted by repulsing them and massacring a number of local Tutsi. Moreover,
a number of UNAR members of parliament were forced into exile. Rukeba, Rebero, Karema and
Rwangombwa were reported to have left the county in September 1961 and May 1962, leaving only
three members of parliament from among whom Rwagasana was summarily executed in 1963. As a
political organisation, the UNAR had disappeared and did not stand for the 1965 elections.407
The PARMEHUTU adopted a policy aimed at eliminating other political parties. After he had
expressed his attachment to a "démocratie réaliste et constructive" in his statement at the first
anniversary of the independence, President Kayibanda laid particular stress on congratulating
himself on the elimination of the opposition. He was pleased about a "parti majoritaire, d'une majorité
écrasante, flanquée d'une minorité d'opposition"40B (majority party, an overwhelming majority, with
some minor opposition on the side). He said that a proliferation of political parties distracted the
population, made the progress of the country inconsistent and caused prejudicial stagnation of the
nation.409
The PARMEHUTU concentrated its attacks on the APROSOMA and the UNAR. As the
APROSOMA's action was practically limited to the only prefecture of Butare41o, Amandin Rugira,
regional secretary of the PARMEHUTU in Butare, took charge of the action from the end of 1960. As
the APROSOMA was equally placed with the PARMEHUTU at the communal elections (237 seats
for the PARMEHUTU and 223 for the APROSOMA), it won eight Butare seats in the legislative
assembly established in Gitarama on 28 January 1961. A large number of communes in Butare were
under the control of APROSOMA. Rugira started an infiltration of APROSOMA's burgomasters since
he was aware that, in a country where the influence of the established authority remained great, the
population of a commune would follow the defection of the burqornaster.t" He persuaded the
burgomasters that the APROSOMA had no future as national party, that a struggle between Hutus
was to be avoided because it would objectively give an advantage to the UNAR and that, therefore, it
would be appropriate to join the PARMEHUTU. This argumentation was often persuasive and, after
407Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 449.
40SPaternostre de la Mairieu, at 250.
409"Une prolifération de partis politiques distrait la population, rend incohérent Ie progrés du pays et cause un piétinement
préjudiciable a la nation". Ibid.
410Except in Cyangugu where the PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA had formed a cartel for the 1960 communal elections
and in Nyanza where it had one roll, APROSOMA had no roll in other territories. Les élections communales au Rwanda,
unreported, 1960, p. 19.
4111nterviewof Amandin Rugira by Reyntjens 15/3/1980 in Reynljens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 449.
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committing his allegiance to the PARMEHUTU, the burgomaster would generally explain the reasons
for that change during a meeting of the people of his commune. Normally the entire population
followed his lead and immediately registered as PARMEHUTU members. This took place from 1961
to 1963 and the APROSOMA had ceased to exist as a political party by the end of 1963. Although
there was no formal dissolution, its members had become PARMEHUTU.412
In order to achieve its objective, the PARMEHUTU exerted pressure on APROSOMA leaders when it
was deemed necessary. Joseph Gitera, for example, was put in jail from 21 August 1962 to February
1963 on the initiative of J.B. Habyarimana, Prefect of Butare and former APROSOMA supporter, and
with the agreement of State prosecutor Tharcisse Gatwa. He was charged with breach of "State
security".413 As regards Munyangaju, following the publication of a "Manifeste des modérés" that he
had addressed to the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, pleading for the union of
Rwanda and Burundi, he was compelled to resign as Vice-President of the Legislative Assembly and
was replaced by Nzabonimpa, PARMEHUTU member of parliament. On September 10, 1963, a
motion of distrust against the Secretary of the National Assembly, G. Gasingwa, presented by
PARMEHUTU members of parliament, was adopted. He was replaced by PARMEHUTU Member of
Parliament J. Hakizimana.414
The PARMEHUTU actions against the UNAR were violent and illegal. It often resorted to
intimidation, arbitrary arrest and brutality.415 For example, in January 1962, UNAR leaders in
Kibungo were arrested, as well as Members of Parliament Karema, Rwangombwa, Rutsindintwarane
(President of the party), and Burabyo (Member of the National Committee).416 On March 2, 1962,
Bunagu, a member of the Prefecture committee of Kibungo, disappeared after he had been
arrested.s" The same actions were taken in other areas of the country where UNAR supporters
were manhandled. Some, of them were arrested and detained for more than a year on a simple
proces-verbal d'arrestation, others were forced to join the PARMEHUTU by having their signatures
appended in the register of members. Furthermore, UNAR meetings and processions were not
allowed.418Within the National Assembly, PARMEHUTU members of parliament usually abstained
412Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 449-450.
4130e Heusch, Massacre Collectif au Rwanda? In Syntheses, 1964, p. 421.
414Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 451.
4151bid.
416L'unité, NO.2, 1/2/1962.
417Id., No.5, 15/3/1962.
41BReyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 451.
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from voting for the simple reason that the debated proposal proceeded from a UNAR member of
parliament.419 At the time of the cabinet reshuffle on 6 February 1963, the UNAR ministers were
dismissed.42o
Manipulation was also applied through electoral operations in which everything was done to prevent
the UNAR from presenting their list of candidates within the allotted time. For example, Article 37 of
the law of 29 May 1963 on elections provided that the list of candidates was to be accompanied by a
certificate issued by the burgomaster of the commune of residence certifying that the candidate met
all the requirements for eligibility. However, burgomasters very often refused to issue the certificates
while PARMEHUTU lists were being processed, even beyond the deadline, July 4, 1963. In Kibuye,
UNAR lists were not presented for participation in elections because they were destroyed and those
which had been reconstituted were rejected on the ground of "late registration". Regarding the
registration of voters, a large number of UNAR members were not registered and did not vote. At
certain polling stations, PARMEHUTU militants checked the contents of the envelopes before they
were put in the ballot boxes. Most often these checks were not even necessary, since UNAR ballot
papers had not been distributed. Votes themselves were counted in a fraudulent way; in some areas
the ballot papers outnumbered voters while in others ballot papers in favour of the UNAR were
burnt.421
Beyond the electoral operations other incidents marked the establishment of a one-party ethnically
based rule. At the time of communal elections held on August 18,1963 in Nyabisindu, the UNAR had
won six out of ten seats for councillors and Munyanziza of UNAR was elected burgomaster. This was
the only commune not under PARMEHUTU domination. The police arrested, tortured and
imprisoned prominent members of the UNAR and their homes, left without defence, were looted. On
4 October 1963, Members of Parliament Ndutiye, Rwagasana and Munyanziza requested that the
National Assembly make representations to the Prefect of Kigali for having allowed police officers to
shout out and manhandle them despite their awareness that these were members of parliament. The
Speaker said that these were simple allegations without any confirmation, refused any debate on the
matter and continued with the agenda. Three months later Ndutiye and Munyanziza were arrested
while Rwagasana was summarily executed, and this was the end of the UNAR in the country.422
4191bid.
420For details about actions against UNAR members, see Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 451-452.
4211d.
4221d.
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Earlier sections have shown how the Belgians, from a mixture of expediency and pseudo-scientific
racial fascination, adopted their policy of divide-and-rule and reconstructed a neo-traditionalist
Rwanda that, in the 1950s, had become more real than it was before the 1890s. However, the 1959
Hutu revolution had not changed the main traits of that construct, but had merely inverted its
significance. Tutsis were still "foreign invaders" who had come from afar, but this now meant that
they could not really be considered citizens. The Hutus had been the "native peasants", enslaved by
the aristocratic invaders: they were now the only legitimate inhabitants of the country. Hutus were the
silent demographic majority, which meant that a Hutu-controlled government was now not only
automatically legitimate but also ontologically democratic.
During the Tutsi rule, the petits Tutsis had felt proud of belonging to the ethnic aristocracy, although
it brought them very little beyond that sense of superiority. Now it was the Hutus who persuaded
themselves that, because the government was Hutu, they, "the humble peasants from the hills",
somehow shared in that power. In both cases the ethnic elites approved and reinforced the
delusions of their followers. The Belgians had managed to reinforce the Tutsi aristocratic domination
and now it was the foreign aid workers who collaborated in reinforcing the vision of a "democratic
majority rule" and who ended up supporting the rise of the Hutu. With regard to the Catholic Church,
it had admired the Tutsis and helped them rule, but now admired the Hutus and helped them rule. In
both cases, this was perceived and explained as being the work of divine providence and a great
step forward in the building of a Christian society in Rwanda.423
As in many other African countries, Rwanda became a de facto one-party State after an initial period
of multi-party democracy. As shown, the elimination of the opposition was achieved through a
combination of various techniques such as intimidation, arrest, physical violence and, sometimes, by
negotiation. PARMEHUTU aimed at the extinction of other parties, both Hutus and Tutsis. The
outcome was that, in 1965, the MDR-PARMEHUTU was the only party to propose candidates for the
parliamentary and presidential elections. Without being fully constitutionalized as such, it
nevertheless called itself "National Party".424 Having eliminated the opposition, the concentration of
power within the party increased. Especially from 1968 onwards, numerous conflicts and divisions
within the government forced the regime to withdraw more and more within itself. In 1972, the
usurpation of power by a small group of politicians from Gitarama, President Grégoire Kayibanda's
423From that point of view, a close reading of the quality Catholic-sponsored review Dialogue is interesting. Its
Kinyarwanda sister publication Kinyamateka evolved in the 1980s towards a more critical stance. See Prunier, The
Rwanda crisis, at 81.
424PREZIDANSI YA REPUBULlKA, Ingingo z'ingenzi mu mateka y'u Rwanda, 1972.
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home region in central Rwanda, was completed.425
Faced with expressions of discontent, especially on the part of politicians and members of the
military from the north, Grégoire Kayibanda's government eventually tried to resort to ethnic tactics.
In 1973, violence - initially of an ethnic nature - erupted in schools, in the administration and in
business enterprises. Psychologically, these developments were certainly influenced and facilitated
by the bloody events of 1972 in Burundi, where Hutus were the victims of genocidal killings.426
It must be emphasised, though, that the impulse aimed at expelling Tutsis found its origin within the
centre of power, which tried to detract attention from other issues.427 However, the politicians from
Gitarama had lost sight of the dynamics such a policy could provoke in a situation where complete
control became rather precarious. Thus, the population began to attack the rich (and not only Tutsis);
Hutus of the north began to chase those of the central region; politicians of the north shifted their
attention from the schools - where everything had started - to the ministries and the enterprises
where they felt underrated or ostracised. As certain politicians from the north, especially the National
Defence Minister, Major General Juvénal Habyarimana, felt in danger of being physically eliminated,
he finally decided on army intervention; with an army in which, historically, the north had always
been dominant. Grégoire Kayibanda's regime was overthrown in a coup on 5 July 1973.428 This
marked the beginning of the Second Republic under President Habyarimana.
After judicial proceedings held in utmost secrecy, a court martial of June 1974 passed death
sentences on former President Grégoire Kayibanda and seven other eminent personalities from his
regime. Others were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. Even though clemency was granted
in some cases, this only had symbolic significance. In fact, during the 1970s scores of dignitaries of
the First Republic perished in the infamous "special section" of the Ruhengeri prison, whereas
Grégoire Kayibanda, who was under house arrest in Kavumu, died in 1976, having been denied food
and the medical care he needed. After the "révolution morale" of 1973, the militants of the "révolution
sociale" of 1959 had disappeared, some through political manipulation, others by physical means.429
Immediately after seizing power, General Habyarimana outlawed political parties, but about a year
425Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 498.
426For some details about killings in Burundi, see Sahinkuye, M., The Legal Protection of Refugees in Zambia in the
Light of International Law, Thesis, 1997, p. 32-4; United Nations Human Rights Commission, Report, 1972.
427Reyntjens, L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en crise, 1994.
428Ibid.; Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, at 61.
4291bid.
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later, in 1974, he had created his own, the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour Ie
Développement (MRND). Explaining his decision, he said that, although he was aware that some
people favoured the multiparty system, he had no hesitation in choosing the single party system.430
Habyarimana thought that the mere declaration of a one-party State was hollow unless the
Republican Constitution recognised the status of the party as paramount over all other institutions.
Thus, in 1976, the MRND National Congress passed a resolution according to which the
"Mouvement was supreme and the only guarantor of public interests and, thus, the Republican
Constitution should reflect the supremacy of the Mouvement over other institutions operating in the
Republic".431 Pursuant to this direction from the National Congress, Article 7 of the Republican
Constitution was amended to make the party supreme over other institutions. The amendment
enshrined one-party rule as a basic value of the regime. It provided for every single Rwandan to be a
de facto member of the party.432This suggests that Rwandans did not need to subscribe to have
membership, and that babies and old people were included. It follows that the deprivation of the right
to form political parties through which Rwandans could articulate their interests was all the more
unjust.
All burgomasters and prefects were chosen from among party cadres. The party was everywhere;
every hill had its cell,433 and the party faithful, hoping for promotion and a professional boost,
"willingly spied on anybody they were told to spy on and on a few others as well".434All citizens had
their place of residence written on their identity cards and changing address without "due cause" was
not tolerated.435 Unless there was good reason, such as going to school or getting a job, the
authorisation to change residence would not be granted unless one had friends or relatives in high
places. "Administrative control was probably the tightest in the world among non-communist
countries".436
430President Habyarimana to the French journalist Philippe Decraene in Le Monde, 7 October 1982.
431"Etant donné que le Mouvement (...) est supreme et est le seul garant des intérêts du peuple la Constitution de la
République devrait refleter la suprêmatie du Mouvement sur les autres institutions." Resolutions du Congres National du
MRND, quoted in Sahinkuye, M., Cours de Droit Constitutionnel, Butare: Groupe Scalaire, 1991, p. 20.
4321978 Constitution, Art. 7 (3).
433Manifeste et Statut du MRND, art. 43-61.
434prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, at 76.
435Article 15 of the Déeret-Loi No. 01181 of 6 January 1981 (J.O., 1981, p. 55) empowered the Burgomaster to
discretionarily issue and withdraw a residence permit and anyone who wanted to change the residential address had to
apply to him.
436prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, at 77.
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Although the MRND obviously was a political party, it is important to mention that Habyarimana
wanted to hide this fact behind a masquerade of appellation. It was deliberately called "Mouvement".
Indeed, the word "politics" was almost a dirty word in the Habyarimana regime in which every effort
was made to forget - at least officially - that politics existed. When the regime finally decided in
November 1981, after eight years in power, to establish a "parliament", it was called the Conseil
National de Développement and was, according to Article 12 of the MRND Constitution, one of the
central organs of the MRND. In this system Habyarimana, sole presidential candidate, was
triumphantly re-elected in December 1983 and then again in December 1988, with 99.98% of the
votes.i"
During the Habyarimana regime, access to power and knowledge was available to very few regional
groups in the country, notably in the northern prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. The
concentration took place over a number of years and was narrowed down to these two prefectures in
the late 1980s. It happened at all levels, but illustration of it will be limited to three examples. In the
mid-1980s, the Gisenyi prefecture alone arrogated to itself nearly one-third of the 85 most important
posts in the Republic, as well as near total leadership of the army and security services. According to
a survey dating back to the early 1990s, 33 public institutions out of a total of 68 were under the
directorship of people from Gisenyi (19 posts) and Ruhengeri (14 posts). During the period 1979-
1986 the "disparity indices" regarding grants to study abroad read 1.83 in favour of Gisenyi and 1.44
for Ruhengeri, the worst-off prefecture being Kibungo in the East, with an index of 0.67. By 1990,
ethnic conflict had been overtaken or even transcended by regional conflict and - within the dominant
region - by small-scale antagonisms. For example, the prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri were at
loggerheads in the north while in Gisenyi itself, Bushiru, Habyarimana's home area, competed with
Bugoyi.438
Meanwhile, as indicated elsewhere, violence in Rwanda had forced a large number of Tutsis into
exile, at first in an almost continuous stream, between 1959 and 1964, and then, after a nine-year
interval, in more limited numbers during 1972 to 1973. According to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, the number of refugees had grown to about 200,000 by 1964.439 The
437Through the official slogan during the 'election campaign' it was hoped that he would be elected ijana kw'ijana (one
hundred per cent) but MRND activists were disappointed by the missing 0.02%.
438Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth, 1996; Reyntjens, L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en Crise, 1994.
439UNCHR, Banyarwanda Refugee Census, 1964, quoted in Guichaoua, A, Le Probleme des Réfugiés Rwandais et des
Populations Banyarwanda dans la Région des Grands Lacs Africains, Geneva: UNHCR, 1992, P. 18.
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bulk of them had left the country without knowing that they would remain in exile for a long period.
Many died, and many of their children were born in exile. As time passed, their situations diverged
more and more from each other depending on where they were and on how they fared in life.
Personal biographies became increasingly diversified to the point where being a Rwandan refugee
could mean anything from eking out a precarious living in a refugee settlement in western Uganda to
another working as a journalist in Switzerland, by way of peasants in Zaïre, businessmen in Burundi
and social workers in New York City.44o Despite their extreme geographical dispersion and their
increasing social differentiation, the exiled Tutsi remained in touch with one another. As the UNAR
memory receded into the mists of history, younger people created in the 1970s a multitude of social
clubs and cultural associations to keep people in contact. Their diversity and wide geographical
spread refiected the diversification of the diaspora. There was the Association des Immigrants
Rwandais du Québec, distinct from the Rwandan Canadian Cultural Association in Ontario; in
Belgium the Isangano group organised folkloric shows and served as a place for discussion. There
were other similar associations in Bujumbura, New York, Los Angeles, Washington DC, Nairobi,
Lomé, Dakar and Brazzaville.s" In Uganda they had created the Rwandan Refugee Welfare
Foundation (RRWF) in June 1979 to help the victims of political repression after the fall of Idi
Amin.442 In 1980 the RRWF changed its name to Rwandan Alliance for National Unity (RANU).
RANU saw itself as more politically militant than the RRWF and openly discussed the question of an
eventual return of refugees to Rwanda.443 At its seventh congress held in Kampala in December
1987, under the impulsion of its most resolute militants, it changed itself into the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF), an offensive political organisation dedicated to the return of refugees to Rwanda, by
force if necessary.t"
Although the immediate motive for the RPF was the settlement of the, the Front also worked out an
eight-point political programme with the aim of structurally modifying Rwandan political culture. The
programme accused the Rwandan government of undemocratic and corrupt practices and of ethnic
44°Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, at 64.
441Id.,at 66.
442Given former President Obote's hostility to the Rwandan refugees, they had welcomed Idi Amin's assumption of power
in January 1971. Some even served in his 'State Research Bureau'. Watson, C., Exile from Rwanda: background to an
invasion, Washington DC: US Committee for Refugees, 1991, p. 10.
443For details about Rwandan refugees in Uganda, see Prunier, G., 'L'Ouganda et Ie Front Patriotique Rwandais' in
Guichaoua, A., (ed.), Enjeux nationaux et dynamiques régionales dans /'Afrique des Grands Lacs, Uile: Faculté des
Sciences Economiques et Sociales de /'Université de Uile I, 1992, p. 43-9; Prunier, G., 'Elements pour une histoire du
Front Patriotique Rwandais', in Politique Africaine, No. 51, October 1993, p. 121-38.
444lbid.
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discrimination. The RPF explicitly projected itself as multi-ethnic.445
In June 1990, President Habyarimana attended the Franco-African summit at La Baule in France.446
As the West seemed to want to link economic aid with political democratization, President Mitterand
advised Habyarimana to introduce a multiparty system in Rwanda. In July 1990, Habyarimana
declared that he supported a multiparty systern+"
On 1 October 1990, the military wing of the RPF, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), started
incursions into Rwanda from Uganda. Some observers questioned the wisdom of the RPF in taking
military action at that particular time.44B The invasion occurred only two months after the thirty-month
long talks supervised by the UNHCR and OAU on the refugee problem had led to a ministerial
agreement between Rwanda and Uganda that might have led to concrete results, and during a
gradually developing political liberalisation process within Rwanda. Although it seemed as if the
negotiations might have led to a breakthrough, the RPF, however, was not prepared to wait any
more; it was apparently tired of the continued stalling by the Rwandan government. It is, however,
argued that RPF attacked at that particular time because a possible breakthrough in the areas of
democratization, human rights and refugee repatriation would have diminished the legitimacy of an
attack.449
Rwandans responded en masse to multipartyism.45o The phenomenon was all the easier since
creating a party required only 30 signatures. 451 MRND hoped this regulation would lead to a
proliferation of parties, which would, in future, facilitate their manipulation. Nearly ten parties were
launched by the end of 1991. Four main motives seemed to push people to pledge allegiance to new
organisations.
Some people, particularly among the underprivileged intellectual elite, were motivated by idealistic
445Fordetails about the eight-point political programme, see Prunier, G., Eléments pour une histoire du Front Patriotique
Rwandais, at 121-38.
4460ver the last fifteen years, France had slowly replaced Belgium as the tutelary power in Rwanda because it offered
financial and especially military guarantees that Belgium could not provide. In 1975 Paris had signed an agreement of
military co-operation and training with Kigali and had regularly increased its economic aid. France kept over 400
coopérants in the country and its development aid was second only to that of Belgium, with $US 37.2 million in 1990.
Economist Intelligence Unit, Rwanda: Country Profile, London: EIU, 1993, p. 18.
447Speech of the President of the Republic, 5 July 1990.
44BPrunier, Eléments pour une histoire du Front Patriotique Rwandais, 121-38.
449Reyntjens, L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en Crise, at 61.
450Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, at 121-135; Reyntjens, L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en crise, 1994.
451LoiNo. 28/91 of 18 June 1991, art. 11, J.O., 1991, p. 728.
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expectations of improving the management of their country. For them, multipartyism meant
democracy, freedom, justice, human rights, fair governance and, finally, economic, social and
cultural development.452
Other people took ethnic considerations into account. The MOR, suppressed after the 1973 coup,
experienced a revival so spectacular that it quickly became the main opposition party or simply the
main national political organisation. In March 1991 in the "MOR appeal", which described its
predecessor in glamorous terms, it was mentioned that MOR-PARMEHUTU was the party for the
ordinary man and that it had never betrayed its democratic and republican principles: respect of
multipartyism, freedom of adherence to the party, free elections at all levels and clear separation of
powers.453 This actually was a fairy-tale view of a party which, without having gone through the
constitutional step of declaring itself a single party legally, had nevertheless eliminated all its
competitors, rigged its own internal candidacy processes, and acted with intolerance. But the key to
its retrospective glamorisation was regional feeling, a strong factor in Rwanda. Moreover, Hutus
retained a good memory of that independence party which had "liberated" them from the "Tutsi yoke"
in the early 1960s. The Coalition pour la Défense de la République (COR) had the ambition to
reunite all Hutus "divided for various reasons".454The Parti Libéral (PL) was called the "Tutsi party"
although its leaders were mixed. Its grassroots members were predominantly Tutsi, due to discreet
propaganda in the recruitment of adherents. For more than one year, the RPF was presented as the
"armed party" of the Tutsi diaspora.455
Regionalism also played a significant role in the choice of parties. The MOR not only profited from
the prestige of the "old liberation Hutu movement" but, for some Rwandans, it also constituted a
political force through which southern people could efficiently challenge the MRNO, created and
dominated by ruling northerners. Some MOR opponents used to discredit that organisation by calling
it the "Party of Gitarama people". Before 1973, and after the reintroduction of multipartyism, several
MOR leaders came from Gitarama, which was, besides, a prefecture considered to be the "genuine
south" of Rwanda. Gitarama had historical reasons for a massive adhesion to an opposition party.
The victims of the Habyarimana coup in 1973 generally came from that prefecture. Furthermore, as
seen, the new regime had arrested and killed about 50 former dignitaries, mostly Gitarama people,
452Nsengiyaremye, The Unkown Tragedy, at 85.
453Translated in Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, at 123.
454Sellstbm and Wohlgemuth, The International Response to Conflict, 1996, p. 21.
4551bid.
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including President Kayibanda, in prisons, less than five years after the COUp.456
Considering its base, the Parti Socio-Démocrate (PSO) had a strong regional colour. Its members
usually were educated elite from the south. Contrary to the MOR, the PSO establishment in the north
was insignificant. The party's two main leaders and founders, Gatabazi and Nzamurambaho, were
prominent southerners who had been ejected from politics for regionalist reasons. Southern
politicians liked to complain about the north, mainly the two prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri,
which, as seen, held most senior posts in the diplomatic missions, army, state-owned companies
and development projects.s"
Finally, there also were other people who, due to their attachment to or personal feud with President
Habyarimana, respectively remained to the MRNO or left it. After almost two decades of non-shared
power, Habyarimana had created many enemies or unconditional supporters who benefited from his
regime. Apart from the deaths under inhuman conditions of detention of the First Republic dignitaries
in the 1970s, Habyarimana particularly recorded enemies at the outbreak of the war. It will be seen
that the government arrested nearly 10,000 people suspected of complicity with the RPF in October
1990. After six months, following international pressure and for lack of "substantial charges against
them", some of them were released. "All these people were rich and/or educated, Tutsi and Hutu
victims of jealousy or political suspicions".458 One year after their liberation, they joined opposition
parties in which they used their money and influence with the population to undermine
Habyarimana's party, power and prestige.
In general, Rwandans were guided by their feelings (tribalism, regionalism, personal enmity or
friendship) in their choice of political parties. Many people, including the literate ones, took no time to
read manifestos or to listen to speeches in political rallies. Nsengiyaremye concludes that the RPF
expertly exploited these feelings to divide the Hutu, weaken them and finally beat them.459
Seven months after the reintroduction of multipartyism, Habyarimana and his party had drifted.
Manipulated peasants forced their MRNO-appointed burgomasters, loyal to the former single party,
to give up their positions. At rallies people from the hills and opposition members sang "Habyarimana
navaho impundu zizavuga", meaning that on the day Habyarimana was kicked out, people would
456Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy at 86.
4571bid.
458Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth, The International Response to Conflict, 1966, p. 24.
459Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 87.
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applaud. A coalition of the three main opposition parties, the MOR, PL, and PSO, held a
demonstration to claim their entry into the government in Kigali in January 1992.
In January 1992, the MRNO proposed elections "in order to have a strong government that would be
respected by all political forces and would be able to efficiently carry out the war against the RPF".46o
The coalition, which stood some chance of winning the popular poll, refused, thinking that time was
not yet ripe as the MRNO, which was still in total control of the local administration and the security
forces, could rig the elections. In order to put an end to political tensions, Habyarimana accepted a
coalition government on April16, 1992. The Prime Minister and nine of the eighteen ministers came
from the opposition. From that moment, the development of war changed to the net advantage of
RPF. MRNO and its chairman lost key departments such as Foreign Affairs, Justice, Finance and
Information. Furthermore, the new "opposition" ministers opted for collaboration with the armed
movement to crush the former single party.461
Habyarimana could no longer control the intelligence services. For long, they had fallen under the
direct control of the State House. Now the Service Central de Renseignement was split into separate
services scattered through different departments. The biggest portion went to the prime minister's
office, Immigration and Emigration to the Interior, and the External Intelligence to the Ministry of
Oefence.462 The government had to suffer the existence of three distinct intelligence services. Not
only did they lack any coordination due to multipartyism, but they were immediately infiltrated by RPF
agents in January 1992. Collected vital information was easily minimised, short-circuited or did not
circulate at all. "Secret decisions were swiftly transmitted to the RPF".463
The government had no such possibilities of spying on the RPF as the intelligence services had no
means. The budget allocated to their services was cut and a good number of experienced personnel
considered pro-MRNO were appointed elsewhere. For instance, Premier Dismas Nsengiyaremye
appointed Augustin Iyamuremye, his personal friend, a veterinary doctor like him, as director of the
intelligence services. Iyamuremye was quite new to the domain as he had spent years in a rural
dairy and only some months as prefect of Gitarama. In his career in the intelligence services "he
worked more for RPF than for the government and so [did] most opposition ministers".464 He would
46°MRND meeting, 23 January 1992; Radio Rwanda, news bulletin, 20 hours, 23 January 1992.
461Id., at 88.
462See Organisation de l'Administration Centrale de l'Etat, J.O., 1992, p. 1746.
463Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 88.
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later be appointed Minister of Agriculture for some months after the RPF victory.
While Major General Paul Kagame, "an information officer by profession"465, realising the importance
of information services in wartime, reinforced them, Kigali dismantled them. When the hostilities were
renewed in April 1994, it was quite amazing to note how ill-informed top army officers and prominent
politicians were about how the RPF was militarily prepared. They knew nearly nothing about
powerful and committed RPF allies determined to help the Front pound the regular forces. That is
why both the population and political leaders, when defeat became obvious, started complaining that
their country had been sold and that they did not know it at al1.466
The pro-RPF attitude of the opposition ministers did not usually stem from personal convictions but
rather from political calculations. The four opposition parties, united in what they called "Forces
Démocratiques pour Ie Changement" (FOC), thought they needed the RPF armed pressure to
hasten the fall of Habyarimana. Once this goal was achieved, the power would come to the FOC,
especially the MOR, which had the strongest popular base and a good portion of government forces,
and controlled the premiership, the Foreign Affairs and the Information departrnents.v" In its
calculations, the RPF had also longed for such a political coalition that, to the eyes of the
international community, would prove the determination of Rwandans "to get rid of the Habyarimana
authoritarian regime". Once Habyarimana was ousted, the RPF would impose its domination as the
only military force in the country.468 The FOG and RPF signed a collaboration agreement in Brussels
in mid-1992.469
Many international observers did not see a simple marriage of circumstances in that agreement, or
else Donat Murego, a leading MOR figure, could not have declared that,
our relationships with RPF are accidental. We say yes to democracy but by the people; they (RPF
guerrillas) want it by the gun. They refuse the changes which took place since 1959. They want to
retaliate (...) For them, they are the elite and the niggards. This is the basis of their ideology.47o
The RPF and FOG found the easy way of ejecting the MRNO and Habyarimana who, due to
4651bid.
466Such complaint was quite commonly repeated by Hutus in exile. Gouvernement Rwandais en Exil, Le Peuple
Rwandais Accuse, Bukavu, 1995.
467lnterview with Kayihura, one of MDR leaders, 9 June 1997.
4681nterviewwith Seth Sendashonga, 12 November 1997.
469Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 90; see also infra, The Fundamentals.
470La Croix, Apri/29, 1993. Translated in Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 90.
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multipartyism, had to abandon the party chairmanship, his position as Defence Minister and Chief of
Staff of the army and gendarmerie, and was to require direct peace negotiations. Up to then, the
government and the Front had signed a cease-fire agreement at Nsele (Zaïre) on March 29, 1991,
with President Mobutu as the mediator.s" It will be shown later that the agreement was never
respected, as with many others that followed until the peace agreement was signed in Arusha,
Tanzania, on August 4,1993.
The government's delegation to the Arusha peace negotiations was led by Boniface Ngulinzira,
Minister of Foreign Affairs. On several occasions, the MRND had complained in Kigali that talks were
a secret business between two men: Ngulinzira and Premier Nsengiyaremye, both from the MDR.
President Habyarimana was not informed of the development. In fact, Arusha appeared more to be
an attempt to topple the MRND and Habyarimana than to achieve responsible negotiations for a just
peace and fair power-sharing with the RPF. Finally, Habyarimana refused to clear Ngulinzira's
journey to Arusha. He was replaced with the MRND Minister of Defence, James Gasana.
Negotiations went straight into an impasse as the RPF did not appreciate the change of chief
negotiator on the government side.472
One phase of the talks that provoked an MRND outcry dealt with the crucial power sharing
agreement. In the name of the government, Ng'ulinzira had accepted to withdraw the Ministry of
Interior and the gendarmerie from Habyarimana's party in favour of the RPF which was bestowed
with five departments out of eighteen in addition to the vice premiership.s" Considering the
atmosphere of the Habyarimana regime during that particular time and in the perspective of
elections, giving the Home Affairs and the gendarmerie to the "enemy" was an unbearable betrayal,
at least in the eyes of MRND supporters.
On July 17, 1993, Agathe Uwilingiyimana replaced Nsengiyaremye as Prime Minister of a new
cabinet that had a mandate from the President to sign the peace agreement. The sharing-out of the
portfolios between the parties was exactly the same as that of the outgoing Nsengiyaremye cabinet:
MRND nine, MDR four (including the Premier), PSD three, PL three and PDC one. MDR partners in
the FDC rejected Nsengiyaremye on account of "uneasy collaboration". They alleged that he
471The Nsele agreement was later amended respectively in Gbadolite (Zaïre, now Democratic Republic of Congo) on
September, 16, 1992 and in Arusha (Tanzania) on July 12, 1992. For details, see J.O., No. 16, 15 August 1993, p. 1264-
66.
472J.O., No. 16, 15 August 1993, p. 1313.
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despised them and already considered himself the President-elect after Habyarimana's inevitable
departure.f" PL, PSO, and poe leaders refused to reappoint him.
Furthermore, in that sudden political development, the MRNO dismantled the powerful MOR. With
the complicity of PL, PSO and poe leaders, Habyarimana designated Faustin Twagiramungu Prime
Minister of the future transitional government including RPF elements. The Arusha accord stipulated
that the name of the Prime Minister of that cabinet had to be known before the signing of the peace
accord. By appointing Twagiramungu as MOR chairman, even though the party was supporting
Nsengiyaremye, the MOR first vice-chairman, the rival political forces had divided the main national
party that they all feared.
Twagiramungu was considered the Hutu politician closest to the RPF. He had a certain ascendancy
over Uwilingiyimana as it is he who had proposed her for the premiership. Since her appointment as
a prime mlnister+", Uwilingiyimana had to follow TwagiramungwRPF directives to secure her
position in the future transitional cabinet.476 In less than two weeks all the crucial peace talks issues
still in abeyance were settled. The Uwilingiyimana government notably accepted the coming to Kigali
of a 600-man RPF battalion to officially protect the Front's ministers and members of parliament. It
also signed off on the future national army and gendarmerie which would be run on a fifty-fifty basis
by officers from the former regular forces and from the RPF. Finally, the government and the Front
convened on the date for the signing ceremony of the comprehensive peace accord: August 4, 1993,
in Arusha. With Uwilingiyimana, the unblocked peace talks took on a new impetus. Anastase
Gasana, Ngulinzira's successor, led the government delegation that met the RPF in the buffer zone
of Kinihira on 23 July 1993.477
To most Rwandans, the peace agreement seemed like a real transfer of power from the MRNO and
Habyarimana into RPF hands through negotiations and multipartyism.478 Most of the presidential
powers were given to the Prime Minister, who then became the real strong man of Rwanda. On the
RPF and its allies, not only were bestowed the premiership, and the post of the Speaker of the
House (the second personality in the country), but also the control of key ministries like those of the
Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Finance and Information. The MRNO had to maintain a presidency
474Kayihura, 9 June 1997.
475For 38 days which later were extended to 9 months due to the political impasse.
476Kayihura, 9 June 1997.
477Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 92.
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with symbolic powers and five minor departments, besides the Ministry of Defence. The RPF had to
accept having 40% of the troops in the army headed by a Chief of Staff from the former government
forces and the gendarmerie run by a former rebel officer.479
Two important questions, however, are to be examined: Was Habyarimana going to accept
surrendering part or all of his power? Was the RPF ready for power-sharing?
2.2.2 The government and the strongmen
Since independence, executive power had been vested in the President for the First and Second
Republics.48o All executive power was vested in him.481 He was the Head of State482, the
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces483, and the Party President.484 Here the President was
what Rwandans call/mana y'i Rwanda (the God of Rwanda) or Umubyeyi w'igihugu (the father of the
Nation), just as the Mwami was considered before the era of the "Republic". Most strikingly, he
embodied the ideal of Hutu "solidarity" just as the Mwami once symbolised the ideal of Tutsi
suprernacy.s" During the Second Republic, the post of Vice-President was abolished and replaced
de facto by that of the Secretary-General of the party, who, apart from being responsible for the
administration of the party, appeared to be the President's deputy.486 During both Republics, the
President was the head of government administration and the leader of government business in the
National Assembly.487 Cabinet ministers and secretaries of state were appointed at the discretion of
the President, who informed the National Assembly afterwards.488 But in the Second Republic the
cabinet was supplanted by the Central Committee of the MRND, which was empowered to formulate
government policy and to advise the President with respect to the policy of the party.489 In practice,
the cabinet was only responsible for advising the President with respect to the execution of the policy
479J.O., No. 16, 15 August 1993, p. 1264.
480Self-government Constitution, art. 51; One-party Constitution, art 39.
481Constitution, art. 49.
482Id., art 51.
483Id., art. 58.
484ld., art. 40.
485About the presidential mwami-ship, see Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, at 269-72.
486Self-government Constitution, art. 42 (2).
487Self-government Constitution, art. 56 (d), (e), 0); One-party Constitution, art. 44 (3), (4) & 64.
488Self-government Constitution, art. 56 (a); One-party Constitution, art 44 (1).
489MRND Constitution, art. 23.
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of the MRND by the Government.490 The subordinate position of the cabinet was underscored by the
MRND manifesto which enjoined the government to constantly put the policy of the MRND into
practice.491Besides, the deliberate absence of a provision regulating a possible conflict between a
decision of the Central Committee and one of the Cabinet meant that the first would mostly prevail
because the Central Committee was third in rank of the MRND central organs, whereas the Cabinet
was the last.492The President chaired meetings of the National Congress, the Central Committee
and the Cabinet.493 In the local government, Prefects, Sub-prefects and burgomasters were
appointed by the President.494
Besides, the President of the MRND was the sole candidate for the presidency of the Republic,495
and in case he was unable to carry on his duties, the Secretary General of the MRND acted ad
interim until a new President was elected.496
Since Parliament was the next to last organ of the party, it goes without saying that all critical
discussion of Legislative proposals was confined to the superior organs, particularly the Central
Cornmittee'" and the duty of Parliament was merely to pass laws in accordance with the instructions
of those organs. This was underscored by Article 27 of the MRND Constitution, which subjected the
Acts of Parliament to the "esprit du Manifeste".498
490ld.
491"(...) L'Etat do it (...) adapter constamment la politique du Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement
a (..) I'évolution économique, sociale, et culturelle." Manifeste et Statut du Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le
Développement, p. 13.
492Article 12 of the MRND Constitution provided for the hierarchy of the central organs: the presidency of the MRND; the
National Congress; the Central Committee; the National Assembly; and the government.
4930ne-party Constitution, art. 44 (4); MRND Constitution, art. 13.
4940ne-party Constitution, art. 44 (5); Décret-Loi No.10175, art. 4, J.O, 1975, p. 299; Loi of 23 November 1963, art. 38 as
modified, Codes et Lois du Rwanda, Vol. II, second ed., 1995, p. 913.
4950ne-party Constitution, art. 40.
496Id.,art. 42.
497The Central Committee was so important that Article 7 of the 1978 Constitution provided for the privilege of jurisdiction
for its members: they were justiciable by the only Cour de Cassation for any judicial matter.
4980ne-party State Constitution, art. 69-79. Under the MRND, the parliament was called "Conseil National de
Développement", and was one the organs of the party, the "Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour Ie
Développement". MRND Constitution, art. 27 par. 2.
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2.3 Impact of the one-party State on democracy,
political rights and civil society
Although the word "democracy" has been defined in many different ways, President Habyarimana
agreed in 1974 that the definition "with the greatest universality of acceptance" was that of Abraham
Lincoln which defined it as a "government of the people for the people".499But about one year later,
Habyarimana added that democracy under the MRND was "the most suitable type of government to
Rwanda".50o To what extent did the one-party State conduce to democracy? One of the most
articulate proponents of one-party rule, Julius Nyerere, the former President of Tanzania, has argued
that,
Where there is one party and that party is identified with the nation as a whole, the foundations of
democracy are firmer than they can ever be where you have two or more parties, each
representing only a section of the community.501
The focus of this part is the undemocratic nature of both Party and General Elections, as well as the
hindrance of the Rwandan civil society. The operation, in practice, of the one-party State in Rwanda
gave the lie to this proposition. The author argues that the one-party State in Rwanda was
undemocratic. The readers will see that people who did not belong to the MRND were completely
excluded from standing for political office and Rwandans were not allowed to articulate and defend
their interests as individuals and as members of organised groups. Moreover, freedom of speech in
general and in Parliament was severely restricted. The author also argues that the one-party State
failed to build national unity in Rwanda.
2.3.1 Election of the President
Under the circumstances, the presidency could not be made an object of political competition, almost
like the Mwami was irremovable. One could challenge the Mwamfs claim to power only at one's own
peril. Since his authority was by the grace of the gods, it could be taken away only by divine
sanction. Thus, the whole purpose of presidential elections was not to provide opportunities for
replacing the incumbent but, rather, to affirm his permanence in office.502
499 Habyarimana interviewed by Radio France Internationale, 11 April 1974. Author's translation.
500Speech during the launching of the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour Ie Développement (MRND), 5 July
1975. Author's translation.
501Nyerere J.K., Democracy and the party system, 1974, p. 7.
502Even in the First Republic in 1965, as in 1969, Kayibanda had also run unopposed and received over 90% of the
votes. Rwanda, Carrefour d'Afrique, September-October 1965, p. 3.
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The Office of President, as already shown, was the most powerful in the country.503 A presidential
candidate had to be a Rwandan citizen and at least 35 years 01d.504The one-party Constitution did
not allow for a plurality of candidates to contest presidential elections. Article 40, paragraph 2
provided that the President of the MRND was the sole candidate for the presidency of the Republic
and that, if he should not gain the majority of the votes, another President was to be nominated for
the MRND so that the election of the President of the Republic could take place.505
The National Congress met every two years.506At the proposal of the Central Committee, the MRND
President was appointed by the National Conqress.s" Further procedures for the election of the
President were laid down by the MRND Constitution and articles 60 to 64 of the law regulating
elections.508
In the elections for President of the Republic, voters had to be given an envelope containing two
ballot papers, green and grey. The green was to remain in the envelope, while the grey was to be
discarded if the voter wanted the MRND candidate to be President and vice-versa, if not. In order to
become President, a candidate had to obtain at least 51% of the green paper votes. This was not
difficult to accomplish as the entire State and party machinery, as well as all the media, were
mobilised to campaign for the election of the MRND candidate. Moreover, in many rural areas the
grey paper was not given to the voter, everything was pre-arranged in such a way that the only
formality for the voter was to put the green paper in the envelope and leave everything in the ballot
box. Most often this was done openly in the presence of a vote officer. Furthermore, no one was
allowed and no one dared to campaign against the election of the party candidate since the
President was to be elected "ijana kw'ijana"(one hundred per cent).509
503The real power in the Party resided in the President. Under articles 13, 22, 23 and 62 of the MRND Constitution,
1976, the President could, inter alia: create offices in the party; preside over meetings of the Party Congress; exercise
discretion with regard to items for discussion by the Central Committee or the National Congress and could add or delete
any item from the agenda of a meeting; give instructions on any matter to any official or member; take any disciplinary
action against any member of the Party on the grounds of a Member's misbehaviour; take any decision or any action
which in his opinion was in the best interest of the development or security of the Party, government and the State, etc.
5040ne-party Constitution, art. 40, par. 3.
505Articie 40 reads: "Le Président du Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour Ie Développement est Ie seul candidat a
la Présidence de la République; s'iI n'obtient pas la majorité des voix exprimées, il sera pourvu a la désignation d'un
nouveau Président du Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement et I'élection du Président de la
République aura lieu (...)"
506MRNDConstitution, art. 18.
5071d.,art. 14.
50BLoi No. 18/1983 of 27 August 1983, J.O., 1983, p. 501 as amended.
509/jana kw'ijana was the official slogan during the 'election campaign' organised and sponsored by the MRND.
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In practice, no genuine elections for the office of party President were ever held, as no person was
allowed to challenge the incumbent President. A personality cult grew around General Habyarimana,
whom party propaganda portrayed as indispensable for the continued unity, peace and development
of the country.510 In the 1970s the government directed all citizens in rural areas to stop using the
name of "General" for the large bags of about 100 kilograms that they used for storing their crops or
for carrying coffee to the market, as the title was reserved for Habyarimana only.
Anyone who was considered to be critical of the "father of the nation" was vilified as being "power-
hungry, fed up with peace, and unpatriotic by the party bosses, whose very careers were closely
intertwined with that of the Presidents" The sycophants around Habyarimana realised that, without
him at the helm, they would lose their positions of tremendous power and prestige. As a result, both
Republican and MRND Constitutions were designed to preserve and enhance Habyarimana's
position as President, to the exclusion of everyone else.
2.3.2 Appointment of the Central Committee
Under Article 22 of the MRND Constitution, the President was the only one empowered to appoint
and dismiss members of the Central Committee. The Constitution did not stipulate any requirement
for a person to be appointed as a member of such an important organ. Even the National Congress
had no authority over this issue. In 1986, Professor Claver Karenzi told President Habyarimana that
people were curious to know what the requirements for becoming members of the Central
Committee were. As a response, President Habyarimana immediately appointed him.512
The Central Committee was subordinate to the President. As a result, Members of Central
Committee owed their positions to the President and were personally loyal to him, rather than to the
people of Rwanda whose interests the Mouvement was allegedly meant to serve.
As already indicated, it is also significant that elections of Presidents were themselves not
democratically conducted. Almost all the delegates to the National Congress, apart from Members of
Parliament, were presidential appointees or nominees. They were selected primarily for their
"unqualified and unswerving loyalty to President Habyarimana".513 The majority of the people of
510Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 99.
5111bid.
512This appointment was done in order to shut up the Professor and he, indeed, never asked his question again.
513Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 65.
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Rwanda therefore had no say whatsoever in the selection of delegates to these organs. What was
even worse was that the delegates did not exercise independent judgement and allowed themselves
to be manipulated and dominated by the President.
2.3.3 Election of Members of Parliament
As indicated above, only those people believed to be convinced party militants and whose
candidature was approved by the Party Central Committee, were allowed to contest the elections.
Thus, a majority of the people were deprived of the right to participate in direct running of the affairs
of their country, contrary to Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Furthermore, by
using the power to disqualify candidates, the non-elected Central Committee reduced the choice of
candidates who were available to the electorate. The electorate was, thus, denied the right to freely
choose candidates who could represent their interests effectively, because candidates who stood up
for the people's interests were invariably vetoed.
The way in which the parliamentary elections were conducted left much to be desired, as candidates
were not allowed to campaign freely. They had to make campaign speeches only at meetings
organised by party officials. No individual campaigning was allowed. Candidates were not even
allowed to campaign through the press.514 Moreover, the candidates were not free to choose their
own campaign topics but could speak only on topics chosen by the prefectural party officials and
approved by the Central Cornrnttee.s"
Because of the undemocratic nature of the presidential and parliamentary elections and the
recognition that the regime could not be changed through the ballot box, there was widespread
apathy towards voting among registered voters. Although no statistics were made available so as to
assess the curve, a trend towards participation by fewer and fewer voters was observed.s"
2.3.4 Discrimination on the grounds of political opinion
The one-party State inevitably involves discrimination against people who do not belong to the party.
In fact, all non-party members are completely excluded from participation in the political process. As
514Id.,at 110.
5151bid. All candidates were required to address every meeting together. Each candidate was required to address the
meeting on any of the following topics: the MRND objectives; development since independence, need for unity; meaning
of development; economic recession in the world and how it affected Rwanda; meaning of peace; how to combat crime
and vagrancy; and problems in the Constituency.
516Fordetails, see Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 110.
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in the First Republic, only MDR members could contest presidential, parliamentary and communal
elections. In the Second Republic, all the important policy making organs in the country, such as the
National Conqress-", and the Central Cornrnlttee!" excluded people who were not believed to be
convinced members of MRND. Yet these were the organs responsible for, inter alia, choosing the
sole presidential candidate and members of parliament. The significance of this can be appreciated
readily when one considers that real power in a one-party State resides in the President. limba
states that:
(...) the entire governmental activities under the one-party system revolve around the President.
He is the real and ultimate authority upon which the entire executive, legislative, and the
adjudicative functions of the State rest. He also controls the entire apparatus of the party. In a
one-party State, it can fairly be said that the President is in himself the government and the
entirety of the State's authority is consummated in him. He directs the operation of the army, the
police, the parastatal bodies, institutions of learning, and the intelligence system. Indeed the list is
[too] discouragingly long to attempt to exhaust. There could therefore be no business of
government without him.519
After the President, the Central Committee was the most powerful body. In a multiparty system such
as that in the USA, the executive body of a political party serves on part-time basis and does not
participate in government. However, under Rwanda's one-party system members of the Central
Committee served on a full-time basis and actually performed governmental functions. They were
also paid from public coffers, driven in government cars and accommodated at public expense. They
also received free administrative and secretarial services. The cabinet was subordinate to the
Central Committee, both in terms of power and remuneration.
As during the First Republic with MDR-PARMEHUTU supremacy, exclusion of non-convinced MRND
members also operated at the locallevel.52o Thus, all the heads of Prefectures and Communes were
517TheNational Congress was the supreme policy-making organ of the Party, which met once every two years. It was
composed of all members of the Central Committee, all prefects, sub-prefects, burgomasters, chairmen of all mass
organisations, representatives of communal councillors, secretaries and treasurers of prefectural committees. Its
functions were: electing the Party President; amending, adopting and approving the Party Constitution; receiving reports
of the Central Committee; examining questions submitted by the Central Committee; and presenting resolutions on
political, economic, social and cultural questions. MRNO Constitution, art. 14; 17; and 74.
518TheCentral Committee was composed of the President of the Mouvement, the Secretary General and other members
appointed by the discretion of the President. Its functions were: defining and orienting the policy of the Mouvement,
elaborating the internal general regulations of the Mouvement and proposing its amendment to the National Congress,
controlling all the organs but the Presidency and the National Congress; ruling on constitutions of mass organisations of
the Mouvement, drawing up the Mouvemenfs budget; appointing candidates for the National Assembly; and executing
decisions made by the National Congress. Id., art. 23.
519Zimba, L.S., The Zambian Bill of rights: Historical and Comparative Study of Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa,
1984, p. 181.
520Most of all, the previous MOR loyalists were removed from office and replaced with 'militants' of the MRNO.
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MRND "militant" members. "Non-militant" MRND members could not be councillors.
Apart from political posts, party membership was made a prerequisite for holding all senior
government and management positions in the parastatal secto,.s21,which accounted for eighty-five
per cent of the economy.
2.3.5 Freedom of expression inside the party-State
Freedom of expression undoubtedly is essential for the operation of any free democratic society.
Carl Friedlick explains that freedom of expression is "primarily concerned with a citizen's right to
political self-expression, effective participation in political life, and hence constitutive of democracy
itself'.522 This suggests that people in the community should be free to discuss issues of concern to
them without fear of reprisal from the government. Democracy requires that all conflicting viewpoints
should compete in the market place of ideas, so that the best ideas will emerge. Accountability of the
rulers to the ruled is accomplished where the ruled are free to criticise the rulers for their
shortcomings. In the United States of America, for instance, first amendment protection exists
against the background of
... profound national commitment to principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open, and that it. may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.523
As demonstrated in section 2 5, freedom of expression was under unrelenting assault from the party
and government throughout the Second Republic. Indeed, an intrinsic characteristic of a one-party
State is the suppression of all ideas that conflict with those of the ruling party. Thus, freedom of
expression in general cannot be realised fully in a one-party state.
The question for consideration here, therefore, is: to what extent did freedom of expression exist
within the party and within Parliament, since these were the fora through which debates on national
issues were conducted?
2.3.5.1 Freedom of speech within the central organs of the party
Since discussions within the party's central organs, such as the National Congress and the Central
521Rwanda pour Tous, Memorandum de Rwanda pour Tous sur la Crise Rwandaise, 2 September 1997.
522Friedlick, C., Constitutional Government and Democracy, 1946, p. 146.
523New York Times v Sullivan, 376 US
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Committee, were conducted in private, one would have expected the discussions to have been much
freer. The absence of publicity would ideally make the party and government leaders more tolerant of
criticism of their performance.
However, in practice discussions within these organs were not robust, uninhibited and free, as the
organs were completely dominated by the executive and, in particular, by the President, whose
powers within the party were overwhelming. Members of the Central Committee were not elected by
the people but were appointed or nominated by the President.524 These people owed loyalty to him
personally. They could, therefore, not be expected to freely criticise party and government policies
without putting their positions or careers in jeopardy. All the major policy initiatives came from the
President and were invariably adopted by the party organs without any critical discussions of their
merits or demerits.525 Party members who took a position different from that of the President were
treated harshly and denounced as counter-revolutionaries and enemies of the nation. For example,
in September 1979, two trade union leaders were expelled from the MRND-controlled Centrale des
Syndicats du Rwanda for opposing the annual subscription required from every citizen which
President Habyarimana had introduced without prior public debate on its merits.526
During the period under study, the major weakness was the failure to accommodate people who
were independent minded, and especially those with leadership qualities as good as those of the
party's great leader or even better. Democratization of the party, inter alia, requires tolerance,
accommodation of dissent and criticism of the party's ideas, including the ideas of the party's
leaders. The successive ruling parties failed to learn to debate within the party, accept independent-
minded people and substitute loyalty for knowledge and good judgement as the foremost criteria for
selecting good leaders and better party members.
Since journalists were barred from meetings of the party organs the public were deprived of
information which could help them evaluate the suitability of the nations' leaders for future elections.
This lack of information ensured that party and government leaders escaped public censure for
whatever misdeeds may have been exposed during the closed-door meetings of the party.52?
524MRND Constitution, art. 22.
525Fore.g. the mass organisations of the party were created by the President without prior debate in the party. These
decisions were merely announced at subsequent meetings.
526Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 41.
527Id.,at 94.
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2.3.5.2 Freedom of speech in the one-party parliament
Parliament, in whom the legislative power was vested, comprised the President and the National
Assembly.528 During the MRND era, the National Assembly consisted of 70 elected members.529
Party militancy, as indicated above, was a prerequisite for membership of the Legislature. In
addition, no one could stand for election to the National Assembly unless the Central Committee had
approved his candidature.s"
Article 66 of the one-party Constitution guaranteed the freedom of Members of Parliament to speak
and vote on any issue in the Assembly. Furthermore, Article 21 of the internal regulations of the
National Assembly provided for the freedom of speech and debate in the Assembly. Such freedom of
speech and debate was not liable to be questioned in any court or place outside the Assembly.
In an ideal democracy Parliament plays an important role in protecting human rights, by checking
abuse of power by the executive and, to some extent, by the judiciary. What degree of freedom from
the executive did Members of Parliament enjoy in practice? To what extent was the executive
accountable to Parliament?
Although the law did provide for freedom of speech in Parliament and the accountability of the
executive to the National Assembly, this was quite difficult to accomplish in practice. First, the
President, who appointed the Cabinet, as well as chaired its meetings, and possessed the real
power within the party and the government, was not accountable to Parliament. He was elected
directly by the people and could therefore not be unseated by a parliamentary vote of no confidence
in him or his cabinet. In the next regime, the same privilege will be enjoyed by the Vice-President
and Defence Minister supplanting the President, while neither will be elected.
Second, although Cabinet Ministers, being members of the National Assembly during the MRND era,
were required to defend government policies, they were not the initiators of those policies. As noted
above, only the Central Committee, which was also appointed and presided over by the President,
could formulate government policy; the Cabinet's role was merely to implement policies decided
upon by the Central Committee, which was not accountable to Parliament. Thus, Cabinet Ministers
were expected to defend policies over which they had little control or influence.
528Self-government Constitution, art. 72; One-party Constitution, art. 51, 1991 Constitution, art. 57.
529Loi No. 18/1983, 27 Aug. 1983, art. 69, J.O., 1983, p. 501.
530ld., art. 78.
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Third, the principle of collective responsibility precluded Ministers and other government officials
from criticising the government in the National Assembly.531 This considerably undermined freedom
of speech in the National Assembly because a good number of its members held government jobs,
like that of cabinet ministers, Secretaries of State, and members of the Central Committee532. In
addition to reducing free speech, the appointment of the majority of the Members of Parliament to
government positions gave the government an automatic majority in the Assembly. Thus, the
government could pass any legislation it liked without worrying about opposition from a few
backbenchers.
Fourth, since the party claimed supremacy over all institutions in the country, the National Assembly
and the government were regarded as instruments or agents of the party merely. Therefore the
National Assembly, being an agent, was subordinate to the Central Organs of the Party. Its role was
merely to pass whatever legislation the party wanted. This was emphasised by President
Habyarimana in a speech to the MRND National Congress on 12 November 1978, when he said that
the National Assembly was not a device of opposing the Mouvement or its other organs but was in
charge of voting laws which were supposed to govern the country according to MRND ideals.533
The Legislative process in practice tended to submerge Parliament. The President invariably made
major legislative proposals to the National Congress, which discussed them in detail. When the
proposals finally reached Parliament their enactment into law was a mere formality. As all Members
of Parliament would have had the opportunity to express their views during discussion in the National
Congress, they were, therefore, expected to conduct only the barest minimum of discussion on the
proposals in the National Assembly. It was considered a waste of time and a betrayal of the party for
any Member of Parliament to criticise the proposals of the Assembly. Members of Parliament who
criticised proposed legislation and party and government policies were often attacked by President
Habyarimana and threatened with reprisals, as was the case with Fé/icien Gatabazi, Frédéric
Nzamurambaho, Vincent Ruhamanya, Fram;ois Muganza, Boniface Rucagu, etc.534
531The principle of collective responsibility is to the effect that once the cabinet has made a decision, all the members
thereof, including those who opposed it behind closed doors, must support it publicly. Basomingera, A., Introduction au
Droit Constitutionel, Butare: UNR, 1985-86, p. 123.
5321d. The Constitution did not explicitly forbid holding of a government position concurrently with a parliamentary one.
Appointment of a minister as a Member of Parliament was a common occurrence in the Second Republic. Even
members of the Central Committee of the MRND could be appointed members of parliament.
5331nhis speech, President Habyarimana said: "Le conseil National de Développement n'est pas un engin d'opposition au
Mouvement ou ses autres organes. It est chargé de voter les lois devant gouverner le pays compte tenu des idéaux du
Mouvement". Discours du Président Juvénal Habyarimana, 1978, p. 93.
534For details, see Ruzindana, E., La Terreur Régne, Kigali, 1988, p. 3.
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President Habyarimana had warned that any Member of Parliament who attacked and made wild,
unfounded accusations against the party and government and their officials, would be punished. He
added that as party members, Members of Parliament should at all times observe party rules and
defend party policies in the house, instead of attacking them. He contended that policies and
decisions made by this national council were expressions of the people's will and, thus, the wishes of
the majority that should be respected. He stated that it was most unprincipled and undemocratic for
any Member of Parliament, who had the chance to discuss party policy in the National Congress to
somersault in the National Assembly and begin condemning a collective decision to which he was a
party.535
It is to be noted, though, that not all Members of Parliament succumbed to intimidation by the
executive. A few backbenchers had the courage to criticise the corruption and mismanagement that
were prevalent in the party and government. It was such Members of Parliament who earned the ire
of the President and other leaders. Thus, in a speech to Parliament in April 1980, President
Habyarimana said, about the non-conformist Members of Parliament, that those with views other
than those lying within the framework of the MRND policy should not have a seat in the "boat to
development'<"
In June 1982, a backbencher, Nkurunziza, called for the scrapping of the full-time Central
Committee. He stated that, because the Central Committee wielded so much power, its members
should be more popularly elected, preferably by party prefecture congresses. He also recommended
the abolition of the posts of Members of Central Committees, Cabinet Ministers and Political
Secretary at prefectural level, as they only duplicated responsibilities. He recommended that the jobs
should be merged and performed by a Resident Commissioner. Parliament was sitting after
President Habyarimana had directed it to re-examine the existing political, economic, and social
structure in Rwanda. However, the Speaker told Nkurunziza to keep quiet and President
Habyarimana denounced the recommendations, and ignored them completely.s" In 1984, Frédéric
Nzamurambaho formulated the same criticism and was dismissed from both the Ministry of
Agriculture and the National Assembly.538
535Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 77.
536Addressed to National Assembly on April 12, 1980. The MRND was labelled as "ubwato bw'amajyambere" (boat to
development) where everybody had to sit and row to avoid sinking.
5371nterview with Nkurunziza, 20 July 1998.
538APNo. 042/84 of 11 February 1984.
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The government also faced some, although very little, opposition from backbenchers in passing
some laws.539 It was because of the executive's inability to silence all opposition in Parliament that
President Habyarimana decided to create a front bench majority of three quarters in order to
guarantee that any legislation he wanted would be passed.
Some of the outspoken Members of Parliament were silenced by being appointed Ministers, Prefects
or Burqornasters.s" Others, however, paid a heavy price for their outspoken criticism of the
government, by being disqualified (vetoed) from standing in subsequent parliamentary elections by
the Central Committee. In the 1983 general elections, for instance, Eliezer Niyitegeka was vetoed
from standing for the Kibuye constfuency.r"
Indeed the Central Committee used its power of disqualification to prevent known critics of the
government from standing for election as Members of Parliament. What was even worse was that
the Central Committee was not obliged to give any reason for vetoing a candidate. This inevitably led
to a gross abuse of this power. A former Member of the Central Committee, Pierre Karenzi, noted
that vetoing of candidates had not been recommended by any organ but was incorporated in the
practice of the Central Committee. He said that decisions of the Central Committee in that regard
were not taken independently, but were dictated by President Habyarimana, or were taken to please
him since he always attempted to get rid of political opponents.w
Thus, in the 1983 general elections, the Central Committee disqualified 14 candidates. Many of
those vetoed were former members of parties in the First Republic, such as the MDR-PARMEHUTU
and the UNAR.543 The Central Committee also disqualified eight candidates from contesting the
1988 general elections.544 The possibility of being disqualified from the following elections
unquestionably was a serious fetter on the freedom of expression of Members of Parliament.
All the factors discussed above served to subordinate the legislature to the executive. Because of
this, the executive was not really answerable to Parliament for its conduct of government affairs.
In a plural democracy the opposition party, by criticising the shortcomings of the government, hopes
5391d.
540ld.
541Hewas later to joln the opposition in the 1991 MOR.
542Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 31.
543 Ibid.
544lbid.
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thereby to supplant the government in the good opinion of the electorate. As a result, the
government is much more responsive to criticism than in a one-party State, where the government
does not fear losing power, no matter how embarrassing the criticism from the legislature may be.
Therefore, in the Rwandan case, criticism of the government by a few back-bench Members of
Parliament, though embarrassing, was not sufficient to check the abuse of power by the government,
for it did not risk losing power to an organised rival political party that could exploit its embarrassment
at the next elections.
2.3.6 The hindrance of civil society
As human rights - those rights which human beings are perceived to have by virtue of their humanity
and inherent dignity, and not by virtue of human law or custom - can only be fully guaranteed under
a democratic government system, the object here is to know whether the majority of Rwandans had
the opportunity to actually participate in the democratic process by expressing their choices.
In his analysis of state/society relations, Migdal has found that a stable democracy is unlikely to
flourish in societies which tend to undermine the creation of civil society545, while Kaene put it that
"whenever civil society becomes more confident, the State rapidly loses its grip; its structural
weakness and powerlessness become evident. Civil society tends to swell rapidly from below. It
feeds upon whatever gains it can wrench from the State, which normally lapses into confusion and
paralysis.546
From the variety of definitions that are available,547civil society can be defined as the arena between
545 Migdal, J.S., Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World,
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 247-250.
546 Keane, J., Civil Society and the State, (ed.) Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 4-5.
547 Alfred Stepan conceives civil society as "an arena where manifold social movements (... ) and civic organizations from
all classes (... ) attempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves
and advance their interests". Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone, Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 4. Although Michael Bratton saw this as a neutral definition in comparison to
the confrontational conception proposed by some contributors such as, for example Bayer following Gramsci and Robert
Fossaert (Bratton, M., "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa" in World Politics, vol. XLI, NO.3,
April, p. 417; Bayer, J-F., "La revanche des sociétés africaines", p. 99; Fossaert, R., La société, Tome 5. Les Etats,
Paris: Seuil, 1981, p. 146-147), this basically orientational definition does not resolve the issue of the types and the
location of the associations in civil society. As Naomi Chazan has remarked in this respect, groups that do not espouse
"overarching societal precepts" are excluded by this type of definition, regardless of their size and professed objectives
(Naomi Chazan, "The Dynamics of Civil Society in Africa", paper presented at an International Conference on Civil
Society in Africa at the Harry S. Truman Institute, Hebrew University, 5-10 January 1992, pp. 8-9. See also her "Africa
Democratic Challenge" in World Policv Journal, vol. 9, NO.2, spring 1992, pp. 287-291). Moche Lewin, on his part,
defines civil society as "( ... ) the aggregate of networks and institutions that either exist and act independently of the State
or are official organizations capable of developing their own spontaneous views on national or local issues and then
impressing these views on their members, on small groups and, finally, on authorities (Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev
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the family and the State where voluntary organizations and private individuals predominate because
they are distinguishable from both the power structures of the State and from the mediating
institutions in political society, even though all of them are still somehow interconnected; the
delineation of this arena permits the members of civil society to articulate and defend interests which
touch them as individuals and as members of organized groups but the sum of which is germane to
the overall civic culture of their State.548 One should expect to see flourish within this realm
associations with a national appeal or agenda as opposed to a parochial one, such as labor unions;
professional bodies - national bar association, teacher's union, journalists' union, writers' union,
chamber of commerce and industry, etc. -; the human rights groups; religious bodies549; student
unions and environmental movements. Unfortunately in Rwanda, the growth of voluntary
associations that could be properly located within civil society suffered a mixed fortune and their
actions were severely trammeled. The political authorities sponsored and then co-opted labor and a
variety of civic associations including youth organizations and women's groups onto their formal
prebendal and hegemonic networks. Thus, up to a point, as was the case in some other African
countries, 550 there was some ground for the attribution of a corporatist tendency to the emergent
political landscape, or even, for highlighting the futility of delimiting the boundaries between the State
and society.
2.3.6.1 Freedom of association and assembly
The imposition of one-party rule, de facto or de jure, inevitably leads to a severe limitation of the right
to assemble freely and associate with other persons in order to defend civil or political interests. Only
the ruling party is allowed to exist by law and/or facts, in order to swallow up other associations in
one way or the other.
Phenomenon, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, p. 80). Although Lewis goes further to state that these
associations are not necessarily opposed to the State, the inclusion of official organizations in his definition does not
resolve the problem of location of the civil society.
548 The relevance of "civility" has been stressed in Victor Azarya, "Civil Society and Disengagement in Africa", Text of a
presentation at an international conference on Civil Society in Africa at the Truman Institute, Hebrew University
Jerusalem, 5-10 January 1992, p. 11-15,22.
549 See Chazan, N., The Dynamics of Civil Society in Africa", at 12.
550 For these and other trends in other African countries, see, for example, Nyang'oro, J.E., and Shaw, T., (eds.),
Corporatism in Africa: Comparative Analysis and Practice, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1989; The blurring of
the boundaries is especially underscored in Bayer, J-F., L'Etat en Afrique: la politique du ventre, Paris: Fayart, 1989;
Lemarchand, R., "uncivil States and Civil Societies: How Illusion Became Reality", The Journal of Modern African
Studies, vol. 3D, NO.2, June 1992, pp. 177-180.
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Concerning the First Republic, something must be said about one interesting instrument through
which a partial reconversion of society had been attempted: the co-operative movement associated
with the coopérative Travail, Fidelité, Progrés (TRAFIPRO).551 The movement had its origins in 1950,
when a group of moniteurs of the Kabgayi region decided to pool their meager resources to set up a
canteen in one of the buildings the mission had set aside for that purpose. The idea of transforming
the canteen into a co-operative came from Father Pien, who drafted the constitution of TRAFIPRO
and secured the approval of the Residency in November 1955. It was not until December 1956 that
TRAFIPRO began its commercial activities, with the active collaboration of Father Pien, and the
blessings of Mgr Perraudin. Judging from the circumstances of its foundation, the identity of its
managers and the nature of its activities, TRAFIPRO was closely tied in with, and subject to the
control of, PARMEHUTU. In his capacity as chairman of the board of directors, Grégoire Kayibanda
became, as he himself put it, "one of its initiators and first promoters".552
Certainly, the harnessing of the co-operative movement to PARMEHUTU explains its popularity
among the rural masses; but it also accounts for some of its shortcomings. Because so much of the
money raised by the co-operative was in fact spent on the financing of political activities, its early
development was slow and arduous. An even greater handicap was the continuing misuse and
misappropriation of these funds by some of its PARMEHUTU appointed managers, a fact that lends
considerable justification to the often-heard quip "TRAFIPFO Profitera". No one profited more from
the co-operative than Calliope Mulindahabi, one of the PARMEHUTU leaders, during the three years
that he held the post of director-general of TRAFIPRO (1960-63): hundreds of thousands of francs
are said to have been diverted by Mulindahabi for his personal use.553 As the funds vanished,
President Kayibanda decided to take advantage of his trip to Europe, in October 1962, to explore
with representatives of the Swiss government the possibility of bolstering the co-operative, financially
and otherwise. These exploratory talks led, in 1963, to the signature of a bilateral technical
assistance program providing for the extension by Switzerland of an annual loan of one million Swiss
francs for the next ten years, to be spent exclusively on the development of the co-operative
551 Details about TRAFIPRO can be found in Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, at 251-4.
552 Despite or because of this, between 1956 and 1966 TRAFIPRO saw its commercial activities expand on a national
scale. Its main assets in 1956 consisted of three general stores, all in the vicinity of Nyanza and Gitarama, and its
membership of less than a hundred. Ten years later, a total of 27 branch stores were owned and operated by
TRAFIPRO and its membership had risen to 70,000. No less impressive had been the impact of the co-operative in the
social and political realms. While much remained to be done to make it a 'going concern', even at that stage TRAFIPRO
could be described as one of the most imaginative and fruitful experiments attempted anywhere in sub-Saharan Africa.
Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, at 221.
553 Id., at 222.
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activities; in addition, a team of experts in co-operative development were placed at the disposal of
the Rwandan authorities by the Swiss government. At about the same time Mulindahabi handed the
chairmanship of the board of directors (which he had inherited from Kayibanda in 1960) to Max
Niyonzima, a long-time PARMEHUTU militant and one of the founders of the co-operative. The
actual management, however, was placed in the hands of a Swiss citizen, R. Rebord.554 Judging
from the past record of the Swiss technical assistance program, one cannot escape the conclusion
that much of Rwanda's future evolution would depend on how much external aid was funnelled into
the activities of TRAFIPRO, and for how long.
But what, exactly, was TRAFIPRO? It, essentially, was a consumers' and producers' co-operative.
Approximately 20% of the total production of coffee was bought and exported by TRAFIPRO. It
imported a variety of consumer goods - oil, soap, salt, milk, matches, lamps, shirts, shoes,
toothpaste, ballpoint pens, etc. - which were then sold at fixed prices throughout the country in each
of the co-operative stores.555
TRAFIPRO was also an experiment in democracy, albeit a very timid one for the time. Although the
board of directors functioned as a fairly autonomous body - except for the technical supervision of its
European manager - the local executive committees, in theory, were directly responsible to the local
assemblies. Each branch had its own assembly, composed of all the local co-operative members,
and its own local committees of five, all elected by the assembly. The head of a branch was chosen
from among the members of the local committee. Commenting upon the political functions of these
local assemblies, the European manager of TRAFIPRO once said that they represented "a form of
direct democracy".556 Even though the comparison may seem unduly far-fetched, there can be little
doubt that the semblance of democracy among the people of Rwanda during that time was due to no
small extent to the structures of accountability set up via TRAFIPRO - and also to the persistent
efforts of certain Swiss advisers to acquaint the TRAFIPRO cadres with the meaning and principles
of direct democracy.
554 A man of boundless energy, properly tactful, and with a long experience of the Swiss co-operative movement as
former director of the Coopératives de Neuchatel, Rebord was justly considered to have done a first rate job during his
'term of office' in Rwanda. See Umunyamuryango, November, 1963, p. 3.
555 During the coffee harvest, 18 Mercedes trucks - all owned by the co-operative - collected coffee beans from individual
producers at each of the 70 purchasing centers, and on their return trips to Rwanda delivered imported commodities to
each of the 27 branches. Umunyamuryango, at 4.
556 Rebord, 'Les acquis de la Coopérative', Trafipro, 4 June 1964.
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However, one can point to the continuing existence of corrupt practices among TRAFIPRO officials,
the lack of requisite skills and aptitudes to run branches efficiently, and a vague sense of
discouragement among certain Swiss experts when they found that their advice was frequently over-
ruled at the local level. But by far the most serious difficulty was that TRAFIPRO still had to be
accepted as a legitimate institution by certain politicians and in particular by northern politicians. By
the ubukonde system in the north, some of them had become prosperous independent traders, a
nascent middle-class of entrepreneurs in their respective prefectures. Hence, many took a dim view
of TRAFIPRO, accusing its leaders of trying to perpetuate the paternalism and authoritarianism of
the old days; some had described the co-operative as "useless for society", as "guilty of abuses and
of exercising a de facto monopoly" over commercial activities; at one point certain deputies violently
attacked the government for concluding a technical assistance agreement with Switzerland without
first seeking the advice of the National Assernbly.r" Much of this hostility was a reflection of personal
animosity against the Gitarama politicians, who were accused of using the co-operative for their own
political ends. Thus, became associated with one of the most divisive issues in contemporary
Rwanda. It was liquidated during the Habyarimana regime in 1983, probably because of economic
problems, but also because the MRND had adopted a new formula of engulfing civil society.
Indeed the one-party Constitution made it unlawful for anyone to form or attempt to form any
organisation other than the Mouvement, or to belong to, assemble or associate with, or express an
opinion or do any other thing in sympathy with such an organisation.558
Freedom of association was protected by Article 19, and freedom of assembly by Article 20 of the
Constitution. According to these provisions, no person could be hindered in the enjoyment of his
freedom of association and assembly, that is to say, his right to assemble freely and associate with
other persons and, in particular, to form or belong to trade unions or other associations for the
protection of his interests.
In practice, as with the other rights considered in Section two, the freedoms of association and
assembly were subject to a number of limitations enacted in laws and regulations and could not be
enjoyed when public order, republican form and State security were in danger.
The formation and operation of societies was regulated by the Loi No. 06/1988 of February 12, 1988
557Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 1970.
5580ne-party Constitution, art. 7.
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on organizing societies.55g The Act required every society, unless specifically exempted from
registration, to be registered.560 The formation and operation of associations was regulated by the
Edit of April 25, 1962 that regulated non-profit-making associaflons.ê" This Edit requires every
association to be approved by an order of the Minister of Justice. According to Article 2, "Le Ministre
de la Justice peut accorder la personnalité civile El /'association sans but lucratif. 11 This provision
gives wide discretionary power to the Minister of Justice for denying a request to be accepted from
any association that the government did not like, since it empowered him to act in his absolute
discretion where he considered it to be essential to refuse existence to an association. The wording
of this provision makes it hard to challenge the Minister's action in court.
Freedom of association was undermined by some of the strategies for recruiting new members that
the MRND had adopted over the years. In fact, prior to December 1975, freedom of association and
assembly included the right to form and belong to any political party.562 However, the right was
removed under the one-party Constitution. Article 7 provided that Rwandan people were politically
organised within the MRND, the only and exclusive political organisation outside of which no activity
with political implications was allowed, and of which every Rwandan automatically became a
member.563 The political leaders thought that the mere declaration of a one-party State was hollow
unless the Republican Constitution recognised the status of the party as paramount over all other
institutions. Thus, in 1976, the MRND National Congress passed a resolution according to which the
Mouvement was supreme and the only guarantor of public interests and, thus, that the Republican
Constitution should reflect the supremacy of the Mouvement over other institutions operating in the
Republic.564 This direction resulted in the amendment of Article 7 of the Republican Constitution to
make the party supreme over other institutions. In the process, party youths led by senior officials
(including Burgomasters and Prefects and members of the Central Committee) conducted door-to-
door card-checking campaigns during which those who were found to be without MRND membership
559J.O.,1988, p. 437 as modified by Loi No. 39/1988 of October 27, 1988, J.O., 1988. p., 1653.
56old.,art. 7.
561J.O.,1962, p. 153.
562Self-government Constitution, articles 10 & 19.
563Le peuple rwandais est politiquement organisé au sein du Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le
Développement, formation politique unique hors du cadre de laquelle nulle activité politique ne peut s'exercer. Le
Mouvement (...) est régit par ses status. Tout Rwandais est de plein droit membre du Mouvement (...)
564"Etant donné que le Mouvement (...) est supreme et est le seul garant des intérêts du peuple la Constitution de la
République devrait réfleter la suprêmatie du Mouvement sur les autres institutions." Resolutions du Congres National du
MRND, quoted in Sahinkuye, M., Cours de Droit Constitutionnel, Butare: Groupe Scolaire, 1991, p. 20.
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cards were harassed.565 As shown, this practice was also used during the First Republic in the
1960s, when people were forced to be adherents of the MDR-PARMEHUTU by signing the
membership register and being issued with the membership card.566
The desire to centralise all power and to eliminate all centres of alternative power in a one-party
state is manifested in the attempt to bring all organisations under the control of the party. Therefore,
every effort was made to incorporate all associations into the party and those that refused to cede
their independence to the party were subjected to harassment and even proscrption.s" The MRND
was no exception to this rule. Under Article 62 of the MRND Constitution, the following groups, for
example, were designated as mass organisations of the party: women, the youth, students, workers,
civil servants, ... and any other organisation so designated by the Central Committee. The
constitutions of such organisations had to be approved by the MRND Central Committee; and their
aims, objectives and regulations had to be framed and realised within the party's objectives.568All
Rwandan women were requested to join URAMA,569while JMRND570was created for the youth. The
party was considered supreme above all institutions and therefore no other institution could exist
without its blessing. Thus, Article 7 of the one-party constitution provided that the party was the
supreme organisation and the guiding political force in the land and that its aims and objectives, as
expressed in this constitution, provided guidelines for all persons and institutions in the Republic.
Furthermore, the supremacy of the party was underscored by the MRND Constitution according to
which no act of Parliament, regulation, rule, or by-law was to be enacted or passed by any state
organ, if it was in conflict or inconsistent with this Consttution.v'
Public meetings and processions were restricted by the Ordonnance No. 171A.P.A.J. of January 20,
565Thiswas the case with the author's grandmother who, in 1984, was forced to sign the membership register and thus to
obtain an MRND membership card after party cadres had threatened to burn her in her house. They proceeded from
door to door and most Rwandans became MRND members without knowing exactly what was the status.
566L'Unité, No. 16, Sept. 1, 1962.
567Thishas been the dominant trend in One-party Regimes in Africa. Professor Nuabueze has aptly observed that, "The
one-party State in Africa has tended to confirm the statement that absolute, centralised power is by its nature indivisible.
It does not tolerate pockets of power within the State, even when their purpose is not political. It seeks to integrate every
organisation of any public significance like trade unions, co-operative societies, farmer's associations, women's and
youth associations, etc. Integration or affiliation involves control by the Party and the government. Nuabueze, B.O.,
Presidentialism in Commonwealth Africa, 1974, p. 249.
568MRND Constitution, art. 62.
569Meaning Urunana rw'Abanyarwandakazi (literally grouping of Rwandan women).
570Meaning Jeunesse du Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Development.
571Id.,art. 13; 27; 30.
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1938572 which invested territorial administrators with police powers and Loi No. 33/91 of August 5,
1991573regulated demonstrations and public meetings, both of which are relics of the colonial era.574
Article 1 of the Loi No. 33/91 requires anyone who wishes to convene a public meeting, an
assembly, or to form a procession in any public place to apply for a permit from the regulating
authority of the area concerned. According to Article 7, the regulating authority or his delegate are
empowered to attend the meeting, assembly or procession and to suspend such assembly or public
meeting as they may deem necessary for the preservation of public order,575 Anyone who
participates in a meeting or procession for which a permit has not been issued can be arrested and
charged with unauthorised assembly. 576
The government's treatment of the opposition political parties is instructive of the way the
government has abused its powers to control meetings or processions.
Political parties reappeared in March 1991 as pressure groups whose main object was to overthrow
the Habyarimana dictatorship and his MRNO. They brought together businessmen, farmers,
teachers, lecturers, students and lawyers. Since the main objective was to dismantle the one-party
State, the government naturally felt threatened and did everything it could to frustrate the parties.
Apart from using the government-controlled press to discredit the parties, the government ordered
the competent authorities to deny the parties permits to hold meetings and rallies."? The conflict
between MOR and the Burgomaster of Bwakira is an example. On 18 October 1993 the Burgomaster
denied the MOR a permit to hold a rally in his Commune and the MOR lodged an administrative
appeal to the newly appointed and pro-opposition Prefect of Kibuye. The Prefect held that the
Burgomaster, in denying the petitioners permits to hold the meeting, had violated the petitioners'
right to freedom of association and assembly and freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution.
Although the Burgomaster had the power to reject applications for permits, he could only exercise
such power in accordance with the law. There was no evidence that the granting of a permit to the
MOR would have led to a breakdown of law and order. On the contrary, all previous MOR rallies had
5728. A., 1938, p. 102.
573J. 0., 1991, p. 1132.
574Bothof these Acts are still in force in the RPF regime.
575Theregulating authority in question is the Burgomaster if the demonstration or meeting concerns only one commune,
the Prefect if they concern more than one commune, the Minister of the Interior if more than one Prefecture is involved.
Loi No. 33/91, an. 4.
576Id., article 9, (2); see also article 4 of the Instruction Ministérielle No. 01/02 of 15 September 1978 regulating the
preservation and re-establishmentoforder, J. 0.,1986, p. 411.
577LeMessager, No. 16, February 12, 1992.
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been peaceful, despite the large number of people who attended them.578
This outcome could be explained by the fact that, at the time of the proceedings, Habyarimana's
power and popularity had been diminished greatly by the opposition's successful campaign for
political pluralism. Some administrative officers, therefore, even in the government, did not fear
reprisals from the completely discredited government.
2.3.6.2 The right of workers to strike
The Habyarimana government enacted legislation with stringent fetters on the right to strike. Owing
to the denial of the right to strike by the Constitution, it was almost impossible for workers in public
and semi-public sectors to organise a legal strike in Rwanda.57g As a result all strikes that have taken
place in Rwanda, although there have not been so many due to the inhibition of workers, have been
illegal. The government, as indicated earlier, used various repressive methods to break up strikes:
mass sacking of workers; detention of organisers; and use of heavily armed security forces, who
often inflicted serious injury or death on striking workers.
The government resorted to repression of workers because it considered the workers in formal
employment as a privileged group compared to the mass of the people who were either unemployed,
self-employed or lived in rural areas.580 Besides, since the government owned all the major means of
production, there was perceived to be a commonality of interest between the State and workers. As
President Habyarimana put it,
The important division of our society is not that which may exist between trade union labour on
one hand and managers and property owners on the other, but between the urban and rural
areas. These are two nations we are running the danger of creating ... Now that the largest single
employer is the State, this is to say the least absurd. The State controls ... the major means of
production in the nation .... It holds industrial investments, not for its own good, not merely for the
good of those employed in the State enterprises, but for the benefit of Rwandans everywhere.
Thus for a union to push a claim against the State is to push a claim against the people .... The
gap between the Rwandan in paid employment and his brother in the villages is proportionately
578Letler dated 21 October 1993, addressed to the Burgomaster of Bwakira, T. Kabasha by the Prefect of Kibuye,
Clément Kayishema.
579Self-government Constitution, art. 32.
58°ln 1964, 74,290 persons were employed for salaries. Of this total, 41,400 persons were employed in semi-public
sectors, 15,348 were central government civil servants, 10,000 in the private sector, 6,000 were estimated to be
employed as domestic servants; and 1,542 persons were added to compensate for a projected underestimation of 3% of
the private and semi-public sector labour force. Nyrop, FR., et ai, Area Handbook for Rwanda, Washington DC: US
Government Printing Office, p. 1978. By 1978, these figures had almost doubled. Mubera, La réforme économique pour
le développement national, Butare: UNR, 1978, p. 61.
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greater than between the urban Rwandan and the expatriate.s"
High wages were considered harmful to the economy for various reasons. First, they increase
production costs thereby making locally produced goods uncompetitive, both locally and abroad.
This limits the scope for industrial development through import substitution and also severely curtails
the country's export potential. Second, high wages lead to high inflation, which makes prices of
essential commodities unaffordable to peasants. As a result, peasants drift to the towns in search of
a better life, thereby putting a strain on the already overstretched government services in urban
areas.582 Third, high wages limit job creation because employers feel compelled to adopt capital-
intensive production methods in an economy in which there is an abundance of unskilled and semi-
skilled labour. Lastly, high wages increase the foreign exchange, thereby forcing the government to
divert scarce foreign exchange reserves from capital investments.583
In view of this, trade unions were not expected to play their traditional role of agitating for the
improvement of conditions of service for their members. Their role under the principle of "Démocratie
ResponsabIe" was to improve industrial discipline, to raise productivity and to eliminate harmful work
practices. As President Habyarimana explained:
There can be no split between workers and employers because of the identity of their interests
and where unions would be a privileged group vis-a-vis the majority of their brethren in the rural
areas. The loyalty of the unions should not be sectional in terms of industry and their interests. It
must be national. The aim of unions must be the development of the nation, not just their own
welfare. In case they happen to exist, they can best do this by playing their role effectively as a
factor of production and as an instrument of industrial discipline. To push for higher wages
despite the adverse effects on the economy in an atmosphere of inflation is to negate this
important role.584
2.3.6.3 Freedom of the press
Traditional Africa has had it that children were not allowed to ask questions as often as they wished,
because questions appear to upset African fathers.585 When these fathers came to political power,
almost the same applied in respect of subjects: tolerable questioning or no questioning at all.
581Translated in Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 66.
582Fora discussion of the Rural-Urban migration see, Mubera, La réforme économique pour Ie développement national,
at 63-65.
5831d.,at 86.
584Translated in Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 67.
585See Bgoya, Walter in Building capacities for Resistance and Reconstruction in Another Development for Lesotho,
Gaborone, 1989.
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Again, Africa has had it that when children washed their hands, they ate with the elders.586Implied in
this is that children should not ask questions when they talked "promisingly big" like their
domineering fathers; when they constantly kept close to their fathers, talked in their voices, mimicked
their jokes and laughed uniformly with opinion leaders of the moment. In short, this is when the new
submitted itself to the old; and when the old saw in the new youth the right attitude that would
perpetuate the status quo with little or no questioning. This is what pertained in most of Africa, only
to be altered rapidly by colonial oppression whose resulting contradiction gave birth to the
uncompromising protests for political freedom.
But when all was done and independence was attained, the father-child attitude revisited the national
home with the father keeping an eye on the child who "played with the knife" - the media of
communication. In Rwanda, it will be noticed that Article 18 of the Constitution did not specifically
protect press freedom. This made journalists highly vulnerable to pressure and intimidation. Freedom
of the press, which was always proclaimed by the President and other leaders, only existed in
theory. Besides, the leaders' proclamations contradicted Habyarimana who, when he became
President of the Republic of Rwanda, stated that,
Too often the only voices to be heard in "opposition" are those of a few irresponsible individuals
who exploit the very privileges of democracy - freedom of the press, freedom of association,
freedom to criticise - in order to deflect the government from its responsibilities to the people by
creating problems of law and order .... The government must deal firmly and promptly with the
troublemakers. The country cannot afford, during these vital early years of its life to treat such
people with the same degree of tolerance that may be safely allowed in a long established
democracyls"
It was argued that the implementation of human rights, which Habyarimana had called privileges,
should be postponed because people "wanted development" as priority.588
In practice, the press operated under tremendous pressure. Every effort was made by the
government to suppress press freedom. The two major newspapers that were allowed to inform -
Imvaho (daily) and La Reléve (weekly) - were owned by the government and their managing
directors were appointed by the President. The only radio and television stations were owned by the
government and so was the only news-gathering agency, the Agenee Rwandaise de Presse (ARP).
The heads of Radio Rwanda and Télévision Rwandaise (TVR) were also appointed by the
586Achebe, C., Things Fall Apart, London: Heinemann, 1962, p. 13.
5871nterview with President Habyarimana by Warutere P., Journalist at Umoja, February 1991.
5881d.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
145
President. 589
Ownership of the mass media by the government meant it had control over the contents of the news
to be published, as well as over who could have access to it. Within government media, there was
tight self-censorship and, therefore, no big explosions of freedom of expression; not because such
cases were rare, but because they were smothered within the editorial system itself. Everyone knew
that they were running risks of being suspended or fired for an unpleasant truth. A hurtful truth would
be referred to as an attempt to hinder the policy of "peace and national unity". Tight self-censorship
would often result in media coverage which was not far from propaganda or mere statements which
did not raise issues of public concern. For example, it took a long time before the media tackled the
issue of corruption within the Ministry of Education, because the Minister was an influential Colonel
from the North (the President's homeland), Colonel Aloys Nsekalije. Behind self-censorship was the
ever booming threat of being thrown into the "1930", the central prison in Kigali, as was the case for
journalists like Niyitegeka and Rudakubana in 1985.590
A lot of pressure was exerted on journalists to conform to the party and government line. Rwandan
journalists who failed to conform were either suspended or fired, or detained without trial. In March
1994, for example, the Director of the Office Rwandais d'lnformation sacked Isidore Nsengiyumva, a
journalist, for interviewing some people believed to belong to the rebels fighting against government
soldiers.591 Foreign journalists who were considered hostile were either denied accreditation or
deported, as, for example, Enos Tumusigye, a journalist from Uganda, who was deported in 1993
without being given any reason for the action simply because he was suspected of working for the
rebels.592 Marie France Cros, a Belgian journalist who, since 1988, has published a series of articles
in the Belgian daily Le Soir in which she criticised the corruption among high-ranking Rwandan
officials, hidden cannabis farming in Nyungwe Forest, and many other issues involving Rwandan
authorities, was never allowed to have a visa to return to Rwanda, as she was considered dangerous
to the public image of a number of government officials.593
Although senior media workers Uournalists and administrative staff) of the ORINFOR were appointed
by the office of the President, for tight control, the government would still interfere more or less
589Self-government Constitution, art. 56; 1991 Constitution, art. 44.
590For details about their imprisonment, see Kinyamateka, April 1985.
591Account from Isidore Nsengiyumva himself. Interview, 12 October 1998.
592Ibid.
593ld.
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directly to the daily running of state media (radio; television; and press). Thus, programmes that were
likely to embarrass any senior government official were closely monitored. It is in this context that the
programme DUSANGIYE IJAMBO was suspended. In fact, the programme (or its producer) would
appeal to cabinet minister or heads of parastatals to come and face the people in a live phone-in
programme. The most influential ministers and those whose departments were corrupt came
together and imposed a ban on the programme in 1990,594arguing that it was likely to "bring division
in the country and let government officials be punching balls of their detractors".595
Internal censorship would also be applied by ORINFOR administrators to defend their own bread.
Thus, any journalist who were suspected of any "unfair", "unbalanced" news coverage, would be
suspended for one to three months with his salary cut to one quarter during the suspension period.
This was the case with Martin Nkurunziza who, in 1973, was put in custody for three years for having
said that northerners were over-represented in government to the detriment of the rest of the
country.596In 1993, Isidore Nsengiyumva was suspended for bringing more MRND members into the
studio than those from MOR, but simply because the Director of ORINFOR was an MOR member
appointed according to the Arusha Peace Agreement,597 Thus, internal censorship was often
subjective and meant to protect the administration's position.
Journalists worked in fear because the much-hated Service Central de Renseignement (presidential
secret police) closely monitored their activities. In a presidential press conference in Kigali in 1993,
Jean Baptiste Rudahangarwa asked why the office of the President's tight surveillance of the media
was evident through a range of intimidatory techniques which involved the close monitoring of all the
country's journalists through the interception of mail, indiscriminate bugging of telephones, and
interrogation of reporters in the hope they would disclose their news sources, and why the private
media should be "the eyes and ears of the State" as were Imvaho and La Releve. He contended that
the press was entitled to enjoy press freedom and to hold opinions without interference. He argued
that Imvaho and La Releve were owned by the people and that neither the press nor any
organisation had a right to use them for political activities, to the exclusion of other citizens.
Criticising the instructions given to journalists not to cover activities of opposition parties, he said that
these instructions were "illegal, unconstitutional and discriminatory", that no one, be it a Minister, the
594 These were the Ministers of Education, Public Works, Justice, and Health. InteNiew with Gerard Gatare, former
journalist, Lusaka 25 July 1997.
595 Gerard Gatare, ld.
596 Urumuli rwa Demokarasi, No. 120, p. 3.
597 Isidore Nsengiyumva, 12 October 1998.
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President, or the Director of Office Rwandais d'lnformation was allowed by law to make
pronouncements which were contrary to the Constitution and that the discrimination embodied in the
instructions was not justifiable in a so-called State of law because such a State allowed a difference
of opinion. He said the instructions were illegal in that they discriminated against the political actors
because they held different political views from the President's ruling party. He concluded that
newspapers were to be run on journalistic principles, which dictated the coverage of all newsworthy
items and placement of stories, since all the people were entitled to a fair airing of their views in
these newspapers.59B Unfortunately, the President did not want to comment on this observation, and
Rudahangarwa was later assassinated.599
The press was warned to adhere to the party line by President Habyarimana and other leaders on
numerous occasions. Journalists were often instructed not to cover certain events600 or not to
interview critics of the government.601 For example, in early 1991, the government issued a directive
to TVR to the effect that only those above the rank of Governor, Director General and General
Managers of companies should be allowed to appear on television. One virulent politician and
frequent critic of the government, Donat Murego, was turned away when he went to TVR for an
interview.602
When a crop failure resulted in widespread famine in which at least 30 people died in 1989 in the
south of the country, the State-owned media did not report news of the deaths. In contrast, Radio
France Internationale had a steady flow of news every day and Kinyamateka had written that the
government aid had been misappropriated. All that Radio Rwanda did was to announce that there
had been disturbances and that the public should remain calm because the government was solving
the problem.603
The intimidation of the press was not just restricted to warnings and directives on what news should
598ld.
5991bid.
6°00RINFOR, Note de Service 08/91, 10 February, 1991. In this notice, the Director of the Rwanda Office of Information
(ORINFOR) instructed journalists to present non-subversive news and news which took account of the government
policy of educating the people of Rwanda.
601Eliezer Niyitegeka, former journalist at ORINFOR, said, during a rally of the MOR in Kibuye in September 1991 :"One of
the most disturbing aspects of our society is the way in which the mass media has unashamedly been manipulated to the
exclusive monopoly of a small clique of the leaders at the top and how the views of the ordinary citizen who wishes to
constructively criticise government policies are blacked out. Audio tape, Discours des Dirigeants du MOR, Kibuye:
Meeting, September 1991. Translation by the author.
602Notes from Donat Murego, Goma, January 1995.
603Sibomana, Gardons espoir pour le Rwanda, at 47.
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or should not be reported. On some occasions senior party and government officials seized stories
prior to publication or, in the case of ORINFOR, ordered a halt to programmes already on the air, as
is exemplified by the following incident. On March 15, 1993, Kalisa, journalist at ORINFOR, was
forced out of bed late at night by agents of the Service Central de Renseignement who demanded to
see reports of Nyandwt's speech at a rally in Ngororero, before they were published. The agents
were acting on instructions from the Director of the Service Central de Renseignement who wanted
to read the reports written by reporter Jean Baptiste Kalinda, before they appeared in the paper the
next day.604The reports were only handed back to the reporter after the Director had approved their
contents.605 This incident called forth a vigorous protest by the journalists606 but neither the President
nor the National Assembly reproached the Service Central de Renseignement for this disgraceful
conduct.
The level of intimidation of the press was so high that the press rarely engaged in investigative
journalism. The Imvaho was at one time described as "another government gazette" by one Member
of Parliament because it only published news that pleased the government.607
The intimidation of the press was not only confined to the party- and government-owned media, but it
also extended to printing companies and privately owned media. Printing companies were strongly
discouraged from publishing books or other materials critical of the government. Even privately
owned companies had to defer to the government's wishes because the government controlled the
paper supply as well as the allocation of foreign exchange, which is essential for importing
machinery and other primary requisites. In 1991, for example, the government ordered
PRINTERSET to stop printing newspapers "disturbing peace and security in the country". In May,
one issue of Kanguka was seized by agents of the Service Central de Renseignement before it was
printed and it never appeared.60B
Private radio and television stations were not permitted,609 neither were independent daily papers
allowed. The only independent publications allowed were the bimonthly church newspaper,
604lnterview with Jacques Muhirwa, former agent of the Service Central de Renseignement, Lusaka, 29 September 1998.
6051d.
6061d.
6071nterviewwith a Member of Parliament, 15 September 1998. The MP did not want his name to be disclosed.
608Muhirwa, 29 September 1998.
609Except foreign radio broadcasts, which were not controlled. Tuning in to Radio France Internationale, British
Broadcasting Corporation, Voice of America or Canal Afrique was frequent practice to know what was happening in
Rwanda.
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Kinyamateka and the monthly Dialogue.610 Publications by interest groups such as the Diapason of
the students of the University of Rwanda and Le Rwanda de demain of Rwandan students in
different overseas universities were allowed. But these had a limited circulation and usually did not
cover general news.
However, the private media, in its effort to operate freely, was often overwhelmed with interference
from government and security services. In the first instance, most critics of the government who were
denied access to the State-owned media had their views published in the church paper,
KINYAMATEKA. This naturally angered the President and his colleagues. On numerous occasions
the paper was lambasted and threatened with proscription for publishing news embarrassing to the
government. The Rwandan papers played a poignant role in disseminating the views of multiparty
advocates through 1991 and at a time when the government-owned media denied them coverage.
The Habyarimana regime often attacked KINYAMATEKA for its non-conformist stand and its
journalists were taken to court for sedition. In Ministere Public v Kinyamateka6ll, André Sibomana,
Sylvestre Nkubiri, Antoine Rwagahilima, and Gaspard Gasasira were charged with sedition.
According to the public prosecutor, the defendants had discredited "high authorities of the country"
by affirming that these authorities had accumulated goods to the detriment of the rest of the
population and that they had placed themselves above laws to commit exaction. Despite their
abundance of evidence, the defendants were sentenced to six months in prison. This was followed
by a threat to Sylvio Sindambiwe, editor-in-chief of Kinyamateka. He received a bucket full of faeces
in his face in 1983, when a suspected intelligence officer disguised as a beggar attacked him in his
office.6l2 He was run over by a truck a few months later. He had, in February 1982, received a letter
from Jean Baptiste Hategekimana, agent of the Service Central de Renseignement warning him that
he would face problems if he continued to act against the "sécurité nationale":
Tu ne devrais pas être affolé par le fait que les forces de I'ordre t'aient laissé porter atteinte El la
sécurité nationale mais tu devrais en avoir peur puisque tu es devenu comme un taureau qui fait
ce qu'il veut. Ceux que tu as attaqués [...] ont décidé de te rendre la pareille [...]. Personne ne
pourra nous contrer dans notre objectif de sauver le pays en supprimant les indésirables.613
A number of other journalists in the private media came to be acquainted with prison and repeated
610Sibomana, Gardons espoir pour le Rwanda, at 44.
611Id.,at 52.
612Kinyamateka, April 1983.
6131d.The government had incited the population to organise itself for self-defence. It will be shown later that those
structures became offensive forces.
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interrogations in the Service Central de Renseignement. For example: Filibert Ransoni, a
Kinyamateka journalist, was the first to expose the scourge of corruption and mismanagement that
was making the SOMIRWA (Société Miniere du Rwanda) sink. He was trailed through courts for
months in 1983-1984, until government put pressure on his employer to sack him.614 Fé/icien
Semusambi, a self-employed journalist and writer, came to be considered by government as
dangerously seditious when he published Ubwato mu muhengeri, a book in which he was saying that
the "one-party system of the MRND was in troubled water" and that "the whole country was likely to
sink".615 In 1986, this was certainly a big "offence", as multipartyism was far from being talked about
in Rwanda, as was the case in many African countries. He was subjected to a number of
interrogations and was jailed in November 1986.616Franqois Gasimba, due to his satirical book Isiha
Rusahuzi617 was highly acclaimed by the readership in 1987. The book was a criticism of
government officials and the corrupt system. But has been exposed to tough interrogation and
intimidation by agents of the Service Central de Renseignement ever since.618 Hassan Ngeze and
Vincent Rwabukwisi, two journalists who started a newspaper, Kanguka, a few months before the
war broke out in 1990, were harassed for "working in favour of the long-deposed monarchy and for
inciting the Tutsi exiles into rebellion".619When these journalists later split and worked separately,
persecution, arrests and newspaper seizures continued. They were thought to be linked to Valens
Kajeguhakwa, a Tutsi businessman from Gisenyi who had just joined the rebellion.62o
All these instances show how government officials infringed on press freedom with impunity and that
the lives of certain journalists were threatened simply because they dared to criticise the regime in
place, or because of their ethnic affiliation.
Apart from journalists, some other people who had the courage to criticise government policies also
suffered harassment and, in some cases, were assassinated. This was because criticism of the
government was considered unpatriotic or treasonable. Although individual ministers or members of
the central committee could be criticised, it was taboo to criticise the President, "the father of the
614 Kinyamateka, No. 132, Aug. 1984.
615 Semusambi, F., Ubwato Mu Muhengeri, Kigali: Printerset, 1986, p. 21.
616 Muhirwa, 29 September 1998.
617 Gasimba, F., Isiha Rusahuzi, Kigali: Printerset, 1987.
618 Muhirwa, 29 September 1998.
619 Kanguka, NO.1 0, 1991, p. 3.
620 Muhirwa, 29 September 1998; Kanguka, Nos. 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1991.
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nation".621
2.3.6.4 Academic freedom
Other groups targeted for persecution for criticising government leaders and policies were university
students and academic staff.
The relationship between the UNR and the government was characterised by tension and mutual
suspicion. Students and academic staff were always under close surveillance by members of the
secret police who were often enrolled as students, or masqueraded as workers at the University. The
government did not hesitate to clamp down on academic freedom, through closure of the UNR,
expulsion or suspension of students, harassment of both students and academic staff, and
appointment of pro-government vice-chancellors, packing the University councils with pro-
government representatives, and censorship of student publications.
Perhaps the most spectacular example of the persecution of a dissident is that of Alberto
Basomingera, lecturer at the Law Faculty of the National University of Rwanda. His troubles began
when he posted an Amnesty International report on torture and prison conditions in Rwanda on a
wall at the Law Faculty in 1984 in order to make it publicly known to his students. He was summoned
for interrogation by the Service Central de Renseignement and was ordered "not to start again that
dangerous game". In 1985, in his lecture during a class on Constitutional Law that was attended by
the author and which came after the assassination of President Tolbert of Liberia by then Staff-
Sergent Samuel Doe, he urged leaders of the Third World, especially those in Africa, to review their
policies towards single party constitutions and reintroduce flexible mechanisms to allow peaceful
change of leadership. He explained that the multiparty system of government was the surest way of
avoiding coups and eliminating the disgraceful tendency of presidents to end up with bullets in their
heads. He said that it was a numbing experience that successive presidents all over the Third World
tended to end up with a bullet in the head. He asked if there was not something wrong somewhere if,
from beneath apparent calm and submission, a sergeant rises and bombs off the head of a
President to immediate popular acclaim. He contended that, if the only change in leadership was to
be by death in the saddle, and especially by death of an assassin's bullet, there was not going to be
621For example, in August 1989, Member of Parliament Félicula Nyiramutarambirwa was deliberately run over by a lorry
after criticising the government for corruption in road-building contracts. Her criticism especially involved the President
and the Minister of Public works, for their failure to put a road building out for tender. She also came from Butare (south)
and was thought to encourage political opposition there. See Prunier, Gérard, The Rwanda Crisis, at 89.
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order.622 Commenting on elections, he criticised the fact that people were forced to vote for a
particular citizen and he remarked that the election of a President of the Republic by 99.98 per cent
of the voters, followed by a coup d'Etat the following day, was not understandable.vê He was
summoned again and terrorised by the same Service Central de Renseignement about his lecture.
The secret police agent told him that "this kind of lecture was arrogant, highly insulting and
subversive". He was dismissed the following year. It should be mentioned that there was at least one
student who notes each lecturer's comments and report to the Service Central de Renseignement in
each class at the National University of Rwanda.
In 1993 a new lecturer from France, Joseph Dieng, was served with deportation orders before he
started his lectureship at the university because he was communicating by telephone with "unknown
people but believed to be members of the enemy", the RPF.624 In the aftermath of this incident,
Charles Nyandwi, the Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, told Parliament that, in
future, lecturers appointed to the staff of the UNR would be screened to ensure that they reflected
the aspirations of the nation and that it was necessary to re-examine the whole concept of academic
freedom and autonomy in institutions of higher learning in a developing country like Rwanda which
had so many priorities.625
Regarding the students, after the creation of the Association Générale des Etudiants Rwandais
(AGER), which, in the 1960s, brought together Rwandan students attending different universities in
the world and which followed the Association Générale des Etudiants de I'Université Nationale du
Rwanda (AGEUNR), the Habyarimana regime attempted to transform these associations into youth
movements under control of the regime. But students kept their distance with regard to such
interference and rather created Le Rwanda de Demain and Diapason as organs of expression for the
AGER and AGEUNR, respectively. In these fora students expressed their views and mostly criticised
the anti-democratic practice and abuse of human rights by the regime. The government's reaction
often was to suspend scholarships for certain students, especially those in Belgian universities. For
example, Emmanuel Gapyisi and Emmanuel Bahigiki had their scholarships suspended and had to
live and study without assistance. Others, like Romuald Mugema, who was on holiday in Rwanda,
were put in jail and the government confiscated their passports, thus denying them their freedom of
622Basomingera, Introduction au Droit Constitutionel, at 42.
6231bid.
6241nterview with Joseph Dieng in Paris, August 1998.
625National Assembly Debates, 1993.
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movement, so that they were not able to pursue their studies. At the University of Rwanda, Seth
Sendashonga and Ezechiel Bisalinkumi had their scholarships suspended. Ezechiel Bisalinkumi had
published an article in the Diapason denouncing government favouritism in granting scholarships for
studies abroad. He was threatened by agents of the Service Central de Renseignement, and so was
Seth Sendashonga who had written many articles like "Regard Critique sur Ie Régime de
Habyarimana" in the Diapason. Both students were forced into exile in Kenya in 1976.626
In 1981, 3 students, Esdras Kanimba, Casimir, and Charles Karake were arrested and tortured in the
Service Central de Renseignement. They were accused of "having said seditious words" during a
meeting of the General Association of Students of the National University of Rwanda at which only
academic and financial problems were discussed.627
The University Council, working under government dictate, approved a new Disciplinary Code for
students in May 1990. The Code contained severe restrictions on student demonstrations,
publications and general conduct. All students had to sign an agreement promising to abide by the
new code as a condition for admission.628
In fact, academic freedom had never been enjoyed at the National University of Rwanda since the
creation of that institution in 1963. Authorities, as well as scientific and academic staff, were
nominated and dismissed by political authorities.629
2.4 The failure of national unity
As shown in Chapter one, Rwandan ethnic groups share all cultural values despite the polarisation
effected by ethnicity. To fashion a unified nation from such a polarised society has been one of the
most important challenges facing Rwanda. While the primary loyalty of many Africans is to their
ethnic group or tribe rather than to the nation, the consequence of the hierarchical organization of
ethnic groups has been the negation of the individual, man or woman, to the profit of the ethnic
community. Even if people belonging to the same group do not have the same qualities and same
faults, the struggle for power has resulted in a determination to indissolubly link the destiny of each
626Account given by Ezechiel Bisalinkumi, November 19, 1998.
627lnterview with Casimir Runyange, Lusaka, July 1997.
6281d.
629See Décret-Loi No. 2/81 of 16 January 1981 regulating the organisation of university education in Rwanda, articles 27,
29, 31, 33, 36, 37bis, 38, 40, 40bis, and 44.
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individual to that of the ethnic group. Therefore it is difficult for many normal individuals of one ethnic
group to believe that they can, together with individuals from the other ethnic group, have and
defend the same ideas and the same political opinions or the same socia-professional interests. The
majority of Tutsis and Hutus have been led to believe that the survival of their ethnic group or even
the safeguarding of that group's interests cannot be assured by someone from the other ethnic
group, unless he is a puppet. In other words, people have been led to believe that their own success
is strongly dependent upon that of their group.
This psychological and cultural conditioning means that every Hutu or every Tutsi has to
automatically stick with those from his or her own ethnic group for good and for evil. In the course of
history, this ethnic solidarity has been used and exploited by Tutsi and Hutu leaders to mask the
contradictions of interests among them and the population. That is why, in order to maintain the
status quo in the 1950s, Tutsis who had no direct link with power were forced to fight against Hutus
who wanted change, and many lives were lost.63o Likewise, after the referendum on 15 September
1961, many innocent "Tutsi peasants without any pretension to power were forced into exile by Hutu
peasants who reproached them [because] of their solidarity with the regime which had exploited
Hutus for four centuries'<"
After 1959, destitute Hutu peasants sang and danced the victory of "Gahutu", ignoring that a small
civil and military bourgeoisie, out of cupidity and indifference towards the interests of peasant
masses, was in formation. Some of them would join the militia to massacre hundreds of thousands of
innocent Tutsis and Hutus for the simple fact of their belonging to the ethnic group from which most
of the RPF combatants were recruited.
Even though the MRND was a truly national party in the sense that it had drawn its support from all
parts of the country, it was not free from ethnic and regional rivalries. This chapter has made it
evident that the incessant struggles for power and privileges within MRND were depicted in ethnic
and regional terms. Of course, it was the failure to resolve these rivalries amicably within MRND that
led to the formation of splinter parties by those who lost influence in the party. As indicated,
Habyarimana was given power to create party offices and to appoint almost all the senior or party
officials, from the Members of the Central Committee down to lower levels. As a result, instead of
free elections for the important positions in the party and government, he favoured the system of
630 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 1970.
631 RDR, Plateforme Ideologique du Rassemblement pour le retour des Refugies et la Démocratie au Rwanda, Paris,
August 1998. Author's translation.
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presidential appointments because "free elections allegedly engendered tribalism as candidates
often canvassed for votes along ethnic and regional Iines".632President Habyarimana adopted the
policy of "équilibre ethnique" (ethnic balancing) in his appointments in order to ensure that all ethnic
groups were well represented in the party hierarchy, in government and in parastatals.633 However,
not only was this policy almost a theory, but ethnic balancing was also conceived at the expense of
democracy, competence and efficiency. It allowed Habyarimana to appoint only those loyal to him
personally, rather than genuine representatives of the various ethnic groups, thereby enhancing his
status at the expense of the entire nation.
Habyarimana cited the need for national unity, peace and economic development as one of the
strongest justifications for introducing a one-party State in 1975.634He argued that, in a nation riven
with divisions or conflicts, the unity of a single political party was necessary for stability and
development. However, his one-party system brought nothing but one-man dictatorship and misery
to the majority of the population. The so-called national unity was superficial and was enforced at the
expense of democracy and human rights.
National unity and national integration, though important goals, must not necessarily be squared with
political unity, that is, the forced fusion of all political parties and groups into a common mould. It can
be argued that a national party aggregating diverse elements in a plural society, can perform an
integrating role, but it must not, for that reason, be erected into an exclusive, monolithic organ, to
which all other associations, groups and individuals must be compelled to belong on pain of
suppression. The need for unity is not so compelling that the individual's freedom of choice and
expression should be sacrificed, and his freedom to associate with others in the pursuit of common
desires and aspirations be taken away. In a plural society, observes Nuabueze, "an attempt to erase
tribal or racial loyalties by political fiat is futile. The ban on parties does not abolish the differences
between the various social groupings in the State or the jealousies and conflicts generated
thereby".635
6321nterviewof President Habyarimana by Radio France Internationale, 19 May 1981.
633Thepolicy of ethnic balancing was also adopted in education. See Sadiki, Connaissances et compétences techniques
en milieu rural au Rwanda, thesis, University Johann-Wolfgang Goethe, 1997.
634See Minifeste et Statuts du MRND, at 13.
635Nuabueze, Presidentialism, at 231. As the example of the former communist countries of Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union shows, unity among the various ethnic groups and nationalities which is enforced cannot last. When
communism collapsed, ethnic rivalries and nationalist feelings that had long been suppressed suddenly burst loose. This
has led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, where civil wars have been raging (i.e. between Serbia
and Croatia in the former Yugoslavia; between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the former Soviet Union). In Africa there are
many examples of civil wars between ethnic groups. Apart from Rwanda, where the conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi
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Normally, national unity can only be achieved through the evolutionary process of education, and
through social intercourse in trade, intermarriage and other cultural and social relationships,
business and professional life, a functional realignment of people cutting across tribal or racial
divisions, and a shared community life generally.636 But it is also possible to have national unity
through, principally, an explicit common agreement between the concerned actors, as has been the
case in South Africa.63?
The imposition of one-party rule in Rwanda did not, and will not, end ethnic and regional antagonism.
Ethnicity, like racism, simply means favouring or discriminating against a person solely on account of
his ethnic group.
Like ethnicity, regionalism is a consequence of the lack of a State of law. It is also a deviation in the
governance and in the social behaviour of individuals characterised fundamentally by the egocentric
appropriation of political power and national resources. It shows itself in exclusion, discrimination,
restriction or preference based on regional origin. As a consequence, it denies or compromises
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Unlike ethnicity, regionalism was sowed during the post-independence period. The analysis of the
recent political history of Rwanda shows that the rulers surrounded themselves almost exclusively
with people from their region because of the fear of democratic alternation. The object was to remain
in power at all costs in order to dominate all the channels for the distribution of the limited national
resources by manipulating, where necessary, the Constitution and other laws. That is why the
"Second Republic" of President Habyarimana was initially a northern revenge over the
PARMEHUTU Southerners.638 But once it became clear that cabinet posts, economic opportunities
and foreign scholarships would go first and foremost to Northerners, they began competing among
themselves for the monopoly. As the President and his wife were from Gisenyi, they favoured the
people of the Gisenyi prefecture over the Ruhengeri prefecture group. This is how the Ruhengeri
has left thousands of people dead, civil war has been raging in Liberia between the Krahan and other tribes and has led
to the death of thousands of people; similarly in Ethiopia thousands of people died in the civil war between the
communist government of dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam (dominated by the Amhara tribe) and various ethnic groups
such as the Eritreans, the Omoros and the Tigreans, etc. All these countries were undemocratic one-party States that
attempted to impose national unity by force.
636Nuabueze, ld.
637Although the South African experience is a young one, it can serve as a model for Rwanda, mutatis mutandis. See
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Government Gazette, 18 December 1996, Act No. 106.
638The fact was that Gisenyi and Ruhengeri prefectures were the main beneficiaries of the country's wealth to the
exclusion of the rest of the country, which was considered as the south in its entirety.
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people took the second place to their Gisenyi neighbours and the rest of the country was neglected.
For example, by mid-1990, people from Gisenyi occupied nearly one third of the eighty-five most
important positions in the country, as well as almost the entire management of the army and
security.639 At the beginning of 1990, of 68 parastatals, 33 directors were from Gisenyi (19) and
Ruhengeri (14).640According to a study of the 1979-1986 period, the disparity pertaining to studies
abroad was 1.83 for Gisenyi and 1.44 for Ruhengeri, the worst-off prefecture being Kibungo, with
0.67.641Although ethnic conflict had not disappeared during that period, it had been outstripped by
regional conflict and the situation reached was that within Gisenyi itself, Bushiru (Habyarimana's
region) was in confrontation with Bugoyi. It is the Bashiru who formed what is commonly called
akazu (litterally meaning a small house or people of the same family) for effective power was within
their hands.
Within the government, only Ministers from the south would be accused and dismissed for
embezzlement, while those from the north, whose management was notoriously disparaged, could
not be removed.642
Regionalism provoked rancour and agressiveness in victims of exclusion or injustice, who, in their
turn, adopted the same behaviour. Thus, no leader has been concerned about public interest,
whence the lack of patriotism among most public office holders.
Regionalism destroyed the country because it allowed the man in power to grow rich at the expense
of the remaining citizens. Instead of turning every region's potentialities to good account and creating
new resources, leaders appropriated limited available resources. That is, instead of developing the
private sector, creating a prosperous civil society, and promoting education, they have stirred up
quarrels for positions in the public service. In short, leaders who feel comfortable only with people of
their own region cannot really solve national problems.
Indeed, it is the search for access to power which led leaders of political parties, during the multi-
party interlude (June 1991-April 1994), to turn to their regions for support in the elections - which
639 Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at. 71.
640 Kinyamateka, No; 1344, April 1991 , p. 10.
641 Dialogue, No. 143 Nov.-Dec. 1990, p. 92; Reyntjens, L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en Crise, at. 34.
642 Examples taken from Ruzindana are those of Gatabazi and Ruhamanya who were dismissed by Habyarimana while
Nzirorera and Nsekalije remained "despite the public outcry" against their misappropriation of public funds. Ruzindana,
La Terreur Regne, Kigali, 1988, p. 3.
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never took place - while they were unable to propose a creditable national programme. The great
problem facing Rwanda was the absence of someone else who would act in the manner of and be
seen as a politician of national stature and thus would be able to challenge President Habyarimana.
It would therefore not be surprising if, after his assassination, the situation were to become worse
and new leaders would simply not solve the problem of violence, and massacres in particular, and of
national unity in general.
2.5 The turn of the vicious cycle
2.5.1 Theoretical end of one-party rule
In the Rwandan political tradition which the MRND Hutu regime had inherited from both Grégoire
Kayibanda and the old Tutsi kings, the ruler needed to have followers who were his ears and eyes,
people outside the official power structure who were unequivocally devoted to him and would do
anything without asking questions. As seen in Chapter one, the kings had found such people among
their own Abanyiginya clan and within their "marital" clan, the Abega. This, of course, with a few
accompanying betrayals, conspiracies, reversals of alliance and so on, which were part of the daily
experience of this court. Under the Hutu Republic, Kayibanda tended to rely mostly on people
coming from Gitarama and under the Habyarimana regime the tendency was to create subunits
according to precise, more narrowly defined geographical origin.
The Second Republic created in 1973 had initially been a northern revenge over the PARMEHUTU
Southerners. But once it became clear that cabinet posts, economic opportunities and foreign
scholarships would go first and foremost to Northerners, the Northeners began competing among
themselves to know who would get more. The President and his wife favoured the people of Gisenyi
prefecture over the Ruhengeri prefecture group led by the foreign minister, Casimir Bizimungu, and
public works minister, Joseph Nzirorera. So the Ruhengeri people were forced to take second place
to their Gisenyi cousins. This resulted in a sort of animosity in which the one-party State was seen
more and more as the obstacle rather than the road to further development.'<
Both Republics were characterised by lack of democracy, the rule of law and abuse of human rights
with regard to the majority of the people. The Habyarimana regime lacked legitimacy because it was
not accountable to the people. The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe should have provided
643prunier,The Rwanda Crisis, at 86.
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inspiration for the struggle for democracy in Rwanda. Apart from the war launched by the RPF in
1990, the linkage of economic aid to good governance, democracy and respect for human right by
donor countries and international financial institutions (such as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund) should also have helped to bring about the end of one-party rule, as the Rwandan
economy was on the verge of collapse. These aspects were mainly propagated by urban politicians
from the opposition and by the RPF. From 1985, rumours about corruption within the regime were on
the increase since the formal but declining economy could not offer the same amount of advantages
as before. Political opposition to Habyarimana was equally on the rise. Although, officially,
Habyarimana was re-elected President for seven years with 99.98% of the votes on December 19,
1988, domestic opposition began to be sounded louder and louder.
As in other parts of Africa in the early 1990s, several protest demonstrations were held in Rwanda in
1990. The police suppressed a strike on 4 July 1990, and a letter denouncing the one-party system
was published and circulated on 1 September. Important also was the resignation from the Central
Committee of the MRND, at the insistence of the Pope, of the Catholic archbishop, Vincent
Nsengiyumva. Up to that date, the Catholic Church, and the archbishop had been traditional allies of
the MRND. In April 1990 and in September of the same year, on the occasion of a visit by the Pope,
the Church expressed its dissatisfaction with the political and economic situation in the country. The
discontent, however, stemmed mainly from the lower echelons of the church. The leadership of both
the Catholic and the Anglican churches continued to liase closely with the President and his
government throughout the whole period.644
Whereas President Habyarimana considered political change feasible only within the one-party
system in January 1989, one and a half years later, on 5 July 1990, he agreed to the necessity of a
separation between party and State.645 On 24 September 1990 a national expert commission was
set up with the task of working out a national charter that would allow the establishment of different
political parties.646 It is difficult to ascertain the President's sincerity with respect to the reforms.
However, the subsequent RPF invasion did speed up the formal process of democratization.
Initially, the expert commission's mandate ran over two years. The new political-military situation
following the invasion of 1 October led to the acceptance of the multiparty system by Habyarimana,
644Africa Rights, Rwanda: Deaths, despair and defiance, London, 1994, p. 14; Reyntjens, L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en
crise, 1994.
645Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 67.
646Reyntjens, L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en crise, 1994.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
160
in a speech on 13 November, which led to the creation of new political parties. In March 1991 the
MOR was publicly launched, with the explicit statement that it was the successor to the MOR-
PARMEHUTU of the first President, Grégoire Kayibanda. About half of those who launched the
"new" party originated from Gitarama and Ruhengeri, Grégoire Kayibanda's traditional stronghold.647
Other smaller parties that came into existence, and that would playa role in the immediate future,
were the so-called intellectuals' PSO, with some popularity in the south, and the PL, which enjoyed
some support from business people and, consequently, from the Tutsi group, and the Parti
Démocrate Chrétien (POC).648
These political parties were linked by the desire to oppose the Habyarimana regime, and there were
few ideological differences.649
A new Constitution replaced the one-party Constitution on 10 June 1991.650 Under this Constitution
the position of Prime Minister was institutionalised to counterbalance the powers of the President.
The bill of rights under the one-party Constitution, apart from a few other minor changes, was
reproduced verbatim in the new Constitution and most of the provisions in the 1991 Constitution
were similar to those in the one-party Constitution. For example, there is no provision for protecting
minorities from discrimination and oppression, and young persons from exploitation, while all the
clawback clauses have been retained.
2.5.2 Negotiations
After the adoption of the new Constitution on June 10, 1991 the President scheduled parliamentary
elections for the immediate future. Only six weeks later, on 31 July 1991, the most significant "new"
parties (MOR, POC, PL and PSO) denounced the plans to hold elections so soon in a common
declaration. They contended that immediate elections could benefit only the MRNO, which had held
power for two decades. Instead, they demanded a national convention to discuss the reform of the
institutions in detail and called for democratic elections.651
Habyarimana rejected the idea of a national convention. Only the small POC was ready to join a
647Ibid.
648Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 69.
649For details of the programmes of political parties in Rwanda, see Reyntjens, L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en Crise,
1994.
650J.O., 1991, p. 615; Code et Lois du Rwanda, Vol. II, 1995. I, p. 21-30.
651Se"strom and Wohlgemuth, The International Response to Conflict, 1966, p. 24.
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transitional government, but no elections were held. The other opposition parties showed their
political dissatisfaction in demonstrations on 17 November 1991 and 8 January 1992.652 This was a
major setback to the presidential hopes to build a unified front of Hutu parties against the RPF. It
also meant the introduction of an increasingly violent policy against any Hutu and Tutsi opposition on
the part of the Habyarimana regime.
On 6 April 1992, after heavy national and international pressure, a transitional government was
established. It included all the major opposition parties and was led by President Habyarimana and a
Prime Minister from the opposition, Dismas Nsengiyaremye (MOR). However, relations between
Habyarimana and the MRNO on one hand, and the opposition parties, on the other, remained tense
throughout the conflict with the RPF. The domestic opposition was vehemently accused of
collaborating with the RPF and the Tutsis, who were increasingly labelled as ethnic enemies.653
Meanwhile, after November 1990, there was a stalemate in the military conflict between the RPF and
the Rwandan army. A military solution was therefore not in sight. The conflict between the political
parties and the difficulties of establishing the first real transitional government (without the RPF) in
April 1992, or 18 'months after the RPF invasion, also indicated the difficulties of reaching a
negotiated solution. Indeed, the Nsengiyaremye-Ied government that started negotiations with the
RPF on a peace treaty in Arusha on 10 August, 1992 was regularly obstructed by the President and
the MRNO. Systematically, Habyarimana would veto any breakthrough in negotiations that could
lead to a substantial decline of MRNO power. It took a lot of international pressure to make the
President agree each time. Also important as underlying factors were RPF military advances,
deterioration of the economy and the increased number of internally displaced persons.654
2.5.2.1 The preliminaries: October 1990-April1992
Seventeen days after the RPF invasion, with mediation by Belgian and Tanzanian officials, President
Habyarimana and President Museveni of Uganda agreed in Mwanza (Tanzania) on an OAU- and
UNHCR-supervised regional conference on the refugee problem and to continue the talks their
governments had been engaged in since 1988.
In Mwanza, Habyarimana and Museveni also agreed on direct negotiations with the RPF.
652Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 112.
653Verité et Dialogue, The Rwandan Tragedy, at 13.
654From 80,000 in late 1990 to 350,000 in May 1992 after the Byumba offensive and to 950,000 in February 1993.
Sellsfróm and Wohlgemuth, 1966, p. 16.
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Consequently, the RPF was recognised by Habyarimana as a discussion partner. Also important
was the continuing dialogue between Habyarimana and Museveni, despite the former's accusation
against the latter's active pro-RPF involvement in the conflict in Rwanda.655
Until the involvement of the major domestic opposition parties in the Rwandan government on 5 April
1992, little progress, however, was achieved in the mostly-mediated talks between the government
and the RPF. No fundamental agreements that would lead to a sustainable peace were signed, but
only those, such as cease-fires, that would solve immediate problems.
Chronologically, cease-fires were signed and renewed after consecutive violations: on 26 October
1990 in Gbadolite, Zaïre, after active Belgian diplomacy; on 20 November 1990 in Goma, Zaïre,
confirming and extending the Gbadolite agreement; mid-February 1991 in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania;
and on 29 March 1991 in Nsele, Zaïre. The last-mentioned cease-fire was amended twice: on 16
September 1991 in Gbadolite at an OAU summit and on 12 July 1992 in Arusha. The latter
amendment led to the creation of a so-called security zone between RPF-held territory and the rest
of Rwanda.656
Notwithstanding the agreement at the Goma talks to send a 55-man OAU observer force, the
Groupe des Observateurs Militaires Neutres (GOMN), to oversee implementation of the cease-fire,
only 15 officers had arrived by September 1991.657
2.5.2.2 The fundamentals: May 1992-August 1993
About one month after the inauguration of the new government, preliminary talks took place in
Brussels and Paris, in May and June 1992, between the MOR, PSO and the PL on one hand and the
RPF on the other. Agreement was reached to start peace negotiations in Arusha, not only to restore
the Nsele cease-fire, but also to discuss further democratization, integration of the RPF in the
government, and military reforms.658
Peace negotiations between the Rwandan government and the RPF started on 10 August 1992, and
were greatly facilitated by Tanzania and President Ali Hassan Mwinyi and his Ambassador, Ami
Mpungwe. Observers from the neighbouring countries of Burundi and Zaïre and from Belgium,
655Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 71.
656The United Nations and the situation in Rwanda, UN reference paper, April 1995, p. 1.
657Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 71.
658Id., at 90.
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France, Germany, the United States, Senegal and the OAU would be present at the consecutive
Arusha negotiations. The negotiations continued for one year before final agreement was reached
on a total package of protocols on the principle of the creation of the rule of law, on 18 August 1992;
power-sharing, the enlargement of the transitional government with the RPF and the creation of a
transitional parliament, on 30 October 1992 and 9 January 1993; the reintegration of refugees and
internally-dislocated persons, on 6 June 1993; and the creation of a unified national army merging
the RPA and the regular forces, stipulations on commanding posts, on 3 August 1993.659
2.5.2.3 The rule of law
According to the protocol of 18 August 1992, Rwanda had to honour the principles of national unity,
democracy, pluralism and human rights. All citizens were to enjoy the same rights and possibilities,
irrespective of their ethnic, regional, religious or sexual identity. An implicit consequence was the
lifting of the quota system, which, in theory, attributed power positions according to a person's ethnic
identity. All refugees were to have the right to return and the multiparty system was to be one of the
cornerstones of democracy. All former agreements (Nseie, confirmed in Gbadolite and Arusha) on
the creation of an enlarged transitional government were to be honoured. The protection of human
rights were to be guaranteed and supervised by a national commission.66o
The first protocol was concluded in a short period of time. It can be characterised either as a
summary of results from earlier negotiations or as a list of more general principles. The situation was
different for the negotiations of the ensuing protocols. Real power distribution was then at stake.
2.5.2.4 The power-sharing and transitional institutions
The texts included stipulations on the transitional institutions (Le. Presidency, government,
parliament, and courts) and on the power distribution between and within the last three.661
The government was to be extended to include the RPF and be composed of 21 ministers: 5 from
the MRND, including the Minister of Defence; 5 from the RPF, including the Vice-Prime Minister and
Minister of the Interior; 4 from the MOR, including the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance; 3 from
the PSD; 3 from the PL; and 1 from the PDC. The CDR was thus excluded. The new government, in
659Protocole d'Accord entre le Gouvernment de la République du Rwanda et le Front Patriotique Rwandais, Codes et
Lois du Rwanda, Vol. II, 2nd ed., 1995, p. 16.
66oProtocoi of 18 August 1992.
661Communiqué of 18 September 1992; Protocol of 30 October 1992; and Protocol of 9 January 1993.
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principle, was to take decisions by consensus.662
The transitional parliament was to be composed of eleven members each from the MRNO, MOR,
PSO, PL and RPF, four members from the POC and one member each from the other recognised
parties. President Habyarimana was to remain Head of State. However, he was to cede certain
powers to the Prime Minister and the government. Presidential and parliamentary elections would be
organised for the end of the period of transition. A commission was to be given the task to draft a
new Constitution, which was to be the object of a referendum.663
Three key ingredients to the agreement need to be noted: the exclusion of the CDR; the switch from
a primarily presidential system to a primarily parliamentary system in the distribution of power; and
the requirement that the concurrence of at least four parties was to be required to reach a majority
vote, even though the rhetoric suggested that the cabinet would try to work by consensus.
2.5.2.5 Military reforms
On June 1993, negotiators from the government and the RPF agreed on a definite cease-fire, with
the inclusion of the RPF in a merged national army and in the gendarmerie. As seen, the RPF would
obtain a ratio of 40% of all troops and 50% of all commanding posts. It was also specified that the
enlarged transitional government would rule the country for at least one year.664 Parliamentary
elections were to be organised at the end of the transitional period.665
Agreement was further reached in Kinihira on an army of 13,000 troops and a gendarmerie of 6,000
men.666With regard to the army, this would imply a considerable reduction compared to the number
of troops at the time: about 28,000 in the regular forces (FAR) and 20,000 in the RPA.667The Armée
Nationale was to be headed by an FAR commander, the gendarmerie by an RPA commander.668
It was also agreed that 600 RPA men - an armoured battalion - would be allowed to see to the
662SeeProtoeale sur le Partage du Pouvair, in: Codes et Lois du Rwanda, Vol. I., second ed., 1995, p. 8-18.
6631bid.
664Later specified as a maximum of 22 months. See Protoeale sur les questions diverses et dispositions finales, art. 22,
Codes et Lois du Rwanda, at 20.
665Protocol of 24 June 1993.
666Articles of 25 July 1993.
6671nboth cases a considerable increase had been observed since 1990. UN Reconnaissance Mission to Rwanda,
August, 1993.
668Protocol of 3 August 1993.
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protection of the RPF people in Kigali who would participate in the transitional government and
administration, and to safety in the capital in general. A neutral international force or an enlarged
GOMN under United Nations supervision was to be in charge of the overall security in all Rwanda
and, more specifically, operate along the border with Uganda, in the demilitarised zone and in Kigali.
That international force was further to be in charge of the supervision of the inauguration of the
enlarged transitional government, the transitional parliament, military reforms, demobilisation and the
preparation of elections. The installation of this force was a precondition for implementation of the
Arusha agreements.669
2.5.2.6 The designation of the post-Arusha Prime Minister
Agreement was reached in Kinihira, in June 1993, to nominate Faustin Twagiramungu from the MOR
as Prime Minister of the enlarged transitional government. We have seen how, at the moment of his
designation, Twagiramungu was excluded from his party, since the newly-formed "Power Group"
within the MOR, led by Jean Kambanda, had signed an agreement without the consent of the MOR
arguing that the Prime Minister did not belong to their party, whereas the Arusha negotiators had
always agreed on an MOR politician as Prime Minister.67o
In the following period, the split within the MOR would remain, probably not to the dissatisfaction of
the President, who could refer to the absence of consent within political parties in order to fail to
inaugurate an enlarged transitional government in accordance with the Arusha agreements.
Whereas the rivalry within the MOR at the start basically was a struggle between a number of
persons, the dispute became more and more dominated by ethnicity. The "Power Group"
increasingly used anti-Tutsi language, whereas politicians like Austin Twagiramungu were open to
compromise with other political and ethnic groups.
2.5.2.7 The non-implementation: August 1993-Apri11994
The actual Arusha agreements signed on 4 August 1993 by President Habyarimana and RPF
Chairman Alexis Kanyarengwe comprised the above protocols plus a series of intermediary and ad
hoc agreements, such as the different cease-fire texts and the stipulations.s"
However, the implementation soon became a problem for a number of reasons. Firstly, it depended
6691bid.
670Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 89.
671See Journal Officiel, 15 August 1993, p. 1264.
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on an external condition: the setting-up of an international military monitoring force since neither
party trusted the other. Until then, the history of international involvement in the Rwandan crisis had
been quite limited. A Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) had been set up by the OAU after the
February 1992 war to monitor the application of the Dar-es-Salaam cease-fire agreement.672 It
consisted of about sixty African military observers but was unable to provide any political input into
the situation. Then, on 23 June 1993, to facilitate the negotiations in Arusha and quieten the
government's fears of the RPF being rearmed from Uganda, the United Nations created, by
Resolution No. 846, the United Nations Uganda-Rwanda Observation Mission (UNUROM).673 But
after the signing of the Arusha agreement, the signatories turned to the United Nations to obtain the
deployment of a neutral military monitoring force to ensure fair application of the agreement. On 25
September 1993, the UN Secretary-General agreed in principle and by Resolution No. 872 created
the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) on 5 October.674 Then began the usual
round of diplomatic consultations to find out which countries would be willing to send troops to
UNAMIR. However, on 29 September, the RPF declared that it would refuse to send its battalion to
Kigali for the protection of its dignitaries as long as French troops were there.675
Secondly, the situation within the MOR had worsened, consecutive to growing tensions between
Twagiramungu and Nsengiyaremye supporters. It became difficult to determine which faction would
have representatives in the government (three ministers) and the National Assembly of eleven
members of parliament, or how they could share posts in the two political institutions.676 Instead of
fighting for democracy, the two camps exhausted energies trying to destabilise one another.
The Nsengiyaremye faction proved by far the most powerful considering the number of its followers,
both at grassroots and in the party executive committee. An extraordinary national congress was
held in Kigali where a majority of members decided to exclude Twagiramungu from the party "for
betrayal". Some of Twagiramungu's prominent supporters, like Uwilingiyimana and Gasana, were
suspended as party cadres who went astray.677 Twagiramungu, with the support of Habyarimana,
672SeeUnited Nations, The United Nations and the Situation in Rwanda, 1995.
673UNUROM was very slow in getting organised and was only deployed after the signing of the Arusha agreement.
Because of a very formal approach to border control work, its efficiency was extremely low, as Prunier was able to verify
on the spot at both Gatuna and Kagitumba in 1994. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, at 194.
674Id.,at 3.
675SWB,Radio Rwanda, 30 September 1993.
676Fordetails, see Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, at 197; Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 93.
677Rapport du Congres National, Kabusunzu, September 1993.
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and determined to crush the giant MOR, ignored the decisions of the extraordinary congress that he
had neither summoned nor attended. He continued to make declarations and to behave as the only
legal national representative of MOR.678
The big problem was that Twagiramungu had become an isolated man within his party. His
systematic pro-RPF standpoints had progressively alienated him from MOR supporters. He had
forgotten that MOR members considered themselves heirs to the Hutu leaders of the 1959
Revolution that had chased the fathers of RPF fighters from power. That historic fact compelled MOR
leaders to avoid close and confiding ties with the exiled Tutsi-based movement. In spite of the faithful
backing of Premier Uwilingiyimana, and that of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Education and of
Information, Twagiramungu could not organise party rallies in Kigali or elsewhere to show off his
political strength. He proved to be afraid of a meaningless attendance. The few times he attempted
it, supporters were scattered by the other MOR faction.679
In the announced "co-habitation system", Habyarimana naturally preferred a politically baseless
Twagiramungu to Nsengiyaremye. The future head of government, duly mentioned in the peace
accord, really represented him as a scared man on the top of a baobab tree being cut down by his
hunters. Twagiramungu no longer was the superstar of the previous year. His eloquence in political
rallies had gained him considerable popularity as he galvanised crowds with his cherished theme of
"Rukokoma" (National Conference), then in fashion in Africa. The first son-in-law of the prestigious
late President Kayibanda, graduated from Canada, was also popular with foreign diplomats due to
his fluency in French and English and easy contact with people. The MOR had elected him national
chairman for his outstanding capacity to capture adherents and in recognition of his remarkable
contribution to Habyarimana's political destabilisation. Few people wanted him for his ideas, which
were often shallow, and his integrity as head of government or head of state was debatable.
Because of the divisions in the MOR, to which the MRNO had contributed fuel, Habyarimana was
assured of some unexpected RPF opponents in the transitional institutions.
Thirdly, at the end of 1993, the Parti Libéral also split into two factions. The Tutsi PL first Vice-
chairman, Landuald Ndasingwa, also Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, called for the
organisation of a national party convention aimed at electing definitive PL leaders. The Hutu PL
chairman, Justin Mugenzi, also Minister of Commerce and Industry, dismissed the operation which
678Kayihura, 9 June 1997.
679Sometimes the tension amounted to fights, and in December 1993, one person died in Nyamirambo.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
168
could overthrow him from the chairmanship of a party overwhelmingly dominated by the Tutsi.68o
From this disagreement were born open ethnic factions. The problem of MOR representation within
the transitional institutions also arose within the PL.
Endless negotiations between rival camps of broken-up parties were followed by the UNAMIR, as
mediator. Talks proved extremely difficult as their outcome had to determine whether the pro- or
counter-RPF camps would be the dominant political group during the 22 months of transition.
With these negotiations, which were not planned when the peace accord was signed, RPF certainty
of having the upper hand at the political chessboard vanished. The talks interested the MRND and
Habyarimana. These opposing attitudes explain why ceremonies to set up the long-awaited
transitional institutions were often postponed due to the absence of either Habyarimana or RPF
dignitaries at the beginning of 1994.
Fourthly, when the MOR and PL factions reached compromises, the RPF blocked the installation of
the broad-based transitional institutions on a mere pretext. It categorically refused to sit alongside
the single CDR delegate in the parliament.681 This denoted a lack of tolerance, since one MP of the
CDR, which the Front had accused of being the "party of Hutu extremists", could have had no
sensible impact on the operation of the 70 members of parliament.
Lastly, the general political climate was far from peaceful, in particular after the murder on the night
of 20-21 October 1993 of the first democratically elected Hutu President of Burundi, Melchior
Ndadaye, by Tutsi soldiers of the Burundian army. Most observers point to this event as a decisive
factor in the ensuing tragedy in Rwanda. As expressed by Linden,
Perhaps the single most important trigger enabling those who were determined to abort the
process to win the day was ironically an assassination in Burundi on 21 October 1993, that of the
new "Hutu" president, Melchior Ndadaye, one of the first fruits of a process of democratization of
its "Tutsi" regime. Tens of thousands died in the wake of the coup and some 70,000 Burundian
"Hutu" fled into southern Rwanda. The message of these events to many around Habyarimana
was doubtless that the Tutsi would never genuinely accept (Hutu) majority rule within the context
of a government of national unity. In other words, the extremists were right: Arusha was too
much, too far, too fast.682
And Lemarchand put it forward that
680Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 93.
681Id., at 94.
682Linden, I., The Churches and genocide: lessons from Rwanda, Svensk Missionstidskrift 83,1995, p. 5-15.
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Ndadaye's death at the hands of an all-Tutsi army carried an immediate and powerful
demonstration effect to the Hutu of Rwanda ... The message came through clear and loud: "Never
trust the Tutsi!" Thus, with Ndadaye's death vanished what few glimmers of hope remained that
Arusha might provide a viable forum for a political compromise with the RPF.683
If one adds to the above the absence of real reconciliation between conservative and reform-
oriented persons and groups, the massive spread of weapons in the country and the harsh economic
situation, one will better understand the difficulties in implementing the Arusha accords.684
Still, most observers thought in November 1993 that Arusha agreements would slowly but certainly
lead to a more stable situation. Donors tried hard to give their support to a peaceful development.
The UNDPs preparation= of a "Round-Table Conference for the rehabilitation of the areas affected
by the war and the social reintegration of the demobilised soldiers" is a case in point. After the formal
approval on 5 October 1993 by the UN Security Council686to station 2,500 blue helmets in Rwanda
by the end of March 1994, the first troops arrived at the end of October 1993. The final formal
obstacle of the 22-month period of the transitional government had thus been overcome.
One of the first tasks for the blue helmets was to escort the 600 RPA soldiers and the designated
RPF ministers and staff members to Kigali on 28 December 1993, which was called "Operation
Clean Corridor". Other tasks were to guarantee the safety of the capital, the border area with Uganda
and the demilitarised zone in the north. In 1994, the UN troops were to be in charge of the
supervision of military reforms, demobilisation and demilitarisation.687
However, the extended transitional government, the cornerstone of the agreement on which most
other activities depended, never came into being. Agathe Uwilingiyimana still was Rwanda's Prime
Minister on the fatal day of 6 April, 1994. After the arrival of the blue helmets, the reasons for delay
were internal, accentuated by the violent aftermath of the murder of Melchior Ndadaye in Burundi on
20 October 1993.688
The inauguration of a new government and parliament was planned, first for 5 January, 1994, later
for 23 February and then for 24 March, but did not take place. In the eyes of the President, the
683Lemarchand, R., Rwanda: The rationality of genocide, 1995.
684Sellstrëm and Wohlgemuth, 1966, at 32.
685September 1993-ApriI1994.
686Resolution 872 (1993), reprinted in The United Nations and the Situation in Rwanda, 1995.
687In 1995, their attention was to be focused on the process that would lead to municipal, parliamentary and presidential
elections during the last six months of the transition. Sellstrëm and Wohlgemuth, 1966, at 32.
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different parties were too internally divided to provide a stable government that he could support. As
long as no government was acknowledged, part of the opposition boycotted the installation of a new
parliament.
In the meantime, in mid-February, Jacques Baah-Baah, the representative of the UN Secretary-
General in Rwanda, had seriously warned of the massive spread of weapons among citizens and
supporters of the militias.689
2.5.2.8 The manipulation of ethnicity
As noted above, the Habyarimana regime had attempted to establish a broad Hutu-dominated front
in the early 1990s. The strategy adopted by at least part of the regime's supporters was to create a
political climate that would result in political and military marginalisation of the RPF and, broadly
speaking, of the whole Tutsi population and Hutu belonging to opposition parties. Political and ethnic
polarisation had clearly been a strategy from the start of the conflict.69o This was confirmed in a
number of reports by different international human rights organisations.691
One of these reports, from March 1993, written by a group of international human rights committees,
gives a detailed description of offences against human rights. The report gives an idea of the
increasing extremism within and around the Presidency and the MRND.692
Some examples amongst many others: Simultaneous and similar patterns of violent conflicts against
Tutsis and reform-minded Hutus at different places such as Kibilira in March 1992, KibiIira, Kanzenze
and Mufura in November/December 1992 reveal a particular strategy and plan adopted by local
authorities, with strong support from the highest levels. Increasing involvement of party militias,
multiplication of the number of FAR soldiers by five over a sixteen-month period, escalating hostile
ethnic-political propaganda by highly-placed officials against presumed opponents of the regime
(Hutu and Tutsi in opposition parties and RPF), and a deliberately-created climate of insecurity and
unsafety, are different indications of an organised aggressive attitude towards opponents of the
688prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, at 207.
689Sellstrbm and Wohlgemuth, 1966.
690Reyntjens, L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en Crise, 1994.
691See Africa Watch, 1992, 1993; Amnesty International, 1992; Fédération Internationale des droits de I'homme, 1993;
Human Rights Watch/Arms Project 1994; African Rights, 1994.
692Fédération Internationale des droits de I'homme, 1993.
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MRND regime.693
The gradual political, military and ethnic escalation benefited from the at least tacit support of the
President. According to Fédération Internationale des Oroits de /'Homme, Habyarimana was held
personally liable for the death of at least 2,000 people in the period October 1990-January 1993. He
never objected, for example in speeches, either to the increasingly ethnic-extremist attitude of local
authorities or to the increasing involvement of party militias in the gradually widening conflict since
November 1991. One of the main conclusions is that there was similarity between the different acts
of violence committed by regime supporters between October 1990 and February 1993.694
As early as in 1993 some members of human rights groups concluded in the report that the Tutsi
population had been exposed to a massacre ever since the conflict with the RPF began: "Tutsi have
been killed, mutilated, harassed, made to disappear, frightened, only because of their ethnic
identity." Bearing the dramatic events of April/May 1994 in mind, little doubt can exist that political
manipulation of ethnicity had been on the rise in Rwanda for quite some time.695
The RPF attack in November 1992 caused an internal flow of displaced persons involving one out of
seven Rwandans who felt forced to leave areas containing the most fertile soils in the country. The
number of internally displaced persons thus increased to about 950,000 in 1993, compared to an
estimated 350,000 in mid-1992. Apart from war, these persons had witnessed deliberate massacres
carried out by RPF soldiers on the Hutu population.696 After 8 February 1993, the RPF had doubled
the size of its occupied territory in Rwanda, thereby infringing one of the basic elements of the
cease-fire agreement with the Rwandan government, i.e. the "neutrality" of the buffer zone between
"RPF territory" and the rest of Rwanda.
The RPF attacks raised massive protest in and outside the country. In Rwanda, the President and
the Prime Minister denounced the latest acts of violence in a joint communiqué. The European
Union, in particular Belgium, France and Germany, expressed its discontent in a similar way. France
decided to increase the number of its troops by 300, to discourage the RPF march towards Kigali.
Reynljens697 strongly doubts whether the RPF, after its half-successful invasion of October 1990,
6931bid.See also Africa Watch, 1992; African Rights, 1994.
694lbid.
6951bid.
696Desouter and Reyntjens, Les Violations des droits de I'homme par Ie FPRIAPR, Working paper, I, June 1995.
697Reyntjens, L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en Crise, 1994.
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had really planned to attempt a take-over of Kigali. According to him, the February 1993 offensive
should rather be seen in the same light as the one in May 1992, when the RPF launched an attack
on Byumba to express its discontent with the lack of progress at the negotiations with the
government. The strategy would have been to demonstrate its military strength and superiority to
convince the other parties of the necessity of a political agreement with the Front.698
New talks were held between the RPF and all the parties of the government save the MRNO in
Bujumbura, from 25 February to 2 March 1993, which led to the Dar-es-Salaam cease-fire
agreement of 9 March (after promises of the withdrawal of the French troops). This cease-fire
agreement was important since it included stipulations regarding an international force, OAU or UN,
to replace the French troops, a demilitarised zone and resumption of the Arusha talks.699
Hostility did not diminish after the agreements of 4 August 1993 were signed. On the contrary,
Rwandan society tended to become more and more polarise in anti- and pro-RPF and Tutsi parties
and groups. As described above, the unity of the MOR, the PSO and the PL was put under
enormous pressure from Habyarimana's supporters, who tended to equate opponents of the MRNO
regime with enemies of the Hutu people. Parallel events in neighbouring Burundi added to the
polarisation.
The political violence that plagued Rwanda throughout 1993 and the first months of 1994 was
increasingly fuelled by influential media, which agitated the Hutu population against their presumed
enemies. On 8 July, 1993, Radio- Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLMC) started to broadcast
officially to counterbalance Radio Muhabura of the RPF and the official Radio Rwanda.7oo According
to African Rights701,"RTLMC played a key role in inciting violence against Tutsi and moderate Hutu
and fervently opposed the Arusha Accords". Other sources indicated that the RTLMC was created to
counterbalance Radio Muhabura, also believed to have incited people to ethnic and political
hatredJ02
The foregoing discussion illustrates the attitude of groups of supporters throughout the conflict. First,
the creation of a poisoned political climate and of ethnicity had been planned since the beginning of
6981bid.
699See Communiqué Conjoint, 2 March 1993.
700Reyntjens, L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en Crise, 1994.
701African Rights, 1994.
702Reyntjens, L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en Crise, 1994.
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the conflict. Second, direct means like the use of militias, the spreading of weapons, the creation of
extremist movements, political assassinations and planned massacres, as well as indirect means like
the permanent climate of terror and fear and the propaganda via the media were strategically used,
certainly from 1992 on. Third, the planning emanated from the highest-ranking persons in the army,
the Presidential guard, the administration, etc., who had benefited from the one-party regimeJ03
All of this resulted in genocide, following the crash of the presidential aircraft in which Habyarimana
died together with his counterpart of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, and all the passengers. The
control tower at Kanombe airport had cleared for landing the aircraft returning from Dar-es-Salaam,
Tanzania at 8:30 p.m. on April 6, 1994.1°4 All the persons aboard were killed in the crash. During the
same evening, after the crash of the aircraft, a selective assassination of opposition politicians, of
which most were Hutus from parties opposing the MRND, began. The most apparent act was the
killing of the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, along with 10 Belgian UN soldiers who were
assigned to protect her. The President of the Constitutional Court and the Minister of Information
were other prominent immediate targets. The leadership of every opposition party was hit in a similar
wayJ05 The second target group for assassination, once the leading politicians had been killed, were
dissenting civilians, Hutu as well as Tutsi. These included journalists, human rights activists,
representatives of non-governmental groups, and civil servantsJ06 Following the killing of the
opposition, the massacre of Tutsis was spread out all over the countryJ07 The first targets were Tutsi
men and boys. Even the smallest boys were not spared. Educated Tutsi men and women were
particularly at risk and the University was "cleansed"J08 Rape was used extensively. Many reports
were received of women who were both tortured and raped, while others who had been wounded
were also raped. Children were not spared and many Tutsi children were killed, others maimed and
left with physical and psychological scars for the rest of their IivesJ09
703African Rights, 1994.
704Atthe time when this dissertation was being printed, the truth about the shooting down of the aircraft had not yet been
established. For speculations about the trip and the shooting down of the aircraft, see Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, at
211-229.
705African Rights, 1994.
706African Rights lists as an example, by name and occupation, 27 journalists who were reported killed immediately after
April 6. Ibid.
707This is documented by African Rights, 1994, prefecture by prefecture, with special accounts dealing with attacks on
women and children, on churches and hospitals, etc. There is no end to the realism and horror of the accounts by the
witnesses interviewed. Ibid.
70BAfrican Rights, 1994.
709Seilstrom and Wohlgemuth, 1996.
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However, RPF soldiers were also perpetrating and had perpetrated massacres against Hutus.
Selective elimination of the Hutu intellectuals was reported in many testimonies. Groupo Solidaridad
talks about the genocide of the Hutu population, which particularly targeted intellectuals,
businessmen and families of soidiers."? Many testimonies reported the existence of mass graves in
the areas controlled by the RPF in which its soldiers killed and buried hundreds of people.?"
Accounts have been given of civilians killed in many regions and of killings of war displaced persons
and refugees,?12 Some organisations had even called for the "identification, prosecution, and
keeping away from the future management of the country of the planners responsible for the
massacres of Hutu families for their mere belonging to a political party or to the Hutu ethnic
group",?13
Desouter and Reynljens affirm that the RPF committed odious crimes since October 1990 when it
started the war, but its human rights violations were never subjected to serious lnvestiqatlons.t"
Amnesty International has responded that, for several years, the RPF closely monitored and
controlled movements of foreigners in areas under its control and journalists and representatives of
humanitarian organisations rarely talked to Rwandan citizens under RPF control without the
presence of an RPF officialJ15
Despite the evidence that both parties were committing atrocities, the UN Security Council ordered
an embargo on arms aimed against the government onlyJ16 The Force Armées Rwandaises which
had actually stopped supplies in order to implement the peace accord, ran short of ammunition while
the RPF was getting its supplies through Uqanda."? The abundance and monopoly of bombs and
rockets constitute one of the main explanations for the RPF's relentless advance and victory.
710(Letter to) "Imo. Sr. D. Boutros, Secretario General de la ONU", Madrid, 30 May 1994 by Grupo "Solidaridad y Ayuda
Humanitaria a Rwanda".
711Detailed information on the populations massacred by RPF in Byumba and Ruhengeri can be found in Solidaire-
Rwanda/Lifatanya, Le non-dit sur les massacres au Rwanda, November 1994; Ligue des Réfugiés Rwandais pour les
Omits de I'Homme (L1RDHO), Part I., December 1994 & Part II, April 1995.
712Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994; African Rights, 1994.
713SeeNzabahimana, F., 'Rwanda or the Political Emergency', in CRAD, 29 AUGUST 1994. This report gives a list of
priests, religious, human rights activists, teachers, journalists .., kil/ed by the RPF. See also Dialogue No. 177, August-
September, 1994.
714Desouter and Reyntjens, Les Violations des droits de I'homme par Ie FPRIAPR, 1995.
715Amnesty International, Rwanda: Reports of killings and abductions by the Rwandan Patriotic Army, April-August 1994,
20 October 1994.
716Reprinted in Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 100.
717lbid.
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Although the new government was to present itself as a return to the Arusha agreement which was a
complement to the 1991 Constitution, it would adopt stratagems to hold the power in monopoly.
Human rights would simply not be given effect, just as they had been violated during the Hutu
regimes.
2.6 Human rights in the books and in action
This section is intended to analyse the human rights provisions in the Constitution, their limitations
and the extent to which they have been respected or violated in practice.
A bill of rights was incorporated for the first time in Rwandan history in the self-government
Constitution in 1962. It was reproduced almost verbatim in the 1978 one-party Constitution and in the
1991 Constitution. The form and content of most of the provisions, therefore, have remained almost
the same. For convenience, unless otherwise stated, most of the articles cited are those found in the
1978 Constitution.
2.6.1 Form of the guarantee of rights
The bill of rights incorporated in the self-government Constitution was modelled on the Senegalese
Constitution of 1963718,which, in turn, was based on the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950. The Senegalese model of rights was also
incorporated in the Individual Constitutions of several other African countries such as Mauritania,
Gabon, Chad, Sierra-Leone, and Guinea. It was about the "droits classiques", the enumeration,
without details of most first generation rights.
It is the author's contention that the bill of rights is predicated on the common law. An eminent
African constitutional scholar, Nuabueze, argues that the bill of rights:
... created no rights de novo but declared and preserved already existing rights .... This is borne
out by the negative phraseology of some of the provisions. To say that no person shall be
deprived of his personal liberty clearly presupposes an existing right, for it would be an abuse of
language to talk of "depriving" a person of a right which he does not haveJ19
It follows therefore that, if the bill of rights is suspended or abolished after, say, a military coup, these
rights will continue operating as against the executive according to the common law of the country.
718Constitution de la République du Sénégal, 1961, Act No. 18/61 of 1961.
719Nuabueze, Constitutionalism in the emergent States, 1973, p. 41.
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However, the Legislature will be freed from the restrictions in its legislative competence imposed by
the bill of rightsJ20
Although human rights can be limited by the rights of others and by the reasonable "needs of the
State to perform its public duties for the common qood?", public international law is of considerable
importance as regards the non-derogability of a number of rights. Under customary international law,
no State may suspend or violate the right to life; freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment, and from medical or scientific experimentation; the right not to
be held in slavery or involuntary servitude; and the right not to be subjected to retroactive criminal
penaitiesJ22
Although not mentioned in the Rwandan Constitution, it is noteworthy that the bill of rights is not
exhaustive of the rights protected by the common law, rights which, in spite of their exclusion,
continue to be enjoyed by the individualJ23 In South Africa, this is expressly stipulated in Section 39
(3) of the 1996 Constitution, which provides that "the bill of rights does deny the existence of any
other rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or
legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill"J24 In the United States of America, the
ninth Amendment to the Constitution provides that "the enumeration in the Constitution of certain
rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people". However, the
omission of such a precision in the Rwandan Constitution is dangerous, mostly since, as analysed in
this chapter, Rwandan courts have failed to interpret human rights provision in favour of the
individual, thus supporting the State's violation.
The bill of rights in the self-government Constitution contained a general declaration of the rights
every person in Rwanda was entitled to regardless of race, place of origin, clan group, political
opinions, religion, colour or sexJ25 Moreover, Article 13 provided that the rights and freedoms
contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were guaranteed to all citizens. The rights
720Karen, A., Rights and the People, Working Paper, Nairobi, 1993, p. 14.
721Higgins, Derogations under Human Rights Treaties', 1976/77, XLVIII BYIL 281, at 283, quoted by Erasmus, G.,
"Limitation and Suspension", in: Rights and Constitutionalism- The New South African Legal Order, Cape Town: Juta and
Co, Ltd, 1994, p. 629.
722Siracusa Principle 69, cited by Erasmus, Ibid.
7231bid.
724Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Act No. 106. Moreover, South African Courts are empowered to
apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does give effect to the guaranteed rights.
Id., section 8, (3), a.
725Self-government Constitution, Titre II.
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may be divided into three categories: a) life, liberty, security of the person and the protection of the
law; b) freedom of conscience, expression, association and assembly; and c) protection of the
privacy of one's home and other property and from deprivation of property without compensation.
The most striking fact is that, by providing that "their exercise may be determined by laws and
regulations"726, Article 13 subjected the enjoyment of all these rights to the Acts of Parliament and
rules and regulations of the Executive. The exceptional power vested in the legislature and the
executive made the constitutional guarantee meaningless. Furthermore, the enjoyment of these
rights and freedoms was subject to limitations: respect for the rights and freedoms of others, and
public orderJ27 In addition to these two general limitations which applied to all the guaranteed rights,
most of the protected rights contained numerous derogation clauses. These included the right to
protection from deprivation of property, freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, equal
protection of the law, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of movement and freedom from
discrimination. The format adopted was that the right was first protected in broad terms. A
succeeding provision then referred to "the law" which outlined circumstances in which that right might
be derogable from. In many instances the qualifications for the rights were so wide-ranging as to
negate the right or render it meaningless. In fact, the derogation clauses allowed the Legislature to
enact laws that might result in the taking away some of the substance of rights granted. The only
fetter placed on the Legislature was that such laws had to be "reasonably required in the interests of
defence, public safety or public order"J28
A significant limitation on the enjoyment of human rights was that most of the rights guaranteed
might be abridged when an emergency declaration was in force due to "threats to public security and
public order"J29 As the constitutions referred to the rules and regulations for the enjoyment of most
of the rights guaranteed, the Décret of 20 October 195973°,still in force, allowed the suspension of all
the rights except the right to life, protection from slavery or forced labour, protection from torture and
inhuman treatment, and equal protection of the law, when an emergency declaration was in force or
726Article 13 reads: "Leur exercice peut être réglé par les lois et reglements".
727Self-government Constitution, article 14. The article begins with the word: "chacun", which means that it is recognised
and declared that every person in Rwanda has been and shall continue to be entitled to the fundamental rights and
freedoms of the individual.
728 See for examples Instruction Ministérielle No. % of 15 September 1978, J.O., 1986, p. 411; Loi No. 33/91 of 5 August
1991, J.O., 1991, p. 1132; Décret of 7 December 1960, B.O.R.U., 1960, p. 8.
729self-government Constitution, art. 14. Read together with Decree of 20 October 1959 on the state of emergency, B.O.,
1959, p. 2412; Codes et Lois du Rwanda, Vol. I., second edition, 1995, p. 487.
730lbid.
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when the country was at war. We will see in Section three how this décret was abused for political
purposes.
As regards the conformity of laws to the Constitution, Article 103 of the self-government Constitution
provided for the establishment of a Constitutional Court, which, according to Article 57, could give a
verdict on the constitutionality of bills within eight days or, in case of emergency, within four days. A
bill found unconstitutional was to be returned to the National Assembly for reconsideration. In this
regard, the National Assembly had to amend the bill to avoid a new censureJ31 In practice, however,
members of parliament allegedly defending the interests of their ruling party frustrated Constitutional
Court judges. For example, members of parliament attacked and denigrated judges, arguing that
"they do not put all their heart into serving the party". The following excerpt from a National Assembly
debate in 1966 is self-explanatory:
Le personnel ne sert pas de tout coeur Ie parti. Voyez des gens comme Munyangaju Aloys, c'est
un ancien de I'APROSOMA. II n'est pas un PARMEHUTU convaincu. Ntashamaje, c'est un
mututsi; Appolinaire également. Ce n'est pas étonnant que [Ie personnel] ne semble pas montrer
tout son sérieux.732
This suggests that a Constitutional Court composed of "non-PARMEHUTU" or simply "non-Hutu"
judges had no power to persuade the National Assembly to amend an unconstitutional bill.
Moreover, declaring an Act of Parliament unconstitutional amounted to attacking and somehow
threatening the government from which most of the laws originated. As a result of this distrust, a
number of bills that were passed and promulgated did not conform to the observations of the
Constitutional Court. For example, the National Assembly refused to consider the Constitutional
Court's ruling on the unconstitutionality of the Bill on National Education passed on 21 April 1966.
The bill had been declared unconstitutional because it provided, inter alia, that religious teachers
should receive only 80% of the salary paid to non-religious teachers of the same category and
competence; and that the property of private schools should be expropriated without compensation.
733The bill was never returned to the Constitutional Court to check whether the National Assembly
had considered its observations, and it was passed without modification, as were many others that
731Décret of 7 December 1960, B.O.R.U., 1960, p. 8.
732Meaning: The staff does not serve the party with their heart. Look at people like Aloys Munyangaju, he is a former
member of APROSOMA. He is not a convinced PARMEHUTU. Antoine Ntashamaje is Tutsi, as well as Appolinaire
Nsengiyumva. It is not surprising that the Court does not seem to take a serious attitude. National Assembly Debate,
Doc. No. 318 (1966-67), session of 7 September 1967, p. 19. Id., at 433.
733Fordetails about this case, see Reyntjens, Pouvair et droit au Rwanda, at 432.
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followed.734
Another example pertains to the ruling related to Article 325 of the preliminary title of the civil
code,735According to that provision, "la reconnaissance de /'enfant par /'un des conjoints n'a d'effets
qu'a /'égard de celui qui /'a faite. Le consentement de /'autre époux est obligatoire, sauf en cas de
séparation des biens". The Constitutional Court ruled it unconstitutional, arguing that it subjected the
legal recognition of a natural child by a spouse to the consent of his partner, while the meaning of
civil liberty was "a liberty guaranteed to an individual against the other individual",736 The National
Assembly did not consider this ruling and the bill passed the second reading, the argument being
that only the lawful family was protected by the State, whence the violated provision did not concern
natural children,737 In this regard, this law excluding natural children from the protection of the law
was a violation of the principle of equality before the law and thus unconstitutional. However, the
Constitutional Court ruled it constitutional. Observers affirm that the judges had received an order to
do so,738
In reading the Rwandan Constitution, the reader would have the impression that Rwandan people
opted for separation of powers and a checks-and-balances system. He or she would think that the
idea of democracy, constitutionalism and judicial review, which provide the substance of
constitutional democracy, have gained strong ground. Arguably, the doctrine of separation of State
power among the three branches of government implies checks and balances of one over the other
and judicial review is one of the devices for such a system. Judicial review is a means to check
legislative encroachments and to control the actions of executive government, so that it should not
go beyond its constitutional limitations. In other words, "judicial review helps a nation as a whole
govern itself and direct its progress in the light of constitutional principles" ,739The Rwandan
Constitution granted such rights to the courts. But the fact that the National Assembly assumed the
734 In his study, Reyntjens counts only four bills referred to the Constitutional Court from 1962 to 1973: cases no.
19/11.02 of 22/5/1963 (law on Rwandan citizenship); No. 42/11.02 of 55/5/1964 (law on the head tax); No. 73/11.02 of
7/8/1965 (law on elections); and No. 78/10.02 of 26/4/1966 (law on national education). Id., at 431. From 1973 to 1989,
Karake counts only 2: the law on cattle tax and that on the value added tax. Karake, K., Les arrêts de la Cour
ConstitutionnelIe Rwandaise, Butare: UNR, 1990.
735 Law No. 21/1988 of 27 October 1988, J.O., 1989, p. 9 (Codes et Lois du Rwanda, Vol. I, 2nd ed., 1995, p. 185).
736 "( ... ) une liberté garantie au profit d'un particulier a I'encontre d'un autre particulier". Quoted in Ntampaka, C.,
'Problematique de la Justice au Rwanda', Dialogue, No. 186, Oct-Nov. 1995, p. 5.
737 ld.
738 Ibid.
739 Jembere, A., 'The Making of Constitution in Ethiopia: The Centralization and Decentralization of the Administration',
New Trends in Ethiopan Studies, papers of the 12th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, 1944, Vol. 11, p. 77.
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right to pass bills and ignore the constitutional court's rulings placed the issue of constitutional rights
in the hands of a partisan body dictated by the wishes of the "majority", whereas "constitutional
guarantees are provided to protect individuals and minorities from the reaches of political expedience
and majoritarian whims and fancies"J4o
2.6.2 No system for the protection of ethnic minorities
Despite the terrible lessons to be learned from the country's recent history, the State has failed to
make provisions in the Constitution and in the laws for the protection of minorities.
In practice, no effective system for the prevention of ethnically motivated massacres has been set
up. There have been no real police in the overpopulated rural areas; at most, there have been one or
two local officials, who would be incapable of facing up to a rampaging mob. Nor has there been any
effective warning system within reach of ethnic minorities themselves or their representatives. In fact,
everything has been left to the diligence of local government officials who, as will be seen, have
often been accomplices in the massacres or even instigated them. For example, the political and
administrative commission which investigated the disturbances in the Prefectures of Gisenyi,
Ruhengeri and Kibuye even noted that the region's telephone system had suddenly "broken down"
at the time of the events of January 1993, and had "curiously" become operational again without any
need for repairs. A number of Tutsis were massacred in those regionsJ41
2.6.3 Theory and practice of individual rights and freedoms specifically protected
Dlamini argues that "the protection of human rights is indispensable for democratic stability". The
provision for the protection of fundamental rights in a constitution, coupled with an independent and
fearless judiciary as a watchdog, constitutes the essential ingredient that makes democracy workJ42
Although the provision for the protection of human rights in a constitution is not the only way to
ensure these rights,743 it has been the one followed by most independent African States, including
Rwanda. By analysing the Rwandan bill of rights and the practice of the guaranteed individual rights
and freedoms, this sub-section shows the ineffectiveness of the bill of rights in Rwanda and the lack
of commitment to it by Rwandan authorities. Although there have been no thorough statistics giving
740 Ibid.
741 UN, The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996, Document 20, at 210.
742 Dlamini, CRM. Human Rights in Africa. Which Way South Africa? Durban: Butterworths, 1995, p. 43.
743 Britain does not have a bill of rights, but effectively protects human rights by virtue of her long-established tradition
which is absent in the African context. See also the alternative ways of protecting human rights in Chapter three.
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cause for an assessment of trends over time since 1962 and ethnic differences in treatment in most
cases dealt with, accessible facts will be used to show that the Rwandan State has failed to protect
human rights. The issue concerning the judiciary is analysed in a separate section.
2.6.3.1 Protection of the right to life
Rwanda is party to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,744The provisions of these instruments form
part of domestic law and take precedence in the event of conflict with another provision of domestic
law.
Article 13 of the self-government Constitution guaranteed to all citizens "fundamental liberties as
defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" but subjected their enjoyment to provisions of
laws and regulations. Moreover, it provided that no person should be deprived of his life intentionally,
save in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence under the law in force in
Rwanda of which he had been convicted.
However, these provisions have not been given effect in practice because of the scant regard shown
by leaders who have not been fully committed to the bill of rights as shown by the situation before
and during the genocide.
2.6.3.1.1 Pre-genocide denials
In addition to the death penalty and death in war, death was permissible where reasonable force was
used to defend any person from violence or to defend property745,or to prevent the commission by
that person of a criminal offence,746Apart from the deprivation of the right to life by the 1994
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, the death penalty has been imposed for
treason=, plotting against State securty=. murder=, rnanslauqbter=, and armed robbery'», The
744United Nations, The United Nations and the situation in Rwanda 1993-1996, New York: United Nations, 1996, p. 205.
745Penal Code, articles 337 and 338.
746Id., article 338, 2.
747Id., art. 151, 154, 158, 159.
748Id., art. 164, 168, 171, 176.
749Id., art. 238, 240, 313, 315, 317.
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courts have frequently imposed the death penalty and executions were conducted quite often/52
In practice, the right to life has been widely violated since independence, by the successive regimes.
On many occasions Presidents themselves were involved in murdering innocent people. As early as
21 December 1962, when Tutsi refugees attacked Rwanda in order to restore the Tutsi regime, the
national police made roundups in which hundreds of Tutsis and some Hutus were arrested and
summarily executed. President Kayibanda dispatched his Ministers in prefectures with mandates "to
organise civilian self-defence groups to counter possible attempts at internal subversion."753 The
killings began on December 23, in the prefecture of Gikongoro at the instigation of the local prefect,
André Nkeramugaba. Addressing an improvised meeting of burgomasters and PARMEHUTU
propagandists, Nkeramugaba is reported to have said: "We are expected to defend ourselves. The
only way to go about it is to paralyse the Tutsis. How? They must be killed." This was the signal for
the slaughter. Armed with clubs, pangas and spears, the Hutus methodically began to massacre the
Tutsis. In that prefecture, an estimated 5,000 Tutsis were massacred/54 Soon the contagion spread
to other areas, accompanied by wanton cruelty.« In one locality more than one hundred Tutsi
women and children were reported to have voluntarily drowned themselves in the Nyabarongo River
in a suicidal attempt to escape the clutches of attacking mobs of Hutus. Popular participation in
violence created a kind of collective catharsis through which years of pent-up hatred suddenly
seemed to find an outlet. Such atrocities would recur in the 1994 genocide, preceded, accompanied,
and followed by atrocities committed by the Tutsi army on the Hutu population.
750ld.,art. 324.
751Id.,art. 400, 403, 411.
752Forexample, in 1979, 15 people were sentenced to death for criminal offences (Karema, A., Death in emerging states,
Working paper, Dodoma, 1986, p. 27); in 1985, 13 people were sentencedto death, 5 for treason and the rest either for
murderor armed robbery (Id.).
753Reyntjens,Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 465.
754That the reprisals should have been primarily in this area is not accidental. Besides having a very high density of
Tutsis, the Gikongoro prefecture was the core area of the Tutsi opposition, a fact that is not altogether unnatural if one
considers that it also contained within its boundaries the former royal residence of Nyanza. In an effort to weaken the
Tutsi opposition, the Rwanda government had decided to break the former prefecture of Nyanza into two separate
administrative units, one of which became known as the Gikongoro prefecture. But this did not prevent the Tutsis of
Gikongorofrom continually and defiantly expressing their hopes of returning to power. Under the circumstancesone can
better understandwhy the Hutu population should have been driven to such extremities.
755One missionary later recounted how a group of Hutu 'hacked the breasts off a Tutsi woman, and as she lay dying
forced the dismembered parts down the throats of her children, before her eyes'. As reported by Claire Sterling in "Chou-
en-Lai and the Watutsi", Reporter, 12 March, 1964. Robert Conley,of the New York Times wrote that on one Tutsi hilltop
the massacrewent on all night, prompting one missionary to say -'still stammering from shock': it was beyond belief -
screams,they went on hour after hour'. New York Times, 9 February 1964.
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Meanwhile, in 1974, upon the overthrow of President Kayibanda, President Habyarimana enacted a
décret-loi756 creating a martial court for crimes against State security. President Kayibanda and
seven other dignitaries of his regime were sentenced to death.w Upon some internal disapproving
murmurs and international pressure, President Habyarimana enacted an order= commuting the
death sentence to one of life imprisonment. However, President Kayibanda was denied food and
died on 15 December 1976. The other dignitaries also died in detention, including the former Minister
for International Cooperation, Augustin Munyaneza, whose skull was crushed with a harnmer.w
Between 1974 and 1977 the Habyarimana security chief, Théoneste Lizinde, and his colleagues had
killed fifty-six people, mostly former dignitaries of the Kayibanda regime, but also lawyers and
businessmen whom they disliked for one reason or another.w
On some occasions the gendarmerie broke up demonstrations and strikes, using excessive force by
which people lost their lives. The gendarmerie also killed unarmed suspects and even innocent
people on the streets. For example, in April 1988, during a demonstration of students from the
University of Rwanda, the gendarmerie opened fire and killed one student and wounded five more.
On June 27, 1993, during a demonstration by members of opposition parties, the gendarmerie fired
into a minibus that was rushing a pregnant woman to Centre Hospitalier de Kigali, killing two people
and critically injuring two others.»
One reason for the prevalence of the indiscriminate killings is that the Rwandan police were not well
trained in either the control of crowds or the use of arms. Nor were they equipped with appropriate
non-lethal crowd control equipment. As a consequence, attempts by police to control strikes and
demonstrations usually culminated in many unnecessary deaths and serious injuries of unarmed
civilians,162For example, in November 1993, during demonstrations organised by opposition political
parties, at least 20 protesters were killed by the security forces composed of army soldiers and
gendarmes armed with automatic weapons and live ammunition which they fired into the crowd
756Décret-Loi of 9 June 1974, Journal Officie/1974, p., 397.
757Jugement of 29 June 1974.
758Arrêté Présidentielof 19 July 1974, Journal Officie/1974, p., 508.
7591nterview with Irené Kayibanda, May 1986.
760Amnesty International, No. 118, December 1985.
761Many other examples can be found in Umurangi, 28 October 1993.
7621bid.
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indscriminately.w
A number of suspects died in police custody under suspicious circumstances, often after brutal
interrogations. The following are examples of suspects who died in police custody: An assault
suspect, Fulgence Karangwa was found hanging in a police cell in Muhima, after interrogation, in
August 1993. His relatives claimed that he had been tortured by the qendarmene.» Two months
later another suspect, Vincent Mugwiza, died at the same police station, after being kicked, punched
and having his testicles smashed during lnterroqation.te In mid February 1994, 2 suspects held in
connection with a robbery died while in police custody after brutal interrogation. The first suspect
died in hospital while the second suspect was found dead in his cell/66
With regard to convicted prisoners, many people have died in Rwandan prisons. Some of the
prisoners died from natural causes exacerbated by inhuman conditions in prisons, while others were
killed by prison warders.w
In most of these cases no serious investigations were conducted by the Ministére Public to ascertain
whether the police force was culpable. On those rare occasions when investigations were
conducted, usually after denunciation, they were not vigorously pursued or thorough and the results
of the investigations were not always published. As a result, few policemen were ever convicted of
murder or rnanslauqhter.w
In spite of numerous complaints by the public about police brutality, little has been done to purge the
police of bad elements and to institute public accountability. It was the lack of accountability of the
police, and lack of concern on the part of the political authorities that allowed this kind of
unacceptable behavior by the police.
7631bid.
764Lii Rocher, Rwanda: Visit report, 25 January 1996.
7651d.
766Kanguka, February 1994.
767Amnesty International, UA 134/95, 9 June 1995.
768Lii Rocher, Rwanda: Visit report, 25 January 1996.
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2.6.3.1.2 The genocide
In the thirteen weeks after April 6, 1994 that followed the crash of the presidential aircraft, at least
half a million people perished in the Rwandan genocide; perhaps as many as three quarters of the
Tutsi population. At the same time, thousands of Hutus were slain because they opposed the killing
campaign and the forces directing it.
The killers struck with a speed and devastation that suggested an aberrant force of nature, "a people
gone mad," said some observers. "Another cycle of tribal violence," said others. We have seen that
the nation of some seven million people encompassed three ethnic groups. The Twas were so few
as to play no political role, leaving only Hutus and Tutsis to face each other without intermediaries.
The Hutus, vastly superior in number, remembered past years of oppressive Tutsi rule, and many of
them not only resented but also feared the minority. The government, run by Hutus, was at war with
the RPF, rebels who were predominantly Tutsis. In addition, Rwanda was one of the poorest nations
in the world and growing poorer, with too little land for its many people and falling prices for its
products on the world market. Food production had diminished because of drought and the
disruptions of war: it was estimated that 800,000 people would need food aid to survive in 1994.
But this genocide was not an uncontrollable outburst of rage by a people consumed by "ancient tribal
hatreds." Nor was it the preordained result of the impersonal forces of poverty and over-population.
This genocide resulted from the deliberate choice of a modern elite to foster hatred and fear to keep
itself in power. This small, privileged group first set the majority against the minority to counter
growing political opposition within Rwanda. Then, faced with RPF success on the battlefield and at
the negotiating table, these few holders of power transformed the strategy of ethnic division into
genocide. They believed that the extermination campaign would restore the solidarity of the Hutu
under their leadership and help them win the war, or at least improve their chances of negotiating a
favorable peace. They seized control of the State and used its machinery and its authority to carry
out the slaughter.
Like the organizers, the killers who executed the genocide were neither demons nor automatons
responding to ineluctable forces. They were people who chose to do evil. Tens of thousands,
swayed by fear, hatred, or hope of profit, made the choice quickly and easily. They were the first to
kill, rape, rob and destroy. They attacked Tutsis frequently and until the very end, without doubt or
remorse. Many made their victims suffer horribly and enjoyed doing so.
Hundreds of thousands of others chose to participate in the genocide reluctantly, some only under
duress or in fear of their own lives. Unlike the zealots who never questioned their original choice,
these people had to decide repeatedly whether or not to participate, each time weighing the kind of
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action planned, the identity of the proposed victim, the rewards of participating and the likely costs of
not participating. Because attacks were incited or ordered by supposedly legitimate authorities, those
with misgivings found it easier to commit crimes and to believe or pretend to believe they had done
no wrong.
This section gives more information about the genocide in 1994 in order to prove the failure of the
State to perform its primordial duty of protecting its citizens.
a. Organization
In the past, the Rwandan government had at times mobilized the population for campaigns of various
kinds, such as to end illiteracy, to vaccinate children, or to improve the status of women. It had tried
to execute these efforts through the existing administrative and political hierarchies, requiring agents
to go beyond their usual duties for a limited period of time for some national goal of major
importance. The organizers of the genocide similarly exploited the structures that already existed-
administrative, political, and military-and called upon personnel to execute a campaign to kill Tutsis
and Hutus presumed to oppose "Hutu Power". Through these three channels, the organizers were
able to reach all Rwandans and to incite or force a number of Hutus into acquiescing in or
participating in the slaughter.
The organization that ran the campaign was flexible: primacy depended more on commitment to the
killing than on formal position in the hierarchy. Thus within the administrative system, sub-prefects
could eclipse prefects, as they did in Gikongoro and Gitarama, and in the military domain lieutenants
could ignore colonels, as happened in Butare. This flexibility encouraged initiative and ambition
among those willing to purchase advancement at the cost of human lives. To preserve appearances,
an inferior might obtain the approval of his superior for decisions he made, but those receiving the
orders knew who really had the powerJ69
Similarly, actors bypassed the usual legal and bureaucratic limitations on their activities. Military
men, retired or in active service, took charge in the civilian domamw and civilians, even those with
no legal authority, obtained military support for their attacks on Tutsis. Administrators gave orders to
militia groups and Interahamwe leaders intervened in the administrative realm, as when their national
committee ruled on the acceptability of the candidate to replace the prefect of Butare. Party leaders,
especially from the MRNO and the MOR POWER participated in meetings of the council of ministers
769Details of the cases mentioned in this section are found in DesForges, A., Leave none to tell the story: Genocide in
Rwanda, Human Rights Watch Report, March 1999.
770 One example given by Human Rights Watch is Col. Simba who took the chair of prefectural meetings away from the
prefect of Gikongoro. Id., at 5.
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while others represented the interim government abroad in its efforts to legitimate the qenoclde.m
The Prime Minister and the Ministry of the Interior directed prefects to involve local politicians in the
efforts to assure "security." They did and they made sure their subordinates did the same.772 Like
officials of the administration, important party leaders were protected by military guards and, like
them, they toured the hills bringing the message of the government to the people. Individuals from
other sectors backed the efforts of the officials.
b. The military
Soldiers and National Police, whether on active duty or retired, killed civilians and they gave
permission, set the example, and commanded others to kill. Although fewer in number than civilian
killers, the military played a decisive role by initiating and directing the slaughter. In the first hours in
Kigali, soldiers of the Presidential Guard and the para-commando and reconnaissance battalions,
along with some policemen, carried out the carnage in one neighborhood after another. Soldiers,
National Police and the communal police also launched the slaughter and organized all large-scale
massacres elsewhere in the country.
Witnesses in Kigali and other towns have identified certain soldiers and policemen whom they knew
before the genocide as killers. But elsewhere witnesses found it difficult to identify the persons or
even the units responsible for given crimes because soldiers and National Police wore the same
uniforms and only sometimes wore berets of different colors that indicated the service to which they
belonged. Witnesses often said that soldiers from the Presidential Guard attacked them, but troops
from other army units or from the National Police may actually have committed some of these
crlmes.:»
Regardless of the responsibility of individuals or units, the widespread and systematic participation of
military personnel throughout the entire period of genocide indicates that the most powerful
authorities at the national level ordered or approved their role in the siaughterJ74
On April10, the temporary Chief of Staff, and the Ministry of Defense each ordered subordinates to
halt the killings of civilians, using force if necessary. The Ministry of Defense sent a second, weaker
771 For example, Karemera was subsequently named minister of the interior and community development and
Barayagwiza became secretary of the assembly created just before the interim government left the country.
772 Ministiri w'Ubutegetsi bw'lgihugu n'Amajyambere ya Komini [actually signed by C. Kalimanzira] to Bwana Perefe wa
Perefegitura (Bose), April 21, 1994 and Yohani Kambanda, Ministiri w'lntebe, to Bwana Perefe wa Perefegitura (Bose)
April27, 1994 (Butare prefecture).
773 In interviews by Human Rights Watch/FIDH, researchers found "Presidential Guard" used as a generic term for
military personnel who killed Tutsi and "Interahamwe" used as a generalized description for civilian bands of killers.
774Sources indicate certain names of people identified as leaders who launched the genocide or who, at least,
collaborated actively with the leaders while others carried out the killings of Tutsi and Hutu civilians. For his security, the
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command on April 28 "to cooperate with local authorities to halt pillage and assassinations." But
neither the general staff nor the Ministry of Defense enforced the orders, leaving subordinates to
conclude that the directives had no importance. In fact, as some officers had observed from the start,
the authorities countermanded the official orders by another message, passed discreetly to like-
minded officers who executed the informal order to kill rather than the official directive to stop the
kiliingsJ75
The military also led militia and ordinary civilians in slaughter, giving orders to citizens directly and
through civilian administrators. At the national level, civilian and military authorities directed the
population to obey these orders, insisting that civilians must "work with," "assist," or "support" the
armyJ76According to a foreign witness, soldiers taught hesitant young people to kill on the streets of
Kigali. When the young people balked at striking Tutsis, soldiers stoned the victims until the novices
were ready to attackJ77 In the prefecture of Gitarama, soldiers said to be Presidential Guards drove
around in a black Pajero jeep, killing and inciting others to kill in the communes of Musambira and
Mukingi. Others launched the killing of Tutsis at a market in the commune of Mugina. In Kivu and
Kinyamakara communes in Gikongoro, soldiers or National Police directed crowds gathered at
market and people found along the roads to attack Tutsis. Soldiers led the killing in Cyangugu that
started on April 7.178
Soldiers and the National Police distributed arms and ammunition to civilians discreetly before April 6
and openly after that dateJ79 They also provided reinforcements in men and material to civilians who
found it impossible to overcome resistance from Tutsls.w
Military personnel also ensured the spread of the genocide by refusing assistance to authorities,
including the prefect of Gitarama and burgomasters in Gitarama, Gikongoro, and Butare who tried to
stop the killing and other acts of desfructon.»
In addition, soldiers and the National Police used force or the threat of force against Hutus who tried
to resist the slaughter. At the request of such administrators as burgomasters, they intimidated
author would not like to cite those names in this dissertation.
775 Commandement des Farces Armées Rwandaises en Exil, "Contribution des FAR," 1996, pp. 96-103.
776Chrétien et al, Rwanda, Les médias, p. 299.
m Keane, K., Season of Blood, pp. 134-35.
778 Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviews, Butare, August 18 and 19, 1995; Kigali, August 21, 1995; Mukingi, July 10,
1996.
779 Augustin Ndindiliyimana, Témoignage a la Commission Spéciale Rwanda, Le Sénat Belge, April21, 1994, p. 14.
780 A medical assistant who was trying to kill Tutsi in the commune of Ntyazo at the end of April asked for military
support: We have a large number of Tutsi at Karama. We have tried to fight them, but they have turned out to be
stronger than we expected. So we ask for your help once again; send us a few National Police and four other communal
police to help the population that is fighting with bows. P.S. We have guns and grenades. Letter from a Medical
Assistant in Ntyazo to Adalbert Muhutu, Deputy, April27, 1994 (CLADHO).
781 Fidele Uwizeye, "Apercu Analytique sur les Evénements d'Avril 1994 en Préfecture de Gitarama, Rwanda," August
18, 1994.
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citizens into joining in attacks. Even more extraordinarily, they directed or permitted militia to exert
the same kind of pressure on administrators if they dissented from the campaign of genocide.
Soldiers who had been wounded in war formed a particularly brutal category of military killers. Some
joined in beating Belgian UNAMIR peacekeepers to death, others attacked Tutsis at the Adventist
university at Mudende, and still others killed and harassed Tutsis in the town of Butare, at Kabgayi,
and near the hospital at Cyakabili,182
c. Politicians and militia
Political leaders at every level championed the genocide, launching themselves into the killing
campaign as a way to increase their own importance and to displace rivals. They were uninhibited by
any of the formal responsibilities that sometimes constrained administrators and led them to disguise
their intentions in indirect language. Invited by authorities to participate fully in official meetings from
the national to the local level, they took the floor to demand ruthless action against Tutsis and those
who helped them.»
Politicians used their personal authority and channels of communication within their parties to direct
attacks on Tutsis= In some cases, politicians organized "security" measures in accord with the local
administrators. In other cases, where administrators showed no commitment to the genocide,
political leaders effectively took over the extermination campaign in their communities.
Politicians claimed to speak for the people in demanding the extermination of the Tutsi when, in fact,
they often incited them to make that demand.» Speeches heard on Radio Rwanda at times
suggested that Tutsis intended to carry out a genocide of the Hutu:
They are going to exterminate, exterminate, exterminate, exterminate
[ugutsembatsemba] ...They are going to exterminate you until they are the only ones left in
this country, so that the power which their fathers kept for four hundred years, they can keep
for a thousand years!786
782Des Prêtres du diocese de Nyundo, "Des Rescapés du Diocese," p. 61.
783See for example letter from the Minister of the Interior and Communal Development to the Prefect of Butare, April 21,
1994, no identifying number.
784 In Taba commune, Gitarama prefecture, the local MRND leader distributed arms and launched killings. See the
testimony of the witness identified as Dll, as reported by Ubutabera, No. 28, November 24, 1997, found at
http://persoweb.franceneUri-intermed. In Butare prefecture, one National Assembly Deputy arranged military support for
civilian killers, another ordered barriers put up, and another reportedly patrolled with his own band of killers. Human
Rights Watch/FIDH interviews, Butare, December 19 and 29, 1995 and January 2, 1996; "Inama y'Abaturage ba Komini
Ndora yo kuwa 7 kamena 1994," in Célestin Rwankubito, Burugumesitiri wa Komini Ndora, no. 132/04.04/2, June 16,
1994; Dominiko Ntawukuriryayo, S/prefe wa S.prefegitura Gisagara to Bwana Prefe, no. 083/04.09.01/4, Apri/15, 1994
and no. 008/04.17.02, June 8, 1994 (Butare prefecture).
785Commission pour le Mémorial du Génocide et des Massacres, "Rapport Préliminaire," pp. 132, 155, 190, 192, 195-6.
786Chrétien et al., Rwanda, Les médias, p. 300.
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d. The militia in action
Political organizations provided the civilian striking force of the genocide, the militia. Before April 6,
the militia-in the sense of those who had at least some training and experience fighting as a unit-
numbered some two thousand in Kigali, with a smaller number outside the capital in communes
where the MRNO and the CDR were strong. Once the genocide began and militia members began
reaping the rewards of violence, their numbers swelled rapidly to between twenty and thirty thousand
for the country as a whole.
The Interahamwe was an unincorporated organization supposedly independent of the MRNO, but
heavily influenced by it. The militia was directed by a national committee that included a president, a
first vice-president, a second vice president, a secretary-general, a treasurer and councilors. The
Interahamwe had committees at the prefectural level, but it is unclear how important a role they
played in the genocide. The best trained groups, those in Kigali, operated under the command of
local leaders.w The Impuzamugambi had no leaders apart from those of the CDR.
Once the genocide began, there was virtually no distinction between Impuzamugambi and
Interahamwe in the field, although members of each might still wear the distinctive garb or colors
belonging to their parties. Some men participated in both groups, attacking when and where action
seemed most profitable. As early as February, the Interahamwe were directed to cooperate also with
Inkuba, the MOR POWER militia, but in the first days of the genocide, many MOR members -
including those identified with MOR POWER - fought against the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi.
After Karamira's April 12 message on the radio and similar directives by other party leaders,
however, MOR youth groups began cooperating with the Interahamwe in attacking Tutsi. In Butare,
the young supporters of the PSO also eventually participated in attacks with the Interahamwe,
exchanging one party hat for another and putting into effect the order that it was time to forget party
loyalties for the larger good of the killing carnpaiqn.w From the start of the genocide, political leaders
put the militia at the disposition of the military,189The head of Interahamwe once explained to a
reporter that "the government authorizes us. We go in behind the army. We watch them and learn.
We have to defend our country. The government authorizes us to defend ourselves by taking up
clubs, machetes and whatever guns we could find",19oIn his radio address on April 12, Karamira
used the same phrase, remarking that the militias "go in behind the army." At major massacres, such
787Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, Brussels, May 26,1997.
788République Rwandaise, Parquet de la République de Kigali, PV. no. 0053; Radio Rwanda, "Radio Rwanda
broadcasts appeal by official of the pro-army faction of the MDR," April12, 1994, SWB, AU1970 Al2, April13, 1994.
789Dallaire, "Answers to Questions," p. 39.
790Lindsey Hilsum, "Hutu Warlord Defends Child Killing," Observer (London), July 3, 1994.
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as the attack on Gikondo church on April 9, witnesses report that militia were clearly following the
orders of the soldiers on the SpOP91
In an account written later, the CDR leader recounts how the militia became real paramilitary forces
once the "interethnic massacres" began: "the targets were no longer the youth of other political
parties but the soldiers of the RPF, especially infiltrators in the ranks of civilians, as well as the
civilian accomplices of the enemy",192
National leaders used the militia, as they did the military, to destroy Hutu opposition to the genocide.
They sent groups across communal and prefectural boundaries to intimidate reluctant Hutus into
attacking Tutsis.
Although generally responsive to directives from civilian and military authorities, leaders of the militia
represented a force with its own base of power-particularly as the number of their members grew-
and they dealt with authorities at the highest level. On occasion they met with ministers, prefects,
and the chief of staff of the army» Like the leaders of political parties, they often claimed to speak
for the people in demanding the most extreme measures against Tutsis. In early May, militia
attacked a convoy of civilians leaving the Hotel Mille Collines although it had received safe conduct
from General Bizimungu. In a similar case in mid-May, U.N. officers negotiated for three hours to
obtain the authorization of military and civilian authorities to evacuate a group of orphans. Then
some young militia members in tee shirts and jeans stood up and imposed conditions that made the
operation impossible. The officials said nothing and the effort failed,194
e. The Administration
The military and the militia brought essential skills and firearms to the slaughter, but they were too
few to kill Tutsi on a massive scale in a short span of time. Executing an extermination campaign
rapidly required the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of ordinary people, tens of thousands to
actually slaughter and the others to spy, search, guard, burn and pillage. In some situations, crowds
were needed immediately and for only a few days to participate in a massacre; in others, a reliable
supply of long-term "workers" was required to do patrols, man the barriers and track survivors. Some
military officers, the militia and some newspapers had foreseen that turning out large numbers of
civilians was the only way to attack an "enemy" dispersed through the population. As Karamira had
said in his radio speech of April12, this "war" had to become everyone's responsibility.
791"Radio Rwanda broadcasts appeal"; U. S.Committee for Refugees, "Genocide in Rwanda," pp. 4-9.
792Human Rights Watch, Leave none to tell the story, p. 36.
793UNAMIR, Notes, Radio Rwanda, 20:00 hrs, April24, 1994.
794"Ce sont les miliciens qui commandent', selon Bernard Kouchner," BOA, no. 14217,20/05/94, p. 18.
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The interim government directed the administration to carry out this mobilization. Some ministers
already known for their determined support of "Hutu Power" were apparently the most insistent about
executing the qenocide.» Judging from the way Interim President Sindikubwabo and interim Prime
Minister Kambanda were assigned their roles in the government, they probably lacked the stature to
influence major decisions, but they nonetheless shared responsibility for implementing them,196
f. Passing the word
On April 19, Interim President Sindikubwabo identified his government as "a government of saviors"
that would come directly to the people "to tell you what it expects of YOU."797Ministers and other high-
ranking government representatives did indeed go out to the countryside, exhorting and insisting on
the need to support the genocide, promising rewards to supporters and threatening sanctions
against dissenters.w The practice of going out to the hills had been used to mobilize people for
projects of public good, but it also harked back to the 1960s when ministers undertook tours of rural
areas to set off the killing of TutsiS,199
In the continuing absence of the minister of interior and communal development, the administrative
head of the ministry, Callixte Kalimanzira, was responsible for implementing the government policy.
He counted on a bureaucracy that was known for executing orders promptly and fully. When he
directed subordinates to "alert the population to the necessity of continuing to track the enemy
wherever he is to be found and wherever he hid his arms," most of them did so. To make clear that
directives about "security" came from the highest authorities and must be obeyed, Kalimanzira
ordered that speeches by the president and the prime minister be disseminated widely. This would
serve, he said, to make citizens "more determined to assure their own security and to warn all
troublemakers. "800
When Kalimanzira directed that meetings about security be held, prefects passed the order to
burgomasters, who scheduled meetings and alerted councilors and cell heads. The burgomaster of
Bwakira, for example, wrote to subordinates on April 19, ordering them to inform all residents of a
series of scheduled meetings. He told them to use whistles and drums to summon the population "so
795Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview, Brussels, October 19 and 20,1997.
796Jean Kambanda confessed and pleaded guilty to genocide at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. On
September 4, 1998, he was sentenced to life in prison.
797"Discours du Président Thodore Sindikubwabo prononcé le 19 avril 1996 a la Préfecture de Butare" (Recorded by
Radio Rwanda, transcription and translation, confidential source). The term "saviors," abatabazi, described heroes of the
Rwandan past who sacrificed their lives to protect the nation from foreign attack.
798Human Rights Watch, Leave none to tell the story, at 39.
799Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p. 223.
800 Fawusitini Munyazeza, [signed by Callixte Kalimanzira] Minisitiri w'Ubutegetsi bw'lgihugu n'Amajyambere ya Komini
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that no one will be absent."BOlPrefects and sub-prefects expected and received reports of these
meetings, many of which were recorded in minutes that were carefully taken and neatly
transcroed=
Administrators were responsible for informing their superiors of all important developments within
their jurisdictions. In correspondence, in telephone conversations, and in meetings they regularly
reported on the "state of security."
In orders passed down the administrative hierarchy, as in the reports passed back up, crucial
elements were sometimes left unstated, or were expressed in vague or ambiguous language.B03
Superiors told their subordinates to seek out the "enemy" in their midst, but did not specify what was
to be done with him when found. Subordinates reported on the capture of "accomplices" but
neglected to mention what measures had been taken against them. No one asked for further
clarification because everyone understood.
As was usual in Rwanda, authorities at the national level even dealt with matters of detail. The
widespread use of banana leaves or other foliage to distinguish attackers from intended victims
throughout the country suggests a decision made in Kigali, as does the frequent reliance on whistles
as a means of communication among assailants.
g. Mobilizing the population
Prefects transmitted orders and supervised results, but it was burgomasters and their subordinates
who really mobilized the people. Using their authority to summon citizens for communal projects, as
they were used to doing for umuganda, burgomasters delivered assailants to the massacre sites,
where military personnel or former soldiers then usually took charge of the operation. Just as
burgomasters had organized barriers and patrols before the genocide, so they now enforced regular
and routine participation in such activities directed against the Tutsi. They sent councilors and their
subordinates from house to house to sign up all adult males, informing them when they were to work.
Or they drew up lists and posted the schedules at the places where public notices were usually
affixed.
to Bwana Perefe (ali), April21, 1994, two letters, no identifying numbers (Butare prefecture).
Bal Tharcisse Kabasha, Bourgmestre wa Komini Bwakira, to Madame, Bwana ConseilIer wa Segiteri (Bose), Bwana
Responsabie wa Cellule (Bose), no. 0.293/04.09.01/4, April19, 1994 (Bwakira commune).
B02For one example, see Dominiko Ntawukuriryayo, S/prefe wa S/prefegitura Gisagara to Bwana Burugumesitiri wa
Komini (Bose), no. 088/04.09.01/16, May 14, 1994 (Butare prefecture).
B03The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the Matter of the Trial of Jean-Paul Akayesu, case no. ICTR-96-4-T,
draft transcripts (hereafter ICTR-96-4-T), Testimony of Jean-Paul Akayesu, March 12, 1998.
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Burgomasters were responsible for ensuring the continuity of the genocidal work over a period of
weeks, a task that many found difficult. "Intellectuals" were needed at barriers to read documents
presented by passersby, but many disliked the duty and tried to evade it. Some councilors tired of
making the rounds to check on the functioning of barriers. Burgomasters threatened sanctions
against laggards and removed councilors who failed in their responsibilities. The administrators also
had to resolve squabbles among participants and sometimes resorted to having them draw up
written agreements, such as that produced by workers assigned to the checkpoint near the
TRAFIPRO shop in the commune Bwakira. All the participants agreed to "be more vigilant" and to
refuse bribes. They were reminded to check identity cards and baggage carefully and to interrogate
all passersby. They were cautioned against drunkenness and disagreements. "To avoid such
disorders, the meeting resolved to create teams, with a leader for each team. The leader will be
accountable ... for whatever happens at his checkpoint. He will be responsible for the success of the
patrol. Every team will have its own patrol day." And because "it is not easy to check everyone, since
some travelers dodge checkpoints," the group asked the whole population to stop and interrogate
any unfamiliar person, wherever encountered=
Burgomasters, as well as those above and below them in the hierarchy, worked with local councils in
implementing the genocide. In some cases, the elected communal council assisted them, but more
often a committee or council devoted specifically to security played this role. Security committees
had existed before April 6 at the level of the prefecture and commune and, in some places, in sectors
and cells as well. At the prefectural and communal levels, they had included government employees,
military or police officers, and other locally important people such as clergy. At the lower levels, they
were comprised mostly of community leaders. After the genocide began, administrators set up
security committees for jurisdictions where they had not previously existed and gave new importance
to committees that before had existed in name only. The officials regularly invited party leaders to
meetings, as was being done at the national level and as they had been directed to do by the
Minister.
Burgomasters occasionally called in soldiers or policemen, particularly if there were many Tutsis to
kill. More usually they relied on local resources: the population, militia, and the communal police. In
the course of the preceding months, many communal police had received new firearms or additional
supplies of ammunition so they were well equipped to serve as the local force for slaughter. They
often guarded the sites where Tutsis had gathered until groups of assailants were organized for the
attack and they then helped direct the massacre. Others led search parties to capture and kill Tutsis
804 See for example Bwakira commune, "Inyandikomvugo y'lnama y'Abashingzwe Gucunga Barriere yo kuri Trafipro,
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in their homes or in the bush.80S Although most communal police followed orders to participate in the
extermination, some did refuse. Others were killed themselves, either because they were Tutsis or
because they tried to save the lives of Tutsis.
Burgomasters used the same forces to oblige dissident citizens to join in the genocide. They directed
or permitted communal police, militia, or simply other citizens to burn down houses and to threaten
the lives of those who refused to join in the violence.806
They also offered powerful incentives to draw the hesitant into killing. They or others solicited by
them provided cash payments, food, drinks and, in some cases, marijuana to assailants. They
encouraged the looting of Tutsi property, even to the point of having the pillage supervised by
communal police. In many areas, authorities led the people from one stage of crime to the next as
they directed them from pillaging property to burning homes, to killing the owners of the homes. In
several places, police reprimanded those people who wanted only to pillage and not to kill.
Assailants at Nyundo reminded each other "Kill first and pillage later."
One of the most important resources for the burgomaster in enlisting participants was his authority to
control the distribution of land, a much desired and scarce source of wealth for the largely
agricultural population. Hutus who had attacked Tutsis in the 1960s had acquired the fields of their
victims. A generation later, people again hoped to get more land by killing or driving away Tutsis.
Some still believed that "the properties of the victims belong to them.''807Later, some would comment
that people were cultivating lands taken from victims "to reward themselves for the work they had
done."808"Work" meant "killings."
h. Enforcing regulations
The burgomaster did more than just recruit and organize participants for attacks and patrols. As
head of the local administration, he became the arbiter of life and death through the implementation
of administrative regulations. Because population registration was done at the commune, the
burgomaster was the ultimate authority in cases of contested ethnic classification. In the commune of
Bwakira, the burgomaster responded to an appeal from a woman named Mujawashema who said
May17, 1994"(Bwakiracommune).
8osICTR-96-4-T,Testimonyof Jean-PaulAkayesu,March12, 1998.
806Broekx,J., "Les Evénémentsd'Avril1994 ElRusumo,"Dialogue, no. 177,August-September,1994,p. 100;Buchizya
Mseteka,"We Were Trained to Kill Tutsis,"Reuter, May 20, 1994;Tina Susman, "Quiet Parish ParadiseDestroyedby
Massacre,"AssociatedPress,May31,1994.
807Bwakiracommune, "Inyandiko-mvugoy'inama ya Komini yateranye kuwa 5.5.94" (Bwakira commune). "Inyandiko-
mvugo"(sometimeswith variantspellings)meansminutesof a meeting.
808Bwakira commune, "Inyandiko-mvugo y'inama ya Komini yateranye kuwa 20.5.94" in Tharcisse Kabasha,
Bourgmestrewa KominiBwakirato BwanaSIPrefe,no. 0329/04.04/2, May31, 1994(Bwakiracommune).
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people accused her children of being Tutsis and wanted to kill them. The burgomaster carried the
research back three generations to the status of Nsengiyumva, grandfather of the children's father.
From a file completed on April 16, 1948, the burgomaster learned that the great-grandfather of the
children was a Hutu. He concluded, "Therefore, no one must harm those children."809
In the commune of Ndora, members of a family accused of being Tutsis wrote to the burgomaster:
After the misfortunes that have struck our family in the course of the recent troubles,
misfortunes caused by the jealousy and the hatred spread by certain residents of the
commune against us and which resulted in the pillage of our goods, in the destruction of our
houses, and even in the massacre of several of our family under the pretext that they could
try to make them [Le., the wrongdoers] pay for what they had done, and to this end, they
have accused us of belonging to the ethnic group of the Batutsi, to the point that those
[among us] who are safe owe this to their having a son in the national army; and even so,
these residents are still pursuing them in the place where they have sought refuge. We are
writing to ask your help especially concerning the question of our ethnic affiliation, which is
the pretext put forward by the residents of the commune, that it be clarified and explained to
them because the ethnic group in which we believe and with which we identify is that of the
Bahutu.810
They concluded by giving the names of four past and present officials in the Ndora commune and
others in Gishamvu, where the family had originally lived, who could verify their Hutu identity.
Persons who hoped to pass for Hutu often "lost" their identity cards and then requested temporary
papers from the councilor or a new card from the burgomaster, hoping the administrator would be
persuaded to falsify the document. In testimony at the International Tribunal about his powers during
the genocide, one former burgomaster declared, "In the countryside, the mere fact of giving an
attestation to a person sufficed to save him."811Tutsis who succeeded in obtaining such papers in
their home communes sometimes found themselves caught by less obliging officials as they tried to
flee through other communes. In another maneuver, Hutu mothers of children fathered by Tutsis
sometimes tried to protect their children by claiming they were illegitimate and seeking to have them
registered on their cards - as Hutus - rather than on the cards of the fathers. The burgomaster of
Huye commune, reluctant to deal with these issues, passed such a case to the local judicial official,
who passed it back to him with a bare explanation of the law that gave no real guidance on how to
deal with the problem.w
809Tharcisse Kabasha, Bourgmestre wa Komini Bwakira to Bwana Conseiller wa Segiteli Shyembe, no. 0.359/04.03/3,
June 21, 1994 (Kibuye prefecture).
810Antoine Gakwaya, Fidele Muzamuzi, and Madame Leonille Usaba to Bwana Burugumesitiri wa Komini Ndora, May
25, 1994 (Butare prefecture).
811ICTR-96-4-T, Testimony of Witness R, January 28,1997, p. 83.
812Jonathan Ruremesha, Bourgmestre wa Komini Huye to Bwana Procureur wa Repubulika, no. 154/04.05/2, May 18,
1994; Mathias Bushishi, Prokireri wa Republika, to Bwana Burugumesitiri wa Komini Huye, no. C/0520/D11/AlProc., May
24, 1994 (Butare prefecture).
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In several cases the burgomaster himself or members of his family were accused of hiding a Tutsi
identity behind an officially Hutu exterior. One of them, the burgomaster of Mabanza, appealed to the
Kibuye prefect, Kayishema, to defend him. He wrote:
Regarding my personal problem - [accusations] that my wife is a Tutsi, that I am supposedly
an accomplice of the enemy, that I protect Tutsi and Hutu with Tutsi wives - these rumors
are spread by my political opponents who want to replace me. My wife is a Hutu of the
Bagiga, a large Hutu family who live at Rubengera, commune Mabanza. The accusations
that my mother-in-law is Tutsi are groundless as well. And if she were, children take the
ethnic identity of their father, not their mother. Those who say that my mother-in-law is Tutsi
are wrong: she is from sector Ruragwe, commune Gitesi, from the Barenga family, a well-
known Hutu family, as the burgomaster of Gitesi explained in his letter no. D 249/04/05/3 of
June 6, 1994, addressed to the councilor of sector Ruragwe and of which you have a
copy=
Administrative officials recorded changes in the population extremely carefully before the genocide,
noting births, deaths, and movement into and out of the commune on a monthly as well as a
quarterly basis. With this data, officials knew how many Tutsis, whether male or female, adult or
child, lived in each administrative unit, information useful in any attempt to eliminate them.
Even before April 1994, Rwandans were supposed to be registered in the communes of residence if
these differed from their communes of birth. Nyumbakumi, cell heads, and councilors all were
involved in making sure that no strangers lived unnoticed in a commune. With the start of the
genocide and the renewal of combat, tens of thousands of people fled the capital, some heading
directly south, others returning to their communes of origin, wherever they might be. Authorities and
radio announcers warned from the start that the Tutsis among these displaced persons were often
"infiltrators" in disguise and stressed the need to keep close track of them. Officials usually directed
the displaced to a common gathering place and sought to discourage their taking shelter with private
families, where it would be harder to keep track of them. But recognizing that some went to stay with
friends or family, burgomasters passed instructions down to councilors, cell heads, and nyumbakumi
that such people must be registered immediately.814Administrative officials also insisted that clergy
or persons responsible for sheltering the displaced provide as much data as possible about those
whom they were lodging. Administrators generally declared that such data was needed to assure
adequate food supplies, but the information also allowed them to know how many Tutsis were still
813Ignace Bagilishema, Bourgmestre de la Commune Mabanza to Monsieur Ie Préfet, no. 0.365/04.09.01/4, June 21,
1994.
814"Réunion de Conseil de Sécurité Elargi du 11 Avril 1994," Dr. Clément Kayishema, Préfet, Dirigeant, Janvier
Tulikumwe, Rapporteur (Kibuye prefecture); Dominiko Ntawukuriryayo, S/Prefe wa S/Prefegitura Gisagara to Bwana
Burugumesitiri wa Komini Ndora, no. 085/04.09.01/4, April15, 1994 (Butare prefecture).
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alive and where they were staying. Often a gathering place was attacked soon after officials had
collected data on the displaced persons sheltered there.815
Authorities also revived an earlier requirement that persons wishing to travel outside their communes
receive written authorization to leave (feuilles de route). Burgomasters controlled the distribution of
these documents which could permit Tutsis to try to flee for their lives. As a state of emergency was
declared, burgomasters also decided who must obey the regulations to remain at home. Officials
insisted that Tutsis remain in their houses while granting passes to assailants who could then move
freely around the commune to attack them.
Burgomasters and other officials sought to keep accurate records on the dead and missing. In
Bwakira, for example, the burgomaster ordered subordinates to prepare such lists on April 29. Five
days later councilors submitted lists, by sector, of household heads who had died, the number of
people in the household killed, and the number from the household who had fled. In Butare, at
Kabgayi and elsewhere, some Tutsis were sent back to their home communes to be killed, in part to
enable local officials to verify that they were actually dead. Burgomasters kept track, not just of the
overall numbers of the dead, but also of the elimination of those persons named as priority targets in
their communes. They seem to have borne final responsibility for ensuring that such persons had in
fact been slain. Where there was any doubt that a person in question had in fact been killed,
authorities would insist on seeing the body to confirm the death. In some cases, burgomasters
tracked down escapees from their communes into adjacent areas, including those who had just
sought temporary refuge in their jurisdiction before being driven away.
Burgomasters were also charged with disposing of the bodies. Sometimes they left the bodies
unburied for days or weeks, a practice which contributed to the "normality" of violent death, but after
a while public health considerations dictated disposal of the remains. Authorities summoned people
for umuganda, which consisted of stuffing bodies down latrines, tossing them in pits, throwing them
into rivers or lakes, or digging mass graves in which to bury them. In Kibuye, workers used a
bulldozer to push bodies into a pit behind the little church on a peninsula jutting into the lake. In
Kigali, Gikongoro, Butare, and elsewhere, authorities also called upon drivers of bulldozers to assist
in disposing of the bodies. In Kigali, prisoners went through the streets every three days to gather up
the bodies, a service that prisoners performed in Butare as well. One witness related his shock in the
early days of killing when he came across a group of prisoners, dressed in their pink prison shirts
and shorts, tossing cadavers into a truck. They were appropriating all valuables from the bodies,
stripping glasses and watches from them, plunging their hands into pockets to be sure they had
815 Telegram from Minitraso to Préfet (tous), no. 016/94, May 4,1994 (Butare prefecture).
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extracted all they could from the dead, and then squabbling among themselves over the division of
the spoils.816
i. Rape and sexual servitude
During the genocide, tens of thousands of women and girls were raped, including one who was only
two years old.817 The assailants raped as part of their attempt to exterminate Tutsis, some of them
incited by propaganda about Tutsi women disseminated in the period just before the genocide. The
women had been depicted as devious and completely devoted to the interests of their fathers and
brothers. Generally esteemed as beautiful, Tutsi women were also said to scorn Hutu men whom
they found unworthy of their attention. Many assailants insulted women for their supposed arrogance
while they were raping them. If assailants decided to spare the lives of the women, they regarded
them as prizes they had won for themselves or to be distributed to subordinates who had performed
well in killing Tutsis. Some kept these women for weeks or months in sexual servitude. In the
commune of Taba, women and girls were raped at the communal office.818 At the Kabgayi nursing
school, soldiers ordered the directress to give them the young women students as umusanzu, a
contribution to the war effort. The directress, a Hutu, Dorothée Mukandanga, refused and was
killed.819
Assailants sometimes mutilated women in the course of a rape or before killing them. They cut off
breasts, punctured the vagina with spears, arrows, or pointed sticks, or cut off or disfigured body
parts that looked particularly "Tutsi," such as long fingers or thin noses. They also humiliated the
women. One witness from the Musambira commune was taken along with some 200 other women
after a massacre. They were all forced to bury their husbands and then to walk "naked like a group of
cattle" for some ten miles to Kabgayi. When the group passed roadblocks, militia there shouted that
the women should be killed. As they marched, the women were obliged to sing the songs of the
militia. When the group stopped at nightfall, some of the women were raped repeatedly.w
816 Human Rights Watch/FIDH examination of the grave site, Kibuye church, February 1995; Human Rights Watch/FIDH
interview, Butare, May 25, 1995.
817 Human Rights Watch/FIDH, Shattered Lives, p. 24.
818 Fondation Hirondelle, "L'ancien maire de Taba aurait encouragé au viol de femmes Tutsies," October 23, 1997.
819 Boniface Musoni, "Holocauste Noir," Dialogue, no. 177, August-September 1994, p. 88.
820 Human Rights Watch/FIDH, Shattered Lives, pp. 54, 62-64.
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2.6.3.2 Liberty of the person
In addition to the reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Constitution provided,
in Article 15, that "la liberté de la personne humaine est inviolable". ". According to this provision, no
person could be deprived of his personal liberty without due process of law. However, the provision
was limited by the reference to the Acts of Parliament and regulations of the Executive.821
Any person who was arrested or detained had the right to be informed as soon as reasonably
practicable, of the reasons of his arrest or detention.822 Furthermore, any person arrested or
detained, with or without a warrant, if not released, had to be brought before a court without undue
delay.823Unfortunately, there was no provision entitling any person who was unlawfully arrested or
detained by any other person to damages from that other person. Instead, the courts ruled that the
above-mentioned rights did not extend to persons who had been detained under emergency
legislation, such as the Décret of October 20, 1959824which empowered the President or his
delegate to detain without trial anyone he deemed to be a threat to public security, for an indefinite
period.825 Unfortunately, neither this décret nor the Constitution stipulated the procedural
requirements with which a presidential detention needed to comply.826
The right to liberty has also been ridiculed by provisions of the code of penal procedure regulating
the preventive detention.827 Scholars have found that preventive detention is an exception to the
sacred principle of liberty of the person because a person still presumed innocent is deprived of his
liberty, his life is troubled, to say the least, he is subject to suspicion and his reputation and honour
might be seriously undermined; it creates an excessive inequality between a detained suspect and a
821There were ten situations in which the right to liberty could be derogated from: where a person had been convicted of
a criminal offence or contempt of court (Code de Procédure Civile et Commerciale, articles 211 and 212; see also Code
Pénal, Livre II); where an arrest warrant had been issued (Code de Procédure Pénal, articles 25 and 28); where a person
was reasonably suspected to be of unsound mind, addicted to drugs or alcohol (Order No. 11/83 of February 14, 1959,
B.O.R.U., 1959, P. 352), or a vagrant or a beggar, for the purpose of their care or treatment or the protection of the
community (Décret du Roi-Souverain, May 23, 1896, B.OR.U, 1959, P. 1055); and for the purpose of preventing the
unlawful entry of a person into Rwanda or for the purpose of effecting the extradition or other removal of that person from
Rwanda (Décret of 12 April 1886, B.O.R.U, 1959, p. 543; Law of 15 October 1963, J.O., 1963, p. 472, art. 18, 21, 22). A
person could also lose his liberty when he was reasonably suspected of having committed, or about to commit, a criminal
offence (Code de Procédure Pénale, art. 38, 50, 53).
822Code de Procédure Pénale, art. 38 - 40.
823Id.,art. 4, 38, 83, 86.
824B.O.R.U, 1960, P. 759.
825Seefor example Gatera v Ministére Public, RP 856/Ruh., 1988 (unreported); Ministére Public v Kagenza, R.P. 642,
1989 (Unreported).
826For some details, see infra 2 6 'Emergency Laws in Practice'.
827Déret-Loi No. 07/82 of 7 January 1982, art. 37-53, J.O., 1982, p. 308.
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free suspect.828
This principle is affirmed in Articles 12 and 15 of the Constitution, but the Code de Procédure Pénale
describes, in an insufficiently firm manner, the procedure for criminal investigation and the limits of
preventive detention. According to Article 37, the suspect can be put in preventive detention under
two cumulative conditions: if there are serious clues about his guilt and the alleged offence is
punishable with six months' imprisonment, at least. However, the same provision contains an
evasion clause providing that the suspect can also be put in preventive detention if the alleged
offence is punishable by imprisonment of less than six months but more than seven days, if there is
cause for fear of his escape, or if his identity is unknown or doubtful, or if, in view of serious and
exceptional circumstances, the preventive detention is imperiously required in the interest of public
security. It is provided that, in that case, the provisional arrest warrant must specify the
circumstances that justify it. It is clear that these exceptional circumstances are alternative, but they
do not, by themselves, justify the preventive detention. They should be read concurrently with the
requirement of serious clues about the guilt.
In a state of law, an exception to such an important principle must be shown strict and limited
guarantees and necessity must be the only justification. However, preventive detention has been so
abused in Rwanda that the people have lost confidence in penal justice, which they resent as
arbitrary and disproportionately repressive.829
Examination of Article 37 shows that, on one side, the preventive detention has an exceptional
nature and, on the other side, the conditions put forward are not sufficiently strict and limited.
As regards the procedure, Article 38 provides that if the required conditions are met, the public
prosecutor can issue a warrant for the suspect's provisional arrest after interrogation and has to take
him to the nearest competent judge to rule on the preventive detention. This appearance must be
arranged no later than five days after the issuance of the warrant for provisional arrest if the judge
sits in the same locality as the prosecutor, which is generally the case. If the locality is different,
Article 38 extends the five days' delay to a strictly necessary period for the journey, save in case of
absolute necessity or delays required by investigation duties. It can be observed that the period for
828Briere De L'lsle, G. and Gogniart, P., Procedure Pénale, Paris, 1972, Vol. II, p. 130-131; Bouzat, P. and Pinatel, J.,
Traité de droit pénal et de criminologie, Paris, 1970, Vol. II, p. 216-218.
829For details, see Reyntjens, F., La grande misere de la détention préventive au Rwanda in Revue Juridique du
Rwanda, 1978/4, p. 364.
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the journey should not go beyond two days in a small country like Rwanda.83o
The judge in question in Article 38 is, according to Article 39, the judge-president of the tribunal de
premiere instance or, in certain cases, the judge-president of the tribunal de canton. His order must
be rendered no later than the days following the suspect's appearance and must be communicated
to the suspect as soon as possible. Article 40 adds that the order authorising the preventive
detention is valid for 30 days, renewable as long as the public interest and the necessities of the
investigation require so. This means that a warrant for provisional arrest not confirmed by an order
from a competent judge-president within five days is in principle invalid, and so is a judge-president's
order that is not renewed after 30 days. However, Article 25 of the Code de Procédure Pénale
empowers the public prosecutor to circumvent that principle by issuing a summons when the suspect
is not present or when there are serious clues to the suspect's guilt and the offence is punishable
with two months' imprisonment. A suspect subjected to such a summons must be taken before the
public prosecutor who issued the summons for interrogation as soon as possible on the day following
his arrival at the place where judgement must be passed. He can then be placed in detention under
a committal order during a period strictly necessary for the investigation.
However, Article 28 adds that the committal order can be renewed by the issuing officer in case of
the absolute impossibility of taking the suspect to the competent judge to rule on the preventive
detention. Unfortunately, this "impossibilité absolue" has not been defined anywhere and, thus, has
been given a wide interpretation, opening the door to prolonged and unjustified detentions.
This argument is supported by the fact that suspects have been detained under the Proces-Verbal
d'Arrestation (PVA), which is a simple report that any officier de police judiciaire can draw up and
under which a person can be detained for 24 hours only before a decision is taken on his detention
or release.s" In this respect, 1,543 people were detained in Kigali prison in January 1978. Of these,
687 (44.52%) were under PVA and 139 (9%) under warrant for provisional arrest, which means that
53.52% of the inmates were detained before trial and without an order from a competent judge-
president and the period of detention varied between one month and four years.832 At the same time,
195 people were detained in Butare prison, 91 (46.66%) under PVA and 24 (12.30%) under warrant
for provisional arrest, meaning that 115 suspects (58.97%) were detained before trial and without an
830ld.
831The period of 24 hours is implicitly stated in the Code de Procédure Pénale and explicitly imposed by ministerial orders
No. 01/E.02/CI70 of January 3, 1970, and No. 32/9/05.00 of October 14, 1974.
832See Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 368.
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order from a competent judge-president. In the Kigali prison the period of detention was the same as
in the other nine prisons of the country.833
On various occasions even the PVA was not drawn up and people were just arrested and thrown into
jail or other places of detention. For example, in reaction to the attack on military garrisons in the
north-east of Rwanda by the Rwandan Patriotic Front on October 1, 1990, the gendarmes, soldiers
and presidential secret police arrested without warrant about 10,000 civilians, nationals and
foreigners, including minors, aged persons and pregnant and breast-feeding women. Many of these
arrested were locked up in Nyamiranbo soccer stadium where the health of some of them
deteriorated, others were dispatched to the different prisons of the country.834
Moreover, Article 6 of the Code de Procédure Pénale empowers every person to apprehend a
suspect of any flagrante delicto, including but not limited to common law offences, punishable with
three years' imprisonment, in the absence of any competent public officer, and to take him
immediately to the nearest competent public officer. Here, again, the right to liberty was exposed to
violation due to the lack of precision of the provision. In a country like Rwanda, where more than half
of the population is illiterate, it is not possible for a great number of people to figure out how seriously
or less seriously the penal code punishes a given offence. Furthermore, although there are no
adequate statistics to make this situation concrete, one should suspect, to some extent, that, since
the State has always been ethnically based, the competent officer of the day would not be inclined to
quickly remedy a false arrest made by men of his ethnic group of a suspect belonging to the other
ethnic group, especially after 1990 when ethnic tension increased.
2.6.3.3 Freedom from slavery and forced labor
Article 17 prohibited any form of slavery and bondage and Article 40 forbade forced labour. However,
a person could be required to perform any labour when the nation was at war or during an
emergency835, in case of accidents, turmoil, wrecks, flooding, fires and other calamities, as well as in
case of robbery, pillaging, flagrante delicto, public clamour or judicial execution;836 as part of the
obligation to assist troops of the public force;837 or as part of other national, civil, or military
8331d.
834LeSoir, 14 October 1990.
8350rdonnance-Loi of 23 May 1943, article 2, B.OR.U., 1943, p. 107 ..
836Décret du Gouverneur Général, 9 February 1891, article 1, B.OR.U., 1943, p. 755.
837Loisur la Réquisition No. 112/FP, B.O.R.U., 1943, p. 6.
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service.838A person who was lawfully detained could also be required to perform any labour that was
reasonably necessary in the interests of hygiene or for the maintenance of the place at which he was
detained.839 Furthermore, a member of a disciplined force such as the army or the police could also
perform labour in pursuance of his duty as such.84o
There were no reported violations of the right to protection from slavery. As regards forced labour,
President Habyarimana, despite the clarity of Article 40, forced people to perform the umuganda
(communal development labour) after the coup d'Etat of July 5, 1973 which overthrew President
Kayibanda. Although this labour, not provided for in any written law, was supposed to take one day a
week out of a Rwandan citizen's time, it often took more. And contrary to party cadres' enthusiastic
descriptions, the work was far from always being voluntary and amounted to forced labour+" In rural
areas where 96% of Rwandans lived, each adult citizen was required to buy a book in which a
supervisor had to mark his presence and participation. There was no difference in treatment of Hutus
and Tutsis in this regard.
2.6.3.4 Freedom from torture and inhuman treatment
Apart from providing that "la personne humaine est sacrée, elle est protegée par /'Etar, Article 12 did
not explicitly prohibit torture, inhuman and degrading punishment or other treatment. Moreover,
certain punishments which may be considered to constitute inhuman or degrading treatment such as
the death penalty842and ill-treatment were allowed in theory and/or in practice. Torture and inhuman
treatment were extensively practised by the police to extract confessions from suspects. Reports are
replete with cases in which the accused complained of having been forced to confess to crimes as a
result of severe torture at the hands of the police or officers from the Service Central de
Renseignement, the secret police in the Office of the President.843
Anyone who had passed through one local cell would swear that they were places of indiscriminate
8380ne-party Constitution, art. 28.
839SeeOrdonnance No. 111/127 of 30 May 1961, B.O.R.U., 1961, p. 951 as modified.
84°Ordonnance No. 081/220 of 4 October 1958.
841Guichaoua, A., Travail non rémunéré et développement rural au Rwanda: pratiques et perspectives, Geneva: ILO,
1990.
842Amnesty international, for example, is unconditionally opposed to the death penalty. It opposes the death penalty
"because it is a violation of the right to life and a violation of the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment". Amnesty International, AI Index: AFR 47/4/98,26 January 1998.
843Seefor example Revue Juridique du Rwanda, 1978/3, p. 407-425.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
205
beatings, torture and other inhuman acts.844Apart from their inevitable dreariness and designated
solitariness, local cells had won or acquired even more terrifying dimensions because of the manner
in which policemen treated suspects and would-be inmates. It had become a foregone conclusion845
that, whenever a citizen was arrested by the police or army soldiers for allegedly committing
whatever crime or offence, the initial treatment received from the men of the law was a beating. An
arrest in Rwanda had over the years become synonymous with a beating by policemen.846 One was
supposed to be pummelled down to his right senses if he was picked Up.847And while the majority of
policemen had evidently come to believe in this logic, the average Rwandan had also come to think
similarly.848 This unfortunate correlation of wrong and misplaced perceptions of law and order had
created a whole spectrum of morbid violence and nasty mannerisms in detention centres. Indeed,
chaos, anarchy and absolute illegality had reigned as opposed to legality.
Common methods of torture included: severe beatings; denying suspects food, water and medical
attention; putting suspects in solitary confinement; and applying pliers, and electric shocks to, or
forcing iron objects into genitals and the anus, etc.
The following are examples of subjection to torture: In December 1962, after Tutsi refugees had
attacked the country, a number of Tutsis in the country were subjected to torture. Nsengiyaremye
gives the example of J. Rutsindintwarane, C. Gasimba, E. Afrika, C. Karinda, O. Burabyo, M.
Rwagasana, M. Ndahiro, M. Mpirikanyi and P. Bwanakweri who died as a result of torture applied by
the national police in Ruhengeri.849 Although statistics are lacking for the remaining period of the First
Republic,85o Callixte Matabaro, a Rwandan priest since 1964, affirms that "torture was commonly
resorted to, sometimes against Tutsi opponents, sometimes against ordinary criminals".851 According
844Seefor example Amnesty International, Reported arrests of Prisoners of conscience and extrajudicial executions in
Rwanda, Monday 15 October 1990; Human Rights Watch Africa, April 1995, Vol. 7, No.1, p. 4; Times of Zambia,
Tuesday, July 25, 1995, p. 6; Reuters, Prison conditions: death of 40 detainees, Friday, 20 November 1998; United
Nations Commission on Human Rights, 54th Session, Item 10 of the Provisional Agenda, E/CHA/1998/60, 19 February
1998; Ubumwe, No. 56, June 1998, p. 6.
845This was one of the main challenges opposition parties addressed to the MRND and RPF before their suspension by
the RPF government. See for example Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 170.
846Ibid.
847Matata, J., "Violations flagrantes des droits de la personne humaine dans les prisons rwandaises", in Centre de Lutte
contre I' Injustice et I'lmpunité au Rwanda, 4 April 1997, p. 3.
848Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 130.
849Ibid.
850Even for the Second Republic and the period of the RPF government, no reliable statistics are available. The few
available cases will be dealt with.
851 Interview with Matabaro, C., Nairobi 10 June 1997.Author's translation.
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to Esdras Mpamo, respectively Prefect and Ambassador during the First Republic and Burgomaster
during the Second Republic, torture was "sometimes a necessity to know the enemy of the Republic
and the offenders of the law".852
In February 1984, Enos Nkinzingabo, a farmer in Kibuye, was brutally assaulted by an inspecteur de
police judiciaire.853 In 1986, the Tribunal de Premiere Instance of Butare ordered the prosecution of
an inspecteur de police judiciaire who allegedly had tortured Joram Shyirakera. Shyirakera had told
the tribunal that, police had hand-cuffed his hands and legs, suspended him from an iron bar
balanced between two tables and had severely beaten him, during pre-trial detention. 854
In the same year a Burundian national was seriously tortured by officiers de police judiciaire and died
in the Butare University Teaching Hospital, whereas in February 1987, Enos Habyarimana, a civil
servant in the Ministry of Education, was brutally assaulted by two gendarmes in Ruhengeri.855
The tense political situation that prevailed in Rwanda before the invasion into eastern Rwanda on
October 1,1990 by Tutsis from the Ugandan army, was used by the government as an excuse for
torture and other inhuman and degrading treatments practised on a number of Rwandan citizens.
Using a fake attack on Kigali as a pretext, the government launched a massive wave of arrests.856 It
soon became obvious that these arrests did not target supporters of the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF) - there were very few and even these few were not all known to the police - but
indiscriminately swept up educated Tutsis, opposition-minded Hutus, anyone who was in the bad
books of the power elite and even their friends or business connections; arrests were often seen as
a way of cancelling outstanding debts of foreign African residents, mainly Zaïrians and Ugandans,
who, as small businessmen, were generally good for a financial squeeze.s" Conditions of detention
were terrible, people were herded like cattle into buildings unsuitable for holding large numbers and
at times not given food or water for several days. Beatings, thefts and rapes were commonplace;
some of the prisoners were beaten to death simply because they happened to do something that
852Interview with Mpamo, E., Bukavu 23 June 1997. Author's translation.
853See Tribunal de premiere instance de Kibuye, RP 1140/Kib, 1984.
854Policemen call this form of torture "Ishanya". See Tribunal de premiere instance de Butare, RP 2122/But, 1986.
855Kinyamateka No. 897, 10 March 1984.
8560n 9 October, the Ministry of Justice admitted the arrest of about 3,000 people. The real numbers were soon to swell
to nearly 10,000, some of them being held till April 1991. There were very few charges and almost no trials. See
Fédération Internationale des Oroits de I'Homme (FIOH) et ai., Rwanda, Violations massives et systématiques des droits
de I'homme depuis le 1er Octobre 1990, Paris, 1993, p. 14.
857Kiesel, V., 'Une épuration qui ne vise pas que les Tutsi' in Le Soir, 9 October 1990; Reyntjens, L'Afrique des Grands
Lacs en crise, 1994, at 95-6.
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displeased a drunken guard.s5s
The trend towards increased torture can also be exemplified by the acts of the RPF in its preparation
for seizing power. In fact, the genocide and its accompanying atrocities were preceded by much
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment as early as 1990 when Tutsi rebels attacked from Uganda.
Apart from rape, torture and live burial of people, Hutus were subjected to torture by Tutsis soldiers.
In a method called agafuni, the victim was tied up with strong ropes. The victim was then struck
firmly on the head with the socket of a used hoe. Generally, a single smartly executed blow was fatal
and psychological suffering before execution was very intense. In akandoya, the victim was tied up
with strong plastic cords, arms and hands at the back, legs bent backwards and tied together to the
arms. The victim was then laid on the stomach and abandoned to die in this bow shape, generally
from asphyxia. By means of the briefcase or attach case, the victim's arms were pulled up over the
shoulders and tied at the back, together with the legs and then hung up. These methods of torture
were widespread in the Basiima House where Major General Paul Kagame was the head of the
Ugandan Military Security Office. They were used in Rwanda and thousands of unarmed and
defenceless Hutu civilians have died since the 1990 attack.s59 Furthermore, Tutsi soldiers and
security forces tortured people by hammering their joints and/or by mutilation: cutting off fingers,
toes, ears and other sensitive parts of the body. The mutilated persons were then forced to spend
the night in a room chilled with cold water. Throughout the night, they could neither go out nor visit
the toilet. These ignominious treatments were carried out in order to force the victims to confess to
having been involved in alleged crimes.s6o
Several explanations may be suggested for the prevalence of torture and police brutality. First, the
low level of education of most of the junior officers who did not even have secondary school
diplomas. This was aggravated by the fact that the training given to police officers was hopelessly
inadequate vis-a-vis investigation techniques, handling of arms, and the law. As a result, they
graduated from the police training school with little understanding either of the rights of suspects or
acceptable investigation techniques. Worse, the officiers and inspecteurs de po/ice judiciaire had no
background in police training. Anyone who chanced to be known to a relative or a friend of the
858prunier, G., The Rwanda crisis, at 109. It will later be seen that Amnesty International expressed concern for prisoners
suffering cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in Rwanda jails. These included children under the age of 14 and
babies with their mothers. See Chapter 3; Amnesty International, UA 134/95, 9 June 1995.
8591tis from Bisiima House that Major General Paul Kagame would have got the nickname of "Pilate" as he always
pronounced capital punishment for recalcitrant soldiers. See Desouter, S. and Reynljens, F., Les Violations des droits de
I'homme par Ie FPRIAPR, Working paper, I, June 1995.
86old.
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appointing authority could get a job in the police, and belonging to the ruling ethnic group was an
asset. Little wonder that junior officers with poor educational backgrounds perpetrated most of the
beatings of suspects.
Second, there had been no serious attempt to investigate complaints of torture or even to punish
police officers who had engaged in such conduct. In numerous criminal trials and also in habeas
corpus proceedings, countless defendants and detainees successfully proved their claims of torture.
In most cases, however, no follow-up action to punish the culprits was taken by the authorities. Even
in cases where defendants had died during interrogation and despite the public outcry, few
investigations were undertaken to prosecute the responsible officers. In fact, when allegations of
police brutality were made, senior police officers and political leaders often rallied to the defence of
the police officers implicated. The rank and file in the gendarmerie and police judicia ire were
encouraged to continue such misconduct because of the absence of effective sanctions.
Lastly, police brutality was encouraged by the fact that the majority of the people in Rwanda did not
know what their rights and freedoms comprised. Being illiterate, they did not know the content of the
bill of rights. This factor, coupled with the pre-colonial legacy of submission to the "chefs"
(authorities), based on the fact that the "chef" was always right and had to be obeyed in everything,
inhibited the capability of large numbers of Rwandans to challenge the wrongdoings of authorities.
This assertion can also be supported by the Rwandan proverb that "umugabo ni ucisha make",
which means here that a real man is the one who submits himself to the treatment meted out by his
superior. Because of the widespread and persistent nature of the beating of suspects by the police
and the army, many people believed that the police had the right to beat up suspects, and that any
one arrested by the police is guilty of the crime with which he is charged, and therefore deserves to
be beaten, and even to die on the spot. The foregoing form part of the reasons that underlie the
culture of impunity in Rwanda.
2.6.3.5 Freedom from deprivation of property
Article 23 guaranteed the inviolability of the right to individual and collective property, but allowed
infringement for reasons of public utility, in case and manner established by law and in return for fair
and prior compensation. A 1979 décret861 empowered the President of the Republic or the Minister
of the Interior respectively with regard to projects of national interest or regional interest, to declare
861 Décret-Loi No. 21/79 of 23 July 1979, Codes et Lois du Rwanda, Vol. I.
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such private property as being of public utility, and authorised the Minister of Land to order the
compulsory acquisition of private land. However, in some cases, the government assumed
untrammelled power to unilaterally determine the compensation payable to the property owner. It
made a mockery of the right of the individual to be paid fair and adequate compensation for his
property. Elias Murenzi, for example, was evicted from his land, his house and his coffee plantation
,
in 1980, following the government's decision to build the Kigali-Butare road. Despite his many
appeals to administrative authorities, Murenzi was never compensated and died in extreme
poverty.862
In 1989, following a presidential order to build the Gitarama-Kibuye road, Joseph Karake and his
family were evicted from their eucalyptus plantation of 1.32 hectare. They were given just one
hectare as a compensation and nothing else.863
The years 1962 through 1966 saw the implementation of a series of economic reforms, which were
intended to put the economy under the control of Rwandans. At independence the economy was
dominated by Europeans and Asians, because the shortage of skilled manpower and complete lack
of pre-independence indigenous entrepreneurs severely restricted the ability of Rwandans to break
into some already well-established fields of the economy. Although no rule was enacted to deprive
foreigners of their properties, about 37 retail shops were affected by military action, which led, not
only to the loss of livelihood of many Asians but also to the closure of shops in rural areas, as Asians
left them and no Rwandan proved able to run them. When two Asians sued the government for
compensation, they lost the case on the ground that the eviction was done for public interest and the
court denied the responsibility of the State in the matter.864
The preceding discussion of Article 23 shows that the protection afforded to individuals was largely
meaningless.
2.6.3.6 Privacy of home and other property
Article 22 guaranteed the privacy of correspondence and communications by post, telegraph,
telephone or any other means and the inviolability of the domicile. However, these provisions limited
the protection offered, by referring to the "law" for determination of restrictions. In this regard,
862/mvaho, No. 29/80, Nov. 1980.
863Letter dated 26 September 1989 addressed to the Minister of Agriculture by Joseph Karake.
864See Basomingera, Introduction au Droit Constitutionel, at 89, (e).
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interception, searching and detention of means of transport, communication and transmission, as
well as the suspension of the delivery of correspondence, when the country was at war, or mobilised,
or when trouble or serious circumstances threatening public security or public interests prevailed.865
In Ministere Public v Ntagarukanwa866, Ntagarukanwa was charged in the Tribunal de Premiere
Instance of Butare with contravening Décret-Loi No. 61/79 containing exchange control
regulations867, by attempting to externalise Rwandan currency to Bujumbura. He allegedly posted 39
airmail envelopes containing Rwandan currency at Butare, which were discovered by a customs
officer. The customs office opened, examined and seized the postal article without a search warrant.
As he was not satisfied with the Tribunafs ruling, Ntagarukanwa lodged an appeal before the court of
appeal of Ruhengeri, which had to examine whether the opening, examination and seizure of the
postal article constituted a contravention of the applicant's right to privacy of property as guaranteed
in Art. 23 of the Constitution. The applicant argued, inter alia, that the actual method employed in the
search and seizure of the postal articles went beyond the permitted derogations, Le. a law that is
made in the interest of defence, public safety, and public interests. The court of appeal held that the
applicant's right to protection from deprivation of property was not violated as the taking of
possession was expedient for a scheme of exchange control which was designed in order to secure
the development of the nation's financial resources for a purpose beneficial to the community. This
was because exchange control was within the permitted derogations.868 With regard to the
applicant's right to privacy, the court held that this right was not infringed as Décret-Loi 161/79, under
which the customs officer was purported to act, was reasonably required for the development or
utilisation of property for a purpose beneficial to the community. This fell within one of the permitted
derogations. It was said, inter alia, that on the basis that the customs officer was duly authorised, his
"reasonable suspicion" was objective and not subjective, that he had to form that suspicion in
respect of a particular postal parcel and before he entered the post office, and that he had to satisfy
somebody as to the grounds for his suspicion, so the action of the customs officer was bona fide.86g
865Edit of 20 October 1959, art. 1 & 4.
866RP1792/But, 1979.
867J.O., 1979.
868R.P.A 1220/Nyab., 1979.
8691d. The applicant had submitted that neither Statutory-Order 61/79 nor a search conducted thereunder was justifiable
because the Regulation did not provide for a search warrant to be obtained before the search was made and that, in fact,
the customs officer did not obtain a search warrant before opening, examining and seizing the post articles. He argued
that a search without warrant was fundamentally objectionable and has been so considered since 1765, when Entic v
Carrington (1765), 19 St. Tr. 1030, enunciated the principle that law officers could not break into a man's home and
search his person in order to obtain evidence. He also cited a number of decisions from the United States, such as Wolf
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As for freedom of expression, the court ruled that the applicant's freedom had not been infringed as
the parcels containing the money did not constitute "correspondence" within the meaning of Article
21.
In practice, the right to privacy of property was widely violated. Anyone who has travelled by road in
Rwanda will have encountered numerous roadblocks mounted by the army, para-military forces,
gendarmerie or militia in agreement with soldiers throughout the country. Travellers have had their
luggage and vehicles searched without their consent. Sometimes vehicles were even confiscated
and this has been a way to enrichment for military and police officers. The searches have been
conducted indiscriminately and without search warrants. Neither were most of the searches based
on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Sometimes no specific persons were targeted, while at
other times the target groups have been people belonging to the other ethnic group than the one
ruling. Everyone in the vehicle had his or her luggage opened and searched. Property and currency
were confiscated and seldom returned to their owners. For example, three gendarmes stopped and
searched people at a roadblock on November 29, 1993. As they could not detect any "offence", they
extorted gold watches and necklaces from ladies.87D This, besides being a way of stealing, was a
real violation of privacy.
The right to privacy was also violated on a massive scale during the so-called "operation clean-up",
referred to above, especially since policemen and soldiers searched and stripped people to the skin
without warrants.
These invasions of privacy were encouraged to a large extent by the fact that courts admit illegally
obtained possessions as evidence. The landmark case in this area of law is Ministére Public v
Ntaganda871, where the applicant, a police inspector, was convicted of official corruption. He was
alleged to have corruptly received a sum of 50,000 Rwandan francs in cans in consideration for the
release of an impounded automobile belonging to the complainant. The evidence on which he was
v Colorado 338 US 25, 27, ... The Attorney General had argued that despite the fact that the 4th Amendment went even
further than the Entic v Carrington principle, the United States Supreme Court had long held that there was a
fundamental difference between the search for ordinary criminal purposes and a search for contraband. He cited the
case of Carrol v United States, 69 Lawed. 882, where the Supreme Court held that customs officers might, without
search warrant, search vehicles and ships to prevent the import or export of contraband. He also cited Frank v
Maryland, 3 Lawed. 882, where Justice Frankfurter held that apart from customs laws, inspection was not
unconstitutional ... the court said: "the court accepts the argument that some distinctions should be made between a
developed society and one which is still developing, thinks one must be able to say that there are certain minima which
must be found in any society, developed or otherwise, below which it cannot go".
870Thiswas accounted by one of the victims who was the author's co-worker.
871Cass. 123/79, 10 Nov. 1979.
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convicted was procured by means of a trap; the handing over of the money at issue by the
complainant was pre-arranged with the police. The money was later recovered from the applicant's
house during a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant. It was incontrovertible that the police
officer in question, at the time he applied for a search warrant to be issued, had sworn that the
money in question was in the applicant's house when, in fact it was in the police officer's own
possession. The applicant argued that the said warrant was invalid and that the resultant search was
therefore illegal, and that anything found as a result of such a search was inadmissible in evidence.
The applicant relied on the United States Supreme Court case of Mapp v Ohio872 in which the
Supreme Court developed the so-called exclusionary rule as part of judicial methods to protect the
rights of the individual. In terms of this rule, all evidence obtained by unconstitutional search and
seizure is inadmissible in both Federal and State courts, regardless of its source. The Rwandan Cour
de Cassation held that evidence illegally obtained, for example as a result of an inadmissible
confession, is, if relevant, admissible on the ground that such evidence is a fact (i.e. true) regardless
of whether or not it violates a provision of the Constitution or some other law.873 However, the nature
and purpose of the exclusionary rule is apparent from the findings of judges Brandeis and Holmes in
the case of Olmstead v United States.874 Judge Brandeis declared that "if the government becomes a
law-breaker it breeds contempt for the law; and it invites anarchy". The purpose of the exclusionary
rule is therefore to control the unlawful actions of law enforcers by excluding evidence illegally
obtained. According to this rule it is more acceptable that a criminal escapes his due punishment
than that the police, as servants of the community, do and become the masters of the law by placing
themselves above the law and in so doing become guilty of non-compliance with the law. The
acceptance of illegally obtained evidence by Rwandan courts seriously undermines the constitutional
protection of the privacy of the home and other property. The police have no incentive to follow the
appropriate procedures for obtaining evidence, since illegally obtained evidence is admitted as
evidence anyway. Moreover, officiers and inspecteurs de police judiciaire who obtain evidence
through illegal methods are never punished.
Thus, the protection afforded by Articles 21 and 24 was meaningless, for all practical purposes, as it
872367U.S. 643 (1961)
873Thecourt of appeal followed French, Canadian, Indian, Scottish and Privy Council decisions, which all proceed on the
principal that evidence procured through illegal searches and seizures is admissible because it is a fact and relevant, and
that such evidence cannot therefore be adversely affected by proof of illegality in the means of obtaining it. The Court
referred to such cases as R v oovle (1886), 12 ont. R. 347, Att. General for Quebec v Begin (1995) 5 D.L.R 394
(Canadian); Emp. v Allahdad Khan (1913), Cr. L. J. 236 (Indian); Jones v Owen (1870),34 J. P 759 (English); M'Govern
v H. M Advocate (1960) S.L. T 133; and King vR (1968) 2 All E. R 610 (Privy Council).
874277 US 438 (1928).
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did not deter agents of the State from conducting illegal searches.
2.6.3.7 Provisions to secure protection of the law
Article 12 stipulated provisions that were designed to ensure that due process rights for suspect or
criminal defendants were observed. No one could be arrested, imprisoned, prosecuted or convicted
other than in the cases prescribed by the law in effect at the time of the perpetrated act and within
the forms prescribed by law, and any person should be presumed innocent of the charges as long as
a definitive conviction had not been delivered yet.
Article 81 appointed the judiciary as guardian of rights and freedoms with the mission to ensure the
respect thereof within the conditions prescribed by the law. The independence of the judicial power
was guaranteed by the same provision. As seen, the law prescribing the conditions for the respect of
rights and freedoms included the Code de Procédure Pénale which, for a person who was charged
with a criminal offence, guaranteed the right to be informed of the charge875 and adequate time for
the preparation of his defence876, and the right to defend oneself and/or to be assisted by a lawyer of
one's cholces"; and the right to have the assistance of an interpreters". Furthermore, no one could
be tried in absentia without his or her consents" and all court proceedings had to be held in public,
except for in camera cases ordered by judgement when publicity could endanger "public order or
public morals".88o
A person who could show that he/she had been tried by a competent court for a criminal offence and
either convicted or acquitted could not be tried again for that offence, save upon the order of a
superior court in the course of appeal or review proceedings relating to the conviction or acquittal.881
Neither could he be tried for a criminal offence if he showed that he had been pardoned for that
offence.882A person could not be convicted of a criminal offence, save for contempt of court, unless
875Code de Procédure Pénale, art. 62.
876Id., art. 67.
877ld., art. 75.
878Id., art. 11-15.
879Id., art. 74.
8800ne-party Constitution, art. 100.
881Code Pénal, art. 5.
882Code Pénal, art 124-133.
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that offence was defined and the penalty was prescribed in a written law.883 The provisions contained
in Article 15 of the Constitution and 16 of the code de procédure pénale, if observed, were sufficient
to ensure that criminal defendants were accorded a free and fair trial by an independent and
impartial tribunal, and to meet international standards.
However, there were numerous practical difficulties that made it difficult for criminal defendants to
enjoy these rights. Most criminal defendants were, and still are, indigent and cannot afford to hire an
attorney. As a result, and because most defendants do not understand their rights, they have not
been able to defend them. Another major problem has been the shortage of courtrooms,
magistrates, judges and prosecutors. This has led to numerous adjournments and delays, to the
detriment of the accused who has to spend much time on endless court actions and spend a lot of
money on long trips from his home to the court.884
2.6.3.8 Freedom of conscience
Article 18 provided that, "La liberté des cultes et celie de leur exercice public, la liberté de
conscience ainsi que la liberté de manifester ses opinions en toute matiere sont garanties, sauf la
repression des infractions commises Ei I'occasion de leur exercice." This embraced freedom of
thought and of religion, freedom to change one's religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others, and both in public and in private, to manifest and propagate one's religion or
belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance. Therefore, for example, a person attending any
place of education could not, without his consent (or if he was a minor, the consent of his guardian),
be required to receive religious instruction or to take part in or attend any religious ceremony or
observance if that instruction, ceremony or observance related to a religion other than his own.
Moreover, it should be unlawful to prevent any religious community or denomination from providing
religious instruction for persons of that community or denomination in the course of any education
provided by that community or denomination.
883ReadConstitution, art. 12 together with Code de Procédure Pénale, art. 209-215. Moreover, no one who was tried for
a criminal offence could be compelled to give evidence at the trial. Id., together with art 16 of the Code de Procédure
Pénale. In Mangara v Etat Rwandais (RPA 098/Nyab, 18/2/1986) the applicant was charged with corruption in the
Tribunal de premiere instance where he was compelled to prove that he had not been bribed to issue a birth certificate.
He submitted that the judgement contravened the provisions of Article 16 of the code de procédure pénale which
provided that a criminal defendant could not be compelled to give evidence of his innocence. The matter was referred to
the court of appeal which declared the judgement unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
884A number of people spend many days away from their home because of adjournments and delays coupled with the
lack of means of transport in most regions in rural areas.
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Finally, no person should be compelled to take any oath that was contrary to his religion or belief or
to take any oath in a manner that was contrary to his religion or belief.
The exercise of freedom of conscience was, however, not absolute, since laws and regulations
abridging freedom of conscience could be enacted in the interests of defence, public safety, public
order, public moralityBB5;or for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons.BB6
The scope of this freedom was considered in the case of Kamangu v Etat Rwandais887. In this case,
the applicant, EmmanuelKamangu, a 14 year-old boy, was suspended from school in June 1986, for
having refused to sing the National Anthem and to salute the National FlagBBBon religious grounds,
pursuant to the Reglement Intérieur of Rubengera Secondary School enacted on 10 January 1986
by the Conseil de /'Ecole (council of the school) headed by the Principal according to Article 62 of the
Loi No. 14/1985 organising primary, craft and secondary education, and Article 114 of the Arrêté
Présidentiel No. 509/13 that established general regulations for primary, craft and secondary
education. The relevant parts of this legislation provide as follows:
62: Le Président de la République peut fixer les programmes f...] de /'enseignement f...]; 114: La
discipline doit être éducative. Le reglement interne des établissements en précise les exigences
particulieres. f...].
Article 117 of the Arrêté Présidentiel empowers the Minister of Education, after examination of the
report from the Teachers' Council, to suspend from attendance at the school any student who wilfully
refuses to abide by disciplinary rules contained in the Reglement Intérieur. According to the
Reglement Intérieur in question, students were required to conform to decisions taken by the school
authorities and to file past in the schoolyard before starting classes in the morning.BB9
The applicant sought an order declaring the suspension unlawful and that he should be readmitted to
the school without having to give any undertaking that he would sing the National Anthem or salute
the National Flag.
The tribunal said the case raised two main issues, a legislative issue and a constitutional issue. The
legislative issue was whether the Reglement Intérieur was invalid because it was in conflict with the
885Constitution, art. 37, see also Décret of 20 October 1959 on the état d'exception, B.O. 1959,p. 2412.
886Constitution, art. 18, 2.
887Kibuye, Tribunal de premiere instance, R.C. 923/86, 29/9/1986.
888Letter signed on 14 June 1986.
889Reglement Interieur, art. 1 and 2.
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Loi No. 14/1985 under which it was made. The constitutional issue was whether his suspension from
the school and the refusal of his application for unconditional readmission thereto, constituted a
hindrance in the enjoyment of his right to freedom of conscience, thought, and religion, guaranteed
to him by Article 37 of the Constitution; and whether the Reglement Intérieur was itself in conflict with
Article 37 of the Constitution and consequently null and void.
Legislative issue: The applicant contended, first, that the Reglement Intérieur did not prescribe any
subject of instruction but merely prescribed a drill. As such it conflicted with the Loi sur l'Education
Nationale and the Arrêté Présidentiel. The Tribunal accepted that it was a drill, but ruled that the
prescription of the drill fell within the Principle's power. The Reglement Intérieur was therefore intra
vires the Principle.
The applicant's second contention was that the Reglement Intérieur was in conflict with Article 60 of
Loi No. 14/1985 regulating primary, craft and secondary education which did not provide for either
saluting the National Flag or singing the National Anthem as a condition for admission of students in
the school. Omitting words irrelevant to the facts of the case, Article 60 reads: "les éleves sant admis
sur base des résultats abtenus ..., du passé scalaire, de /'équilibre régional, ethnique et entre les
sexes .... Et dans Ie respect du principe de /'équité". When the applicant was suspended, his father
invoked these provisions and asked for his reinstatement. The Tribunal held that Article 60 did not
afford him any assistance. He noted that he was not refused readmission because he was a
Jehovah's Witness, but because he would not salute the National Flag or agree to do so in future;
that although it was true that his attitude in this regard was dictated by his religion, this, at best, only
made his religion a remote cause of his suspension and failure to achieve reinstatement - a cause
sine qua non, perhaps, but not the cause causens, the proximate cause, which was what had to be
looked at, and that that cause was the applicant's breach, and indicated continued breach of the
Reglement Intérieur.
The Tribunafs argument is hard to fathom. To describe religion as merely a remote cause of the
applicant's suspension and continued exclusion from school defies logic. It was his religion that
forbade him to sing the National Anthem and to salute the National Flag. In the author's considered
view, it was the proximate cause of his exclusion from school. Religion was at the core of his case,
as his conduct was dictated by it.
As regards Article 60, the Tribunal stated that the argument in relation to it raised one of the key
questions of the whole case: "Is either the singing of the National Anthem or the saluting of the
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National Flag a religious ceremony or observance?" After considering a number of cases from the
United 8tates890, England891, and Canada892, in which similar issues had arisen, the Tribunal said
that it was abundantly clear from these cases that, where a religious opinion was in question, a
subjective test had to be applied; that indeed it was impossible to test something as personal as an
opinion in any other way, but that when the nature of a ceremony or observance was in question, a
subjective test was inappropriate and its application could lead to anomalous reasons. It added that
the ceremony itself had to be looked at objectively, but explained that this was not to say the
subjective views of those attending the ceremony were not to be taken into account and that they
would carry considerable weight; but they would not necessarily be decisive.
In order to determine whether or not the singing of the National Anthem and saluting the National
Flag constituted a religious ceremony, the Tribunal asked itself, and answered, three questions.
First, by whom were the ceremonies instituted and with what object? The answer was that they were
instituted on the directions of the State and not by any church or religious organisation. Besides
instruction, their object was "to promote national unity and proper respect for the National Anthem
and the National Flag as the secular, not religious, symbols of national consciousness."
Second, in the manner in which they are conducted, are they invested with any of the trappings of
religious worship? The answer was that these ceremonies were not invested with the trappings of
religious worship, because "they were not conducted by a priest, nor in a place of religious worship,
nor made use of any equipment or books associated with religious worship."
Lastly, do the persons who attend the ceremonies regard them as religious? The Court concluded
that "some persons, notably the applicant and his Jehovah's Witness colleagues, do genuinely and
sincerely regard these ceremonies as religious."
After applying the objective test through the medium of these questions and answers the Tribunal
held that, notwithstanding the views of the applicant and his colleagues, the singing of the National
Anthem and saluting of the National Flag were not religious ceremonies or observances. Thus, the
applicant's claim that he was entitled to be excused from singing the National Anthem and saluting
the National Flag and, in consequence, reinstated at the school without the obligation to participate
890 Wolf v Colorado 338 US 25, 27, ...; Carrol v United States, 69 Lawed. 882; Frank v Maryland, 3 Lawed. 882; and
Mapp v Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
891KinqvR, 2 All E. R 610, 1968.
892R v Davie, 12 ONT. R. 347, 1886.
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in those ceremonies failed by reason of the provisions of the Reglement Intérieur.
Constitutional issue: The applicant argued that his suspension and continued exclusion from school
constituted a hindrance in the enjoyment of freedom of conscience without his consent. Therefore, it
was his contention that the Reglement Intérieur violated Article 37 of the Constitution. The Tribunal
held that the onus clearly was on the applicant to prove that he had been so hindered. It accepted
that he had successfully discharged this burden and that he was entitled to redress in respect
thereof, unless that hindrance and the law that sanctioned it came within the ambit of the
Constitution.
The Tribunal stated that there was a presumption that the legislature acted constitutionally and that
the laws that it had passed were necessary and reasonably justifiable. It said this presumption also
applied to the rules made by a Principal, assisted by the Council of Teachers, under statutory powers
conferred on him by the Arrêté Présidentiel. The applicant therefore had the onus of proving that the
Reglement Intérieur was unconstitutional and that his suspension and his continued exclusion were
not fair.
The Tribunal accepted the prosecutor's argument that it was essential to have national unity to
achieve and maintain national security. Furthermore, that in a multi-ethnic society such as Rwanda
ethnicity and sectionalism constitute serious dangers to national unity and thus to the security of the
nation. It also accepted that, to counteract these dangers, there was need to instil a consciousness
of national unity and national allegiance in the nation and that such consciousness had to be instilled
in the minds of the young in particular by proper and appropriate instruction. It explained that the
Reglement Interieur was expressed to be designed to that end, that for the purpose of promoting
national unity ..., along with ... every other civilised country in the world, Rwanda had adopted a
National Flag and a National Anthem as symbols of her nationhood, and that these symbols had to
be acknowledged as such and treated with due respect, whence in principle a law which made
proper provision was one which was reasonably required in national interests and is reasonably
justifiable in a State of law.
The Tribunal noted that the applicant was not compelled by the State to sing the National Anthem or
salute the National Flag. It continued that he was only required to do so as a condition - along with
other conditions, if he wished to attend a government or state-aided school, that is to say, if he chose
to accept education provided or financed by the government. This seemed to the Tribunal to be
reasonable. It added that he was not compelled to attend a government school since education was
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not compulsory in Rwanda as it was in other countries, nor was the State under any mandate to
provide education. It remarked that, although he could not look to any other comparable source of
education than the Rubengera school because no other was available at that time, he was not, as a
result, denied freedom of religion. He was free to practice his religion as he pleased. It was not really
his freedom of religion which was invaded, but his freedom of education which was not a freedom
guaranteed by the Constitution.
This case demonstrates the extent to which the Tribunal would go to support abridgement of
individual rights by the State. Under the stringent tests laid down by the court it is almost impossible
for an applicant to win cases against the government. Not only must he show that he has been
hindered in the enjoyment of the right in question, but he must also show that the law or action in
question was not reasonably required in any of the interests specified and that the law or action was
not reasonably justified in a State of law.
This is a heavy burden. It is the author's contention that, once the applicant has succeeded in
proving that his right has been violated, the onus of showing that the law which brought about that
situation is reasonably required and also reasonably justifiable in a State of law, must rest on the
State itself. This is because the facts upon which a conclusion on this aspect must be based, are
peculiarly within the knowledge of the government and also because it is more difficult to prove a
negative (i.e. that the law is not justified). In this regard the approach taken by the court in the
Ntagarukanwa case893 is much more progressive and would advance individual rights. In that case
the judge placed the burden of proving that the challenged law was reasonably required in the
specified interest on the State.
Furthermore, the presumption of constitutional validity in favour of a regulation such as the
Reglement Intérieur is an unfortunate self-imposed limit on the powers of judicial review. It is the
author's view that, to apply that presumption to that regulation or any statute that appears prima facie
to violate a fundamental right protected by the Constitution seriously undermines the effectiveness of
a bill of rights. The position of the individual alleging a violation of his rights would be enhanced if the
presumption were reversed, i.e. that when there is such a prima facie violation of the fundamental
right, the onus must rest upon the government to show that it is justified.
Although freedom of conscience was largely observed in practice, the record was not entirely clean.
Jehovah's Witnesses, over the years, were subjected to harassment by government and MRND
893Seesupra, Privacy of Home and Other Properties.
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officials and militants. They were perceived as anti-government dissidents who were implacably
opposed to government policies.894 Members of the Sect were dismissed from employment and
imprisoned because of their refusal to participate in political activities.895
A number of pupils belonging to the sect were expelled from school for refusing to sing the National
Anthem and saluting the National Flag. For instance, in 1981, at least 84 pupils were expelled from
primary schools in Gisenyi alone.896
Some Jehovah's Witnesses were brutally assaulted and their homes burnt down by MRND
members. From February through April 1981 more than 13 houses of Jehovah's Witnesses were
burnt down by MRND members in Gitesi.897
In February 1981, the Burgomaster of Gishyita ordered that the preachers of the Jehovah's
Witnesses should not be allowed to preach in that Commune unless they produced MRND cards and
sang the National Anthem in front of their converts.898 Subsequently, Jehovah's Witnesses who were
found preaching in that Commune were beaten up by policemen.899
The Jehovah's Witnesses Sect was banned in Zaïre, Malawi and other countries in Africa. The
Witnesses were persecuted by their governments and many of them fled to Rwanda, especially to
Kibuye and Gisenyi. But the Rwandan government was not hospitable to the refugees. For example,
in 1979 and 1981, a number of Jehovah's Witnesses came into Rwanda, from Kivu in Zaïre.90o In
Zaïre, the Witnesses had been killed, raped, beaten, and forced to walk naked by the JMPR, the
Youth Wing of the ruling Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR). Unfortunately the
government declared these refugees prohibited immigrants. Many of them were elderly people,
women and children.901 They were rounded up and handed over to the Zaïrian Security forces, which
894lnJune 1980 the Burgomaster of Gitesi gave the Watch Tower members a final warning to stop their anti-government
activities or face the ban. So because of all this and other cautioning and ever-growing hate campaigns the present
attitude of Jehovah Witnesses towards life in general was that of a "bunch of lost sheep" who were so fearful that they no
longer trusted an outsider. Mweya, Faith in the last days, at 21.
895For example in March 1980 8 Jehovah's Witnesses were sacked by police officers because they refused to buy
MRND cards. Id.
8961d.
8971bid.
8981bid.
8991bid.
9oolbid.
9011bid.
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had connived in their persecution. The Rwandan government ignored pleas by the refugees that they
would be killed or persecuted in Zaïre.902 This action by the government was inhuman and illegal
under international law.
Although there was no written ban, freedom of conscience generally was restricted by the
government with regard to the registration of new churches and religious organisations. The rationale
for the restriction was that it would discourage the formation of undesirable sects.903
2.6.3.9 Freedom of movement
Article 21 guaranteed freedom of movement. This freedom meant the right to move through Rwanda,
the right to reside in any part of Rwanda, the right to enter Rwanda, and immunity from expulsion
from Rwanda. But a person who was in lawful custody was not entitled to this freedom.904
As with other rights discussed above, freedom of movement was subject to several limitations as the
Constitution referred to laws to regulate this freedom. Thus, a number of laws severely curtail
freedom of movement for the purpose of the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public
morality or public health, or the imposition of restrictions on the acquisition or use by any person of
land or other property in Rwanda. For example, regulations made by the President or his delegate
pursuant to Articles 3 and 4 of the Décret regulating the state of emergency905 provide for the
restriction of movement and detention without charge of anyone considered to be a threat to public
security. They also provide for the declaration of curfews by the President.
Moreover, laws abridging the freedom of movement of aliens and public officers were permitted.906
Extradition of criminal fugitives was also permitted.907
These regulations were used extensively and in most cases improperly, as shown in section 2.6.
Thousands of people were restricted or detained without trial under the regulations. The President or
his delegate also declared curfews on many occasions.
902Asenior immigration officer at Goma Immigration office, told a reporter: " We send back thousands of these people
every week. Every time they come back through the hills". Ibid.
9031bid.
904Constitution, art 22; Code Pénal, art. 16, Code de Procédure Pénale, art. 35-57.
905Seeinfra section three.
906These were especially the Loi of 15 October 1963, J. 0., 1963, p. 472, 478; and Arrêté Ministériel No. 3/04 of 2
January 1963, J. 0., 1963, p. 23.
9071d.See especially art. 18, J. 0., 1963, p. 472.
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Even courts favoured the denial of freedom of movement. In Mukamabano v Etat Rwandais,908 the
Court ruled that Mukamabano, being a woman, had no right to apply for a passport without
authorisation given by her husband. This position was taken in accordance with the Code Civil
according to which a married woman had to obtain her husband's authorisation for any legal matter
in which she had to appear in person.909 As the court considered the application for a passport a
legal matter, its decision meant that a Rwandan married woman could not enjoy freedom of
movement without her husband's consent.
The Arrêté Présidentiel No. 25/01 of February 26, 1966 regulating the reintegration of refugees910
imposed controls on the movement of refugees in Rwanda. Article 5 subjected their freedom of
movement to prior and written authorisation of the burgomaster of the commune in which they
resided.
Certain areas were designated as protected areas and were off-limit to the public, except with
special permits. These included electricity power generating stations, military camps, etc.911
Over the years, the government restricted the freedom of movement of its political opponents by
banning them from travelling abroad and confiscating their passports. In 1980, for example, at least
11 passports were confiscated and about 121 applications were turned down.912
2.6.3.10 Protection from discrimination
Article 16 guaranteed equality before the law without any discrimination on the grounds of race,
colour, origin, ethnic group, clan, sex, opinion, religion or social position to all citizens. It is therefore
clearly understood that, if persons in the same conditions were treated differently on the above-
mentioned grounds, the provision establishing such discrimination would be radically
unconstitutional, and so would the practice thereof.
This freedom is interesting because of the ethnic disparity in Rwanda. As will be recalled, Hutus
908R.P2571/Kig., 16/2/1977.
909Government of Rwanda, Rapport National du Rwanda pour la Quatrieme Conférence Mondiale sur les Femmes
(Beijing), Sept. 1995, p. 31.
910J.0., 1966, p. 27.
911See for example the Décret of December 15, 1953, B.O., 1954, p. 180; Décret of June 20, 1952, in Codes et Lois du
Rwanda, p. 491.
912Among those who had their passports confiscated were Callixte Rukera, Théoneste Lizinde and Callixte Kanyangoga.
InteNiew with a former immigration officer who did not want to disclose his name, Harare, 29 September 1998.
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were subjected to widespread ethnic discrimination, both before and during colonial rule. It was
largely because of this discrimination that Hutus fought hard to dismantle the kingship, and to gain
independence from Belgium.
Theoretically, abolition of discrimination based on ethnic group became one of the major priorities of
the PARMEHUTU government after assuming power. The object was to desegregate all schools,
hospitals, and public facilities and to eliminate the industrial colour bar. However, ethnic
discrimination did not disappear but rather took the colour of discrimination on grounds of political
opinion and affiliation, which, in practice, was ethnically based but now in favour of Hutus. We have
seen that non-PARMEHUTU members were persecuted or denied access to certain jobs or facilities
on account of political affiliation throughout the post-independence period. During the first Republic
(Le. 1962-1973) members of opposition parties such as the UNAR, mostly Tutsis, were denied their
civil and political rights. They were often evicted from government, fired from jobs and harassed in
many other ways (such as being prevented from travelling abroad). This discrimination against non-
PARMEHUTU members was consistent with the policy promoted by President Kayibanda and the
top leadership of the party, which was aimed at forcing people to join the ruling party. These leaders
coined the slogan "it pays to belong to PARMEHUTU".913
The discrimination against non-members of the ruling party, Tutsis as well as Hutus, continued
during the Second Republic under the MRND of President Habyarimana (1973-1994). MRND
opponents were completely excluded from the political system. This was because, as seen, MRND
membership was a de facto prerequisite for elective offices, top civil service jobs, and employment in
the defence force. In addition, only "convinced" MRND members were allowed to head parastatals
and statutory boards (which control 85% of the economy).914
Discrimination was also carried out against women in profound and systematic ways that subjected
them to a wide array of limitations and restrictions. Although the prohibition against discrimination
extended to discrimination based on gender, laws that discriminate against women, both legislative
and customary, are allowed. One of the areas in which women suffer discrimination is employment.
The Code du TravaiP15 empowers the Minister of Labour to enact regulations placing restrictions on
women's access to jobs such as mining. These restrictions are ostensibly aimed at preventing
913MDR slogan: (...) "PARMEHUTU yaratsinze"( ...)
914SeeThe Hindrance of Civil Society.
915Loi of 23 February 1963, J. 0., 1967, p. 107, as modified.
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women from being exploited and exposed to danger in heavy industrial and night work. Although
there was no ministerial order determining the types of work prohibited to women, women could not
be employed in industrial undertakings during the night, unless the undertaking was a family one. An
industrial undertaking included mines, quarries and other undertakings for the extraction of minerals
from the earth, manufacturing and building industries.t"
The main effect of these denials was to exclude women from a large sector of formal wage
employment opportunities in the country. This is because the Rwandan economy was dominated,
apart from agriculture, by the mining industry. Such discrimination against women in employment not
only contributed to a sex-segregated occupation structure in Rwanda (where most women work as
nurses, secretaries, primary school teachers, etc.) but it also perpetuated, to a large degree, the
economic dependence of women, by excluding women from some of the main employment sectors
of the Rwandan economy.
It is difficult to justify this legislation in view of the fact that women in the rural areas are involved in
heavy agricultural work917 and women are employed at night in poorly-paid public service jobs such
as nursing in hospitals. Another discriminatory provision hard to explain is Article 4 of the Décret
regulating trade918, according to which a wife could not engage in trade activity without the express
authorisation of her husband.
Women have occupied an inferior legal position to men under customary law. They have been
considered perpetual minors and have thereby been regarded and treated as dependent on their
male relatives in several respects. First, a woman must obtain the consent of her parents or relatives
to contract a valid customary marriage, regardless of her age. Second, the requirement that a man
pay bride price (inkwano) to the parents of the woman in order to validate a customary marriage,
means that the parents must consent to the marriage. The law therefore discriminates against adult
women by denying them the right to marry men of their choice under customary law. Third, inkwano
undermines the status of women with regard to divorce because inkwano must be repaid to the
husband by a woman's relatives on dissolution of the marriage. Thus, the woman is compelled to
9161nreply to Ms. Agathe Ntabanganyimana's application for employment, the Director of the mine company (SOMIRWA)
stressed that (...) "/'extraction des minerais et les autres travaux y re/atifs sant interdits aux persannes de sexe
féminin"( ...) Letter dated November 11, 1979; even in schools pupils were taught that certain jobs such as building and
manufacturing naturally were men's and, thus, prohibited to women.
917See for example Human Rights Watch, Shattered Lives, Sexual Violence during the Rwandan genocide and its
aftermath, 1996, p. 22.
918Décretof August2, 1913, B.O., 1913, p. 775.
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seek her parent's consent to divorce her husband. It is therefore apparent that the law discriminates
against women by denying them the right to terminate a marriage in their own right.
These are but a few instances of discrimination against the Rwandan woman whose role in society
has centred on her position as wife and mother. As observed by Ntampaka,
... from a young age, the education that girls receive from their mothers initiates them into their
future lives as wives and mothers. A woman will take care of the house as well as working in the
fields. She will learn certain kinds of behaviour, such as keeping a reserved attitude, or
submission ... The strength of a family is measured in [the] number of its boys.919
He added,
... the ideal image of a woman is still generally viewed through the perspective of her maternal
role. The woman must be fertile, hard-working and reserved. She must learn the art of silence
and reserve.920
This obligation to be docile has guaranteed domestic abuse: it has been reported officially that over
fifty percent of Rwandan women have been victims of domestic violence at the hands of their male
partners.921 Moreover, a woman who has committed adultery is sanctioned more severely under the
penal code than a man prosecuted for the same offence.922 It is clear that there is inequality between
married men and women with regard to their obligations and rights vis-a-vis each other's consortium
(Le. the sharing as far as possible by spouses of a common domestic life).
2.6.3.11 Protection of freedom of expression
Freedom of expression was guaranteed explicitly by Article 18, and implicitly by Article 22, which
guaranteed the secrecy of correspondence and postal, telephonic and telegraphic communications.
It encompassed freedom to hold opinions about any subject without interference with one's
correspondence.
Freedom of expression was, however, not absolute. Article 18 permitted derogations by referring to
the Acts of Parliament, regulations of the executive, protection of state security and the honour of
other persons. These permitted derogations were so vague and ambiguous as to render freedom of
919Ntampaka, C., La Femme et la flile dans leur familie d'origine, Kigali: Haguruka, p. 24-25, translated in Human Rights
Watch, Shattered Lives, Sexual Violence during the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath, at 19-20.
92old., at 20.
921Government of Rwanda, Rapport National du Rwanda pour la Quatrieme Conférence Mondiale sur les Femmes
(Beijing), September 1995, p. 19.
922Article 354 provides for imprisonment of one month to one year for the woman, and one to six months for the man.
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expression almost meaningless. Almost any regulation or practice could be made to fit within one of
the derogations. They were not subjected to any single test. A serious defect in Article 18 was that
freedom of the press was not expressly protected. Yet it is incontrovertible that freedom of the press
is indispensable for the operation of any democratic system of government. The lack of such
freedom had serious consequences in Rwanda, as will be shown later.
Several laws, regulations and practices have operated to severely restrict freedom of expression in
Rwanda. The penal code923, particularly, contains some ambiguous and interesting provisions.
Article 164 provides for the death penalty for any person who undermines the person of the Head of
State: "taute persanne (...) porter atteinte a la persanne du Chef de IHat". Article 166 prohibits
sedition:
Quiconque soit par des discours tenus dans des réunions ou lieux publics, soit par des écrits, des
imprimés, des images ou emblemes quelconques, affichés, distribués, vendus, mis en vente ou
exposés aux regards du public, soit en répandant sciemment de faux bruits, aura soit excité ou
tenté d'exciter les populations contre les pouvairs établis, soit soulevé ou tenté de soulever les
citoyens les uns contre les autres, soit alarmé les populations et cherché ainsi a porter les
troubles sur Ie territoire de la République, sera puni d'un emprisonnement de deux a dix ans et
d'une amende de deux mille a cent mille francs au de /'une de ces peines seulement, sans
préjudice des peines plus fortes prévues par d'autres dispositions du présent code.
And Article 391 sanctions defamation:
Celui qui aura méchamment et publiquement imputé a une per sonne un fait précis qui est de
nature a porter atteinte a /'honneur ou a la considération de cette persanne, ou a /'exposer au
mépris public, sera puni d'un emprisonnement de huit jour a un an et d'une amende de mille a dix
mille francs, ou de /'une de ces peines seulement.
These provisions have a chilling effect on freedom of expression, since, because of their wide
sweep, almost any criticism of the government or the President can be termed seditious or
defamatory. In practice, during the Habyarimana government, critics of the government, including
students at the National University of Rwanda, had their publications banned or declared seditious.
Critics who were not detained under emergency regulations were often charged with sedition.924
Many people who were heard to criticise the President were arrested and charged with defamation of
923Décret-Loi No. 21/77, 18 August 1977, J. 0., 1978, no. 13 bis, p. 1, as modified.
924For instance in 1978, Seth Sendashonga was questioned and warned by the Presidential secret police about his
article in the DIAPASON, "Le gouvernement du peuple", which was considered to be seditious. The article simply
criticised the fact that the government was not elected. A.JR, May, 1978. In 1980, Esdras Kanimba, President of the
General Association of Students of the University of Rwanda (AGEUNR) was detained and tortured by the Presidential
secret police for having chaired a meeting in which "political issues" were discussed.
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the President.925 This inevitably stifles public debate on matters of national importance, as many
people are too frightened to speak up. How it has hindered civil society by denying press and
academic freedoms has also been shown.
Furthermore, Ordonnance No. 53/Cont. 926 regulating cinematographic films restricts freedom of
expression by submitting the creation of cinematographic films to prior and special authorisation by
the President of the Republic or his delegate. This authorisation is personal and non-transferable.
Moreover, Ordonnance No. 221/114 protecting children with regard to film projection927 restricts
freedom of expression by permitting prior censorship of films by a State appointed Control
Comrnlsslon.t" The Commission is required to examine every cinematographic picture and may
approve the same as suitable for exhibition to the public, or refuse to approve the same, or agree to
approve the same subject to such excisions from the cinematography film as it thinks proper.929 The
Commission must refuse to give approval to any film or any part thereof "which, in its opinion, depicts
any matter that is contrary to public order".930
It is clear that the Commission has a wide discretion to censor the content of films shown to the
public. Although this power has not been used frequently, the words "public order" are not defined
anywhere in the legislation, leaving it entirely to the discretion of the Commission to define them.
Some films were banned because of their political content or for featuring intimate love scenes or
violence. The majority of films that were not banned outright had whole scenes which the
Commission found unacceptable excised.
Although there were no censorship Commissions for plays, artists in the theatre had to practice self-
censorship. Although the Rwandan State was liberal compared to most African States, and did not
practice open censorship of plays and productions, the habit of self-censorship on the part of
playwrights and theatre practitioners in fact made its task easier. The artists were afraid of having
sanctions applied if they stepped out of the MRND line. The government did little to encourage the
925For example, in October 1989, a 63-year old woman, Rahab Kamashara, was charged with defaming President
Habyarimana. The accused, a former government employee, denied the charge and said all she had done was to
complain about her pension money. R.P. 239/Kig, 15 Aug. 1982.
9260rdinance No. 53/Cont., May 1, 1936, B. O. R. U., 1954, p. 443.
9270.R.U., No. 221/114, June 19, 1959.
9281d.Article 1 empowers the Minister to appoint a Control Commission. This order, a relic from the colonial days, was
enacted in 1959.
929Seeart. 7 & 15.
930ld.Read together with Order No. 221/4, January 7, 1960, art. 1.
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development of theatre in the country. This can be evidenced by the fact that there is no functioning
arts centre and no national theatre, that the government has not even built one theatre house and
that theatre itself has almost disappeared.
2.7 Emergency laws in practice
A state of emergency can be defined as
"An exceptional situation of crisis or public danger, actual or imminent, which affects the whole
population or the whole population of the area to which the declaration applies and constitutes a
threat to the organised life of the community of which the State is composed."931
Emergencies are mostly due to war, internal subversion (including secession and insurrection); and
a breakdown, or potential breakdown in the economy.932 Other emergencies are caused by riots,
natural catastrophes such as fires and floods, earthquakes, and strikes in strategic services and
industries. What distinguishes the second category from the first is that the latter are often localised,
temporary and normally counteracted by the normal or customary powers of the government.
It is undeniable that every sovereign government must possess effective means to deal with
emergency situations and must reconcile the apparent necessities evoked by danger with the
protection of human rights.933The exercise of emergency powers inevitably impinges on individual
rights. Three important questions need to be addressed. First, in what circumstances and subject to
what safeguards would individual rights succumb to the claim of emergency powers by public
authorities to preserve national security? Second, should every threat to the State, whether real or
imaginary, justify derogation from legal protection of individual rights? Lastly, what can be done to
ensure that emergency powers are not abused, for example to cover up police inefficiency or as a
treat against rivals, or simply as a method of personal harassment?
Not all "emergencies" justify an official state of emergency and the suspension of fundamental rights.
"Only those which threaten the life of a nation require exceptional measures. The best way to
931Chodwrury, S.R., Rule of law in a state of emergency: The Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a
State of Emergency (1989), p. 11. This definition is given by the International Law Association which approved a set of
minimum standards governing the declaration and administration of states of emergency that threaten the life of the
nation, at its 61st Conference held in Paris from August 26 to September 1,1984. These standards, known as the Paris
Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency, are designed to help ensure that even in
situations where a bona tide declaration of a state of emergency exists, the State concerned will refrain from suspending
non-derogable rights under article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
932Kavaruganda, J., Droit Judiciaire, Butare: UNR, 1982, p. 12.
933Groves, H., Comparative constitutional law: cases and materials, 1963, p. 189.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
229
prevent abuse of this power and unlawful infringement of fundamental rights is to provide for
comprehensive constitutional checks in such situations. In times of emergency the protection of
fundamental rights becomes all the more important. In a democratic constitutional State, an
emergency clause must exist which may only be implemented under the control of a supreme
Constitution which provides for extensive judicial and legislative controls". 934The absence of such a
provision in a constitution is no guarantee that exceptional powers will not be invoked. Even
countries without explicit derogation clauses in their constitutions sometimes find it necessary to
invoke emergency powers.935 "Such measures are then justified by invoking 'implied provisions',
prerogative powers, martial law, the principle of salus reipublicae suprema lex, or the right of the
State to self-defence, or necessity".936 In most African countries, the most used "implied provisions"
are those relating to the salus reipublicae suprema lex. In this regard, it has been argued by some
that it is only when the safety of the State is assured that individual rights can be realised.?"
According to this argument, the rights of the State must take precedence over individual rights
whenever the stability of the State is threatened. The danger is that this ground may suggest some
"extra-constitutional" source of executive power that is beyond normal constitutional and judicial
control. There are nevertheless minimum international standards that must be complied with. In this
connection reference must be made to salient provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.938
Article 4 (1) permits State parties, during times when an emergency declaration is in force, to take
measures derogating from individual rights to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their obligations under international
law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or
social origin. However, a State may not derogate from the following rights and freedoms939: the right
934Erasmus, Limitation and Suspension, 1994, at 629.
935See the US case of Korematsu v United States 323 US 214 (1945), where it was stated, per Frankfurther J:
'Therefore the validity of action under the war power must be judged wholly in the context of war. That action is not to be
stigmatized as lawless because like action in times of peace would be lawless'.
936Erasmus, Limitation and Suspension, 629.
937Forexample Kavaruganda stated that the rights of the individual depend for their very existence and implementation
upon the continuance of the organised political society - that is - the ordered society established by the Constitution. He
contended that the continuance of that society itself depends upon national security, for without security any society is in
danger of collapse or overthrow. He concluded that national security is thus paramount not only in the interests of the
State but also in the interests of each individual member of the State; and measures designed to achieve and maintain
that security must come first, and subject to the provisions of the Constitution, must override, if need be, the interests of
individuals and of minorities with which they conflict. Kavaruganda, J., Droit Judiciaire, Butare: UNR, 1984, p. 141.
938VillanDuran, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1998.
939Article4 (2).
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to life (art. 6); freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (art. 7);
freedom from slavery or servitude (art. 8); freedom from being imprisoned merely on the ground of
inability to fulfil a contractual obligation (art. 11); the right to recognition everywhere as a person
before the law (art. 17); freedom of thought, conscience and religion (art. 18); and the right not to be
tried on any criminal offence which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or
international law, at the time when it was committed (art. 15). Moreover, Art. 5 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates that a State party may "engage in any activity or
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognised herein or at
their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Covenant."
In addition to the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights outlined
above, reference will also be made to the Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a
State of Emergency.940 These norms offer an international standard against which the Rwandan
legislation will be compared. The legislation in question is governed by the 1959 Décret,941 its
executory ordonnance,942 and the dispositions spéciales (special provisions) of the Code de
Procédure Pénale.943 As seen in Chapter one, the 1959 décret was enacted as a result of the
jacquérie in which many people, mostly Tutsis, lost their lives. To date, this Décret is still in force and
states of emergency have been declared whenever there was fear, real or imaginary, of coup d'état
or Tutsi attacks during the Hutu rule, and of Hutu infiltrators during the Tutsi rule. Unfortunately there
has never been an explicit provision on states of emergency and the suspension of fundamental
rights in the Rwandan Constitution. Article 13 only reads: "Nul ne peut être soumis a des mesures de
sOreté que dans les cas et les formes prévus par la loi, pour des raisons d'ordre public ou de
sécurité de /'Etal". This section will examine the manner in and extent to which emergency powers
were used during the three post-independence regimes: Were emergency powers used legitimately
to deal with real threats to public security? Were they used for the primary purpose of eliminating
political rivals, suppressing dissent, covering up police inefficiency or simply in personal vendettas?
What were the effects on the human rights culture in Rwanda, especially the culture of impunity? To
what extent did they perpetuate or change the predominant and colonial legacy for the worse? To
what extent were they used to (or resulted in) exacerbation of ethnic rivalry?
940 Reprinted in Villan Duran, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1998.
941 B.O.R.U., 1960, p. 759.
942 Ordonnance No. 11/630 of 10 December 1959, BA, 1959, p. 3259.
943 Code de Procédure Pénale, Loi of 23 February 1963 (J.O., 1963, p. 98) as modified (J.O., 1986, p. 155), Codes et
Lois du Rwanda, Vol. II, 2nd edition, 1995, p. 561, articles 146-149.
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The power to detain or restrict without trial was used extensively by successive regimes. The author
contends that this power was used improperly in a majority of situations. Moreover, the author
argues that, during several periods, the semi-state of emergency was sustained, not for the
preservation of public security as the Executive claimed, but for the preservation of the successive
ruling parties and their strongmen. During the Hutu regimes, emergency power was used to
persecute Tutsis and Hutu political opponents. Many of the so-called threats to public security that
were dealt with through the use of emergency powers could easily have been countered through
ordinary law.
2.7.1 Legal basis and abuse of emergency powers in Rwanda
In Rwanda, as in many other countries, the sine qua non for the operation of emergency laws is the
existence of a state of emergency. The provisions relating to the proclamation of a state of
emergency remained unchanged during the period under study. The emergency statutes
empowered the President or his delegates to make regulations for the preservation of public security.
Amongst these regulations may be those providing for entering and searching of premises944;
detaining and restricting people without trial;945 prohibiting, restricting and controlling association,
assembly946 and publication.s" suspending delivery of correspondence and other services;948 and
taking possession or control of any property or undertaking;949and any such regulation deemed
necessary for public security or the conducting of operations.95o Under the Code de Procédure
Pénale, the President may make regulations to provide for the extension of ratione loci competence
of jurisdiction as he determines and the ratione materiae competence of cantonal tribunals.951
However, the statutes do not provide for the duration of emergency regulations and, unlike in many
countries, there is no guarantee that only emergency regulations that have been affirmed by a
9441959 Décret, art. 4,1°, a.
945Id., art. 4, 1°, b.
946Id., art. 4, 2°, a, c.
947Id., art. 4, 2°,b.
948Id., art. 4, 3°,b & 4°.
949Id., art. 4, par. 3.
950ld., par. 3 & 4.
951Code de Procédure Pénale, art. 148, par. 1.
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resolution of the National Assembly will take effect during an emergency.952 This failure suggests
that the President and his delegates have broad power to infringe individual rights by enacting
emergency regulations that are therefore valid by themselves.
All the successive constitutions953 provided that no one could be subjected to security measures,
except in cases and forms provided by the law for the reasons of public order and the security of the
State. Article 1 of the Décret empowered the "Gouverneur Général" to declare either that a full state
of emergency was in existence or that a threatened state of public emergency was imminent (Le. a
semi-emergency). As the functions of the "Gouverneur Généra/" were exercised by the "Président de
la République" after independence, the power to declare the state of emergency was vested in the
President of the Republic.954 However, the Décret was silent about the publication of the state of
emergency and implicitly made the state of emergency a reserved domain of the executive by not
providing for parliamentary approval and I or control and not determining the duration of the state of
emergency.
In enhancing Executive power, and correspondingly excluding the power of the National Assembly,
Rwanda followed in the footsteps of countries like Malawi which had amended its Independence
Constitution to reduce or eliminate Parliamentary control over the executive's use of emergency
powers.955
The provisions of the 1959 Décret were not in conformity with acceptable international standards, of
which the most famous are the Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of
Emergency.956 According to the Paris Minimum Standards, the following norms must be adhered to
in order to ensure that the legislature can enforce accountability of the executive branch which
assumes or exercises emergency powers: the duration of the emergency shall never exceed the
period strictly required to restore normal conditions; the duration of the period of emergency (save in
the case of war or external aggression) shall be for a fixed term established by the Constitution; and
every extension of the initial period of emergency shall be supported by a new declaration made
952Forexample, section 37, (11) of the South African Constitution and article 30, (2) of the Zambian Constitution provide
that only emergency regulations that have been tabled and affirmed by a resolution of the National Assembly shall take
effect during an emergency.
953Self-government Constitution, art. 13 & 14; one-party Constitution, art. 13; 1991 Constitution, art. 13.
954Basomingera, Introduction au Droit Constitutionel, at 43.
955The Provisions relating to the declaration of a state of emergency in the independence Constitution of Burundi were
similar to those contained in the 1959 Décret. Regarding Malawi, no provision was made for the declaration of a state of
emergency in the Republican Constitution of 1966.
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before the expiration of each term (i.e. with the prior approval of the Legislature) for another period to
be established by the Constitution. A strict scrutiny, by the legislature, of every extension of the
period of emergency is imperative; prior approval is essential since the reason of urgency that might
have justified the initial declaration by the Executive is no longer relevant. Emergency provisions in
the Rwandan Décret fell short of these norms. The first state of emergency during the post-
independence period was declared by President Kayibanda on 21 December 1963, as a result of the
inyenzi957attack from Burundi, as the UNAR leadership in exile in that country had decided to strike a
decisive blow against the republican regime.958 After Kayibanda, intelligence services were informed
of the attack, the State radio repeatedly beamed emergency warnings, asking the population to be
'constantly on the alert for Tutsi terrorists' .959 In this atmosphere of intense fear, saturated with
rumour and suspicion, the worst was bound to happen. At the root of the tragedy lies President
Kayibanda's decision to entrust each of his cabinet ministers with emergency powers in each of the
ten local prefectures, with instructions to take whatever measures they deemed appropriate.w In
many cases, this mandate was interpreted as a licence to kill: the first reaction of the authorities was
to round up and jail some twenty leading Tutsi personalities associated with the local branches of the
UNAR and RADER parties, some of whom figured in the list of potential ministers. Less than a week
later they were all taken to Ruhengeri and summarily executed.w' Simultaneously, steps were taken
to organise civilian 'self-defence' groups among the Hutu population, to counter possible attempts at
internal subversion. In this regard, primary responsibility was placed upon the burgomasters and the
prefects. In addition, one minister was assigned to each of the ten prefectures - now converted into
"emergency regions" - to supervise the organisation of the self-defence units.962 These
arrangements were made within a few hours, in an atmosphere of panic, and therefore with little
attention to procedural detail or co-ordination. Addressing an improvised meeting of burgomasters
and PARMEHUTU propagandists, a certain André Nkeramugaba, prefect of Gikongoro, is reported
to have said, "We are expected to defend ourselves. The only way to go about it is to paralyse the
956SeeKavaruganda, Droit Judiciaire, at 192.
957Literally meaning "cockroaches", the term inyenzi was used both within and outside Rwanda to refer to small-scale,
Tutsi-led guerrilla units trained and organized outside Rwanda and varying in size from about six to twelve men.
958The decision was taken during a meeting held in Bujumbura on 11 November 1963. In fact, the inyenzi leaders had
hoped to organise simultaneous attacks from at least four different quarters: from the regions of Kabare (Uganda), Ngara
(Tanzania), Goma (Congo), and Ngozi and Kayanza (Burundi). See Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, at 219.
959Id., at 223.
960See Circulaire 12/63, 21/12/1963.
961Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, at 223.
962Circulaire 12/63, 21/12/1963.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
234
Tutsis. How? They must be killed".963 In this prefecture alone, an estimated 5,000 Tutsis were
rnassacred.w Soon, the contagion spread to other areas.965
Whenever Tutsis attacked, a state of emergency was declared during which many innocent people
lost their lives. Besides, the most important effects of the Tutsi attacks and subsequent states of
emergency policy had been to strengthen ethnic divisions, and the personal power of the President.
Indeed, the Hutu republic took on a strange tinge since, in many ways. The President was in fact the
Mwami of the Hutus and his will was law. The same style of leadership applied, and his deliberate
remoteness, absolutism and secretiveness unavoidably recall what Maquet wrote of the leadership
style of the old kings:
The role of the ruler was a mixture of protection and paternalistic profit. ... The subject was
expected to fit within this form of leadership. He was supposed to adopt a dependent attitude.
Inferiority is the relative situation of a person who has to submit to another in a defined field. But
dependence is inferiority extended to all spheres of life. When the ruler gives an order, he must
be obeyed, not because his order falls into the sphere over which he has authority, but simply
because he is the ruler.966
This unquestioning obedience was to playa tragic and absolutely central role in the unfolding of the
1994 genocide which was perpetrated during a state of emergency declared by the Minister of the
Interior just after the death of President Habyarimana.967
One of the results of states of emergency was to strengthen the culture of impunity for Rwandan
authorities. The best proof is supplied by Kayibanda's reaction to the report of the commission of
inquiry set up at the request of the Swiss government, partly in response to the accusations made by
Denis Vuillemin, a Swiss-appointed investigator.968 As a result of this investigation - conducted under
963Quoted in Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, at 225.
964That the reprisals should primarily have been in this area is not accidental. Besides having a very high density of
Tutsis, the Gikongoro prefecture was the core area of the Tutsi opposition, a fact that is not altogether unnatural if one
considers that it also contained within its boundaries the former royal residence of Nyanza. In an effort to weaken the
Tutsi opposition, the Rwanda government had decided to break the former prefecture of Nyanza into two separate
administrative units, one of which became known as the Gikongoro prefecture. But this did not prevent the Tutsi of
Gikongoro from continually and defiantly expressing their hopes of returning to power. Under the circumstances one can
better understand why the Hutu population should have been driven to such extremities.
965As reported by Claire Sterling in "Chou-en-Lai and the Watutsi", Reporter, March 12, 1964.
966 Maquet, Le Systéme des relations sociales dans Ie Rwanda ancien, at 186-7.
967Communiqué du Ministére de la Défense, 6 April 1994, 3.00 a.m; Communiqué du Ministére de !'Intérieur, Radio
Rwanda, 6 April 1994, 5.00 a.m.
968In February 1964, the head of the Swiss technical assistance program, Auguste Lindt, informed President Kayibanda
that his government would discontinue its aid to Rwanda unless an investigation was undertaken. It was largely in
response to this that the first commission of inquiry was appointed. The findings of the second commission of inquiry are
contained in the White Paper released by the Rwandan authorities in March 1964, misleadingly entitled Toute la Vérité
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the auspices of the Procureur de la République, Tharcisse Gatwa - no less than 89 persons were
found guilty, including two ministers, and a number of local officials, prefects and burgomasters.
Kayibanda refused to acknowledge the evidence and ordered a new investigation. This time, as one
might have expected, only a handful of individuals were incriminated. Most of them received light
prison sentences. At this point the matter was laid to rest.969
Regarding the Second Republic, following rumours of a potential coup d'état in April 1980, President
Habyarimana declared a semi-state of emergency during which Théoneste Lizinde, former Director
General of the intelligence service, and about thirty others, were arrested and detained for allegedly
preparing to overthrow the government on April 23, 1980. They had allegedly recruited an indefinite
number of men from the regular armed forces.97o While in detention, they were tried in the Cour de
SOreté de /'Etat on November 25, 1981, which convicted them of "affeinte El la sOreté de /'Etat".
Thoroughly unsatisfactory evidence adduced by the prosecution resulted in the acquittal of 24.971
Despite their acquittal, 21 of those 24 were not released from detention until May 8, 1989, after 8
years in detention.972
Emergency powers were also used against alleged members of alleged rebellions. Following the
RPF attack on October 1, 1990, a curfew was declared by the Minister of the Interior. Using a fake
attack on Kigali as a pretext, government soldiers, gendarmes and officiers de police judiciaire
launched a massive wave of arrests.973 It soon became obvious that these arrests did not actually
target supporters of the rebel movement,974 but indiscriminately swept up educated Tutsi, opposition-
minded Hutus, anyone who was in the bad books of the power élite and even their friends or
business connections, and foreign African residents, mainly Zaïrians and Ugandans. Businesses
were conflscated.s" Outside prisons, MRND activists terrorised, looted and raped civilians they
sur le Terrorisme Inyenzi au Rwanda, Kigali, n.d.
969Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, at 226.
970Agence Rwandaise de Presse, 18 September 1981.
971Id.,26 Nov. 1981.
972S.0.S Prisons, 1989, p. 2.
9730n October 9, the Minister of Justice, Theoneste Mujyanama, admitted the arrest of about 3,000 people. The real
numbers were soon to swell to nearly 10,000, some of them being held till April 1991. There were very few charges and
almost no trials. See Fédération Internationale des Droits de I'Homme, Rwanda: Violations massives et systématiques
des droits de I'homme depuis Ie 1er October 1990, Paris, 1993, p. 14.
974Thealleged supporters were very few and even these very few were not all known to the police. See Prunier, The
Rwanda Crisis, at 108.
975Kiesel, V., 'Une épuration qui ne vise pas que les Tutsi' in Le Soir, 9 October 1990; Reyntjens, L'Afrique des Grands
Lacs en crise, at 95-6. Conditions of detention were terrible, people were herded like cattle into buildings unsuitable for
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considered to be spies, as Justice Minister, Théoneste Mujyanama, had declared
There is cast-iron proof of guilt against all those who have been arrested ... and ... as far as public
security is concerned, to be released does not mean that one is innocent.t"
On the national radio, the Minister of Defence asked the population to "track down and arrest the
infiltrators".977 Between 1 and 11 October, about 400 people were killed and 500 houses burned in
Gisenyi.978 At a press conference, President Habyarimana explained,
Civilians? Why should we kill civilians if they are not involved in the fighting and breach of public
security? ... We are in war, a state of emergency has been declared. There is no revolt.
Everybody is obeying .... 979
2.7.2 Judicial review of emergency declaration
The question to be determined here is whether the judiciary can pronounce on the validity of an
emergency proclamation and also whether the measures taken to restore normalcy were permissible
in law. As the power to declare an emergency is a presidential prerogative, the President was the
sole judge of the existence of the conditions that justified the exercise of power. An obvious
drawback in Rwandan legislation was that what constituted an emergency, apart from war, was not
defined. The natural meaning of the word "emergency" can cover a very wide range of situations and
occurrences. It is, to use Dunedin's words, "something that does not permit any exact definition: it
connotes a state of matters calling for drastic action ...".98o The executive, therefore, is likely to lapse
into arbitrariness and violate fundamental rights and freedoms without a judicial review of the
declaration of the emergency. The question of the justifiability of the power to declare an emergency
holding such large numbers. They were not given food or water for several days. Beatings, thefts and rapes were
commonplace; some of the prisoners were beaten to death simply because they happened to do something that
displeased a drunken guard. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, at 109.
976Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 93.
977RadioRwanda, News bulletin, 10 October 1990, 4 p.m.
97BAssociation Rwandaise pour la Défense des Droits de la Persanne et des Libertés Publiques, Rapport sur les Droits
de I'Homme au Rwanda, Kigali, 1992, p. 101-16.
979Translated in Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, at 110, and in Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 94.
9BoJustice Lord Dunedin in Bhagat Singh v King Emperor, L.R. 58 I.A. 169. Under the Constitution of Ghana a state of
public emergency is defined as including any action that has been taken or is immediately threatened by any person or
body of persons: (a) which is calculated to deprive the community of the essentials of life; or (b) which renders necessary
the taking of measures which are requisite for securing the public safety, the defence of Ghana and the maintenance of
public order and supplies and services essential to the community. Constitution of Ghana, par. 33 (9) Under the
Constitution of South Africa, a state of emergency may be declared only in terms of an Act of Parliament, and only when
(a) the life of the nation is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public
emergency; and (b) the declaration is necessary to restore peace and order. Constitution of South Africa Act No. 108,
1996, Section 37 (1).
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unfortunately was not explored by Rwandan courts. It only arose indirectly in Ministere Public v
Lizinde981, where the defendant contended, inter alia, that the use of emergency powers to detain
him exceeded anything which might reasonably have been deemed necessary. The court, upholding
the detention, held that it was not open to the courts to debate whether it was reasonable for a
declaration under the 1959 Décret to be in existence.
Unfortunately, since this was a peripheral issue merely, it was not fully examined by the Cour de
SOreté de t'Etat. But in Nigeria the courts had an opportunity to deal directly with the question
whether the declaration of an emergency was justiciable. Under the Nigerian Constitution of 1963,
the power to declare an emergency was vested in Federal Parliament. In Williams v Maiekodumni'~82,
Chief Justice Ademota stated that
... a state of emergency exists in Nigeria is a matter apparently within the bounds of Parliament,
and not one for this court to decide. Once that state of emergency is declared, it would seem that
according to the Constitution, it is the duty of the government to look after the peace and security
of the State, and it will require a very strong case against it for the court to act_983
Even outside Africa there is no consensus regarding the competence and propriety of the judiciary to
pronounce on the validity of the proclamation of an emergency. For example, the International
Commission of Jurists (IC), while acknowledging the position that it is "axiomatic that, for the
protection of human rights, the greatest possible degree of judicial control should be striven for",
commented:
However, it is widely thought that the executive and legislature, the political branches of
government are entitled to discretion in determining the existence and gravity of a threat to the
nation, Le. the need for a state of emergency, and the necessity for recourse to specific measure.
Whether judicial review of these two decisions is advisable is, therefore, another issue that must
be decided in the light of the legal traditions of each country.984
981Agence Rwandaise de Presse, 25 September 1981.
982(1962) 1 ALL NLR 328.
983Id.,at 336. In Adegbenro v Attornev General, Justice Ademola stated: "We however, feel that on the question whether
or not there were sufficient grounds for Parliament to declare a state of emergency, it is unnecessary for us to rule on the
submission that if Parliament acted mala fide in making a declaration of a state of public emergency the court could hold
invalid, since it is impossible to say in the present case that there was no ground to justify a declaration, it is not for this
court to go outside the provisions of paragraph 65 (3) of the Constitution of the Federation defining emergency". (1962) 1
ALL NLR 338-48. An almost identical set of facts existed in the Malaysan case of Ningkan v Government of Malaysia
(1969) 2 W.L.R 365, decided by the Privy Council. In that case, the Privy Council stated categorically that the power to
declare an emergency was the sole prerogative of the Federal government, and therefore could not be questioned in any
court of law.
984lnternational Commission of Jurists, States of Emergency: Their impact on human rights 435 (1983). At a United
Nations Seminar held in Kingston, Jamaica, there was general agreement that the 'declaration of a state of emergency
should not be subject to judicial control.' Seminar on the Effective Realisation of Civil and Political Rights at the National
Level, Kingston, Jamaica, UN Doc. STITAO/HR/29, par. 237 at 51 (1967).
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After having studied the case law of eight countries - United States of America, United Kingdom,
Canada, South Africa, Ireland, New Zealand, Australia and India - Alexandra concludes that courts
are vulnerable in times of national crisis and that "in the most serious cases, courts have performed
badly, will necessarily continue to perform badly and should ideally not be involved."985 He asserts
that, in the United States of America and other countries, the courts have upheld, with few
exceptions, "far-reaching expansion of governmental power with corresponding contraction of
individual rights during times of public emergency."986 Regarding the justiciability of a declaration of
emergency, he found that the preponderant view is that the judgement of the political branches of
government, with a few exceptions, are outside the purview of judicial review.98?
Given the practice in other jurisdictions it is not hard to predict that, if Rwandan courts were
confronted with a case that required them to pronounce on the validity of a declaration of an
emergency, they would probably have declined to do so. Moreover, the absence of a definition of
"exception''988 in the 1959 Décret and the fact that Article 1 required only the President's subjective
satisfaction before he could declare an emergency, made it highly improbable that the courts would
review his action. This state of affairs, coupled with the lack of parliamentary check, is indeed
unfortunate as it creates a situation where emergency powers are easily abused. It is not
inconceivable that an emergency can be declared even when prima facie conditions for an
emergency do not exist.
The absence of judicial review of the merits of a declaration of a state of public emergency
constitutes a grave threat to guaranteed rights because certain rights (e.g. to life, freedom of
movement, assembly, expression, liberty) are curtailed during an emergency.
2.7.3 Ambiguity of 'sécurité publique'
Although the purpose of the regulations made pursuant to the emergency statutes is the
preservation of public security, the three statutes do not precisely define the words "sécurité
pubtique" or "sOreté de t'Etat" contained therein. The penal code itself, under the subsection on the
"atteintes a ta sOreté de t'Etat" (acts of conspiracy against the security of the State) restricts itself to
985Alexander, The illusory protection of human rights by national courts during periods of emergency, 5 Hum. RTS: J, 1-
65, (1984).
9861bid.
9871bid.
988The state of emergency in the 1959 Oécret is called "état d'exception".
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enumerating these acts, without defining them, and to determining their punishment. However,
"sOreté de t'Etat" is not defined anywhere and Rwandan case law is silent on the matter, which, in
some ways, opens the door to arbitrariness.
In some countries, courts have attempted to interpret 'public security'. A more enlightened definition
was given by Judge Cullinan of the Zambian Supreme Court in Kaira v Atn. Gnf989over a detention
for economic crimes alleged to have troubled public security. He said:
The words "public security" in their ordinary sense surely mean the securing of the safety of all
persons and property and the preservation of law and order. It can be said that the last four
objects stated in the definition supplement the first object. Thus, in order to protect the safety of
persons and property it is necessary to maintain supplies and services essential to the life of the
community, to prevent public disorder, or subversive activities, or indeed a breakdown of law and
order. The emphasis, in the view of the court, is on the preservation of the safety of the
community, rather than on its economic prosperity or otherwise. There may well be a nation
whose economy is little short of chaotic but the peace and safety of whose citizens is never in
doubt.990
Under this approach, the executive can only resort to emergency regulations when the security of the
entire community is threatened and the ordinary law has proved inadequate to cope with the
situation. Emergency powers should not be used to deal with isolated crimes of any kind that have
little connection with the peace and safety of the c?mmunity as a whole.
The lack of definition of "securité pubtique" and "sOreté de /'Etaf' and the weakness of judicial review
in Rwandan law and in practice contributed to rampant abuse of powers of detention. As indicated,
the Habyarimana regime had used these powers extensively. The expression "public security" was
given the widest interpretation imaginable. The most important factor is that the presidential regimes
in Africa are more sensitive about national security than any other. In Africa, "concentrated power is
very sensitive to criticism and very jealous and suspicious of rivals or competition, hence the
increasing predominance of the one-party system in presidential regimes."991 In these regimes, "the
989(1980) ZR 55. In this case the applicant was detained for having allegedly externalised 500,000 kwacha and for an
alleged attempted externalisation of a further 150,000 kwacha. President Kaunda subsequently told the press in an
interview that he had ordered the detention of the applicant because ROP (1975) Ltd., a State-owned company, had
unlawfully paid him 200,000 kwacha. The applicant contended, inter alia, that his detention was invalid as the grounds
for his detention were not relevant to the preservation of public security. The court broke up the definition as set out in
Section 2 into five groupings: (I) the securing of the safety of persons and property; (ii) the maintenance of supplies and
services essential to the community; (iii) the maintenance of public order; (iv) the maintenance of the administration of
lawful authority; and (v) the maintenance of the administration of justice.
99old.,at 82. Judge Cullinan's well-reasoned judgement was cited with approval in many other cases E.g. 1987/HN/158
(unreported). In this case the applicant was detained on grounds that he had indulged in illegal trafficking and smuggling
out of Zambia of "large emeralds". See also 1981/HN/713 (unreported).
991Nuabueze, B.O., Presidentialism, at 298.
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president is a personal ruler, thus given a personal dimension, too. It involves not only the security of
the State and its institutions, but also the security of the President's tenure of office. Anything that
threatens the security of his continuance in office is also a threat to the security of the nation. He is
the symbol of the nation, and the instrument through which this personal identification is achieved is
the single or dominant party. A threat to the security of the party is therefore viewed as a threat to
the security of the nation. Herein, therefore, lies the underlying reasons for the sensitive concern for
national security in presidential regimes."992
Although the interpretation of the Constitution and statutes is often a complex undertaking, especially
when matters of State security are involved, the bottom line is that it is quite unacceptable to subject
individual freedoms to such severe limitations and restrictions during a public emergency as to
render them meaningless. Thus, there must be "limits to limits". Amongst other principles to be
considered to achieve this is the principle of "proportionality", originally developed by the French
Conseil d'Etat and widely used in Europe. It refers to the constitutional limitation of the power of the
State in legislation as well as administrative action. Interference with constitutional rights is only
possible if (a) permitted by the Constitution; (b) capable of achieving its purported objective; (c)
necessary to achieve such purported objective in the sense that no lesser form of interference is
available; and (d) reasonable or proportional in the sense that the purported objective of such
interference is as such lawful, adequate, necessary and of superior or equal weight when balanced
against the affected right. These questions are asked in relation to the facts of every case and every
right when there is a limitation and a challenge. Thus, Orucu asserts that the proportionality principle
is the ultimate test for justice and a requisite concretisation of the rule of law and is thus immanent in
the concept of basic rights.993
2.7.4 Ordinary criminal law and preventive detention
Does the detaining authority have power to detain where the offence falls under criminal law or
where the accused has been acquitted on criminal charges? This question first arose in Re Kavumba
& Munvandamutsa994, where it was submitted by the petitioners, inter alia, that the discretion to
detain was exercised in bad faith because the grounds for detention constituted criminal offences for
which a criminal prosecution could be instituted. Dismissing this submission, the Tribunal stated inter
9921bid.
993Orucu, C., 'The Core of Rights and Freedoms: The Limits of Limits' in Campbell, T. (ed.), Human Rights: From
Rhetoric to Reality, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, p. 45.
994RP886/90.Gis.
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alia that:
... detention or restriction without trial is, by definition, intended for circumstances where the
ordinary criminal procedure is regarded by the detaining authority as inadequate to meet the
particular situation. There may be various reasons for the inadequacy; there may be insufficient
evidence to secure a conviction without disclosing sources of information which it would be
contrary to the national interest to disclose; or the information available may raise no more than a
suspicion, but one which someone charged with the security of the nation dare not ignore, or the
activity in which the person concerned is believed to have engaged may not be a criminal
offence, or the detaining authority may simply believe that the person concerned, if not detained,
is likely to engage in activities prejudicial to public security. And one must not lose sight of the fact
that there is no onus on the detaining authority to prove any allegation beyond reasonable doubt,
or indeed to any other standard, to support any suspicion. The question is purely for his
subjective satisfaction.995
This decision was followed in Re SabakunzP96 in which the Tribunal also ruled in favour of the
subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.
These decisions undoubtedly further accentuated the harshness of detention since the detaining
authority was given the green light. Thus, a person who was found innocent by the courts could still
face detention on exactly the same set of facts. The courts, by taking this position, abdicated their
responsibility to be a sentinel of individual liberty. One sad result of this was that the police had no
incentive to conduct thorough investigations during the period under study, because they knew that
they could resort to preventive detention at any time.997
As regards the safeguards available to detainees, the Service Pénitentiaire du Rwanda order of
1961998 permits the detainee to wear his own clothing999; receive and write letters 1000;receive and
read books 1001;exercise dailyl002; provides that the detainee shall receive a normal daily diet1003;
allows visitors to visit him1oo4;and his attorney to visit him.1oo5Only convicted detainees may be
995Author's translation.
996RP 1019/92.But.
9971ntheir report, Kanyarwanda deplored the way in which detention was abused and was becoming alarming.
Kanyarwanda, Rapport sur les droifs de /'homme, February, 1992.
9980rdonnance No. 111/127 of 30 May 1961, B.O.R.U., 1961, p. 951 as modified.
999Id.,art., art. 24, par. 3.
10oold.,art. 51.
1°01Id.,art. 54.
1oo2Id.,art. 33, par. 1.
1oo3Id.,art. 35.
1004ld.,art. 50, par. 1.
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compelled to perform labour.1oo6
During the period under study there, unfortunately, was no court case by which one would be able to
assess whether the safeguards outlined above were mandatory or not and what the effect of non-
compliance with them was. The safeguards were not respected in many places of detention, which
could be overcrowded prisons, soccer stadiums, private houses and other clandestine places. What
is more, the legislation never provided for damages or compensation for unlawful detention and for
torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.
2.8 A non-independent judiciary and an inadequate legal profession
Neither the judiciary nor the legal profession has been a strong defender of human rights and the
rule of law in post-colonial Rwanda. In this section, the argument is that the denial of human rights
and the rule of law are partly due to the lack of independence of the judiciary from other branches of
government. This, together with other important reasons, will explain why the judiciary has been
ineffective in protecting human rights. Moreover, the legal profession has been woefully inadequate
in the promotion and protection of human rights, mostly because of the lack of an organised bar and
the inadequacy of the education and training of lawyers.
2.8.1 Independence of the judiciary
In a democratic society the independence of the judiciary is firmly upheld. This signifies, in the words
of Beinarf, that:
The law-deciding and law-applying agency must be one in which those whose rights are
affected will have confidence, that is confidence that the agency will administer justice
according to law and will do so impartially, predictably, fearlessly and as far as possible
uniformly - free of outside pressure, governmental, legislative or otherwise.1oo7
This assertion suggests that every judge is free to decide matters before him in accordance with his
assessment of the facts and his understanding of the law, without any improper influence,
inducements, or pressures, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason; and that the
Judiciary is independent of the executive and legislature, and has jurisdiction, directly or by way of
10051d., art. 50, par. 3.
1006Id., art. 40.
1007 Beinart, B., "The Rule of Law" 1961 Acta Juridica III.
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review, over all issues of a judicial nature.100B
The fact that human rights can be protected by an impartial and independent judiciary has been
recognised in many national constitutions and international human rights instruments such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter of Human and Peoples'
Rights.l00g
However, Rwandan law, both on the books and in practice, shows that the judiciary has not been
independent. Analysis can be focused on procedures for appointment, discipline and removal of
judges, security of tenure and immunity of judges. Since prosecution is also involved in the
functioning of the judiciary, the independence of prosecutors must also be assessed.
2.8.1.1 Qualification and appointment of judges and prosecutors
Judges at all levels are appointed by the President acting on the proposals of the Minister of Justice
and in accordance with the advice of the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature.1010
A person could qualify for appointment as a judge of the tribunal de canton if he could prove that he
has completed secondary education and special training determined by the Justice Minister. To
qualify for appointment as judge-president of that tribunal, a person must hold a law degree or have
five years' experience in the functions of judge in a tribunal de canton. lOll
As regards the tribunal de premiere instance, to qualify for appointment as judge, a person needed
to have a law degree and three years' experience in judicial functions or legal functions in public
service or a law firm or law educational institution or, failing a law degree, six years' experience in
the functions of assistant judge or assistant public prosecutor. This provision also applies to the
qualification for appointment as assistant public prosecutor.v" To qualify for appointment as judge-
president of the tribunal de premiere instance or public prosecutor in that tribunal, the candidate
must have, in addition to a law degree, at least seven years' experience in judicial functions or legal
functions in a public service or law firm or law educational institution or, failing a law degree, at least
1008Kint,R., L'indépendance de la magistrature en droit rwandais in Revue Juridique du Rwanda, 1983/1, p. 1-8.
10098eeCouncil of Europe, Human Rights in international law, Council of Europe Press, 1992, p. 31-56; 342-362.
10108ee the law on the statute of judicial staff, in Décret-Loi No. 06/82 of January 7, 1982, art. 20, J.O., 1982, p. 285; Loi
Organique No. 07/92 of 19 Nov. 1992, art. 11, J.O., 1992, p. 1959.
1011Id.,art 6 & 7.
1012Id.,art. 9.
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ten years' experience in the functions of deputy judge-president of a tribunal de premiere instance or
first assistant public prosecutor in that tribunal.1013 These are also the requirements for appointment
as judge or deputy public prosecutor in the Cour d'Appel.
At the level of the Cour de Cassation, a person could qualify for appointment as judge or assistant
public prosecutor if, in addition to the law degree, he had at least fourteen years' experience in
judicial functions or legal functions in a public service or law firm or law educational institution. These
are also the qualifications required for appointment as judge-president of a Cour d'Appel or
Procureur Général in that court.1014
In case the candidate is a Doctor of Laws, the period required for professional experience is reduced
to two thirds.1015
These are the only professional qualifications that any person needs in order to be admitted to the
Rwandan courts of law. Other prerequisites for appointment as judge such as, for instance,
admission to the bar, as is the case in other countries1016are not required. Perhaps this has been due
to the fact that there was no bar in Rwanda until 1998.1017
However, it should be pointed out that no single Rwandan had a law degree at whatever level at
independence.1018 The University of Rwanda was only established in 1963 and its Law Faculty was
inaugurated in 1974. After Tutsi judges - themselves without any qualification in law - were ousted
between 1959 and 1961 and upon the hurried departure of Belgian judges on independence, a
number of Hutus were appointed judges and prosecutors without academic qualification and judicial
experience. It was only in 1963 that the first Rwandan law graduate from Belgium, Fulgence
Seminega, was appointed judge-president of the Supreme Court. Three years later, Donat Murego,
was appointed deputy judge-president of the same court, from 1965 to 1970, while Juvénal Muganga
was judge in that court from 1970 to 1973. Apolinnaire Nsengiyumva was the second deputy judge-
president, from 1965 to 1972, and Antoine Ntashamaje was the third deputy judge-president, from
1013Id.,art. 11.
1014Id.,art. 13.
1015Id.,art. 15.
1016Examples: Benin, Zambia, and France.
1017For details, see Kint, L'independence de la magistrature en droit rwandais, at 1-8.
10181d.
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1965 to 1976.1019These were the only university law graduates the country had until 1978, when the
first 23 students of the Faculty of Law received their law degrees at the National University of
Rwanda.102oThe four-year training was organised in such a way that there was graduation every two
years until 1985 when annual graduations started. However, not all trainees who graduated were
appointed in the judicial service, since a number of them preferred a better salaried position in the
private sector. We will also see how the recruitment of judges and prosecutors has been exercised
with ethnic and regional bias.
Before the genocide, only 34 out of 659 judges had studied law at an advanced level, and none of
the cantonal court judges had any legal training. In addition, out of 84 government prosecutors, only
18 held degrees in law. These inadequacies had a considerable influence on the quality of justice.
They also provided a loophole for accused persons, whose lawyers (when they had any) could easily
invoke faults in procedure as grounds for having their clients released. Such failings make judges
more susceptible to corruption and to interference by the executive in the administration of justice. It
may be noted that Article 86 of the Constitution states that "the President of the Republic is the
guarantor of the independence of the judiciary".1021 However, some of the difficulties the Rwandan
judicial system has had in functioning, have been the results of inadequate human resources.1022
Therefore, the conditions for qualification as judge or prosecutor have never been met and
Marchalfs contention that "the greatest scourge an angry heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful
and a sinning people was an ignorant, corrupt, or a dependent judiciary"1023 found its application
here. In this regard, Havugimana observes, without concrete examples, that many judges and
prosecutors have had to keep "good relations with their appointing authorities" in order to remain in
their positions and, on the other hand, "people coveting judicial positions" did "everything possible to
get them without required qualifications.1024
Since all the members of the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature were appointed by the President,
it is apparent that the latter had enormous power vis-a-vis the appointment of judges under the
décret-Ioi regulating the judicial staff. Apart from the 'proposals' from the Minister of Justice - who
1019Fordetails, see Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 437.
1020See, Université Nationale du Rwanda, Annuairre, 1979.
1021Author's translation.
1022Material resources as well as interference by political and administrative authorities have also played a great role.
UN, United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996, Document 20, at 209.
1023BorkinJ., The Corrupt Judge, p. 9.
1024Havugimana, D., Droit judiciaire, Butare: UNR, 1984, p. 23.
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was also appointed by discretion of the President - and the advice of the Conseil Supérieur de la
Magistrature, it was unfortunate that the President's power to appoint judges to courts including the
highest court, was not subject to any check or control by the legislature or any other independent
body. Notwithstanding that he acted in accordance with the advice of Conseil Supérieur de la
Magistrature, his power was considerable. This was because, despite the constitutional provision on
the independence of the judiciary, the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature was not, in practice, a
truly independent body. It was dominated by the President's political appointees, who inevitably had
to "dance to the master's tune".1025It is arguable that the overwhelming dominance of the President
in the appointment of judges diminished the independence of the judiciary to a large extent. It was
likely that under such circumstance political consideration played a greater role in the selection of
judges than merit and integrity.
2.8.1.2 Security of tenure, discipline, and removal of judges
A judge or a prosecutor has to vacate his office on attaining the age of seventy years.1026Apart from
this, a judge can be removed from office only for inability to perform the functions of his office
(whether arising from infirmity of body or mind or from any other cause) or for misbehaviour.'?" A
judge can only be dismissed in accordance with an elaborate procedure stipulated in the Décret-Loi,
which provides for a disciplinary committee. The committee consists of the judge-president of the
Cour de Cassation, chairman, the deputy judge-president of the same court, vice-chairman, and
judges who are members of the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature.1028 The procedure requires
that the Minister of Justice denounces the facts that justify the disciplinary proceedings to the
committee and the chairman appoints a rapporteur from among the members of the committee. The
charged judge is invited by the Minister of Justice to appear before the committee, which can
deliberate only if two thirds of the members are present. The same procedure applies for the
prosecutors whose disciplinary committee consists of the General Prosecutor in the Cour de
Cassation, chairman, the first assistant public prosecutor in the same court, a civil servant from the
Ministry of Justice appointed by the Minister, and the prosecutors who are members of the Conseil
1025Sahinkuye, M., L'organisation et la compétence judiciaires au Rwanda face au droit international des droits de
I'homme, Butare: GSa, 1991, P. 83.
1026Seethe law on the statute of judicial staff, CLR, Vol. II, 1995.
1027Id.,art. 75, 119, 122, 124.
1028Id.,art. 64.
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Supérieur de la Magistrature.1029
The provisions contained in the Décret-Loi under study regarding security of tenure, discipline, and
removal of judges, if observed, were sufficient to ensure that the Rwandan judiciary was independent
and met international standards.
As all the institutions in Rwanda were politicised103o, judges were suspended or removed from office
in violation of the provisions contained in the décret-Ioi. Available documentation shows that Eugene
Ndagijimana was suspended for failing to participate in the umuganda in June 1986.1031 In November
1996, Sylvere Bugilimfura, judge in the Kigali court of appeal, was suspended for opposing illegal
occupation of Hutu properties by army officers and abducted.1032
2.8.1.3 No duty to advise the executive
One of the hallmarks of judicial independence is that judges do not have a duty to advise the
executive in cases that do not come before them in the ordinary course of justice, or to warn the
government concerning the legality of proposed action.1033
Since independence, the successive regimes reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining an
independent and impartial judiciary on many occasions.P>' Examples abound, however, which show
that the government overtly interfered with the functions of the judiciary.
In November 1974, two Burundian soldiers based in Ngozi crossed into Rwanda at Akanyaru,
without their weapons, to find out why a Rwandan immigration officer was calling them. They were
arrested, detained and tried for illegal entry into Rwanda. In the Butare tribunal de premiere instance,
where they were convicted of the offence, each was fined five thousand francs or, upon default,
three months imprisonment. Upon review of the case by the Nyabisindu Court of Appeal, the court
quashed the sentence and released the 2 soldiers on December 12, 1974 on the ground that the two
fines were "too severe and unlawful". Default in paying the fine would have led to 15 days'
imprisonment and not three months. The court stated that there was nothing sinister on the part of
1029ld.,art. 64-66; 75 & 76.
1030Fordetails of the politicisation of Rwandan institutions, see Lizinde, T., La découverte de Kalinga ou la fin d'un mythe,
Contribution a I'histoire du Rwanda, Kigali: Someca, 1979, p. 191-191.
1031Letter dated 14 June 1986 from the Minister of Justice.
1032Matata, J., Epuration ethnique de la magistrature rwandaise, April 1997, p. 4.
1033SeeMutsinzi v Ministere Public, RPA 981/Kig, Nov. 1997
1034SeeDiscours du President de la République, 1978, p. 198; Statement by President Bizimungu, July 6,1995.
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the prisoners; they divested themselves of their weapons before entering Rwanda and they openly
crossed the border in daylight, after an exchange of non-abusive words with a Rwandan immigration
officer who called them across. The court went on to say that their immediate arrest, subsequent
detention and charging did not redound to the credit of the Rwandan authorities.1035
As the préfet of Butare was dissatisfied, he called a meeting in which he described the court's
decision as a "décision politique". He argued that, since Rwanda was in a state of emergency, the
Cour d'Appel should not have quashed the sentence in this manner. He held that the court should
review its decision according to the circumstances prevailing in the country.1036However, the State
prosecutor defended the Cour d'Appel. In a letter to the President he did not accept that the
judgement was political in any sense or motivated in any way by political considerations. He said it
was wrong to describe it in such terms since he had consulted with other judges and that they were
unanimously of the opinion that the court had acted properly and that its decision had done justice.
He deplored and condemned the acts of aggression committed against Rwanda by some
neighbouring regimes in the same way that he had always condemned the tyranny committed by the
organs of the government in those States. He stressed, however, that this should not mean that
judges should decide cases or impose sentences in such a way as to please public opinion or the
government, but that they should rather decide them in accordance with facts before them and the
law which was relevant. He concluded that it was only in this manner that an accused person could
be guaranteed a fair and impartial trial before an unbiased judge free from the domination of public
opinion.1037
Following this and other events that did not please the government, individual judges were
threatened and considerable damage was done to the integrity and independence of the judiciary by
these events. First, it led to the assassination and resignation of some judges, like Karemano who
was arrested and killed in Ruhengeri prison in January 1975, and Murekezi who resigned and went
1035RPA848/Nya, 12/12/1974.
1036Rapportde la réunion des chefs de services de Butare, December 15, 1974.
1037Theleiter reads: "Je ne conviens pas que l'Arrêt que la Cour d'Appel ... était en quelque sens que ce soit une décision
politique ou motivée en quelque maniere que ce soit de considérations politiques, et, il est faut de le décrire en ces
termes. J'ai consulté les autres juges et nous sommes d'avis unanime que la Cour a agit comme ille faut et sa décision
a fait justice. (...) Les actes d'aggression perpétrés contre le Rwanda par quelques régimes voisins sont il déplorer et
condamner vivement de la même maniere que la tyrannie com mise par les organes gouvernementaux de ces Etats.
Cependant, ceci ne signifie pas que les juges devraient statuer sur les affaires ou imposer des condamnations de
maniere il plaire il l'epinion publique ou le gouvernment. lis doivent juger compte tenu des faits leur présentés et la loi
dont ces faits relevent. C'est seulement en procédant de la sorte que I'inculpé peut avoir la garantie d'un proces juste et
impartial devant un juge impartial, libre de toute domination de I'opinion publique. Letter No. 15/ka dated 15 December
1974.
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into exile in Burundi the following month.1038Second, and more importantly, the crisis cowed the
judiciary into submission. The judges who remained on the bench understood that it was dangerous
to pass judgement against the government, and in favour of individual rights, especially in politically
sensitive cases. Paper guarantees of independence would not save them from rampaging mobs set
loose by the government. From that time onwards, and as the government increasingly undermined
democratic institutions during the one-party era, it was hardly necessary for the government to
overtly interfere with the judiciary. The message had already been received loud and clear.
2.8.2 Assessment of the Rwandan judiciary's role in the protection of human rights
It is almost a truism that the quality of justice depends more upon the quality of men who
administer the law than on the content of the law they administer.1039
Although the law (both statutory and case law) lays down a few elaborate provisions to ensure
judicial independence,1040 much still remains to the individual judges themselves. Schwartz once
wrote that,
Unless those appointed to the bench are competent and upright and free to judge without fear
and favour, a judicial system, however sound its structure may be on paper, is bound to function
poorly in practice. That is why the problem of judicial selection and tenure is the pivotal one in all
discussions of the proper administration of justice.1041
The Rwandan judiciary, like most other judiciaries in Africa1042,has not been a sentinel of liberty. The
courts have supinely upheld government actions and laws against constitutional challenge. When
civil liberty cases presented any real choice, courts have almost invariably sustained the impugned
government action. The cases of Ntagarukanwa1043 and Kamangu1044 are prime examples of this. To
be sure, except for cases pertaining to the 1994 genocide as analysed in Chapter three, few cases
alleging violation of human rights were ever presented to the courts, despite the large-scale violation
1038Mukendi, K., The judiciary in central African countries, Working paper, Nairobi: CSP, 1980, p. 49.
1039Hynes,The Selection and Tenure of Judges, 1944,5.
1040See Casso 122, 12/8/87.
1041Schwartz, B., American Constitutional Law, 1955, p. 130.
1042E.g.Professor Dew Days and others have written of the Kenyan judiciary: "the Kenyan courts have often evaded their
constitutionally mandated responsibility to protect individual rights. The courts have stood aside as the Kenyan
government has used the Preservation of Public Security Act (the Kenyan detention law) as instrument of political
repression". The courts have largely refused to review allegations of torture or other mistreatment. In the face of judicial
inaction, blatantly political prosecutions for treason and sedition have proceeded without serious examination of the
constitutional values at risk." Drew Days et ai., Justice Enjoyed: The state of the judiciary in Kenya, 1992, p. 9.
1043RP1792/But, 1979.
1044R.C.923/86, 2919/1986.
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of human rights which has taken place. The category of cases that the courts dealt with, although
few, involved rights of people detained without trial. Most of the detention cases have been decided
in favour of the government as the courts have declined to inquire into the merits of detention
orders.1045Moreover, the courts even allowed the government to detain people for economic crimes
that had absolutely nothing to do with public security.1046Furthermore, the courts upheld detention
without trial of people acquitted of purely criminal offences.1047
The few cases that were decided in favour of detainees were those in which there was clear non-
compliance by the government, with the procedural safeguards laid down by the Constitution and/or
the law1048or where torture was conclusively established.1049 In many such cases the government
simply issued fresh detention orders curing the original error.
Since independence, there have been only four instances in which the court has declared a
provision in a statute void for being in conflict with the Constitution.105o
Why have the courts been so ineffective in protecting human rights? Several explanations may be
suggested, some of which apply to the judicial function in African countries generally, and others
which apply to the Rwandan judiciary in particular.
First, the expansive nature of clawback clauses to guaranteed rights have placed severe limits on
the courts' power to uphold human rights. These clauses in most cases are so broad as to negate
the substance of the rights guaranteed. In Kamangu, for example, despite finding that the petitioner
had been hindered in the exercise of his freedom of conscience, the court nevertheless upheld the
government's action under one of the permitted derogations. Again, in Ntagarukanwa, the
government's action in depriving the applicant of his property was upheld by the court under one of
the permitted derogations.
10451nRe Rukeza, the court declined to inquire into the merit of Rukeza's detention for the simple reason that the State
always had the right and the obligation to detain suspects to make sure they would not escape justice. RP 712/89.Kad;
See also Re Kayumba & Munyandamutsa and Re. Sebakunzi, RP 1019/But. 1992.
1046Seefor example MP v Mbonabucya, RP 1215/87.
1047This happened, for example, when two suspects of robbery were rearrested after their acquittal. The court held that
the re-arrest was justified by public interests and did not go any further. Recueil des Proces, No. 391, 5 December 1996,
p.40.
1048RP2122/But.
1049RMP1140/Kib.
l050Those cases are: A. No. 19/11.02 of 22.5.1963 (law on Rwandan citizenship); No. 42/11.02 of 5.5.1964 (law on the
Head Tax); No. 73/11.02 of 7.8.1965 (law on elections in Rwanda) and No. 78/10.02 of 26.4.1966 (law on national
education). See Reynljens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 431.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
251
Second, courts in Rwanda do not have an independent supervisory authority. They depend on
litigants bringing actions before them. It follows, therefore, that the courts are impotent to protect
human rights, no matter how egregious the violation, until a litigant brings an action. The rationale
underlying this rule is that it is imperative for the proper administration of justice that there should be
harmony between the Executive and the Judiciary and that the principle of the judiciary, the only
body ruling on actual disputes, be upheld. A meddlesome judiciary, says Nuabueze,
... poses the danger of abuse, and of conflict with the government, and is well calculated to
undermine, if not destroy, the courts popular image of an impartial, disinterested arbiter between
contestants in a dispute. It is this posture of impartiality and disinterestedness that makes a
decision invalidating a government act, tolerable to the government. Realising that the court is not
the prime-mover or instigator of its discomfiture, that its only role is to interpose the machinery
between the government and its opponents, the government should have no reason to feel
antagonised by an adverse decision.1051
As noted earlier, very few private individuals have sued the government for violating their rights and
therefore the courts have had little opportunity to adjudicate constitutional civil liberty cases. Besides,
there has been no organisation, public or private, to typically raise constitutional issues. The
prohibitive cost of litigation has contributed to the paucity of litigation.1052 Only wealthy people or
people backed by their political organisation could afford litigation. In the closing days of the
Habyarimana regime in 1992, all the constitutional. cases were brought by the MDR.
Another reason for the paucity of litigation is that, owing to the high level of illiteracy, most people
were/are ignorant of their rights. This is exacerbated by the fact that the judicial process is too
technical for most people to comprehend and it consequently is not easy for them to move the courts
for redress. Besides, the Tribunal de Premiere Instance is inaccessible to many people as it is
located in towns, while the majority of people live in rural areas. The low level of political
consciousness has also inhibited constitutional litigation. Unlike in Western countries where the
public is alert and self-assertive in defending its rights, the masses in Rwanda have tended to be
extremely fearful of government officials and have suffered for long periods because of the inaction
of inefficient or corrupt officials, without endeavouring to do anything about their rights. Low political
consciousness has been caused by a number of factors, including the absence of a free press, the
high level of illiteracy, and the absence of democracy.
1051Nuabueze, Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa, 1977, p. 49-50.
1052In the United States of America, for example, it is mostly wealthy private litigants or clients of some private
associations of moral entrepreneurs, the NAACP or the American Civil Liberties Union, who typically raise constitutional
issues. Seidman, 1978, p. 364.
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The same reason can also serve to explain the rarity of administrative jurisprudence, which, in part,
is due to the people's reluctance to appeal to the Conseil d'Etat to nullify administrative decisions
made in violation of their rights. This is because Rwandan people do not dare to oppose the State.
They prefer to be subjected to irregularities rather than to behave like an "enemy of the State" .1053In
fact, although they might legally be right, people prefer "not being noticed" by bringing an action
against the State, particularly when it is a matter of issues likely to be perceived as "political".
Needless to say, any matter involving the State has political connotation in one way or the other for a
Rwandan. In the eyes of most Rwandans, the automatic dismissal of a civil servant, or a refusal to
issue a passport without apparent proper reason, would be political.1054
The successive regimes did not stimulate people to exercise their right to submit cases to courts, but
inhibited them instead. This can be attested, inter alia, by the report of the parliamentary commission
of 1968, which indicated that the ministerial circular No. 253/Just issued on March 22, 1967 required
that any complaint against a public authority be submitted, first to the communal council, and then to
the Ministry of the Interior.1055Needless to say, this circular had no constitutional or any other legal
basis.
Third, judges are constrained by the fact that they can take cognisance only of concrete cases
involving rights of parties before them. They are not vested with a general kind of power to entertain
any matter implicating a constitutional issue at the instance of anyone. Their role is not that of
"standing as an ever open forum for the ventilation of all grievances that draw upon the Constitution
for support".1056Therefore, for the court to intervene, a definite "case" or controversy at law or in
equity between bona fide adversaries under the Constitution and the law must exist, involving the
protection or enforcement of valuable legal rights, or the punishment, prevention, or redress of
wrongs directly concerning the parties to the justiciable suit.1057
Fourth, and closely linked with the preceding limitation, is the requirement that a party must have
locus standi or standing before he can invoke the court's jurisdiction. "Standing" imports that the
affected individual is in imminent danger of coming into conflict with the statute, or that his rights or
normal business or other activities have been directly tempered with, by or under it. This was
1053Havugimana, Droit Judiciaire, at 25.
1054Reyntjens, Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, at 436.
l055lbid.
l056Wechsler, Towards neutral principles of constitutional law 73 Harv. L. Rev., 1 (1959).
1057Abraham, H.J., The judicial process, 1968, p. 355-356.
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expressed in the case of OCIR-CAFE v Ngomanzungul058,
The party who invokes the power of the court must be able to show not only that the statute is
invalid, but that he had sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, some direct injury as
a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with
people generally.
This position, needless to say, is deplorable as it reduces the efficacy of a bill of rights. It is not only
the legitimate function of the courts to enforce the bill of rights, but the efficacy of the constitutional
guarantee of human rights is a paramount requirement of the rule of law, calling therefore not for
restraint but for "vigorous, vigilant, courageous activism on the part of the court".1059
While it is appreciated that the requirement of locus standi is meant to deter the "professional litigant"
. and the "meddlesome interloper" from invoking the court's jurisdiction in matters that do not concern
him, there is nevertheless something paradoxical in the idea of a judge declining, on account of want
of locus standi, to hear a challenge to a law he himself knows to be unconstitutional because it
violates a right guaranteed by the Constitution. This is tantamount to approving of the law, and
thereby condoning oppression.1060
Fifth, the presumption of constitutionality, which holds that a statute is presumed constitutional until
the contrary is proved by a party alleging that it is unconstitutional, is a serious limitation on judicial
power. This tends to impose an onerous burden on the complainant even if he has established a
prima facie case of interference with his rightsl06l and the purpose of entrenched fundamental rights
which is to forestall easy interference or infringement seems to be defeated.1062The rationale for the
presumption of constitutionality is that, since the legislature represents the people, it would not prima
facie wish to exercise its power illegitimately. But given the way the Rwandan legislature has been
put in place over years, it would be misleading to assert that it really represents "the people". This
presumption, when applied to laws alleged to contravene the constitutionally guaranteed rights, is
particularly indefensible. In fact, "it is primarily to prevent the minorities being oppressed by the
majority that the rights are entrenched in the Constitution, but the operation of this presumption is
bound to impair efficacy. It is submitted, therefore, that the presumption of constitutionality in relation
1058Cass. 46/86, 10/5\1986. In Nyilibakwe v Karekezi, the court dismissed the application on the ground that it did not
directly concern the applicant but someone else. RCA 1066/92.But.
1059Black,CL, The people and the court, 1960, p. 100.
106°Nuabueze, Judicialism, at 360.
1061Read Nkinzingabo v Etat Rwandais, Kig. RP 045/81 (1981).
1062Kamangu case, R.C. 923/86, 29/9/1986.
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to human rights is completely repugnant to the primary purpose of the entrenchment" .1063
As already seen, successive governments have used their legislative majority to pass legislation
which attenuated individual rights, and also introduced either a one-party State or something similar.
Thus, to apply the presumption of constitutionality to such legislation seems indefensible.
Sixth, although judges and prosecutors are not allowed to affiliate themselves with political
organisations, the successive regimes have been influencing them to bias one side against the
other. Despite the requirement of tenure until the age of 70 years, each regime appointed its own
judges and prosecutors since those previously in the function were most often regarded as
collaborators of the ousted regime and, therefore, unworthy of confidence. As indicated, when Hutus
took power at independence, Tutsi judges were kicked out. During the Habyarimana regime, a
number of judges and prosecutors who had been appointed during the Kayibanda era were either
killed or forced to resign.1064 Those Hutu judges and prosecutors who are not killed will be either
arbitrarily arrested or forced into exile to be replaced by Tutsis.1065 Therefore, the most experienced
judges met with the same fate as the regimes which had appointed them and justice was always in
the hands of novices.
Seventh, Judges in Rwanda, like their counterparts in some other African countries, have inherited
the civil law attitude towards the judicial function.1066 This is an attitude that attaches little importance
to importing literalness and analytical positivism into the interpretation of the law, enforces a
narrowness of outlook towards problems presented for decision and discourages creative activism.
Judges are guided by the principle of the "hiérarchie des normes" which sets out a variety of
competing authorities to which a lawyer may look for material on which to base an opinion, whether
as counselor as judge.106? Argument in court by lawyers concentrates almost entirely on analysis of
the law as embodied in statutes and decided cases and very little reference is given to policy
1063Nuabueze, B.O, Constitutional law of the Republic of Nigeria, 1964, p. 311.
1064Havugimana, Droit Judiciaire, at 32.
1065See Chapter three.
1066Kint,R., Introduction au droit écrit, Butare: UNR, 1983, p. 20.
1067Thesources of Rwandan law are the following: the Constitution; international conventions; codes and statutes, and
provisions of legislative acts of subordinate authorities, such as presidential decrees, and ordinances of administrative
authorities; the travaux préparatoires, that is to say, the records of the public discussions, written and oral, which have
preceded and accompanied the promulgation of the legislative text (Rwandan jurisprudence, unlike in the common law
system, has no principle condemning the relevance of such material as an aid to interpretation); reported decisions of the
courts (national as well as foreign) and learned annotations, usually by academic writers; local customs; and equity (ex
aequo et bono). Basomingera, Introduction au Droit Constitutionel, at 51; Kint, Introduction au droit écrit, ld.
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conslderations.P" Even in common law countries, according to McWhinney, the pervasive influence
of a common law education and a common law system of professional organisation have conditioned
the minds of judges and legal practitioners culminating in a:
... uniformly positivist attitude to constitutional adjudication; the "strict statutory construction"
approach to the constitutional instrument, the insistence upon full and complete divorcement
between law and politics, sociology, and economics, and consequent refusal to consider
materials drawn from these other social sciences, which might give the dry provisions of the
constitutional text an ample meaning; the adherence to stare decisis and the doctrine of
precedent in its most mechanical form.1069
This attitude is, in part, due to the method adopted for selecting judges, which is in contrast to the
method employed, for example, in the United States of America where, McWhinney says,
... strict professional expertise plays a comparatively minor part in the selection of personnel for
appointment to the Supreme Court, and broad intellectual qualities, as manifested in
distinguished service in public life or in the executive branch of government (e.g. as Attorney
General or Solicitor General), or as manifested in academic achievement in the Universities and
law schools, receive prime attention. And it seems clear that this wide basis of selection of judges
has done much to mould the broadly pragmatic, policy-making approach that characterises
constitutional decision-making in the United States of America today, even though the forms and
practices of private law adjudication are still contentionally adhered to by the court.1070
In Rwanda, although the Constitution provides for the independence of the judiciary, the latter has
not been independent, mainly since judges are appointed by the government, either on the basis of
their ethnic group or geographic origin or on the basis of their professional expertise (a number,
although small, have been former magistrates or state prosecutors or attorneys in private practice),
rather than on account of their broad intellectual qualities. As a result, they have demonstrated an
intellectual inability to appreciate some of the issues presented for decision. Their judgements, thus,
often lack insight and intellectual stimulation, as shown in the cases analysed in this dissertation.
The lack of independence can also be perceived, to some extent, in the climate of suspicion in which
the parliament did not want to uphold the rulings of the Constitutional Court on unconstitutional bills
simply because the unconstitutionality was ruled by Tutsi judges.
Lastly and in connection with the preceding developments, it is axiomatic that judges do not just
decide cases mechanically. They are influenced to some extent by their private interest,
notwithstanding the fact that judicial independence purports to insulate them from such incentives.
1068Kint, L'independence de la magistrature en droit rwandais, at 1-8.
1069McWhinney, Judicial Review in the English-speaking World, 1965, p. 27-28.
107°ld.
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Cantonal judges, for example, hope to be promoted to the Tribunal de Premiere Instance; and
Tribunal de Premiere Instance judges hope to be promoted to the Cour d'Appel. Judges in the Cour
d'Appel, as well as those in the Cour de Cassation, have their own reference groups, whose
reactions affect their decisions. The observation made by Robert Martin regarding the socialist State,
is also valid for Rwanda:
... we must also ask whether the whole concept of the independent judiciary is illusory. Judges
are members of the ruling class by birth or assimilation (regardless of what that class may be)
and hired employees of the State who depend ultimately on the coercive power of the executive
for the enforcement of their decisions. To disregard these conditions in an attempt to be totally
independent would be meaningless.107l
The fact that the regime of the day in Rwanda appoints its own judges, despite tenure, suggests that
judges are an integral part of the political elite. They, thus, have an interest in maintaining the status
quo. Paper guarantees of judicial independence have failed to transform most of them into vigorous
protectors of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Thus, judges have adhered to the literal
language in clear cases, but in cases with room for discretionary choices their values have led them
to uphold impugned government actions in civil liberties cases.
As is quite evident, the judiciary is in a position too weak to effectively protect individual rights
without the support of the other branches of government. This tends to confirm the views of some
writers who contend that what is necessary is good government and not a bill of rights. Good
government, as the argument goes, can dispense with a bill of rights, and good government is
evidenced in respect for the judiciary.l072 This argument, however, fails to state how good
government is attained. A bill of rights is one of the ways of fostering good government.
2.8.3 The legal profession
An independent legal profession is an indispensable counterpart to an independent judiciary.
Needless to say, without an independent and courageous legal profession to conduct cases before
the courts an independent judiciary would be almost totally ineffectual in enforcing human rights as
it, at least in Rwanda, by its very nature, has an extremely limited right to free action. Therefore
lawyers, like judges, should be allowed to discharge their professional duties without restriction,
influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any
1071Martin, R., Personal freedom and the law: A study of Socialist State administration, 1974, p. 55.
1072Sanders, AJGM, "The Bill of rights Issue: Look at the Rest of Africa!" 1990 South African Public Law, at 185.
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reason .1073
Article 81, (1) and (2) of the Code de Procédure Civile et Commerciale1074 provided for the monopoly
of the legal practice by lawyers registered at the national bar and, upon authorisation of the Minister
of Justice, by foreign lawyers. As an exception, however, the same provision allowed parties to be
represented or assisted by an authorised representative or any proxy whose quality was established
at the audience by the represented party or by a special power of attorney given by mention at the
bottom of the summons.
In penal matters, Article 73 of the Code de Procédure Pénale obliged the suspect to appear
personally, save in case the offence was punishable with imprisonment not exceeding two years. In
this case he could be represented, as was the case for civil matters.
Before the 1994 genocide there were about 40 lawyers in the country, with most of them working in
private practice in the few large towns. There were, and still are, virtually no lawyers in rural areas
and small towns, where the majority of the population lives. It is apparent that 40 lawyers is a very
small number given the size of a population of over seven million people and the geographical
distribution of lawyers. Moreover, there was no bar association until 1997, therefore the exception in
Article 81 was rather a general rule. Furfhermore, articles 81 and 73 did not provide for a legally
regulated profession and, since there was no sine qua non for a proxy ad litem, anyone could claim
to be an "attorney at law". That is, anyone from any educational background could claim to be an
avocat. As a result, a high proportion of accused persons were not assisted during their trials, or
received only very poor assistance. The majority of "attorneys", as far as professional ethics are
concerned, were of a deplorable standard and the quality of their services was most often mediocre.
Commenting on the absence of a bar in Rwanda, Havugimana observed "a proliferation of a flood of
business agents some of whom were of service for a number of persons unable to defend their
infringed rights" but others were "laymen and ignorant in the field of law and sullied the praises and
merits of the law practice".1075
1073Montreal Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, 1983, Chap. 3, par. 3.02, 3.03 and 3.04. The
declaration, which was made by the World Conference on the Independence of Justice held in Montreal, Canada, from
June 5 to 10, 1983, is published as annex 11 in The Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession, 1988, p.
161-184.
1074Lawof 15 July 1964, J.O., 1964, p. 275 as modified (J.O., 1986, p. 158); Codes et Lois du Rwanda, Vol. II, 2nd
edition, 1995, p. 530.
1075Hesaid: "Faute de barreau, la représentation en justice, entendue a base de mandat seule en vigueur, a donné
naissance a une vague sinon a un "flux" d'agents d'affaires qui ont rendu certes service a beaucoup de gens qui
n'étaient pas a même d'assurer en justice d'une facon adéquate la défense de leurs droits lésés. Cette volonté, en elle-
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Whereas the décret-Ioi No. 09/90 subjected the appointment of judges and government prosecutors
to training criteria, nothing similar was required by the law of 12 May 1984 with regard to persons
involved in the practice of law. The author contends that being real representatives of the law, such
persons ought to have a level of legal knowledge to enable them to work and militate in favour of
sound administration of justice. The omission of the training requirement resulted in the non-success
of the law of 1984, mainly because having to turn to law practitioners who did not have essential
legal training was one of the causes of a typical climate of mutual suspicion between, on one side,
the judge and the lawyer, and, one the other side, the lawyer and the justiciable. It is not unusual to
come across lawyers and judges who clearly despised one another during the court's proceedings,
especially when one had a law degree while the other did not.1076On the other hand, Rwandans are
frequently heard to say, "That person cannot manage to defend my case; I know him, he does not
have a law degree". Sometimes, would be added: "even at school, he used to fail". In such an
atmosphere of mutual contempt and suspicion, it is hardly possible for the law to develop.
Not attorneys at law only, but most judges also, had not undergone legal training. It was indicated
earlier that, at independence, no single Rwandan had a law degree. This was because of the
absence of national facilities for the training of lawyers during the colonial period, because Belgium
did not consider it politically wise to train African lawyers, fearing they would turn into agitators on
their return to Ruanda-Urundl.P" Moreover, lawyers were assigned a relatively minor role, as the
organisation of the legal system was such that, except in respect of more serious criminal offences,
members of the judiciary, as well as lawyers, were kept away from regular official contact with the
African population. Most of the cases involving Africans were adjudicated by customary courts where
lawyers were not allowed. The reader should recall that, from independence until 1976, Rwanda had
only five people who had university degrees in law.
Legal education began in earnest with the establishment of the Faculty of Law at the University of
Rwanda in 1974, ten years after the founding of the University. The "licence"1078of the law degree
même, était louable, mais encore faut-il déplorer que certains esprits, pourtant profanes et ignares en la rnatiere ont
souillé les louanges et les mérites de cette pratique combien noble et délicate! D'autres se sont attribués des tit res
d'avocat ou de maitre sachant ou ignorant peut-être ce il quoi ils (ces titres) répondent. Havugimana, D., "Les incidents
de la procédure en droit judicia ire privé", thesis, Butare: UNR, 1983, p. 60-61; see also Mwumvaneza, M."Umwuga
mushya wo kuburanira abantu", in: IMVAHO, No. 449, 4-10 October 1992, p. 4.
1076In one case, Felicien Gatabazi was charged with contempt of court for having told a presiding judge that he did not
know the legal doctrine regarding the case in question. He challenged this charge in the court of appeal and won the
case. See Gatabazi v Karambizi, RCA 122/83 (1983).
1077SeeChapter three.
1078Canbe taken as equivalent to LLB
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programme offered by the Faculty is based on the Belgian paradigm, that of a four-year
proqramme.v"
Students spend two years studying fundamental courses in the Humanities and Social Sciences, as
well as basic law courses, after which they spend another two years studying purely law courses that
lead to obtaining the law degree. Students have to pass 54 courses to get a degree in law. All the
courses are mandatory, except for one optional course that students can select to study at any of the
University's faculties.108o However, not a single course focussing on human rights is offered.1081
Unlike in some other universities, students are not offered an opportunity to participate in a moot
court programme based on appellate brief arguments. As a remedy, students have some very limited
sessions of legal aid exercises in the first year of the second level. In the final year, they spend two
months training in courts or in private law firms. As a former student at that Faculty, the author has
observed that the teaching method lays too much emphasis on formalism: students are taught to
memorise large numbers of rules organised into categorical systems (e.g. requisites for contracts,
rules about breach). They learn issue spotting to identify the laws in which the rules are ambiguous,
in conflict, or have a gap when applied to particular fact situations. The students do not usually learn
case analysis, as textbooks rather than case books or law reports are the basic tools for instruction.
The students learn broad holdings of cases. They do not learn policy arguments. Most of the rules
learned are straight from Belgian or French textbooks. It is easier to learn Belgian or French rules
than local rules in the African context, because the difficulties of working with local materials are
often formidable. The result is that students are not taught to think creatively about legal problems.
This inevitably has an impact on how Rwandan lawyers and judges handle cases involving human
rights. As noted earlier, many of the human rights cases decided in Rwanda lay too much emphasis
on formalism and reveal few policy arguments. Moreover, there is no further legal training for law
graduates in Rwanda. The author is persuaded that the country needs legal training that, as far as
possible, uses local materials with emphasis on developing the ability to think clearly and critically,
rather than the memorisation of rules of law. In the United States of America, a graduate, upon entry
into the profession, will usually be under the guidance of a more experienced attorney and will
gradually be given increased responsibility according to his readiness for it. The position in Rwanda
is altogether unlike this; there is no opportunity for further education or refinement of legal skills after
the completion of formal training for the recent graduate. Owing to the scarcity of lawyers, the new
1079UNR, Annuaire, 1979.
1oBolbid.
1oB1TheBill of rights, though, is briefly covered under Constitutional law.
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graduate is immediately expected to assume major responsibilities.1082 It is needless to say that
creative thinking is imperative for Rwandan lawyers, as it is for other Rwandans, in order to solve the
problems related to the social, economic, and politic organisation of the Rwandan society.
In general, the legal profession as a whole has not played an active role in the protection and
enforcement of human rights. This is not to suggest that individual lawyers have not taken up
controversial or politically sensitive human rights cases. Some lawyers have indeed taken up cases
such as those of torture and inhuman treatment. However, since they do not operate as an
organised body to promote and protect human rights, little has been done in this regard. They, for
example, did not protest the arbitrary expropriation of individually owned properties and businesses,
the mass detention of people without trial over the years, and the erosion of press freedom.
Examples of this kind are endless.
Other areas that have been affected are the education of the public about their rights and legal
assistance to the poor. In this latter area, impoverished Rwandan people have been left without
hope. The accused has a right to legal counsel as guaranteed in the Constitution, the Code de
Procédure Civile et Commercia/e, the Code de Procédure Péna/e, and in the Organic Law on the
organisation of prosecutions for offences constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against
humanity since 1 October 1990 (article 36), but not at government expense: no pro bono legal aid is
provided for and there has never been a Department of Legal Aid in the Ministry of Justice.
2.9 The socioeconomic crisis, underdevelopment, human rights
and the youth
2.9.1 Economic crisis and under-development
The argument contained in this section is that the Rwandan State has failed to take steps to ensure
the realisation of economic and social rights. The economic crisis has affected economic and social
rights and the ability of persons to enforce the guaranteed civil and political rights. The failure of the
State to provide adequate education to the majority of Rwandans is also analysed as a social factor
that has played a large role in the Rwandan tragedy.
1082Forexample, just after completion of their studies at the University of Rwanda, a number of the author's classmates
were appointed judges, others prosecutors, whereas others occupied high positions in law practice without any prior
professional training.
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There is no doubt that the economic crisis and underdevelopment existing in Rwanda make the
attainment of human rights difficult. Although the Constitution does not incorporate economic and
social rights, these rights are nevertheless just as important as the guaranteed civil and political
rights, as they make the latter more meaningful.1083 Rwanda, acceded to the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966. It is thus bound to take steps to the maximum of its
available resources to ensure the progressive realisation of the rights recognised in the Covenant.
These include the right of everyone to work; to social security; to education; to an adequate standard
of living, including adequate food, clothing and housing; to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health; and to take part in cultural life, etc.1084
Rwanda has fallen far short of attaining most of the above rights in the past thirty-six years. The
Belgian colonial authorities did little to promote African education so that Rwanda had less than five
university graduates and a tiny number of people with Secondary School diplomas at independence.
Vast progress has been made in the education sector since independence, as hundreds of primary
schools, secondary schools, technical and vocational schools and one University have been built.1085
Despite this vast progress the rate of literacy is only 56%, with a higher illiteracy rate among women
(50%) than among men (37%).1086 Moreover, not every child has been able to attend basic primary
school because there, in fact, are not enough schools to accommodate everyone. Only half of all
children who enter grade one finish primary school and only about 10% of students who finish
primary school go on to secondary school, as primary schools vastly outnumber secondary
schools.P" Owing to the limited number of institutes and universities, not every secondary school
graduate has access to higher education. Thus, a vast number of children drop out of the education
system and (the lucky ones) go to the employment market at very tender ages.
1083Noneof the Constitutions, from independence through 1991, has ever incorporated economic and social rights.
1084ICESCR,particularly art. 2, 6, 7, 9,11, 12, 13 & 15.
1085About60% of the primary school age population attended school in the late 1960's. An estimated 85% of all boys and
65% of all girls who reached schoolgaing age each year enrolled in the first year of primary school. In 1967-68, there
were 6,195 boys in 34 boys' schools and 10 seminaries and 2,647 girls in 20 girls' schools. Secrétariat d'Etat au Plan
National de Développement, Direction de I'Office Général des Statistiques, Bulletin de Statistiques, No. 17, April 1968, p.
2-5. The World Bank estimates that 71% of primary age Rwandans attended school in 1991, compared with 68% in
1970. However, only 8% benefited from secondary and less than 1% from tertiary education. World Bank, Report and
Recommendation of the President of the International Development Association to the Executive Directors on a
Proposed Credit for SDR 67.5 Million to the Rwandan Republic for a First Structural Adjustment Program, Washington
DC, 1991.
1086Worid Bank, Report and Recommendation of the President of the International Development Association to the
Executive Directors on a Proposed Credit for SDR 67.5 Million to the Rwandan Republic for a First Structural Adjustment
Program, Washington DC, 1991.
1087Sadiki,Connaissances et Compétences Techniques, at 267.
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Unfortunately, not many of these children can get jobs because the economy has been in steady
decline since 1980, owing to the drastic fall in the price of coffee and tin ore, high oil prices,
corruption and the ethnic strife in Rwanda and in the Great Lakes region.1088Agriculture, which might
have provided an alternative source of employment, has also been in decline because of the leaders'
disastrous agricultural policy.1089Authorities failed to transform the subsistence agriculture into a
market agriculture likely to create jobs, and many of the unemployed semi-literate youths who live in
urban areas have turned to crime, prostitution and drugs.109oAnd many are very susceptible to
manipulation by unscrupulous politicians. The MRND often recruited such youths into its youth wing,
and used them to terrorise its opponents.
Apart from the decline of the economy, other factors also contributed to the abandonment of the
youth to their own fate. One of them was the inadequacy of the education system. As indicated
earlier, despite the political independence obtained in 1962, Rwandans were not professionally
prepared for the task of "taking the destiny of the country into their own hands". It was therefore
necessary to appoint Belgians in different services due to the experience they had acquired in the
administration of colonial Ruanda-Urundi. As a consequence, the orientation given to education was
no different from what it was during colonisation. The curricula were verbatim copies of Belgian
education without any reference to the Rwandan realities and were meant to prepare the pupils for
secondary education which benefited a tiny minority of pupils who had managed to finish primary
school, whereas the majority had "to return to the land" where they were not prepared to live.
Professor Herny found that, until 1976, the Rwandan system of education had formed people who
were not economically, socially or culturally adapted.1091
As a remedy, the government instituted a reform in 1979 in order to democratize basic education (by
ensuring schooling of all children, reduction of the number of pupils who abandoned school and
elimination of regional inequalities) to orient primary and post-primary education towards economic
deveiopment1092and to integrate and promote the national culture in the curricula.1093
1066Selistrom and Wohlgemuth, 1996.
10691bid.
1090lbid.
1091Herny,P., L'enseignement dans les pays pauvres. Modéles et propositions, Paris: L'Harmattant, 1979, p. 166.
1092Hanf,T. et al. used the French words "ruralisation de I'enseignement primaire et post-primaire" and explained that
"ruralisation" does not mean in any case a purely agricultural education but rather an education oriented towards the
mastery of problems that occur in rural areas. They contended that such an education contains elements of theoretical
mastery of the surrounding world, as well as the knowledge and skilfulness of arts and agriculture. See Hanf, T., et aI.,
Education et développement au Rwanda, Munchen: Wltforum Velrlag, 1974, p. 166.
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In countries like Rwanda, where 96% of the population live in rural areas, these objectives were
justifiable and defensible. Basic education is a human right and "ruralisation" of primary school, the
only school accessible to the majority of children, was most reasonable in a country where the most
important labour market was agriculture.
As a characteristic of the "ruralisation" of the curricula, primary education was aimed at consolidating
basic knowledge and developing the psychophysical aptitudes necessary to live in the rural area. For
this reason, practical education was to be provided in addition to general education, in order to
develop in the children the habit of working in teams.1094
After the primary education, children who did not go on to secondary school received post-primary
education in institutions called Centres d'Enseignement Rural et Artisanal Intégré (CERAI). These
centres were meant to form and produce a technical labour force integrated to the specific needs
and resources of rural areas over a period of three years.
In practice, however, a number of weaknesses became apparent. Firstly, although an effort was
made to provide all children with schooling, this objective was not attained. The Ministry of Primary,
Secondary and Integrated Crafts Education had, for example, expected a schooling rate of 85% for
the period between 1988 and 2001. But in the 1989/1990 school year, only 74.1 % of seven year-old
children attended school, whereas the net rate for primary schooling was 62%.1095 This shows that
twenty years after the reform had started, a quarter of the children did not have access to school,
and one third of all the children of school-going age were not able to attend any school at all. They
had no chance to improve their standard of living through access to the modern economic sector.
Secondly, the way the "ruralization" of primary education was carried out left much to be desired.
The reform extended the six years of primary education in the previous system by two years. There
was no change in the curricula for the first six years of education that were meant to eliminate basic
illiteracy and to obtain general theoretical knowledge, while the two added years were meant to offer
training in practical work, which comprised crafts and agriculture. Thus, contrary to expectations,
primary education was not "ruralized" but, to quote Hanf and Wolff, "ruralization" was rather added to
1093Sadiki,Connaissances et Compétences Techniques, at 211.
1094ld., at 213.
1095Hanf,T. and Wolff, J., L'enseignement primaire au Rwanda, Working paper, 1992, p. 3. One should notice that their
findings are not very different from those of the World Bank mentioned in World Bank, Report and Recommendation of
the President of the International Development Association to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Credit for SDR 67.5
Million to the Rwandan Republic for a First Structural Adjustment Program, Washington DC, 1991.
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it.1096 As a result, this partial and artificial "ruralization" had a minor effect on the whole system.
Thirdly, regarding the CERAI, education was general and theoretical, while practice occupied less
than 50% of the weekly timetable. This was insufficient for a truly agricultural or crafts education.
Sadiki affirms that the technical knowledge the pupils gained during the three years was certainly
inferior to what they would have learned should they have actively participated in the daily activities
of their families.1097 Moreover, as observed by Erny, most teachers suffered from the "white collar"
syndrome and were loath to devote themselves to a truly practical education. He put it that,
f'instituteur il qui I'on impose un programme de type agricole se sentira rabaissé et mettra ilprofit
la moindre faille dans le systeme pour revenir il un type d'enseignement plus "scalaire", plus
intellectuel, et ainsi se valoriser lui-même. Comme d'habitude on évalue les éleves il partir de
leurs connaissances livresques, et non de leurs habiletés techniques, un maitre qui favorise les
premieres au détriment des secondes part toujours gagnant.1098
This explains why the CERAI trained craft handymen and provided marginal agricultural initiation that
was not helpful in rural areas.
Fourthly, there was a wide divergence of perceptions of the CERAI objectives between the State,
parents and pupils. There was no change in parents' and pupils' perceptions of a school. As in the
past, they believed that the school's role was to propel the pupils from their original milieu and not to
fix them there. And indeed, through its structure, organisation and curricula, the CERAI was a
school. However, the State expected the reintegration of pupils in their rural milieu after they had
acquired the best knowledge in agriculture, cattle breeding and crafts, which would have been
helpful to them and to the nation. "They were expected to playa multiplier's role in their milieu" .1099
These conflicting expectations entailed loss of consistency of the CERAl's objectives. After three
years of training, graduates were neither able to fit into their original milieu - which was not their
intention - nor into the modern labour sector for which they were not adequately prepared.
Fifthly, the number of trained teachers was insufficient. Considering that the 1979 reform was
centred on the "ruralization" of the curricula, the need for special teachers with motivation and
appropriate methodology was obvious. The country, however, lacked such teachers. As Sadiki points
out, 72% of CERAI teachers were not trained. Some had attended teachers' training schools where
l0961d.,at 4.
l097Sadiki, Connaissances et Compétences Techniques, at 219.
1098Erny, L'enseignement dans les pays pauvres, at 188.
1099Hansand Wolff, L'enseignement primaire au Rwanda, at 53. Author's translation.
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only disparate professional and pedagogic education was given and this was not adequate to
efficiently train and supervise the CERAI pUpilS.1100
In its efforts to try to alleviate some of the weaknesses, the government revised the structure of
primary education in 1992 by suppressing the seventh and eighth years.1101 Because of failing to
"ruralize" the first six years, primary education was freed of its already inefficient added "ruralization"
and, thus, its practical aspect, and pupils were cut off from their milieu. With this reversion to the pre-
1979 reform, primary education was no longer meant to integrate pupils with their milieu but to
prepare them for secondary education. As the latter was open to only 20% of primary school
graduates, the overwhelming majority was left helpless in their original milieu.
The revision also contributed towards the aggravation of social inequality since the twenty per cent
that could be accepted for secondary education were the only ones who would later have the chance
to find an occupation that enabled them to improve their living conditions.
Because of the economic crisis, which was characterised by low production, hyper-inflation, high
budget deficits, massive unemployment and underemployment, the scarcity of foreign exchange and
an external debt of over 7 billion dollars, the vast majority of the population lives in abject poverty.
The gross national product per capita in Rwanda in 1993 was US $ 200 compared with US $ 330 in
1989.1102
Many people live in overcrowded, ramshackle huts in filthy squatter settlements, which often lack
clean water, electricity, adequate schools and medical facilities.1103 Most medical establishments
lack adequate drugs and doctors and thousands of children die of malnutrition.1104 Many people lead
a hand-to-mouth existence, as even those in employment are not paid a living wage.1105 Because
many living places are filthy and unsanitary, there are frequent outbreaks of such deadly diseases as
cholera, bilharzia, dysentery, malaria, typhoid and respiratory infections which claim thousands of
lives every year.1106 The infant mortality rate is 117 out of 1000 live births and life expectancy at birth
11ooSadiki, Connaissances et Compétences Techniques, at 222.
1101Id.,at 223.
1102TheEconomist Intelligence Unit, Rwanda and Burundi, 1994-1995, London, 1995.
11031d.
1104Statistics show that in 1992, 1.5 million Rwandans were without access to health services; 2.6 million were without
potable water, and 3.2 million without sanitation. Ibid.
11051bid.
11061bid.
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is 53.1 years.1107 As if this were not enough, the population has increased at an annual rate of 3.7
percent at a time when the economy has been registering little or negative growth.110B
The level of poverty is even greater in the rural areas, where not less than 94.6% of Rwanda's
population of about seven million live.1109 Schools, hospitals, safe water and government social
services are almost non-existent in many rural areas.
It is apparent that the vast majority of the people in Rwanda are denied the economic, social and
cultural rights guaranteed in the International Covenant on the Protection of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, not necessarily by deliberate government action but mostly because of the overall
conditions of underdevelopment and economic malaise existing in the country. These conditions
have doubtless made enjoyment of civil and political rights by the majority of the population rather
hollow.
2.9.2 The desperation of the youth and the 1990·94 crisis
The tragedy that Rwanda has endured since 1990 and which culminated in genocide in 1994 has
exacerbated the Rwandan human rights situation. It was seen that the newly born pluralism was
compromised, misunderstood by the population and infiltrated by antagonistic forces. Within some
months of the tragic 1994 year, thousands of innocent children, women and men were savagely
massacred by these antagonistic forces and over two million people took refuge in neighbouring
countries where they lived in camps under inhuman and degrading conditions.
In this submission, it is proposed that the inadequacy of the education system and the depreciation
of family education have played an important role in the Rwandan tragedy. Considering that the
youth represents 65% of the Rwandan population and the determinant role they played in the tragic
events amounting to massacres, pillaging, rape and banditry, the weakness of the Rwandan
education system was one of the profound causes of the tragedy. It has been shown that the
inadequacy of primary and post-primary education systems had produced individuals who were
maladjusted and incapable of playing an efficient role in rural or urban milieus. In a deteriorated
economic environment, with ill-adapted land tenure, an unwholesome political climate, and the 1990
11071bid.
110Blbid.
11091bid.
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war, the youths became frustrated and worried about their future1110 and gave themselves over to
criminality and barbarity.
2.9.2.1 A deteriorated economic environment
Compared to its neighbouring countries, Rwanda enjoyed considerable economic development
within three decades, owing to the efforts of its hard-working population and the generosity of its
donors. The manifest signs of this economic progress were the stability of the currency, the increase
of the gross national product by 4.9% per annum from 1965 to 1989, one of the weakest inflations of
the continent (less than 4% per year) and minor importation of foodstuffs, despite strong
demographic pressure.tt"
However, this modestly bright picture contained shadows. After 1980 the economy started shrinking
with the collapse of world coffee, tea and tin prices and this led to the closing down of tin mining in
Rwanda in 1987.1112 As 90% of receipts in foreign currency was generated by these three
commodities, this blow struck very hard.
Furthermore, due to the drought in most regions of the country, especially in the south, the
production of foodstuffs decreased considerably and the population in rural areas met with more and
more difficulties related to food, health care and school fees for their children.1113
The political stability followed the curve of that shrinking economy almost exactly. As Rwanda is a
very poor country built on peasant subsistence agriculture, little surplus value can be extracted
directly from the peasant mass. For the elite of the MRND (and later RPF) regimes there were three
sources of enrichment: coffee, tea and tin exports (the latter being suppressed before the arrival of
the RPF), and creaming off foreign aid. Since a fair share of the first had to be allocated to running
the government, the shrinking of sources of revenue left only the second as a viable alternative by
1988 through 1995. Hence there was an increase in the competition for access to that very
specialised resource, which could only be appropriated through direct control of government power
1110The frustration and worry of the youths was expressed through their program on Radio Rwanda, Ejo Nzamerante.
See infra note 1085.
1111Chossudovsky, M., Les fruits empoisonnés de I'ajustement structurel in Le Monde diplomatique, No. 488, Nov. 1994,
p.21.
1112République Rwandaise, Mémoire présenté par le Rwanda Ella Deuxiéme Conférence des Nations Unies sur les Pays
les Moins Avancés, Paris, 3-14 Sept. 1990, p. 3.
1113prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, at 84.
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at high levels.1114
As shown in studies by Gasana and Nsengimana, the national wealth benefited a tiny number of
people privileged by the regime and a militarist-commercial elite. The peasant class was socially and
economically excluded. Owing to an endemic famine and the non-access to land of the new
generations, a number of people emigrated to Tanzania as ecological refugees towards the 1980's.
An increasing number of the youths lapsed into violence, criminality, banditry and exodus to urban
areas where they lived a down-and-out life.1115
The reliance on foreign aid, small at first, had become significant by the late 1970s and enormous by
the late 1980s through 1995. According to the OECD, foreign aid, which had represented less than
5% of the gross national product in 1973, had risen to 11% in 1986, 22% in 1991; and 39% in
1997.1116 Generally, the pauperisation marginalized the majority of the population and, thus, the
youth almost entirely. Added to the strong demographic pressure and serious deterioration of the
production of foodstuffs, the consumption per inhabitant decreased, while a privileged minority
accumulated land, wealth and social prestige. This phenomena of great social inequality was one of
the factors of the extreme weakness of the Rwandan society and the unprecedented violence which
swooped down on the country.tt"
The deplorable fact was that the traditional remedy prescribed by the Bretton Woods institutions
(devaluation of the currency, reduction of personnel, privatisation of public firms and services,
suppression of aid to farmers, etc.) failed and aggravated the situation. Unlike the period before the
Structural Adjustment Programme, the inflation increased and national revenues decreased'!" and
social inequality, as well as poverty, was aggravated. Unfortunately, the State failed to take steps in
order to evade the negative effects of the Structural Adjustment Programme.
2.9.2.2 An ill-adapted land tenure
As indicated, the successive constitutions guaranteed the right to property to every person. Following
the politico-economic situation prevailing till the beginning of the sixties, this measure set the
11141bid.
1115Gasana, J., and Nsengimana, N., Bátir une nouvelle espérance pour Ie Rwanda, working paper, 1995, p. 5.
1116TheMonitor, 31 December 1997.
1117Gasana and Nsengimana, Báfir une nouvelle espérance pour Ie Rwanda, at 5.
1118Chossudovsy, Les fruits empoisonnés de I'ajustement structurel in Le Monde diplomatique, No. 488, Nov. 1994, at
21.
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individual and household free from the community's ascendancy and mostly from the economic
domination prevailing in the ubuhake system. However, the land had lost its social function through
the individualistic and liberal nature of that autonomy. The concept of private right to land was a
factor in the disintegration of clanic and family groups because it led to excessive parcelling out of
land, developed scattered housing and fragmented living arrangements. As a result, farming land
was degraded and progressively became unsuited to agriculture.1119
One of the consequences was the miniaturisation of the arable area through the parcelling of land by
inheritance, transfer and concession. The arable area of the majority of the agricultural units, has
become smaller than one hectare and decreases continually in proportion to an excessively
expanding population.112o
Besides the miniaturisation, there has been what Jean Marc E/a calls "cu/tivateurs en sou/iers
vernis"1121, literally meaning "cultivators wearing shoes with a brilliant shine". The continuing
impoverishment of the rural area has forced peasants to sell part of their land in order to pay school
fees for their children. The land is bought at ridiculous prices by tradesmen, civil servants and
politicians who finally accumulate large cultivable areas while peasants and their families become
destitute. The lucky ones become farmhands on their former land.1122 Land had been the only source
of income in the rural milieu, but the resultant scarcity has made it inaccessible to the youth. It is
impossible for them to acquire even a single plot so as to make a living for themselves.
2.9.2.3 An unwholesome political climate
Towards the end of Habyarimana regime, following the coming down of the Berlin Wall and
dictatorships in Eastern Europe, the move towards democratization in Africa had led to the formation
of about seventeen political parties in Rwanda. The youth, enticed by promises of socioeconomic
change and better prospects, joined political parties en masse and became easy prey to any
manipulator. Instead of proposing political and socioeconomic programmes as an alternative to the
1119Runyinya, B., Innovations agraires et gestion des espaces ruraux au Rwanda, Thesis, University Foundation of
Luxembourg, 1985, p. 136.
11200neof the major problems of Rwanda has been its galloping demography (3.7%) which has increased the population
density to more than 300 inhabitants per square kilometre. In some regions like Butare and Gisenyi it has even reached
800 inhabitant per square kilometre. See Sadiki, Connaissances et Compétences Techniques, at 235.
1121Thisis a phenomena observed everywhere in Africa, particularly in Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Cameroon. See Ela,
J.M, "Bourgeoisie verte contre paysans" in Le Monde diplomatique, Nov., 1981.
1122Nshimyimana observes that the land owned by those rich people is only partially exploited. Nshimyimana, A., Ejo
Nzamerante?, Radio Rwanda, May 1989.
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prevailing system, however, leaders of opposition parties, many of them opportunists, devoted
themselves to denigrating and unseating the ruling authorities. Through their opportunism, much
time was wasted in quarrelling for the sharing of ministerial and managerial posts.
They were able to use the media, inter alia, to manipulate the youth. In Rwanda, one family out of
two has a radio and as democratization was accompanied by a number of independent
newspapers1123 publishing anything about anyone it was not difficult to attract the attention of the
youth with certain issues. The majority of Rwandans being peasants, they characteristically accepted
whatever was published as the truth. The existing radio stations broadcasting in Kinyarwanda, the
state-owned Radio Rwanda, the private Radio Muhabura of the RPF and Radio Télévision Libre des
Mille Collines, played an important role in intoxicating the youth. It has also been mentioned
elsewhere in this dissertation that radio stations played a role in the indoctrination and enrolment of
the youth in armed groups.
For most of the unemployed and frustrated youth the army provided employment as well as a reason
for gratitude to the society that was coming into being. Being in uniform and possessing a gun
represented power and enrichment. That is particularly why the youth joined militias.1124 Many of
them received some military training. In Kigali they manned roadblocks and took part in the house-to-
house searches for the sake of killing and/or looting the victims' houses. They took pride in being
seen by journalists as 'one of the boys' and being able to protect their own house against 100ters.1125
Apart from the selective massacres in the civil war, socioeconomic violence also increased
considerably. The absence of any perspective led the hopeless youths to generalised banditry,
criminal violence combined with militarist-political attacks that took the form of particularly pernicious
violence. This was witnessed by Soulanet who aptly put it that,
une pareille débauche de crimes a quelque chose d'irrationnel ... cette rage de tuer s'est
emparée d'un aussi grand nombre de gens .... La haine n'était pas seule en cause. EI/e paraft
avoir été utilisée, exacerbée pour chauffer a blanc des gens pétris de rancoeur et de frustrations
parce qu'ils ont été exclus de la vie sociale, économique et culturel/e, bref de tout ce qui fait
/'équilibre des individus en leur donnant leur place dans la société. Ce n'est pas le simple fait du
1123Therewere about 16 newspapers in 1993. See Sibomana, Gardons espoir pour Ie Rwanda, at 85.
1124Godding, P. and Musabyimana, P.: "La jeunesse au Rwanda: quel avenir?" in Dialogue, No. 176, June-July, 1994, p.
59. In reaction to RPF's recruitments and in order to counter increasing political intimidation, political parties had formed
militias: e.g. Interahamwe of MRNO, Inkuba of MOR, Abakombozi of PSO, and Impuzamugambi of CDR.
1125LaLibre Belgique, 24 May 1994; Aubenas, F., 'l'exii doré des profiteurs Rwandais au Zaïre' in Libération, 30 July
1994.
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hasard si les plus violents parmi les miliciens sont issus de ... dépotoir de toutes les misétes.v»
2.10 Conclusion
Hutu elites who took over were unprepared for a system of government that had never been
practiced in colonies and they were not committed to nation-building and constitutional government.
As the colonizers had not managed to plan or organize an orderly transfer of power, it is not
surprising that the elites that took over power after independence were acquisitive, expropriationist,
propelled mainly by the desire for private accumulation, and resorted to ethnic hunting and human
rights violation rather than nation-building. Thus, issues of socialization of power, constitutionalism
and democracy took second place quite early in the post-colonial era. Instead, what occurred was a
rapid decline in the operation of governmental structures and processes as private took the place of
public goals, and local or sectarian interests overshadowed national concerns.
Because of that fact, the Rwandan state at independence was not a constitutional state. Rather, it
was a "constituted" State, one erected on pillars that were not fashioned out of past experiences or
future aspirations. As constituted, the machinery of the state was not part of the shared experience
of Rwandan people. It would therefore have been a miracle if independence arrangements had
survived, leave alone fostered constitutional and democratic practices.
Inherently elaborate on paper as it may have been, the constitutional format which was established
at independence was bound to and did indeed collapse. The collapse of the constituted State was
rapid and virulent. That is why, within a span of 35 years, the country had gone through a number of
traumas that led to the genocide.
The Rwandan genocide stands alone in the way its organizers aimed to mobilize mass participation
in murder. Far from hiding their objective, they advertised their goal of exterminating the Tutsi
citizens of Rwanda in meetings, through the press and over the radio. They exhorted Hutus to join
the killing campaign, insisting that it "concerned everyone." They carried out the worst massacres in
broad daylight and they left the dead in full view in many communities.
By focusing fear and hatred on the Tutsis, the organizers hoped to forge solidarity among Hutus. But
beyond that, they also aimed at creating collective responsibility for the genocide. People were
encouraged to kill together, just as soldiers in a firing squad are ordered to discharge their weapons
simultaneously so that no one should bear individual or total responsibility for the execution. "No one
person killed anyone person," said one of the participants.
1126Soulanet, M., Vivre jusqu'á demain. Une mission au Rwanda, Paris-Montpelier, 1994 quoted in Reyntjens, L'Afrique
des Grands Lacs en crise, at 8.
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The leaders of the genocide, experienced at wielding power, knew how to use the state machinery
and their network of personal contacts to mobilize large numbers of people. They expected to
succeed and had planned carefully for the operation. With their quick, ruthless murders of political
opponents that began on April 6, they intimidated the remaining dissidents. Then, strengthened by
their apparent acceptance as a legitimate government by the international community, they pushed
ahead with a speed and ease that may have exceeded their own expectations. By two weeks into
the campaign, they had slain hundreds of thousands of Tutsis and squashed any significant open
dissent.
But ultimately they failed in their goal of total mobilization for extermination. Hundreds of thousands
of Hutus who lacked the courage or resources to openly oppose them resisted passively, most by
withdrawing from political and community life, a few by working within the system to restrain its
excesses.
Among those who did carry out genocide, actors participated in many ways: from the national
leaders who aimed to extirpate the Tutsis down to the level of ordinary people who showed no taste
for violence but wanted only to enrich themselves through pillage. As the roles varied, so did the
motivations of the actors, some moved by virulent hatred, others by real fear, by ambition, by greed,
by a desire to escape injury at the hands of those who demanded they participate, or by the wish to
avoid fines for nonparticipation that they could not hope to pay.
The fact that we cannot afford to forget when we try to understand the genocide is: when Hutus killed
Tutsis in the genocide, who did they think they were? And whom did they think they were killing? To
some extent, and considering certain parts of this dissertation, they thought they were the sons of
the soil killing aliens seeking to grab power. They thought they were natives killing settlers.
Lenin once wrote to Rosa Luxembourg that she had become so preoccupied with fighting Polish
nationalism that, like the rat, her eyes could see nothing but cats. The world of Hutus and Tutsis had
become like the world of the rat and the cat. For the rat, there is no animal more dangerous than a
cat; no lion, no tiger, no elephant, just the cat. And for the cat, there is no animal more delicious than
the rat. We cannot dismiss the social and political gains of the 1959 Revolution: from land reform to
some reform of governance. But we can also not overlook the limitation of that revolution.
The author's point is that the 1959 Revolution failed to overcome the political legacy of colonialism.
Instead of challenging, it embraced the political identities colonialism created, of the Hutu as the
indigenous Bantu and the Tutsis as the alien Hamites. It failed to recognize that colonialism was not
simply an economic system that had expropriated the native; it was also a political system that had
poisoned political life by politicizing indigenousness.
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The October 1990 RPA invasion of Rwanda was testimony to a citizenship crisis on both sides of the
border. Genocide is not carried out against neighbors who we consider to be legitimately living on
the same soil, no matter what other differences we may have with them. Genocide is only carried out
against those whose very presence in the political arena is considered illegitimate, whose very bid
for power is considered illegitimate. Genocide, regionalism, states of emergency, hindrance of civil
society and other stratagems used by absolute rulers lead to the question to know who owns the
country.
It is a fact that occupation of the state brings concrete rewards in the form of control over public
goods. The allocation of public goods (education, welfare, police protection), as opposed to private
goods, must meet the following criteria: jointness of supply (the use of such goods by anyone citizen
must not preclude or prevent another from using them); and non-excludability (no criteria should
exist whereby some citizens are allowed to use such goods and others are prohibited from doing so).
One of the very reasons that a state can justify its societal hegemony and market its own set of
survival strategies as superior to those of other societal organizations lies in its claim to be the only
body capable of providing goods collectively which cannot be obtained through private endeavor. Yet
when an ethnic group does gain control over the state and starts distributing public goods on the
basis of ethnic preferences, jointness of supply is undermined (the resources of the state are used to
educate, care for and protect one set of citizens) and non-excludability is violated (ethnicity emerges
as the dominant criterion for exclusion).1127That is how one of the most basic justifications for the
existence of the Rwandan state itself had fallen away.
The other fact is that control of the state gives access to the regime. Changes in constitutional rules,
the most vital component of the regime, can result in consolidating control of the state and
forestalling future alternation of regime incumbency. Such changes are typically contemplated, and if
possible, executed. Should this be successfully accomplished, the state ceases to be an
autonomous actor and the state, the regime and the incumbent ethnic group coalesce into a single
unit of hegemonic social control. When ethnic outsiders try to distance themselves from such a state,
the sphere of autonomy typically offered by the state to civil society is unlikely to be considered
sufficient. Furthermore, the incumbents of such a state are likely to try to dismantle such boundaries
between state and voluntary organizations in their attempt to assert state control over ethnic
competitors. It is under such conditions that the Rwandan state has not been viewed as the guardian
of civil society, mostly since the legal framework within which some organs of civil society operated
forbade them from engaging in political activities or publicly espousing political views. As such
1127Rabushka, A. and Kenneth, A.S, Politics in Plural Societies - A Theory of Democratic Instability, Columbus OH:
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political discourse in Rwanda has always been conducted as if civic organizations are instruments of
the state in respect of grass-roots development. Indeed the government went so far as to establish
mechanisms for the coordination of these bodies so as to ensure that they operated strictly within
state policy.
Ethnic and regional exclusion and the hindrance of civil society in Rwanda also involve the issue of
citizenship. Normally, a strong autonomous state can be identified by the extent to which citizenship,
rules of social control and resulting survival strategies are applied to individuals within the state in a
non-discriminatory manner. The state assumes a neutral stance towards social differentiators, such
as ethnicity in determining criteria for membership of the state, as well as in determining the
substance and quality of such membership. Citizenship of equal value is available to all sectors of
society. Yet the salience of citizenship over other competing forms of social membership is ensured.
To democratize a strong, autonomous state the regime needs to be adapted to allow for citizens to
get access to free and unrestrained participation in, and contestation for, the political power within
the state.
To democratize a strong ethnic state the contest for hegemony needs to be dissolved. This entails,
inter alia, the further strengthening of the state, as it is the only agency that can ensure that the value
of citizenship transcends that of other contending social loyalties such as the ethnic group. For the
state to supplant the ethnic group as the terminal unit of political loyalty, agreement has to be
reached on the substantive issues involved. All of these center on what the appropriate unit for
domestic politics should be. Questions on the substantive content of nationhood and/or people hood
and the collective "self' that is to be accommodated within the sovereign state have to be settled.
From this agreement must follow mutually accepted yardsticks for establishing who should be
treated as citizens and subjects. This entails the first step towards dismantling the ethnic and even
regional character of the state.
For membership of the state to become more valuable than membership of the ethnic or regional
group also requires that the allocation of public goods by the state be made in a neutral way: the
criteria of jointness and non-excludability must be upheld in an unscrutable manner. This again
requires that the administrative personnel of state departments themselves be informed by a
collective ethos of the public servant as a civil servant who serves all citizens of the state equally
well, and on the terms set by the laws of the state and not on those set by other social organizations.
For an ethnic or regionalist state to be reconstituted in so fundamental a manner requires that the
state acquire the attributes of an autonomous social organization, which, in competition with other
Charles E.M, 1972, p. 84, 85.
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units such as ethnic groups, must be strengthened in its capacity to assert itself over societal
competitors.
Recommending concerted state-building of this order towards securing democracy appears, at first
glance, to run counter to what the Anglo-American intellectual tradition would advocate. This tradition
identifies the state as the greatest threat to liberty and sees the containment of state power as the
foremost priority in consolidating democracy.u»
Not only the strength of the state, but equally important, its autonomy, must be established. Migdal
stresses the need for bureaucrats of the State to see themselves as part of an institution with
interests which are not related to or derived from their own positions in and wider commitments to
societally based organizations of which they may be members:
Bureaucrats of the State, both those at the tops of agencies and the implementers in the
field, must identify their own ultimate interests with those of the State as an autonomous
orqanzanon.v»
This is seen as a crucial step in the building of autonomous strong states which" ... can emerge only
when the shared notion that there should be an autonomous set of state interests exists, and when
bureaucrats believe those interests coincide with their own" .1130State autonomy has not been met in
Rwanda because state officials have not acted upon their own preferences but on those of ethnically
and/or regionally based individuals or groups. Certain rules and practices have been absent, which
could have insulated (but not necessarily isolated) the personnel of the state from the rest of society.
Rules and practices which succeed in doing so give effect to what Gellner speaks of as "the strategy
of gelding: the idea is to break the kin link by depriving the budding warrior/bureaucratic/cleric either
of ancestry, or of posterity, or of both".1131In the agrarian polities of an earlier age a variety of
techniques were deployed which
... included the use of eunuchs, physically incapable of possessing posterity; of priests
whose privileged position was conditional on celibacy thereby preventing them from avowing
posterity; of foreigners, whose kin links could be assumed to be safely distant; or of
members of otherwise disenfranchised or excluded groups, who would be helpless if
separated from the employing State. Another technique was the employment of 'slaves',
men who, though in fact privileged and powerful, nevertheless, being 'owned' by the State,
technically had no other legitimate links, and whose property and position could revert to the
State at any time ... 1132
1128For details, see Ake, C., 'The Case for Democracy', in African Governance in the 1990s: Objectives, Resources and
Constrains', Working Papers from the second Annual Seminar of the African Governance Program, The Carter Center of
Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, March 23-25, 1990, p. 5.
1129Ake, C., 'Rethinking African Democracy', in Journal of Democracy', vol. 2, no. 1, Winter 1991, p. 32-44 at 38.
1130Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, p. 6 (footnote 5),274,275.
1131Gellner, E., Nations and Nationalism, London: Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 15.
1132Ibid., p. 15.
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The application of some of these techniques is not likely to be considered with great enthusiasm by
state-builders (and their personnel) in the late twentieth century, especially when the aim is to foster
esprit de corps! Consequently, constitutional rules are the major remaining mechanisms available to
post-genocide state-builders for creating the conditions of "gelding" or breaking the "kin link" which
lies at the root of favoring one's own ethnic or regional group over another.
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Chapter Three
The Post-Genocide State and the Problem of Reconstruction
3.1 Introduction
Article 1: The top man is always right. Article 2: If, by any chance, the top man is wrong, Article 1
enters into force immediately.1133
National unity, democratic institutions, human rights and repatriation of refugees were the main
arguments put forward by the RPF when it launched the war on 1 October 1990. After its victory in
the summer of 1994, the central problem was the kind of political system that would be chosen for
governing the country. The new government sworn in on 19 July presented itself as a return to the
Arusha agreement of 3 August 1993, which had been conceived not only as a 'Peace Agreement',
but also as a constitutional law, providing a direct complement to the 10 June 1991 Constitution.1134
In this chapter, an analysis is presented of whether Rwanda has changed or is likely to change into a
democratic State with respect for human rights and the rule of law. The argument is put forward that
the Tutsi government has failed to tackle the fundamental problem of peace, reconciliation and
construction of a viable Rwandan State. Indeed, the RPF power has proved to be absolute and
exclusive. It has put in place facade institutions while all the wheels of the State are controlled by a
small militarist-civil oligarchy derived almost entirely from the Tutsi ethnic group. All other political
sensivities have been marginalized and Hutus have become second-class citizens, some of whom
have been used to build an amiable facade behind which lie absolutism, exclusion and elimination.
The massacres of thousands of innocent people is evidence that the RPF can rule the country only
by violence, particularly due to its lack of a sound social basis and political legitimacy. The most
influential Hutus have to choose between submission, disappearance, and rebellion.
While no viable solution has been offered so far, mostly since even the international community,
especially the United Nations whose role is the maintenance of peace and security in the world, has
remained inactive, the last part of this chapter makes suggestions for ways in which the impasse can
be broken.
1133 Zairian (now Congolese) humour. Author's translation.
1134 Kagame, interviewed by Radio Rwanda, 10 July 1994.
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3.2 Economic and social split
After the genocide, the security situation has exacerbated a tendency which predated the war. Given
the fact that their life had been difficult in the hills and also given their higher level of education in
colonial Rwanda, the Tutsis had tended very early on to move to the cities, where they constituted
more than their overall10 per cent of the population. But this trend was only in operation during the
colonial period and under the Hutu Republic, and the majority of the Tutsis were still tillers of the soil.
The massive slaughter of April-June 1994 almost completely destroyed the rural Tutsi community.
The survivors huddled together in Red Cross camps for internal displaced persons (located away
from similar camps for the Hutus) and most of them never went back to their hills after the RPF
victory. These are the people who were resettled in the UN-sponsored resettlement schemes.1135
During and after the war around 600,000 Tutsis came to Rwanda from abroad, numerically roughly
replacing their dead peasant relatives. But they were not the same type of people at all. They were
mostly moderately well educated people and most of them had no notion of agriculture. Those who
were not educated tended to be herdsmen and came back with large numbers of cattle. These
people tended to settle in the Mutara plain of eastern Rwanda, encroaching on the Akagera National
Park of which a large part has been turned into ranch land. But the educated ones were in the
majority and they took over most of the urban properties (houses, shops, small factories) belonging
to the Hutus who had fled. Most of the urbanised Hutus had fled, on one hand because some of
them were among the leaders of the genocide, and, on the other hand, a great number feared the
RPF more than did the hill dwellers, who felt they could weather the storm more easily in a rural
environment. It has been out of the question for the Tutsi returnees to give these properties back to
their "rightful" owners. Many Tutsis returnees of 1994 argue that these properties were built on land
which belonged to them anyway and which the Hutus stole during the violent years of 1959-1964.
Since the few present Hutu elite has been fearful of the Tutsi security apparatus, the trend has been
not to press too hard for restitution of their properties and "the government has done little to make
justice".1136
The result has been a dichotomised economy, with the Hutus on the land, working at subsistence
farming, just as they were during the pre-colonial and colonial era, and a town-based monetary
economy practically entirely in Tutsi hands. Not only is this economic dichotomy a problem for any
1135Sadiki, Connaissances et Compétences Techniques, at 222.
1136prunier, Rwanda: The Social, Political and Economic Situation, Writenet, July 1997, at 6.
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future rehabilitation and development of the country, it is also a major social and political problem.
During the preceding Hutu regime, the Hutu elite had deep country roots. Every civil servant, right up
to cabinet ministers and top army officers had relatives in the country. Every weekend people went
back to the hills. They acted like small sultans and presented an exaggerated idea of their own
worth. But at least they were there. The Hutu peasant in the hills entertained a complex relationship
with his successful city cousins. He was told they ruled in his interest. He knew this was not true but
he was fiattered that they needed to lie to him in order to keep up the fiction of a "peasant-based
democracy". They taxed him and forced him to work "for the public interes!". He evaded the taxes
when he could but accepted the fact that at least some of the forced labour was indeed in the public
interest. They knew the men in power, even if indirectly. They had relatives nearby. The government
ferociously extracted peasant agriculture surplus value from the toiling masses. But the men who
stole that surplus value were abana bacu (our boys) and if one felt that he had to try to avoid the
worst forms of exploitation the relationship was nevertheless always one resembling a domestic
quarrel rather than a foreign feud. This picture was of course truer in the north, while, as seen, the
southern Hutus were much more alienated from the government than their northern or eastern
brethren were.
During the Tutsi regime, the situation became completely different. The Hutu peasant could have
understood being ruled by a land-based Tutsi aristocracy. After all, this had been the case before
1959. But he could not understand being ruled by a town-based alien business class. As Prunier
observes, "these people are foreigners" is a remark heard frequently.t!" Or even, as another more
educated person has said: "they are like beings from outer space. They speak our language but they
are different from us". This, by the way, is a comment no Hutu would have thought of making about a
Tutsi survivor of the genocide who lived in the country before 1994. In fact, despite the political
problem prevailing in the country, Hutus and Tutsis in the hills had lived in harmony and had shared
their daily lives by intermarrying, inviting each other to feasts, attending the same church, and
sharing other daily activities. With time, as the traditional roles assigned to each ethnic group
disappeared, it was not unusual to find Tutsis who were tillers of the soil and Hutus who were cattle
herders. Without becoming perfectly the same people, most Hutus and Tutsis had developed
community life to such an extent that killings would not have occurred if politicians had not
manipulated members of their respective ethnic groups. But with the 1994 returnees the "us/them"
feeling was strong. Even Tutsi survivors would at times use the same expression about their exiled
11371bid.
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relatives who had come back.
In order to understand the problem one has to realise that the expression "exiled relatives who came
back" is deceptive. The people who "came back" were not the same as those who had left. Thirty
years had gone by and given African mortality rates, the vast majority of the exiles who came into
Rwanda in 1994 were either raised or born abroad. Major-General Kagame, the country's
strongman, "left Rwanda when he was two years 0Id".1138The Hutu regime never talked about
refugees because refugees had to be "allowed" back home. The expression used was "les Rwandais
de /'étranger" (the Rwandans abroad), even in 1990, after the creation of the joint Rwanda-Ugandan
Committee for Repatriation.1139 And "les Rwandais de I'étranger" legislation never allowed any of
these people to come back to Rwanda, even for a short holiday or to visit relatives. Thus "les
Rwandais de /'étranger" community grew up with a magical and unreal sense of Rwanda which had
very little to do with the real Rwanda and much to do with their parents' and grandparents' stories
and fantasies about the world they had left behind. After the genocide, finding a tiny, bloody, poor
and ruined country was for many a great disappointment, which could turn them from idealism to
cynicism and towards the hope for fast money.
For better or for worse, the 1959 Hutu regime had been a peasant regime. Not that it pretended to
be a "peasant democracy" but rather that it was 'a peasant-based patrimonial oligarchy. Practically
the majority of the pre-1994 city dwellers had grown up in the countryside. RPF rulers grew up in
refugee camps and in cities. Prunier has written that "they are not only Tutsi they are 'aliens' in the
double sense of being foreign-born and educated and of being urban people in a land where 96 per
cent of the population are peasant farmers. The dominant feeling expressed by Hutu farmers when
they speak about their new masters is - more than fear - a feeling of strangeness" .1140
Halfway between the Hutu peasants and the Tutsi shopkeepers and small businessmen stand the
Tutsi genocide survivors in their roadside resettlement schemes. The houses are built on tiny
overcrowded plots, the inhabitants have no land to cultivate and they are located miles from urban
services. The settlements are prefabricated rural slums in the middle of nowhere, with no economic
base to support them. The NGO workers who work in them have estimated that gardening, poultry
farming and crafts can support perhaps up to 25-30 per cent of the resettlement dwellers. Many of
1138Nsengiyaremye,The unknown tragedy, at 71.
1139Guichaoua,A, Le Probleme des Réfugiés Rwandais et des Populations Banyarwanda, Haut Commissariat des
Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés, Geneva, May 1992.
114oPrunier,Rwanda: The Social, Political and Economic Situation, at 7.
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those are widows with dependants and they feel rather desperate. A common remark is: "All of us
survivors are now in one place. This will make it easier for the Hutu to kill us during the next
genocide".1141Although the government is supposed to be a "Tutsi regime" their lack of interest in
these poor rural Tutsi is evident. They have very little to do with the new power elite, except when
they are "lucky enough to have foreign-born relatives who can sponsor their entry into the new order
of things", since, as shown in further developments, the country is in a state of complete
absolutism.1142
3.3 Disregard of the constitutional order
The RPF government promised the institution of a State of law in Rwanda. It agreed to respect the
Arusha Peace Accord. However, this has not been the case.
3.3.1 Disregard of the peace agreement
The 'Loi Fondamentale' of 26 May 1995 shows that the RPF promise was only words and that the
Peace Accord was interpreted in its favour. The Loi Fondamentale is rather a tricky and cleverly
assembled constitutional statement, the seal of which hides the monolithic nature of the regime.
As seen, the fundamental law subsequent to the Arusha Peace Accord comprises the 1991
Constitution and the 1993 Arusha Peace Accord .1143Since the establishment of new institutions on 9
July 1994, significant gaps have become visible. For example, the Presidency became executive and
the post of Vice-President was created. The members of the Transitional National Assembly
expressed their satisfaction with this concentration of power in the hands of the victorious party when
they voted in favour of the Loi Fondamentale on 5 May 1995. The law was promulgated on 26 May
19951144and had retroactive power as from 17 July 1994. However, it contained no material
provisions and was confined to identifying four constitutional instruments and their hierarchy: the
1991 Constitution, the 1993 Arusha Peace Accord, the RPF Declaration of 17 July 1994, and the
Protocole d'Accord signed on 24 November 1994 between the RPF and 7 political parties in order to
11411bid.
1142LeTribun du Peuple, No. 109, 1996.
1143One could even say the Peace Accords because the Arusha negotiations were a long drawn-out process, lasting a
year, and several different agreements (on army integration, on the status of refugees, on the duration of the transitional
period) were signed along the way. It was only the formal crowning of the whole process which took place on 3 August
1993.
1144J.O., 1995, No. 11, 1/6//1995.
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establish the Transitional National Assembly. According to Article 2 of the Loi Fondamentale, the
Protocole d'Accord is the most important instrument in the hierarchic order, followed by the RPF
Declaration, then the Arusha Peace Accord and, lastly, the 1991 Constitution. According to Article 1
of the Protocole d'Accord, however, the political parties in government had agreed to adhere to the
RPF Declaration that regulates the establishment of institutions. As it was incorporated with the
Protocole d'Accord, the RPF Declaration was logically at the top of the constitutional hierarchy,
except in two instances that will be discussed with reference to its modification by the Protocol.
Some important modifications of the Arusha Peace Accord in favour of the RPF were introduced.
First, regarding the Executive, the RPF Declaration provides for a powerful President. It has been
indicated earlier that, in the Arusha Accord, the President of the Republic had become the formal
head of State since he was supposed to execute decisions taken by other organs in all domains,
especially by a cabinet he had no power to appoint.1145The object of the Arusha negotiations in this
regard was to weaken President Habyarimana, mostly because of his obstruction of the transitional
government of 1992-1993. For example, most of his power to appoint to higher positions was
transferred to the Prime Minister;1146he was deprived of his traditional veto to sanction and
promulgate laws and statutory orders,1147as well as presidential orders, adoption of which was
entrusted to the cabinet.1148It was also the cabinet that had the competence to decide on the content
of the messages to be announced to the nation by the President.1149 In short, the powers of the
broad-based transitional government were extended in order to combine the attributions of the head
of State and those of the government.
In the RPF Loi Fondamentale, however, the presidency became executive again and even dominant.
Article 2 provides for the President to be consulted and to approve the composition of the
government. The first modification in this regard is contained in Article 6 of the Protocole d'Accord
which provides that the President can initiate a cabinet reshuffle and dismiss the Prime Minister on
the opinion of the National Assembly. Moreover, Article 6 provides that a new Prime Minister shall be
nominated after consultation with political parties participating in the institutions. This gave more
1145It was supposed to be appointed by the 'political parties participating in government' and the RPF. Protocol of 30
October 1992, art. 14.
1146ld., art 11 and 18.
1147ld., art 6 (d). In case he did not sanction and promulgate them within ten days after the constitutional court's ruling,
the job was done by the Prime Minister as regards statutory orders, and the Speaker of the National Assembly, as
regards the laws. Ibid.
1148Should the President refuse to sign a presidential order, the Prime Minister would do it. Id., art. 9.
1149Id., art. 12.
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liberty to the President than in the Arusha Accord. Article 3 of the Protocole d'Accord refers to
Articles 53 and 54 of the Arusha Protocol on Power Sharing which stipulated that, where the Prime
Minister or a Minister were to be replaced, they would be replaced with candidates from the same
political party. Furthermore, Article 7 gives sovereign power to the President to make decisions in
case the government is unable to do so.
Secondly, a post of Vice-President, combined with a ministerial portfolio, was created by Article 2 of
the Declaration. However, the office of the Vice-President is not defined anywhere, and neither are
his attributions, his appointment or removal from office. Article 9 of the RPF Declaration provided that
"Par consensus du Bureau Politique du FPR, Monsieur Pasteur Bizimungu accede aux fonctions de
Président de la République".
This provision said nothing about Major General Paul Kagame as Vice-President. As far as the
constitutional order is concerned, this office is empty. But the fact that this function was entrusted to
the strongman of the regime reinforced the presidential branch of the Executive. In other words, it
would have been honorary if Kagame, Minister of Defense and President of the RPF did not occupy
the position.115o More importantly, the combination of the vice-presidency with a ministerial portfolio
in the hands of one person could arise in a serious contradiction: whereas the President (and, by
analogy, the Vice-President) is not politically responsible before the National Assembly, Ministers
are. Therefore, as Minister, General Kagame could be dismissed, whereas he could not be censured
as Vice-President. The same contradiction existed under the Habyarimana regime before the
December 1991 government in which Habyarimana lost the Ministry of Defense. However, during the
Arusha talks, it was the RPF that argued mordicus that it was absolutely essential to balance the
powers.1151 Once it seized power, it would be seen that this argument was to be replaced by the
concentration of power in the hands of the victorious party.
As regards the composition of the government itself, the RPF took the lion's share in the government
which it controls, despite appearances. Article 3 of the RPF Declaration provided that ministerial
portfolios the Arusha Peace Accord granted to political parties excluded from power sharing were to
be taken over by the RPF. This means that the RPF would take the 5 portfolios allocated to the
MRND. However, contrary to Pruniers observation that the RPF had taken these "seats en bloc''1152,
1150By the time of printing this dissertation, Kagame has become the President of the Republic and he apparently has no
intention of appointing a Vice-President, which confirms the author's contention.
1151Prunier, The Social, Political and Economic Situation, at 9.
1152Id., and The Rwanda Crisis, at 329.
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the RPF has taken only 3, leaving the other 2 to independent candidates, thus violating its own
Declaration.1153 But was this a pure act of magnanimity? According to Article 21 of the Arusha
Protocol on Power Sharing, in the event of the cabinet failing to decide by consensus, two-thirds of
the members of government can take decisions. This suggests that the RPF did not need ten
members of government to control the power: its eight portfolios among a total of 21 ministers
allowed it to exercise a blockage with a minority of one third plus one. This was sufficient for the RPF
to govern alone mostly since, as seen, the President of the Republic has sovereign power to decide
when the government is incapable to take a decision. In other words, the real constitutional exercise
of power is held by the RPF and it is not necessary to occupy the entire government to do so.
Other important modifications pertain to the legislative power. According to the RPF Declaration, the
RPF would take over the seats allocated by the Arusha Peace Accord to political parties excluded
from power sharing. This provision was modified by the Proto cole d'Accord of 24 November 1994,
which provided for the distribution of those seats to all political parties represented in parliament.
However, the RPF Declaration imposed an important correction regarding the representation of the
army in the National Assembly, whence the Protocole d'Accord allocated 6 seats to the army.1154
There now occurred another maneuvre that assured the RPF and its allies a parliamentary majority
that they would not have had otherwise. The situation reached was such that on the RPF side, the
RPF had 13 seats, the PL, 13 seats, 3 small parties1155,6 seats, and the army 6 seats, which makes
a total of 38 seats. On the side of other parties, the MDR attained 13 seats, the PSD, 13 seats, and
the PDC 6 seats, which totals 32 seats. Clearly, the six military members of parliament tipped the
scales in favour of the RPF and its allies. As a matter of fact, the military officers would not vote a
motion of censure against the Defense Minister, their hierarchic superior in the Executive under
which the army falls. This contradiction underlies the principle of incompatibility between the duties of
a Member of Parliament and other functions detailed in Article 72 of the law on the National
Assembly.1156 This law, which is still in force, provides that once a person in the categories
enumerated in Article 72 is elected Member of Parliament, s/he has to resign from that category
1153 One minister who had to resign and go into exile told the author that what is called 'independent candidate' is "just an
RPF supporter".
1154 Protocole d'Accord, CLR, Vol. I, 1995, p. 7.
1155 It is not certain that the RPF can rely totally on those parties; without military seats, the RPF would have remained a
minority.
1156 According to article 72, the mandate of a member of parliament is incompatible with the functions of: Republic
President, judge, prosecutor, civil servant, agent of a public or private institution, member of the armed forces, and agent
of communal administration. Loi no. 18/1983 0(27 August 1983, J.O., 1983, p. 501; Codes et Lois du Rwanda, Vo/./, 2nd
ed., 1995,p. 37.
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before being sworn in, in order to serve the National Assembly fully and independently. As the armed
forces are classified under the functions in question, the appointment of military officers provides
some evidence that the rule of law continues merely to be on the books in Rwanda. Besides, the
maneuvres of the National Assembly were accompanied by rude remarks uttered by Vice-President
Kagame on Members of Parliament who criticised the RPF and the behaviour of army officers. On
several occasions, he accused Parliament of acting as an opposition party, and working to subvert
the government.1157
For example, in an interview in June 1995, he said that there would be no tolerance of any
undisciplined action among Members of Parliament operating under parliamentary privilege. He said
the Speaker of the National Assembly should make the party disciplinary rules part of the standing
orders, under which Members of Parliament could be punished for any breach within the precincts of
Parliament.1158
Regarding the duration of the transitional period, Article 5 of the RPF Declaration provides for 5
years instead of the 22 months stipulated in the Arusha Peace Accord. At the time of writing this
dissertation, the five years have been extended by another four years.1159
Following abuses committed by the RPA on the Hutu population and irregularities committed by the
RPF in almost exclusively appointing Tutsis to the judiciary and territorial administration,1160 there
was a misunderstanding within the cabinet. The meeting of 25 August is worth commenting on
because it caused political incidents that illustrate the unpreparedness of Rwandans for establishing
a viable State.
As the Vice-President and Minister of Defense was implicated and could not support his questioning,
he quit the meeting and the security problems on the agenda remained unsolved as no one else
could chair the meeting or convene another one. On 28 August the Prime Minister resigned at 12
o'clock.1161 His resignation was announced in a press release by the Minister of Information,
rapporteur of the government, at 1 o'clock.1162This resignation was followed later in the afternoon by
1157Nkuliyingoma, J.B., Speech during the funeral of the late Seth Sendashonga, May 1998.
1158Sendashonga, 12 Nov. 1997.
1159AFP, 19 July 1999.
1160Sendashonga, 12 Nov. 1997.
1161Faustin Twagiramungu, Interviewed by Canal Afrique, 25 July 1999.
1162Radio Rwanda, news bulletin, 25 July 1995.
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that of the Minister of the Interior.1163 Then President Bizimungu convened the National Assembly at
3 o'clock. He 'asked' the parliament to vote a motion of censure against the Prime Minister, which
was done without debate.1164 On 29 August, the President dismissed the Ministers of Information,
Justice, Interior - despite his resignation the preceding day1165 - and Transport and
Communications.1166 On 31 August, the President nominated a new Prime Minister, Pierre-Cé/estin
Rwigema and twenty Ministers among whom 5 were new while 3 changed portfolios.1167
Serious unconstitutional procedures can be pointed out with regard to this episode: since the Prime
Minister had resigned, the vacancy would have had to be certified by the Supreme Court upon the
request of the government.1168 Whatever the case, the dismissal of a resigning Prime Minister is a
legal non-sense. Even in the instance of a dismissal being imposed on the incumbent, Article 79 of
the Arusha Protocol on Power Sharing would have been violated as it does not provide for a motion
of censure, but rather for the implication of the responsibility of a Minister or the government by
Parliament, and not by the President.1169 What is more, a motion of censure is admissible only after
questioning of the person involved and in the presence of one third of the members of parliament.1170
In the particular case, there was no questioning and the motion was presented by the President.
Article 79 also provides that 'members of parliament vote by secret ballot', but this vote was taken by
the raising hands.
Furthermore, according to the Arusha Protocol on Power Sharing, the vote on a motion of censure
against the Prime Minister entails his resignation and that of the entire cablnet.i'" In this case, the
whole cabinet was supposed to resign after the vote of 28 August and it would not have been
necessary to dismiss the four Ministers. It was another example of legal non-sense.
The nomination of the new Prime Minister also violated the constitutional order. According to Article
53 of the Arusha Protocol on Power Sharing, the political party to which the dismissed or resigning
1163 Sendashonga, 12 Nov. 1997.
1164 Apparently the members of parliament voted on the President's pressure. 'Only 6 courageous members did not
vote'. Interview with an M.P who, after the meeting, went into exile.
1165 All Hutus
1166 This Minister was probably 'sacrificed' to avoid the impression that the measures concerned only Hutus.
1167 For the composition of the cabinet, see Le Camet, Sept., 1995, p. 138-9.
1168 Arusha Protocol on Power Sharing, art. 53, Codes et Lois du Rwanda, vol. I., 2nd ed., 1995, p. 14.
1169 Codes et Lois du Rwanda, vol. I., 2nd ed., 1995, p. 16-17.
1170 Ibid.
1171 Ibid.
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Prime Minister belongs presents one candidate who first has to be accepted by the other political
parties in government and then be presented to the President of the Republic for formal nomination.
However, the MDR, party of the Prime Minister, was asked to present four candidates and the other
political parties had no opportunity to indicate acceptance or rejection of the candidate, Célestin
Rwigema, who was number four on the list nominated by the President.''"
Within less than four days the Rwandan State had been confronted with a number of unconstitutional
issues in favour of the RPF. One has every right to conclude that Rwanda does not have a
fundamental law worthy of the name. Indeed, there is no provision for amendment of the so-called
Loi Fondamentale. One could wonder whether the RPF could unilaterally modify it by amending its
Declaration of 17 July 1994 to which the 24 November 1994 Protocol subscribed. It would have been
easy and transparent to combine the four instruments that form the Loi Fondamentale in a new
Constitution, be it provisional, and to let the National Assembly act as a derived constituent.
Overall, the new government did not present any hope of national unity. Statistics show that out of
eighteen ministries there were only three or four minor adjustments and five complete changes.1173
But these changes and the way they were carried out were highly indicative of a new order of things
in the political structure of post-genocide Rwanda. The removal of Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe from
. the Ministry of the Interior was a major signal in itself. At the same time, his case is perhaps the most
illustrative of the denial of freedom of speech within the RPF. A Hutu soldier from the Ruhengeri
area, Colonel Kanyarengwe was a close associate of General Habyarimana and played a role in his
take-over in 1973. In 1980 he was involved in an attempted coup d'état, aimed at the overthrow of
his friend, and had to flee to Tanzania. After ten years in exile he joined the RPF in 1990 and
became its nominal Secretary General. When the PRF came into power in 1994 he was appointed
Vice Prime Minister, a largely honorary position, and when his Hutu colleague Seth Sendashonga
was removed from the Ministry of the Interior in August 1995, he took his place. A former Hutu power
devotee in his youth, he had become the willing tool of the RPF's Tutsi power structure during the
war years. As a native of the Ruhengeri prefecture he was considered to be a natural "protector" of
the people of his area.1174 In fact, he had managed to recruit some Hutu soldiers into the Tutsi-
dominated RPA. His political situation therefore became very awkward in early 1997 when many
1172Mouvement Oémocratique Républicain, Position du Parti MOR sur les grands Problemes actuels du Rwanda, Kigali:
MOR, November 1994.
1173prunier, Rwanda: The Social, Political and Economic Situation, 14.
11741bid.
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people of his area were being killed by the same RPA. By February the situation had worsened to
the point where many members of his direct family had also been killed. When, on 3 March 1997,
more than 150 people were killed in the communes of Kigombe, Mukingo and Nyakinama, in
Ruhengeri, in reprisal for the murders of two RPA soldiers, he felt he had to act. He organised a
meeting in the north where he supported the Ruhengeri Prefect Ignace Karuhije who had denounced
the violence and asked for the arrest of Major Rugambwa, the commander of Battalion 199
responsible for the killings. Rugambwa was detained briefly, but was later freed and it was Prefect
Karuhije who was first arrested and later dismissed from his position. On 27 March, Kanyarengwe
was forced to resign his post of Minister of the Interior, and his position of Vice Prime Minister was
abolished. He was later dismissed from his position as nominal head of the RPF and replaced by
Major General Paul Kagame, Vice-President of the Republic and Minister of Defence, the second in
command being President Pasteur Bizimungu.1175
The new Minister of the Interior, Abdul Karim Harerimana, a particularly lacklustre person, was a
political lightweight. Of uncertain parentage, considered "a Hutu by defect", he was a Muslim brought
up in Tanzania who did not belong to any political party. He had no independent political
constituency and was "a pliable tool in the hands of the RPF power structure". After the elimination of
Seth Sendashonga and Faustin Twagiramungu in August 1995,1176Kanyarengwe was the last Hutu
in government who could be said to have a truly independent political constituency. "His removal was
a symbol of the total elimination of the Hutu community as a political partner in the so-called coalition
government" .1177
Another case was that of Marc Rugenera, Minister of Finance, who was demoted to the newly-
created Ministry of Tourism, Mines and Crafts. But since there was no tourism and there were no
mines, the Minister's job was to administer a handful of arts and crafts cooperatives.tt" In a lesser
way than Kanyarengwe, Rugenera was also an autonomous Hutu politician. He was one of the last
surviving leaders of the PSD, most of whose leaders, all liberal Hutus, were killed during the
genocide. Rugenera had his own constituency in the south and was an able administrator. In his
position as Minister of Finance, he had often questioned the disbursement of large unauthorised
sums of money to the military, and the RPA leadership was looking for an opportunity to remove
1175TheCentral African Newsletter, No. 15, April 28-May 28, 1998, p. 17.
1176SeeMatata, J., Communiqué NO.5, 1996.
1177prunier, Rwanda: The Social, Political and Economic Situation, at 4.
11781bid.
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him.1179
Rugenera was replaced by Jean Birara, former Head of the Central Bank under President
Habyarimana and Minister for Planning. Birara was a technocrat, a very able administrator, but not a
politician. When he was asked by the Belgian Senate Commission of Inquiry on Rwanda to go to
Brussels to testify, he initially accepted but later withdrew his acceptance when the Rwandan
government frowned upon his giving testimony. He was unlikely to cause many problems in his new
position.
Then there is the curious case of Patrick Mazimpaka. Contrary to the two preceding ministers he is a
Tutsi. But he spent all his years of exile in Canada, which means that, unlike the "Ugandans", the
"Zaïrians" or the "Burundians" he had no basic area of influence. Although a founding member of
RPF, he also happened to be considered a moderate. He was Minister of Rehabilitation and Social
Solidarity, but his Ministry was abolished on 28 March. This was a somewhat surprising move in the
light of the return of more than a million refugees within a few days in November 1996, a
development which did seem to call for both "rehabilitation" and "social solidarity".118o Patrick
Mazimpaka himself was made Minister in the President's Office, a high-sounding title for a very
ambiguous position. Not that the President did not need a man of confidence near him. President
Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu member of RPF without any personal following of his own, is extremely
isolated and under intense personal pressure. His children having been bullied at school by Tutsi
children,1181he has had to remove them from school and keep them at home, with private tutors.1182
Prunier has remarked that he is discreetly sniggered at by even his closest Tutsi aides and has at
times reacted with physical violence (spitting, slapping), which has led to rumours of "mental
imbalance", but he has a guardian angel in the person of Colonel Frank Mugambage, a well-
connected member of the "Ugandan" group. A month after his nomination to this apparently duplicate
position, Patrick Mazimpaka, however, still did not have an office at the Presidency and still had not
managed to have an interview with his old RPF comrade Mugambage, to define the relationship
11791bid.
1180TheRPA had attacked refugee camps sheltering Rwandan Hutu in Eastern Zaïre, allegedly to break the control of
armed elements training to attack Rwanda. However, they indiscriminately killed hundreds of thousands, many of them
women and children, in this operation and many others were forced to return en masse to Rwanda. See Human Rights
Watch/Africa Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Oroits de {'Homme, Vol. 9, NO.5 (A), October 1997, p.1O; Agence
France Presse, Wednesday 9 September 1998.
1181Theywere called "children of the Protector" (a local brand of condoms), an allusion to the fact that the Hutu President
is used by the Tutsi regime as a public relations device.
1182Prunier, Rwanda: The Social, Political and Economic Situation, at 4.
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between their respective posts. The change looked more like sidetracking than like promotion.1183
The Rehabilitation and Social Solidarity job was demoted to the level of a Secrétariat d'Etat that was
given to a new person Béatrice Sebatware-Panda. This seemed like an odd choice since she is the
daughter of a well-known Hutu génocidaire who is on the wanted list of the International Tribunal in
Arusha. With such a 'criminal' father, it is probable that Ms Sebatware-Panda will also prove to be
rather compliant mostly since she has not been given means to work with the Hutu returnees.1184
The other changes - appointment of Bonaventure Niyibizi to the Ministry of Trade and Dr Vincent
Biruta to the Ministry of Health - have brought two capable young Tutsis who have expertise in their
fields but no political experience whatsoever, and who consider themselves to be "technical
ministers" into these positions.1185
But the manner in which these changes were carried out, was at least as significant as the changes
themselves. "The regime acted within 48 hours to complete the reshuffle, consulting nobody since
political parties were suspended for an indefinite period, and making no mention of the Arusha
Agreement or of the Government Convention of 24 November 1994 or of any other constitutional or
para-constitutional provisions. The reshuffle was an arbitrary act, with ministers dismissed or chosen
secretly."1186 The absence of any reference to political parties confirmed their actual demise, not that
they mattered very much in themselves. As seen, their marginalization had been obvious since the
RPF seized power and not much of them remained. But the fact that they were so unceremoniously
buried signalled an end to any pretence of a democratic RPF regime in Rwanda. As the next section
will indicate, the simultaneousness political promotion of the Army and the disappearance of the
political parties has actually turned Rwanda into a de facto collegial military dictatorship.
The question of the relationship between the RPF and the former opposition was at the center of the
whole political process. Foreign Minister Jean-Marie Vianney Ndagijimana, in an interview given to a
French magazine after his defection1187, listed the fact that as a 'party' minister he was constantly by-
11831bid.
1184By the time of printing this dissertation, Béatrice is seeking asylum in Belgium.
11851bid.
11861bid.
1187 Jeune Afrique (24-30 November 1994). Ndagijimana was a determinedly careerist diplomat. A mild MRND supporter,
who had been posted as ambassador to Paris, he switched sides soon after the death of President Habyarimana. He
managed to impose himself on Prime Minister Twagiramungu as future Foreign Minister all the more easily since the only
other logical candidate was Anastase Gasana (who replaced Ndagijimana on 24 November 1994), a political rival of the
Premier. Ndagijimana then joined the Premier's party, but was soon disappointed by his experience as a born-again
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passed by more powerfully connected RPF colleagues as one of his complaints against the new
regime. The impression was that an RPF minister was twice the standing the minister his MOR or
PSO colleague was. This state of affairs eventually led to the publication by the MOR on 25
November of a working paper devoted to the constructive criticism of the political evolution in
Rwanda since 19 July.1188This is worth examining in detail because it presents a discussion of all
the various problems faced by the new government.
The first MOR complaint concerned the fact that the Loi Fondamentale had been violated because
the transitional period, which was supposed to last twenty-two months, had been unilaterally
extended by the RPF to five years. This was of course both true and a calculation. For the MOR,
which was almost sure to win any election and dreamed of power acquired in this fashion, with all the
necessary trappings of democracy opening a royal road to the World Bank vaults, five years was a
very frustrating delay. Worse, it could be the prelude to a definitive confiscation of power by the RPF.
For if there were a few Hutus in the Front, this was mainly due to the war, when men like Pasteur
Bizimungu or Seth Sendashonga had made their choice, thinking that armed struggle was the only
way to remove 'the Habyarimana dictatorship'.1189 But now, after victory, ethnic politics were bound
to reassert themselves, whether one wanted them to do so or not. Some Tutsis11900n the Kagame
political line hoped for a Rwandan society where they could practice the Ugandan type of 'no-party
democracy'.1191 But this of course was an ambiguous recipe which, on one hand, was sincerely
trying to avoid the pitfalls of ethnicity and which, on the other hand, could also become a convenient
disguise for Tutsi domination. The difference was that there were thirty-two main tribes in Uganda
and not two, and that Museveni's balancing act was somehow possible only because he played a
masterly and complex game among all of them. The dual logic of Rwandan politics allowed no such
refinements, and non-ethnic politics still belonged in the domain of pious wishes.
MOR minister, and defected while on his way to the UN Assembly in New York, having made sure he had enough
government money to cushion his exile. But he is an intelligent man and his criticism of the new Kigali government is far
from being unfounded.
1188 Mouvement Oémocratique Républicain, Position du Parti MOR sur les grands Problames actuels du Rwanda, Kigali:
MOR, November 1994.
1189 This objective was often repeated on RPF Radio Muhabura during the war.
1190 Some sources cite Frank Mugambage and Patrick Mazimpaka as "idealistic Tutsi moderates". See for example,
Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, at 210.
1191 See Nelson Kasfir, 'The Ugandan elections of 1989', p. 247-78, and Apolo Nsibambi, 'Resistance councils and
committees: the case of Makerere', p. 276, both in H.B. Hansen and M. Twaddle (eds), Changing Uganda, London:
James Currey, 1991. Also Gérard Prunier, 'La recherche de la normalisation', p. 131-58, and Per Tidemand, 'Le
systéme des Conseils de Résistance', p. 193-208, both in Prunier, G., and Calas, B., (eds), L'Ouganda Contemporain,
Paris: Karthala, 1994.
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The RPF could not win elections as a political party because, even with some Hutus in its ranks and
with moderate Tutsis at its head, it was going to be perceived as 'Tutsi Power'. This was what
President Buyoya of Burundi had painfully learned in April 1993 when all his 'goodwill and honesty'
failed to save him from defeat at the polls. So the MOR wanted elections for exactly the same reason
as the RPF did not want them.
The next five points of the MOR document also had to do with the problems posed by the duality of
power between RPF and cabinet:
Firstly, there was a confusion of powers between the executive, the legislative and the judiciary (p.
3). Secondly, the process of integrating the 1,000 former FAR officers and soldiers who had joined
the RPA was too slow. And the document added, on page 16: 'We must create a really national army
that is an army that will reflect all the components of Rwandan society'. For this read 'We want more
Hutu in the RPA', something the Tutsi RPA officers were bound to view with extreme caution.
Thirdly, it is necessary to clarify the juridical status of the RPF (p. 7), an obvious point, but which was
akin to asking the protean RPF 'military-front-social-movement-political-party' to become a political
party like any other. Or rather unlike any other. It would become the Tutsi political party. With the
RPF turned into a party (though it is known as such by the public opinion), how many Tutsis would
there be in the MOR, the PSO or even the PL? And how many Hutus would the RPF retain, should
the political game be opened at that particular time?
Fourthly, the document underlined the fact that there was no security, no due process of law and that
there were many arbitrary detentions in military camps (p. 7), a point which came as a complement
to the first above, adding, on page 18: 'To restart agriculture, we must eliminate insecurity which
prevents the peasants from cultivating their fields because they cannot be sure that they will still be
alive a few days from now'.
And finally, there was a denunciation of the widespread property grabbing by the former refugees
coming back from Uganda and Burundi (p. 7 and 22), the implicit criticism being that the RPF turned
a blind eye on such acts or even connived with the voracious refugees.
Over the other points raised there was much greater consensus: establishment of some sort of a
jurisdiction of exception to judge the perpetrators of the genocide and the creation of an international
commission of inquiry in order to counter the idea of the 'double genocide' (p. 16).
This document should be seen as documentary evidence of a number of the main socia-political
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problems existing at this particular time in Rwanda. It should also be analyzed both as a political
broadside aimed at the RPF as an over-powerful partner in a so-called coalition government and as
a political tract aimed at putting down other coalition rivals such as the PSO by demonstrating to
Hutu opinion that even if Faustin Twagiramungu was Premier, he was no stooge of the RPF. But the
document also had something of a 'holier-than-thou' quality. For example, on the question of
arbitrary detentions, the MOR was very vocal about those of the judges Josephine Mukanyangezi
and Claude Gatera1192, the journalist Dominique Makeri and former vice-governor of the National
Bank of Rwanda, Pierre Rwakayigamba. But it was less vocal about the detention of Sylvestre
Kamali, a direct political adversary of Faustin Twagiramungu within the MOR, who had probably
been detained on the Prime Minister's orders.1193
3.3.2 More abuses
Not only has the RPF violated the constitutional order regarding the exercise of power but it has also
failed to prove different from the Hutu regimes with regard to the protection of human rights.
In one case, where a gendarme was tried for manslaughter, a judge of the tribunal de premiere
instance, Gratien Ruhorahoza, deprecated the indiscriminate way in which policemen used firearms
on suspects, saying that guns were "carried as if they were meant to frighten the people" and that
cases of police firing at people had become prevalent in Rwanda. He said that while the idea was to
scare away would-be robbers, the use of firearms against suspects was to be discouraged. He
remarked that day in and day out there were abundant reports about suspects being shot dead by
police and that in the end the Republic was becoming oppressive because of such incidents.1194
The deployment of heavily armed soldiers along the border with Burundi to stop "smuggling of fuel,
1192Although not charged with anything, the detained judges were usually arrested for being 'too soft' on Hutu detainees.
Most of the time they simply did their job of releasing from custody prisoners whose files were empty. But the army did
not see it that way, and for the soldiers a denunciation is often a presumption of guilt.
1193Kamali was a leader of the 'Power' fraction of MOR in 1993-4, but he distanced himself from his fellow 'Power'
members and does not seem have supported the genocide. This is why he came back to Kigali of his own free will
instead of going to Goma. He was arrested soon afterwards. But one should not forget that before the explosion
Twagiramungu had lost control of his party and the 'Power' fraction held the majority. In any case, the problem of
detentions was a nightmare because, as one minister said, 'given the intertwining of matrimonial and family relationships,
many of us in the government, even the Tutsi, have relations who are guilty of having taken part in the genocide'. (Patrick
Mazimpaka, interviewed by Prunier G., Kigali 17 January 1995. Prunier, G., The Rwanda Crisis, at 333). Shortly after,
two of the Hutu cabinet ministers were discovered concealing relations who were allegedly suspected to have played a
major part in the genocide in their houses.
1194LiiRocher, Rwanda: Visit report, 25 January 1996.
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potatoes and other basic commodities", culminated in killings of suspected smugglers.1195 On
November 13, 1995, the security forces were ordered to shoot on sight fleeing "smugglers of petrol"
by the commander-in-chief of Butare who compared those people to "armed robbers". At least 24
suspected "smugglers" were shot dead between September and October 1996.1196The Centre de
Lutte contre /'/mpunité et /'Injustice au Rwanda condemned the killings and described them as no
less than "tueries sans pitié" (cold-blooded murder).1197However, the political and administrative
head of Kigembe Commune defended the shootings saying that suspected smugglers should be
treated as criminals.119BWhat was even worse was that Vice-President Paul Kagame also defended
the shooting of suspected smugglers as justifiable because of the circumstances under which the
officers were operating. He urged Rwandans not to rush to condemn the security forces.1199 Not
surprisingly, no soldier was ever arrested and charged for any of the killings.
The sanctioning and encouragement of these killings by political leaders, including the Vice-
President, placed the security forces above the law. Smuggling was not a capital crime, and even if it
were, it would not be justifiable to kill unarmed suspects who did not threaten the lives of the security
forces. Every suspect is entitled to due process of law consisting of investigation of facts by duly
appointed officers, a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial court of law, and a judgement pronounced publicly unless this would be against public
morals, national security or public order.12oo
In December 1996, Obed Rwangasana, suspected of theft, died at Ruhengeri Hospital after 3 days
of interrogation at the Ruhengeri gendarmerie. He bled profusely from deep wounds on his buttocks
(inflicted by the gendarmes) but for 3 days the gendarmerie ignored his wife's pleas to take him to
the hospital.1201
1195Mostof the killings of suspected so-called smugglers occurred between 1995 and 1997. For example on Sept 24,
1995. soldiers deployed along the Burundian border in Butare and Gikongoro shot dead 128 people. Id.
11961nterviewwith Major Leonard Nzeyimana, 20 October 1997.
1197Centrede Lutte contre I'Impunité et I'lnjustice au Rwanda, Press Release, 008/96.
11981d.
1199TheMinister of the Interior, Seth Sendashonga, in a statement to Parliament on 15 June 1995 admitted that firearms
had been issued to police officers who were not qualified to handle them. Interview with Seth Sendashonga, 12 Nov.
1997.
1200Constitution, Article 89 and 90; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 9 (3) and 14.
1201LiiRocher, Rwanda: Visit report, 25 January 1996.
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Suspect criminals have been tortured and compelled to confess to crimes.1202 The most striking fact
is that any mention of police cells in Rwanda instantly evoked fear and terror. For many Rwandans
police cells were horrifying places that do things no other place can do to a human being. There
were seventeen prisons in Rwanda almost all of which were and still are in a terrible state of
disrepair and are not fit for human habitation.1203 Rwandan prisons have arguably become the most
crowded, most dangerous, and most inhumane prisons in the world. Hundreds of thousands of
people have been held in truck containers, disused factories, old bathrooms, wet or leaking
dungeons, or anywhere things can be confined.1204 The prisons, most of which were built during
colonisation, are overwhelmingly over-crowded, lack sufficient manpower and adequate resources.
Most of the existing prisons were built between 1928 and 1965 when crime was not a serious
problem. For example Kigali prison was built in 1930 for 480 inmates but now takes in over twelve
thousand inmates. As a result, the density has been such that at least four inmates occupied every
single square metre of floor space in the open courtyards and six were squeezed into every square
metre in the poorly maintained and ventilated dormitory buildings that surround the courtyards.
These crowded places serve as toilets, sleeping, and living rooms. Pot or plastic containers are used
to collect urine and faeces. Once the containers are full, they are carried outside the cells by
prisoners under police escort. The containers are then sometimes cleaned and brought back for
reuse and the cycle starts over again.1205 Prisoners have no beds and often have no blankets. They
are usually given one poorly cooked meal a day, which is usually inadequate, and which they have
to eat in those foul smelling places. The prisoners usually have little or no recreational facilities.
Because of the shortage of prison space remand prisoners and convicted prisoners are kept in same
cells.1206 Furthermore, prisoners are not allowed to greet the relatives who bring food to them. There
is a row of heavily armed soldiers between the visitors and the prisoners' rowS.1207
These conditions constitute inhuman and degrading treatment. No human being, no matter how
heinous his crime is, deserves to live under such abominable conditions.
1202Amnesty International, UA 134/95; HRFOR, status report as at 14 May 1996; Dialogue No. 196, Feb. 1997, p. 44;
ARDHO, Raport de visite, June 1997; and Centre de Lutte Contre /'Injustice et J'/mpunité au Rwanda, Note d'information
No. CL 08/97/MJ, March 18, 1997.
1203United Nations, GRFOR, E/CNA/1998/61, 19 Feb. 1998.
1204Kabongo, K., Rwandan prisons or the return of servitude, Clarinews, May 23, 1998.
1205Account given by a former prisoner who managed to escape, under the pseudonym of Kabongo, June 1997.
1206Mulaba, A., Rwandan prisons: The genocide of Hutu in Rwanda (unpublished), p. 2.
1207Kabongo, Rwandan prisons or the return of servitude, May 23, 1998.
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Well over a thousand people have died in detention. In Butare prison, the extraordinary high death
toll of 166 prisoners was recorded in 1995.1208 For example, on March 17, 1995, soldiers at the
Muhima brigade forced more than sixty persons into a room far too small to accommodate them.
During the night they begged to have the door opened because some were dying for lack of oxygen.
The guards refused to open the room until the next morning. Then they found twenty-two persons
had died of suffocation. Four others were so ill as to require hospitalisation and two of them
subsequently died.1209 Detained persons have been beaten before arriving at prison, either en route
or at some intermediate place of detention such as military brigade, communal lockup, or residence
occupied by soldiers.121o Prisoners have been regularly tortured. Thousands have lost limbs,
developed skin diseases, or caught recurrent or terminal illnesses.1211
To the common methods of torture used during the Hutu regimes, the post-genocide regime has
added: stripping suspects naked while they were being interviewed, and suspending suspects from
iron bars and then whipping them.1212
Even hospitalised prisoners were tortured. For example Bimenyimana, detained in Gitarama prison
was hospitalised in Kabgayi hospital as a result of torture resulting in contusions and bleeding. On
15 February 1995, two gendarmes and one soldier visited him "for interrogation" and took him to an
isolated room of the hospital. The following day he presented "serious post-traumatic epistaxis,
dyspnoea and dysphagia caused by strangulation manoeuvres" of which marks were visible on the
neck. On 17 February he was no longer able to swallow anything and he died at 14 hours.1213 Five
months before, several hundred soldiers who were left at Kabutare hospital "disappeared" soon after
the town fell to the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) at the start of July 1994. Former government
soldiers had been severely wounded or disabled in battle and were left behind by their retreating
colleagues. Amnesty International found in the hospital one decomposed body of a soldier whose
head had been smashed by RPA soldiers before death.1214 Alarming statistics on mortality rates of
1208HRW/Africa and FIOH, April 1995, Vol. 7, NO.1, p. 4.
1209Id.,at 5.
121°lbid.
1211Kabongo, Rwandan prisons or the return of servitude, May 23, 1998.
1212Karemano, P., 'The Rwandan tragedy: What people should also know', 1997, p. 49.
1213Kabgayi Hospital, Examen médical de Mr. Bimenyimana, 17 February, 1995.
1214AIINDEX: AFR 47/16/94, April-August 1994.
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hospitalised prisoners as a result of torture had been made available by Médecins Sans Frontieres
(MSF) who concluded that out of 129 hospitalised prisoners, 53.8% died.1215
Political prisoners were subjected to torture. In Ministere Public v Muhirwa, 1216 the plaintiff, who was
detained by the public prosecutor under public security regulations for political reasons, claimed
damages for assault, intimidation, trespass to the person and false imprisonment by the secret
police. He was moved to an illegal non-gazetted detention centre, where he was imprisoned in a
filthy cell of minute proportions with little or no light or ventilation, forced to enter and remain in the
nude, threatened with violence, subjected to torture and particularly to electric shock, interrogated in
a dark room with bright lights directed into his eyes, punched and slapped, had his life threatened,
was given little arid insufficient water and food, and forced to remain awake for long periods of time.
The court found that allegations of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment had been proved. The
judge condemned the treatment meted out to Muhirwa by the secret police and awarded him
exemplary damages. On the day which followed this ruling, Justice Ruhorahoza, who had chaired
the bench during the proceedings, was abducted by the torturers and Muhirwa died in prison a
month later.1217
Some authorities condemned police brutality against suspects and prisoners.1218 For example, in
April 1995, Seth Sendashonga, Minister of Home Affairs accused prison warders and secret police of
perpetrating "Nazi-type atrocities of torture" against inmates and detainees. He asserted that one
popular method of torture was packing iron objects into suspects' genitals. He wondered how the
gruesome tortures were being committed under the "noses of leaders who claimed to be guided by
the rule of law." He said tortures were being committed especially against inmates whose cases
were of a political nature. He added that government, army and party leaders should not be using
institutions created to serve the people for torturing innocent citizens. He alleged that tortures were
administered because of "biased and unfortunate reports" and that in most cases the police did not
have sufficient evidence against detainees. He also deplored the interference of army soldiers in
1215Seeletter dated 19 February 1995 addressed to the Director of Gitarama prison by Médecins Sans Frontieres quoted
in Centre de Lutte Contre /'Injustice et /'Impunité au Rwanda, 008/97.
1216RP 470/95/Kig., 1995
1217CLCIR,CL 01/96, p. 2.
1218The wide-spread and pervasive nature of torture and inhuman treatment of prisoners and suspects drew criticism
from international human rights organisations such as Amnesty International (Amnesty International, AI INDEX: AFR
47/05/95, 14/9/1995) and Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch Africa, The Aftermath of Genocide in Rwanda,
September 1994).
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police matters .1219
Faustin Twagiramungu, former Prime Minister, alleged that Rwanda was building "torture chambers".
He told the National Assembly of some gruesome tortures, in which inmates and detainees were
stripped naked, had pins pushed into their genitals and were left in agonising pain.122oBut his
remarks had no positive effect.
In addition to the explanation for the prevalence of torture and police brutality in Chapter two, the
excessive politicisation and ethnicisation of the gendarmerie and the office of public prosecution to
which the police judiciaire belongs bred lack of discipline and lack of professionalism. The police has
had, since colonial times, operated in an oppressive government in which the civil and political rights
of the individual have been subordinated to public security and public order. The gendarmerie and
police judiciaire have been used as an instrument to suppress dissent against the government. Thus,
the police were loyal not to the Constitution but to the political leaders of the day. Political leaders,
including the President, often defended the police against accusations of brutality.1221
Moreover, the prevalence of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment can also be explained by
the interference of the army in tasks falling within the competence of the police. Since colonisation
the army has been interfering in the maintenance of law and order. During the Hutu regimes, army
soldiers were responsible for arrest, torture and killing of people believed to be "enemies of the
Republic" whereas during the Tutsi regime, RPA soldiers were responsible for the same acts on
persons suspected to be "infiltrators' and/or to have participated in the genocide. Some officers have
apparently viewed their domain as extending beyond their normal action into the judicial sphere.1222
The so-called "operation clean-up" in 1994 and 1995 also worked against the right to liberty. Armed
police, aided by heavily armed soldiers and helicopter gun-ships, usually sealed off large sections of
a town or a residential area, preventing anyone from leaving or entering the target area for several
hours at a time. They then proceeded to search, without search warrants or probable cause, all
1219Statementby Seth Sendashonga, Council of Ministers, 1995; Sendashonga, 12 Nov. 1997.
122°Faustin Twagiramungu, Conference, Brussels, 14 November 1996.
1221Forinstance, during the Habyarimana era in May 1988, the gendarmerie violently broke up a demonstration by
University of Rwanda students. The government-controlled press published a picture which clearly showed gendarmes
brutally kicking students. This was not just an aberration. On numerous occasions, General Kagame sent heavily
armed soldiers, paramilitary police and regular gendarmes to the so-called "red zones". The security forces would
surround the area late at night when people were asleep and then, at the crack of dawn, force the people at gunpoint to
assemble in a central area and open fire. Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 105.
1222Human Rights Watch/Africa and Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Oroits de /'Homme, Apri/1995, Vol. 7, No.
1, p. 7.
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houses, business premises and people, who were often stripped naked. These searches were
intended to flush out "infiltrators", criminals, and to recover stolen property.1223However, hundreds of
Hutus were arrested without arrest warrants and detained without accusation or trial. Many of them
were evicted from their properties. A number of them died in custody and the properties were taken
and illegally occupied by officers of the Rwandan Patriotic Army.1224Such indiscriminate searches
and mass detentions of people were a serious violation of the right to liberty, as well as other rights
and freedoms such as the freedom of movement, freedom from deprivation of property, and the right
to privacy of home and other property.
In March 1998, about 167,000 people were in detention in prisons allover the country and and in
secret places, many of them for alleged participation in the 1994 genocide. 58,450 (35%) were under
PVA, 61,790 (37%) without any title and 25,050 (15%) under warrant for provisional arrest. This
means that 145,290 (87%) inmates were in detention before trial and without order for preventive
detention.1225 The most striking fact is that the National Assembly has enacted a retroactive law
extending the period of provisional detention to December 31, 1999 for this category of suspect
arrested before December 31, 1997.1226 This suggests that all the suspects arrested before
December 31, 1999 may remain in prison for more than five years without a warrant for provisional
arrest or order for preventive detention .1227
Contrary to emergency regulations studied in section 2.6, the police declared illegal curfews on many
occasions.1228 Thousands of people were arrested, detained and fined for breaking these illegal
curfews. Some of the curfews were often applied only to Hutus under the pretext that they were a
danger to the 'sécurité de I'Etat'. During a curfew declared by the Ministry of Defence, particularly in
1223Forexample in Jan 21, 1995, heavily armed security forces, supported by helicopter gun-ships mounted a massive
clean-up operation in Kigembe, in which hundreds of aliens, mostly from Burundi were rounded up. The security forces
raided homes and business premises and seized large quantities of goods and money. In Ruhengeri, armed units
sealed off all public places such as hotels and guesthouses at dawn before conducting searches of all rooms and
occupants. Troops were ordered to arrest any "aliens" not able to produce valid immigration papers, and also anyone
found with large sums of money. All roads leading out of the city were sealed off and motorists were only allowed
through after their vehicles had been thoroughly searched. (La Voix des Sans Voix, No.2, March 1995). Such
operations have been carried out on a regular basis.
1224Centre de Lutle Contre I'lnjustice et l'lmpunité au Rwanda, 008/97.
1225Forcede Résistance pour la Démocratie, 10 April 1998.
1226AgenceFrance Presse, 9 January 1998. A great number of the suspects were arrested in 1994 through 1995.
1227For the impact of this state of affairs on human rights regime since 1994, see RDR, Press Release, No. 18, 1999.
1228Example: the curfew imposed on October 7, 1996, in Ruhengeri was declared by the gendarmerie without
consultation with administrative authorities. Radio Rwanda, news at 19 hours.
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Gikongoro1229after Tutsis had seized power in 1994, RPA soldiers opened fire to about 8,000 Hutus
who had taken refuge in Kibeho.1230 During the consecutive nights of 20 and 21 April 1995, RPA
soldiers opened fire on the crowd of refugees and also fired on them several times during the day on
22 and 23 April, until 5 p.m. They threw grenades at women and children. According to Human
Rights Watch, the soldiers hurriedly buried some of the dead during nights of 22 and 23 April and
early in the morning on the 23rd, and threw the rest into latrines. They prevented the blue helmets
and human rights observers from seeing the bodies in certain parts of the camp. In the few places
where access was not denied, UN officials estimated the deaths at 4,050.1231The Centre de Lutte
Contre I'lnjustice et I'lmpunité au Rwanda counted 8,000 dead.1232Furthermore, between 24 and 27
October 1997, villagers fleeing violence during a curfew declared in Ruhengeri took refuge in the
Nyakinama caves. The Rwandan army and security forces bombed the caves, killing thousands of
people.
A fake attack similar to the one in Kigali on 1 October 1990 occurred in 1997 when a pattern of
killings of detainees by RPF security forces emerged. The most serious incident occurred in May
when a guard opened the communal detention centre at Bugarama in Cyangugu to kill the inmates.
Rwandan authorities argued that the prison had been attacked by armed groups and that the
security forces intervened to "maintain public order'.'.1233At least 46 detainees were shot by guards
who also threw grenades through cell windows. However, United Nations' human rights observers
and local human rights organisations reported that the detention centre building showed no sign of
an attack from outside.
With regard to press freedom, the government has operated a sort of "ethnic cleansing" of the State
media. Anxious to avoid the emergence of more "hate media", the ruling RPF has called for
journalists to be responsible and maintains strict control of information. Newspapers in the country
include two publications controlled by the Rwandan Information Office (ORINFOR), La Nouvelle
Releve and Invaho Nshya, and a range of weeklies that appear with varying regularity, including
Intego and Le Partisan, which have been both victims of official harassment.1234The government has
1229Radio Rwanda, News bulletin, 27/11/1994
1230 Matata, Violations flagrantes des droits de la personne humaine, 1996.
1231Human Rights Watch/Africa and Fédération Internationale des Droits de I'Homme, quoted in Dialogue, No. 183, May-
June 1995, p. 36-37.
1232Matata, Report 1997.
1233Amnesty International, Report, 1997.
1234The Editor-in-chief of Le Partisan has been forced into exile and live in USA since April 1999.
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no immediate plans to privatize broadcasting. Three applications to start private radio stations have
been on ice since 1994. They are Human Rights Radio, put forward by the Col/ectif des Associations
des Droits de /'Homme (CLADHO), which groups various human rights organizations, and the
French-language Belgian branch of Amnesty International, Agatashya, submitted by the Swiss
charity Hirondel/e, and Radio Unité, submitted by the diocese of Kabgayi.1235
Journalists have been reported missing, have been arbitrarily arrested, threatened and harassed.
Manasse Mugabo, head of the Kinyarwanda-Ianguage section of the United Nations' Radio
(MINUAR), left his home to go to Uganda on 19 August 1995. He never arrived, and neither his wife
nor his employers have received any indication that he is alive since. He was officially on leave from
15 to 31 August. On 2 September the MINUAR peacekeeping force contacted the journalist's wife,
who confirmed that was missing. MINUAR officially informed the government on 10 September and
human rights organizations on 12 September. The security services claim to have opened an inquiry
but no findings have been published. On 4 October, annoyed by the government dragging its feet,
MINUAR publicly announced that the journalist had gone missing. A source close to Mugabo
recalled that he had received direct threats from officers of the RPA.1236
Radio Rwanda journalist Dominique Makeli has been held at Rilima prison since 18 September 1994.
Some witnesses say he was arrested for declaring on the radio that his and others' houses were occupied
by RPA militia.1237 One government Minister accused a senior ORINFOR official of having Makeli
imprisoned unjustly. Despite promises from the justice and defence ministries, representatives of Reporters
Sans Frontieres were refused permission to visit him on six consecutive occasions between September
1994 and May 1996.1238
Gédéon Mushimiyimana, a journalist with Rwandan national television, was arrested in Kigali on 17 March
1995 and accused of belonging to the Coalition for the Defence of the Republic, a Hutu extremist
movement implicated in the 1994 genocide. An RPA soldier, a police officer and a police inspector went to
arrest Joseph Ruyenzi at his office on 30 March. The journalist, a Hutu, had been in charge of
1235Reporters Sans Frontiéres, 1 Feb. 1998.
12361d.
1237Caporal Maniragaba, 14 March 1995; Agnes Mujawamariya, 12 May 1996; André Karuhije, 26 March 1998.
1238Reporters Sans Frontiéres, 1 Feb. 1998.
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Kinya/Wanda-Ianguage programmes on Radio Rwanda since January 1995. Observers believe he was a
victim of a plot to stop him working for the radio station.1239
In June, the staff of the privately owned weekly Intego entered a period of continual harassment. Amiel
Nkuliza, editor who also runs the weekly Le Partisan, was briefly arrested and questioned on 10 June about
a report on tension in the country. On 29 July a court ordered the seizure of Intego's 15th issue at the
printing works, shortly before it was due to be distributed. The next day managing editor Isaie Niyoyita was
summoned by the court for interrogation. Meanwhile Appolos Hakizimana, another Intego journalist, was
arrested and held at Muhima police station. Nkuliza was arrested again on 6 August by three men wearing
civilian clothes and one soldier. He was held for a week. The arrest came the day after the most recent
issue of Intego and the 37th issue of Le Partisan appeared. He was questioned about various reports that
had appeared in Intego and a soldier warned him that he might be killed if he wrote any more reports
considered subversive by the government.1240
Boniface Murutampunzi, a journalist with Radio Rwanda and a contributor to international media such as
Africa NO.1, Deutsche Welle and Radio France Internationale (RFI), took refuge abroad on 24 June 1996.
He said there was a "denigration and intimidation" campaign against him, and pointed to an article in La
Nouvelle ReliNe headlined "Unpatriotic press correspondents". He was accused of being an "agent" for an
"anti-patriotic organization" - Amnesty International - because he had passed on information about
atrocities committed by the government. He fled to escape what he described as "certain arrest".1241
RFI journalist Ghislaine Dupont was assaulted in her hotel room on the evening of her arrival in Kigali on 5
March 1995. Two men armed with knives got into the room, accused her of being an enemy of the
Rwandan people and threatened to kill her, then stole her money and made off. Despite the journalist's
cries for help, the two men were not prevented from leaving the Hotel des Diplomates. The police force
second-in-command, Jean Damascene Sekamana, was at the hotel when the assault occurred, but only
took action 25 minutes later. Dupont complained to the police, who refused to give her a copy of her
statement. 1242
1239 Caporal Maniragaba, 14 March 1995; Agnes Mujawamariya, 12 May 1996; André Karuhije, 26 March 1998;
Reporters Sans Frontiéres, 1 Feb. 1998.
1240 Reporters Sans Frontiéres, 1 Feb. 1998.
1241 Murutampunzi, B., 10 Oct. 1997.
1242 RFI, 6 May 1995, quoted in Karemano, The Rwandan tragedy, at43.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
303
These data are sufficient to demonstrate that the abuses have occurred so often during the post-genocide
government and in such similar ways that they must have been directed by officers holding highly
responsible positions. The fact that these abuses were known to and tolerated by the highest levels of
command of the RPF forces is evidence of the scant regard of Rwanda authorities for human rights.
3.4 Military officers in power
The RPF as a whole is composed of ethnic Tutsis from Uganda, Burundi, Zaïre, Rwanda (survivors
of genocide), Kenya, Tanzania, Europe and the United States. Most of them contributed to the war
against Habyarimana administration, in giving funds to the RPF, or sending their sons and daughters
to the battlefield in the ranks of the RPA. But those members from Uganda, a distinct political faction,
effectively seized the leadership. It is this group of "Ugandans" known as the akazu which effectively
came to form the government. The "non-Ugandans", perceived externally to be part of the ruling
structure, are isolated and alienated from the "Ugandans". Those who created akazu are from the
same refugee camps named Nyakivara and Nshungerezi in Uganda, and originally came from
Gahini in the Kibungo prefecture of Rwanda.1243
The RPF power structure in Rwanda is dual. There is a government, of course, but this government
carries out policies, it does not define them. To give an example of how this works: late in 1996 the
then Minister of Finance, Marc Rugenera, was asked point blank by RPA colonel to give him $US
500,000 "to take care of urgent matters". When asked to state in greater detail what the money was
for, he said it was to pay his men. The Minister then asked him for a detailed list of personnel for
whom this money was earmarked and what their salaries were. Whereupon the Colonel exploded
and told Rugenera that he would "hear about it". Later, Vice President and Minister of Defence Major
General Paul Kagame phoned Rugenera and told him to pay the $US 500,000 to the Colonel "for the
good of the country". Rugenera did not push the matter any further and arranged for payment of the
money.1244This illustrates fairly well the relationship between the army and the civilian government.
Practically all the key men in the power structure are "Ugandans" who either are current or former
RPA officers. Nepotism and regionalism in the military forces is well remarked when it comes to
promotion: almost only "Ugandans" are promoted and observers have seen this as a reason for the
closure of the institute of military sciences, the Ecole Supérieure Militaire (ESM). According to
1243For details about the akazu, see Mugabe, J.P., 'Mbwirire Kagame muruhame rwa bose', Rwandanet, 10 June 1999.
1244lbid.
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Mugabe, the closure was to prevent general applications for officer candidacy so that officers could
be selected solely from the akazu families and not from other regions.1245"Most high-ranking officers
are uneducated and from Uganda while many of the non-commissioned officers are educated high
school and college graduates and from other countries than Uganda. Open dissent is rare, however,
from "non-Ugandans" because of the fear of the Department of Military Intelligence (DMI), itself not
surprisingly, led by officers from Uganda".1246Indeed, in the Security organs it is sometimes possible
to find an innocuous Hutu officer in the official Number one position. But the real power is in the
hands of Number two. The name and practice of the DMI was directly borrowed from the
corresponding Ugandan service. Major-General Kagame had been second in command of DMI in
Uganda before the 1 October 1990 attack. The name of the service has never been translated into
French and it was the almost exclusive preserve of former Ugandan Army officers. It keeps files on
all political personnel and has targeted as "accomplices of the infiltrators" all the various Hutu
politicians who have been marginalized during the RPF regime.1247Keeping tabs on the others has
helped to keep them in line.
During the RPF regime, there were many colonels in civilian positions, such as Emmanuel Ndahiro,
who was a personal aide to Major-General Kagame and his ears and eyes when he accompanied
cabinet Ministers on foreign trips, Ephraim Kabayija who was a special adviser on the question of the
returnees from Zaïre, or the already mentioned Frank Mugambage who shadowed President
Bizimungu. Claude Dusaidi, General Kagame's diplomatic adviser, was also a "Ugandan".1248
The same group of "Ugandan" colonels, such as Colonel Fred Ibingira who is head of the Kigali
Military Region, held key positions in the army.1249The "Ugandan colonels", whether in the army or
outside it, were the real new elite of the country. They relied on a second tier of non military
"Ugandans" who were their friends, relatives and associates back in Uganda and tried, as far as
possible, to monopolise all the good jobs in the monetary sector of the economy. In fact, many had
relatives who had stayed in Uganda, perhaps as a kind of "insurance" in case things go really bad in
Rwanda, and many were shuttling back and forth. Among the "shutters" some ended up deciding
1245Mugabe, Mbwirire Kagame kukarubanda, p. 3.
1246Ibid.
12471bid.
12481bid.
1249Colonellbingira was the local commanding officer in April 1995 when the Kibeho Internally Displaced Persons' camp
came under attack from the RPA, causing about 8,000 casualties. He was tried in late 1996, given a six-month
suspended sentence for "negligence" and walked out of the courtroom a free man to take up his command in the Kigali
Military Region within days.
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that it was better for them to stay in Uganda, thus widening the network.125o
3.5 The return to the ancien modele
In the contest for ascendancy between State leaders and strongmen, State leaders invariably resort
to the tactic of regime modification.1251 "The Big Shuffle" consists of a rapid and unpredictable
turnover of personnel in strategic positions within the regime and bureaucracy, through the power of
appointment available to State leaders, so as to prevent individuals from developing autonomous
sets of interests which differ from those of State leaders. Non-merit appointment, such as those
based on personal loyalty to State leaders, co-optation of potential rivals, and the so-called "ethnic
bargain" aim to achieve the same objective.1252 The final tactic consists of "dirty tricks", ranging from
illegal imprisonment of opponents through to deportation and the elimination of individuals by death
squads. Extreme tactics like these, where State leaders subvert the rules they need for effective
State building, set in motion a process of de-institutionalisation and thus undermine the very project
for which they are deployed.1253
When the RPF launched the war, the establishment of a State of law and a democratic system which
were the main claims was just a pretext and the RPF took advantage of the genocide to set up a
self-proclaimed government and related institutions. Observers have indicated that the suppression
of political activities, the decisive place of the army in the government, the parliament, justice and
civil service and the neutralisation of communal, prefectural and national institutions by powerful
military secret services proceed from the establishment of a hegemonic, absolute and oppressive
regime.1254
1250lbid.
1251Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, at 217-226. Migdal does not use the state/regime distinction but merely
draws a line between State leaders and State bureaus and agencies. It is clear from his analysis, however, that some of
these agencies and bureaus are products of specific regime types. According to Fishman, a regime refers to a
component within the State, consisting of values, norms, rules and procedures that deal with the ordering of power within
the different organizational sites of the State. Fishman, R., "Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe's Transition
to Democracy". World Politics, (1990, April) 42,422-440.
1252The Lebanese National Pact of 1943 is selected as a prime example of an "ethnic bargain". While this label hardly
does justice to the complexity of this pact and other such constitutional arrangements, Migdal's awareness of these kinds
of regime types links his framework to the body of literature which focuses on the appropriate constitutional rules for
democracy in divided societies.
1253du Toit, P., Civil Society, Democracy and State-building in South Africa, Research Report No.1, Stellenbosch:
Centre for International and Comparative Politics (Stellenbosch University), 1993, p. 5.
12540therwise, members of opposition parties, or simply Hutus, have been harassed in many ways. Some have been
fired from jobs, evicted from their houses and prevented from using public facilities. Others, such as Sylvestre Kamali
have been arbitrarily arrested for allegedly posing a "threat to the State's security". Amnesty International report, April
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Moreover, the ethnicisation of institutions is a sign of a regime based on exclusion and ethnic
discrimination instead of inclusion and equality before the law. In a country where nearly 90% of the
population are Hutus and nearly 10% are Tutsis, out of 21 government ministers 13 are Tutsis; the
army is overwhelmingly Tutsi; all the councillors at State House are Tutsis; out of 17 principal private
secretaries 14 are Tutsis; out of 5 departmental heads in the office of the Prime Minister 3 are Tutsis;
out of 18 director generals 16 are Tutsis; out of 60 general managers of parastatals 58 are Tutsis;
out of 10 chairpersons and vice-chairpersons of parliamentary commissions 8 are Tutsis; in the local
government, out of 11 prefects 8 are Tutsis and all the 143 burgomasters are Tutsis.1255As one
commentator said, "these integrated Hutus are just there to show the donor community that the
power is not mono-ethnic".1256
3.6 Abuse of legislative power: The Organic Law No. 8/96
On 30 November 1996, the government gazette, Journal Officiel de la République Rwandaise,
published the first list of 1946 suspects of genocide and crimes against humanity, in execution of the
Organic Law No. 8/96 of 30 August 1996 regulating the prosecution and punishment of the acts of
genocide and crimes against humanity perpetrated in Rwanda since 1990. The analysis of both
instruments reveals a deliberate violation of certain human rights by the RPF Tutsi regime.
3.6.1 The wording of the organic law
Article 9 of the Organic Law No. 8/96 of 30 August 1996 provides that,
As investigations proceed, a list of persons suspected or accused of acts placing them within
Category one shall be prepared and updated on a continuing basis by the Prosecutor General of
the Supreme Court. This list shall be published three months after this Organic Law is published
in the Official Gazette, and shall be republished periodically thereafter as it is updated.
This provision suggests that progressive results of a judicial inquiry will be published and thus,
persons whose names appear on the list should be those "suspected or accused". In other words,
1997. See also Rwanda pour taus, Mémorandum sur la crise rwandaise, Brussels, 24 October 1995, p. 4; Prunier, G.,
Rwanda: The Social, Political and Economic Situation, at 11.
1255Rwandapour taus, Memorandum sur la crise rwandaise, at 5.
1256Kamanda, B., "The RPF Reveals its Image". Rwandafor, 25 June 1998. However, nepotism has also divided RPF
members and the armed forces. For example, most RPF ambassadors are from the same region of Kibungo prefecture.
Examples: Rudasingwa (Washington DC); Kayinamura (UN); Rugema (Israel); Nsenga (London); Karenzi (South Africa);
Mukanyange (Tanzania); Karenzi, T. (Burundi). International Strategic Studies Association, Substantial Movement
Toward New Rwanda War, Aug. 9, 1999.
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there should be a complaint and public action against them. The examination of the individual
dossier should allow the Prosecutor General to conclude that serious clues of evidence of guilt exist
so as to rank the suspects in Category one. According to Article 2 this category comprises only:
Persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them among the
planners, organisers, instigators, supervisors and leaders of the crime of genocide or of a crime
against humanity; persons who acted in positions of authority at the national, prefectural,
communal, sector or cell level, or in a political party, the army, religious organizations or in a
militia and who perpetrated or fostered such crimes; notorious murderers who by virtue of the
zeal or excessive malice with which they committed atrocities, distinguished themselves in their
areas of residence or where they passed; and persons who committed acts of sexual torture.
These persons allegedly responsible for the Rwandan tragedy are likely to be sentenced to death
and to the total and perpetual loss of civil rights.1257 Such an accusation is so serious that it should
be based on serious and confirmed clues.
Moreover, the published list raises many questions: was the publication in the Official Gazette the
right way to deal with genocide suspects? Was the publication within the jurisdiction of the Procureur
Général who is under the hierarchical authority of the Minister of Justice? Was not there a confusion
between the competence of the "General Attorney" or the "Deputy Minister of Justice" in the United
States system and those of the Rwandan Procureur General? Are the persons mentioned in the list
presumed innocent or already condemned by the already done categorisation? Did the published list
correspond to legal requirements for prosecution? What are the predictable consequences on the
persons whose names appear on the list for the State and the prosecutor who drew the list in case
some of the suspects sue them for libel? What attitude should the international justice take vis-a-vis
the named persons? Does the list bind the person who drew it or prosecutors dealing with the
charges in question?
3.6.2 Legislation on publication in the official gazette
The Ordonnance Législative No. R/60 (1962)1258 which provides for the publication of formal official
decisions determines the decisions of which publication in the Official Gazette is imperative. These
are, according to Article 1, the acts of parliament, presidential orders which have been passed in the
Council of Ministers, ministerial orders upon presidential delegation, administrative decisions taken
by a competent authority for the whole population, as well as for individuals in certain administrative
1257Id., art. 14 & 17.
12580rdonnance Législative No. R/60 of 28 June 1962, J.O., 1962, p. 305.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
308
cases. 1259
After the preamble, the publication reads "Ordonnons que". This expression can be assimilated to an
"ordonnance" (order). However, an order made by the high ranking prosecutor in the Ministere Public
which is under the authority of the Government and the Minister of Justice1260 does not find any
place in the hierarchy of norms in force in Rwanda.
In the preamble, it is provided that "Vu la loi organique No. 8/96 du 30 AoOt 1996, spécialement en
son article 9, ensemble {'ordonnance légis/ative No. R/60 du 28 Juin 1962, en son article 1er alinéa
2".
This suggests that the list published in the Official Gazette is one of the decisions taken for execution
of the Article 9 of Organic Law No. 8/96. According to the 1991 Constitution, under Article 16, 1° of
the protocol relating to power sharing, the government is the principal institution in charge of the
execution of laws. The President is also vested with the same authority by Article 14, 4°, which
emphasises that the President must be explicitly required to execute a given law. One would,
therefore, wonder how a public prosecutor could enact decisions in execution of laws whereas the
President of the Republic cannot do it, except when he is explicitly required to do so.
The Code d'Organisation et de Compétence Judiciaires which determines, inter alia, the mission of
the Ministére Public provides that,
(oo.) exerce {'action publique et requiert {'application de la loi; il poursuit {'exécution des arrêts et
jugements rendus en matiere repressive pour ce qui concerne les dispositions intéressant {'ordre
public. /I a la surveillance des officiers de police judiciaire et des officiers publics. 1261
En matiere répressive, le Ministere Public recherche les infractions aux lois et reglements; il
regoit les plaintes et les dénonciations, fait les actes d'instruction et saisit les tribunaux. 1262
It follows that the Code does not provide for the enactment of decisions in execution of laws. In their
investigative mission, the Officiers du Ministere Public can only issue warrants: warrant for arrest,
summons, search warrant etc.1263 and not enact orders. An order is not an act of investigation.
1259Example: appointment of a Prefect, a burgomaster, a director general; promotion, dismissal or suspension of a civil
servant etc.
1260SeeCode d'Organisation et de Compétence Judiciaires, art. 63.
12611d.,art. 57.
1262Id.,art. 58, par. 2.
12638eeCode de Procédure Pénale, art. 25 & 32.
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Therefore, it is exceptional that an order of such a magnitude could be enacted by an Officier du
Ministére Public. The reference in the preamble to the Ordonnance Législative No. R/60, particularly
to its Article 1, paragraph 2, shows clearly that the measure enacted ranks among administrative
acts enacted under the supervision and control of the Government. As far as the prosecutor is
concerned, the decision was published in the Official Gazette in violation of certain essential rules
and principles for a judicial investigation worthy of the name.
3.6.3 Rules and principles violated
The atrocities that Rwanda has endured since October 1, 1990 require adequate, appropriate and
stringent solutions. However, whatever measures are taken should respect the rule of presumption
of innocence and the principle of secret of investigation.
The presumption of innocence is provided for in Article 11, 1° of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and in Article 14, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As
already seen, Rwanda is party to these instruments and the presumption of innocence is guaranteed
in Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Constitution, as well as in Article 16 of the Code de Procédure
Pénale which puts the burden of proof on the Ministére Public or the private party associating in
action with the public prosecutor for compensation. Article 16 reads:
La charge de la preuve incombe au Ministére Public ou, en cas de constitution de partie civile ou
de citation directe, a la victime ou a ses ayants cause. Le prévenu est présumé innocent tant que
sa culpabilité n'est pas établie par une condamnation devenue définitive. Aussi longtemps que sa
culpabilité n'est pas établie, Ie prévenu n'est pas tenu de fournir la preuve de son innocence.
Toutefois, lorsqu'un fait est prouvé, il appartient au prévenu d'établir toutes exceptions, fin de
non-recevoir, cause de justification ou d'excuses, toute preuve contraire.
On the list, certain persons are identified under names and/or surnames without any mention of
charge, commune of origin or place of commission of the crime. This suggests that the process was
at the stage of preliminary investigation and, thus, suspicion. Otherwise, as some have asserted, this
would look like an invitation to the suspects to present their guilty plea.1264 But this assertion is not
right because the publication of a name in the Official Gazette under the first category of criminals
legally constitutes an obstacle for the accession to extenuating excuses for a plea of guilt provided
for in Article 9 of the Organic Law. This provision, omitting the irrelevant part, reads,:
(...) a person who confesses and pleads guilty, and whose name was not published on the list of
1264See Raporo y'inama y'abaperezida, 3 Nyakanga 1996, p. 34 - 36.
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Category one, shall not be placed in Category one if the confession is complete and accurate. If
his confession should place him in Category one, he shall be placed in Category two.
It adds:
Persons who shall have confessed their criminal acts before the list of names of Category one is
published shall be placed in Category one if the acts they have committed place them there.
This provision shows clearly that the publication of names or surnames in the Official Gazette
automatically makes the persons in question guilty and this is blatant violation of the constitutional
right of presumption of innocence to which the suspect is entitled until a final court decision.
The principle of secret of investigation forms one body with the presumption of innocence. They
contribute together to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. As long as a person
is not condemned by a final decision of a court of law, it is formally prohibited to divulge elements of
investigation contained in his dossier. In the civil law system, the procedure is unilateral, written and
secret during the pre-trial phase. The Ministere Public, which, in Rwanda, plays the role of the
examining magistrate, has the obligation to conduct the investigation in order to charge or discharge
the suspect.1265 It is an institution in charge of the protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in a democratic regime.
Article 9 of the Organic Law No. 8/96 reads "au fur et a mesure que les enquêtes progressent ..... "
This suggests that the publication in the Official Gazette concerns persons whose dockets are under
investigation. It also suggests that there are sufficient charges for these persons to rank in the first
category of criminals. Although publication is a legal obligation, it is in violation of the principle of
secrecy of instruction, mostly since the author of the decision is himself exceptionally in command of
public prosecution. This exceptional capacity is conferred upon him by Article 22, paragraph 3 of the
Organic Law:
Le Procureur Général pres la Cour Suprême assure la supervision et la direction générale des
parquets de la République et des parquet généraux pour les matieres relevant de la compétence
des chambres spéciales.
This provision is a derogation from Article 59 of the Code d'Organisation et de Compétence
Judiciaires which limits the capacity of the Prosecutor General to the cases to be judged by the
1265Kint,R., Introduction au droit écrit et il la recherche juridique, Butare: UNR, 1983, p. 48.
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Supreme Court only .1266
3.6.4 Relevance of the facts communicated to the public
3.6.4.1 Identification of suspects
As already shown, the provision that "au fur et il mesure que les enquêtes progressent ... " suggests
that dockets are already opened against persons of whom data that identify them are given in the
Official Gazette under their registration numbers. These persons are accused of actions ranking
them in the first category. However, they are identified in various ways on the basis of sundry data,
some of which do not allow unequivocal and certain identification of persons in question.
Article 62 of the Code de Procédure Pénale determines the required data for the identification of the
suspect: name, surname, sex, residence, summary of the offence, place and date of commission
and provision of the penal code which defines and punishes the offence. These data allow the
Officier du Ministere Public to personalise the offence and to avoid judicial errors. Any judicial
complaint must contain necessary data for the identification of the perpetrators of acts brought under
attack and which, if necessary, can allow the judge to request extradition to Rwanda of persons who
are outside the Rwandan territory.1267
It should be pointed out that Rwandan law does not require a family name1268and the same names
and surnames for people from different families are a common occurrence in Rwanda, which is likely
to lead to confusion. On the list in the Official Gazette, most of the data provided comprise the name
and surname, ex-occupation or political party, and for some suspects, the commune, parish, sector
or cell of residence.
Many suspects are identified by name and surname only, without any other reference. This is the
case for persons appearing under numbers 208, 209, 210, 218, 219, 220, 222, 232, 233, 236, 237,
244, 248, 270, 275, 313, 333, 334, 337, 361, 1687, 1906, 1907, 1908, 1909, 1910, 1911, 1915,
1916,1917,1918,1919,1920, and 1921.1269Others are identified either by their name or surname,
1266According to article 59, Le procureur Général pres la Cour de Cassation [Cour Suprême} n'exerce pas /'action
publique, sauf lorsqu'i1 intente une action dont le jugement est attribué il la Cour de Cassation [Cour Suprême}.
12671nMP v Kagenza, for example, the court acquitted the defendant because the prosecutor had failed to identify his sex
and place of residence. See Kibungo, RPM 105/3.
1268Theonly requirement is just a surname (any) within 15 days following the birth. The first name is optional. See Loi
No. 42/1988 of 27 October 1988, art. 59, J.O., 1989, p. 9.; Codes et Lois du Rwanda, Vol. I, p. 189.
1269Ntampaka, C., 'La Justice rwandaise a I'épreuve du droit, in: Dialogue, No. 195, p. 21.
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for example, numbers 163, 164, 185, 186, 190, 194, 200, 202, 226, 267, 282, 283, 1461, 1476,
1510, 1528, 1604, .... 1270 The frequency of Rwandans bearing the same names and/or surnames
would render legal proceedings against inadequately-indentified people almost impossible.
Other persons are falsely identified by positions they did not occupy or titles they have never born.
For example, number 64 is identified as former president of the MRND. However, the MRND has
had two successive presidents: Juvénal Habyarimana and Matthieu Ngirumpatse1271 and none of
them appear under No. 64. Number 88 is identified as "ex-officier des FAR (Major), ancien
Secrétaire Général du Ministere de la Justice, partisan de la CDR". However, it has become clear
that there was a confusion with another person who was neither a military officer nor a secretary
general.1272
Number 141 is labelled "Président du gouvernement MRND-CDR". But such a government did not
exist during the period in question and has never existed in the Rwandan history.
Other persons appear under two different numbers identified by different data. This is the case for
persons under numbers 32 and 252; 119 and 193; 894 and 1893.
The lack of uniformity, the diversity of data of identification and the omission of basic data for the
identification of suspects reflects the precipitation and lack of seriousness with which the lists were
established and published and, thus, the precariousness of the human rights of the suspects.
3.6.4.2 The legal description of facts
The Organic Law No. 8/96 provides for the prosecution of acts that constitute the crime of genocide,
war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated in Rwanda from October 1, 1990. These crimes
are defined in international conventions1273 and the Nuremberg principles adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations in 1946 and which constitutes customary lnternatlonai taw.w- These
1270lbid.
1271SeeManifeste et Statut du MRND, at 13; Rapport du Gongrés National du MRND, 4 March 1991.
1272Testimony from Kamatali, Justice Ministry, quoted in Ntampaka, La Justice rwandaise a I'épreuve du droit, at 21.
1273Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, U.N., Treaty Series, vol.
78, p. 277; the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949;
Convention on the non-application of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity, 26 November
1968, UN, Treaty Series, vol. 754, p 73.
1274Reference can also be made to the following reports by Americas Watch Committee, Violations of the Laws of War
by Both Sides in Nicaragua 1981 - 1985 (1985); Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides in Nicaragua -1985, First
Supplement (June 1985); Human Rights in Nicaragua 1985 -1986 (1986). Common Art. 3 reads as follows: 'In the case
of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each
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are the only possible qualifications referred to by the Organic Law.
Apart from the name, surname and ex-occupation, the list mentions, as elements of identification,
expressions such as CDR, MRNO, actionnaire de RTLM, chef suprême des interahamwe, membre
des interahamwe, membre du MOR, membre du MOR-Power, chef du MOR-Power, PL-Power,
interahamwe, membre de l'escadron de la mort, etc.1275 No precise indication concerning the legal
qualification of facts is mentioned beside the published name. This raises the issue of knowing
whether these expressions constitute the charges against the persons in question.
As seen, membership of political parties was authorised by the law on political parties of 18 June
1991.1276 Making membership of a political party or any other registered organisation a charge
means that the membership per se is considered an offence, which would place the law on the
registration of the organisation itself in question. The author of the list should rather have detailed
punishable acts allegedly perpetrated under cover of their organisation or in its framework by the
suspects. The accusation would, thus, concern the act itself, whereas the organisation would
constitute an aggravation of the offence if, as required by the penal code1277, it was proved that it
was created to facilitate the crime, which is conspiracy punishable under Articles 281 to 283 of the
penal code.
It follows that the facts brought under attack are neither precise, nor defined in time and space. They
are indicated by vague and non-precise terms that do not come near to legal definitions of the
denounced crimes. They are not imputed to indubitably identifiable individuals, which opens the door
to arbitrariness.
3.6.4.3 Prosecution of dead suspects?
Article 1 of the Convention on the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes
Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: (1) Persons taking no active part in
the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the
following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-
mentioned persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, (d)
the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. (2)
The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. ( ... ).
1275Gakwaya, J., 'Condamnation avant Ie jugement?' in: Dialogue, No. 195, January 1997, p. 27.
1276J.O.,1991, p. 728; Codes et Lois du Rwanda, vol, 1, p. 47.
1277SeeCode Pénal, art. 281 - 283.
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against humanity establishes an important rule of imprescriptibility of war crimes and crimes against
humanity including genocide, and Article 37 of the Organic Law No. 8/96 provides that "prosecutions
and penalties for offences constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity are not
subject to a limitation period". This suggests that the passing of time from the perpetration of the
offence or the pronouncement of the final sentence does not have any extinctive influence
respectively on the prosecution and the execution of the sentence. However, according to Article 100
of the penal code, the death of the suspect stops prosecution. During the discussions on Law No.
8/96, a number of members of parliament had no knowledge of this principle. For example,
according to the travaux préparatoires, the members of Parliament found that the principle of
categorisation should not concern only persons in prison, but all guilty persons ... alive or dead.1278
Nevertheless, the bill that was passed did not abrogate Article 100 of the penal code, and Article 39
of the bill provided that
... all laws, including the penal code, the code of criminal procedure and the code of judicial
organisation and competence, shall apply to proceedings ...
But the published list contains persons deceased before the genocide, victims of the genocide or
who died in massacres during and after the genocide. For example, persons numbered 37, 128,300
and 784 died during the genocide.1279 Number 43, judge in the Cour de Cassation, was a victim of
the genocide on 7 April 1994.1280 Those listed under numbers 32, 67, 68, 84,117,130,145,252 and
921 died between April and July 19941281 whereas those under numbers 321, 733 and 1712 died
after July 1994.1282 It is not clear, therefore, how Rwandan courts could prosecute the deceased.
This rather goes against the tradition of the Rwandan society with regard to the deceased, towards
whom the Rwandan society has legendary respect. This respect requires every member of the
society to bow before the deceased and extends beyond burial and even the nothingness, with a
cult1283 frequently developing in honour of the deceased. The publication of the names of deceased
persons in the Official Gazette deeply distressed and afflicted the relatives likely to testify for
1278Thetravaux préparatoires read: "( ) Abadepite basangaga principe ya catégorisation itagendera kubafunze gusa,
ahubwo ireba abakoze ibyaha bose ( ) baba bazima cyangwa barapfuye. Raporo y'inama y'abaperezida yo kuwa 21
Kamena 1996, p. 9.
1279Ntampaka, La Justice rwandaise il I'épreuve du droit, at 23.
128olbid.
1281Gakwaya, Condamnation avant le jugement?, at 35; Ntampaka, La Justice rwandaise il I'épreuve du droit, at 23.
1282Ntampaka, La Justice rwandaise a I'épreuve du droit, at 23.
1283Thiscult is called "guterekera". The deceased is considered as a respectable and omnipotent being of whom relatives
can ask favours relating to rain, children, etc. Ntampaka, C., Introduction au droit coutumier, Butare: UNR, 1983.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
315
them.1284
It follows from the foregoing discussion that the Organic Law contains lacunae. Entrusting the
Procureur Général with publishing the list of persons allegedly of the first category while
investigations aiming at establishing their guilt are still under way is a violation of the constitutional
right of presumption of innocence. It should be understood that the author does not deny the
usefulness of knowing who has been accused and of what to help with their arrest, but what is
considered here is that the system that was used will not bring peace and justice to a country where
responsibility for the atrocities in Rwanda is only put on the Hutus by Tutsis, in a one-party Tutsi-
based State where Tutsis simultaneously are victims, prosecutors and judges. Despite the genocide,
Hutu people know that they have also been victims of atrocities perpetrated by Tutsi soldiers. The
author believes that this Organic Law was mostly due to the lack of representative government and
the failure of the State to equip its apparatus with human resources from both ethnic groups. It was
enacted, not essentially as a deterrent to the culture of impunity, but as a stratagem of maintaining
and strengthening the Tutsi hegemony and, at the same time, as a way of covering up Tutsi
perpetrators of crimes against humanity probably now in government and in the RPA. In practice, it is
seen by Hutus as a "ratification" of the elimination of "educated, physically fit, and mostly male Hutu
people".1285
Besides this, the Organic Law undermines the principle of secrecy of investigation during the
inquisitorial phase, inasmuch as the publication is entrusted to a magistrate under whose authority
and supervision the matter is being investigated.
This was a serious violation of the constitutional principle of presumption of innocence. A number of
persons have to prove their innocence and public opinion, mostly of the Tutsi population who do not
know exactly who killed their relatives, holds them guilty. The proof of evidence is not easy to rely on,
mostly when a person's name appears amongst persons of Category one that is published in the
Official Gazette. This list suggests that these are persons who should be put to death1286and
nowhere in the Organic Law is there any evidence that the Prosecutor General would make
corrections in the same Official Gazette should a person be able to prove his innocence and be
1284Karemano, C., 'Controverses autour de la Loi sur le crime de génocide et les proces des auteurs présumés' in:
Dialogue, No. 195, January 1997, p 37.
1285See Letter to the Secretary General of the Organization of the United Nations, signed by The Rwandan Community
in Zambia, 10/5/1998. Other letters of this kind have been addressed to the OAU (12/3/1997 by Rwandans living in
France); all Western Governments (Id., and living in Belgium: 15/8/1997). See also Matata, 1996 and 1997.
1286Some of them are already dead, in jail or after unfair trial. See Amnesty International report, April 1997.
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acquitted.
Furthermore, the inaccuracy of the identification of suspects, coupled with the absence of charges
and the listing of persons deceased before the genocide, contributes, not only to make trite serious
crimes committed in Rwanda and to strike a severe blow to the memory of victims and their families,
but also to cast discredit on the Procureur Général, if not on the whole Ministére Public.1287
In practice, this law has been seen by a number of Rwandans as a "ratification" of the elimination of
"educated, physically fit, and mostly male Hutu people.1288 In fact, the finger of suspicion has been
pointed at all Hutu people and the way for mass arrests has been cleared. The RPF government has
been arresting people at a rate of up to 2,000 a week. Arrests have been carried out mainly by RPA
soldiers on the basis of verbal statements by one or two accusers. All Hutus, whoever and wherever
they are, inside or outside Rwanda, feel insecure. The terrible conditions in Rwandan prisons have
already been described. By June 1995, Rwanda had around 45,000 prisoners awaiting trial, crowded
into prisons designed to hold 4,500. On 26 April 1995, 28 prisoners died of suffocation in a jail in the
commune of Rusatira in Butare. According to a Médecins sans Frontiéres report, one prison,
Gitarama, which was built to hold 400 prisoners, held over 7,000 by May 1995. Between September
1994 and May 1995, 902 prisoners had died 'as direct result of inhumane living conditions due to the
lack of space'.1289 According to Human Rights Watch, by October 1997, about 120,000 Hutu were
held under "inhumane conditions, crammed into prisons, irregular places of detention and communal
jails meant to house a fraction of that number. In the early part of the year, prisoners in several
central prisons received no or very little food for up to ten days, supposedly because of lack of
firewood for cooking".129o At the end of 1998, over 130,000 Hutus, including children, were detained
in Rwandan jails1291and the Minister of Justice had announced in November that during only two
weeks, 40 detainees at Rilima had died of "a strange disease".1292
Only about 15% of the detained had documented files1293and, under the new "Genocide law", these
accused have no right to challenge their prolonged detention without charge in court.1294The few
1287Gakwaya, Condamnation avant Ie jugement?, at 36.
1288See ICTR, especially note 1296 and accompanying text.
1289'Health status of the inmates of Gitarama Prison, Rwanda', June 1995.
1290Human Rights Watch, Report, 1998.
1291Amnesty International, Report, 1998.
1292Reuters, Friday, 20 November 1998.
1293Matata, 1996.
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trials that have taken place have been held before minority Tutsi judges who have received four
months' training.1295 There have been almost no lawyers and case documents have only been
provided the day before the trial. Most trials have lasted a few hours, have been based on
documentary evidence, and the death penalty has been the general result. The trials, broadcast on
the radio, have been held in an atmosphere of hysteria. These legal lynchings have been praised by
the United Nations Commission for Human Rights, which has stressed the progress made in
Rwanda in the fight against impunity.1296 Amnesty International is one of the few international
organizations to have criticized the trials in its April 8 report "Unfair Trials: Justice Denied".1297
Parallel to this punishment reigns a terrible impunity. In Eastern Zaïre, a few hundred kilometers
away, hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees have been massacred by the Ugandan and
Rwandan armies, not to mention the executions of the local populations by the same armies. The
systematic murder of Catholic leaders such as Archbishop Christophe Munzihirwa of Bukavu is
reminiscent of the tactics of the Salvadorian death squads who murdered the vocal critic and
champion of the people, Archbishop Romero, in September 1980. Christophe Munzihirwa was
himself an outspoken critic of the exactions on the Hutu refugees by the Tutsi army.129BMeanwhile,
no one is accused of the supreme crime of organizing aggressive war in spite of two major invasions
in six years: Rwanda in 1990 and Zaïre in 1996.
The adoption of the slogan of the fight against impunity by Rwandan authorities to justify war and
aggression is little more than human rights demagogy. Behind the thin veneer of respectability
associated with the fight against impunity, can be read once again the history of the last thirty years:
impunity is the rule and is reserved for the powerful Tutsis whereas one-sided punishment is the sort
reserved for the downtrodden Hutus who stand in the way of the RPF hegemony. The changes that
have occurred have nothing in common with the aspirations of Rwandans to democracy and human
rights.
One of the conditions for laws Rwandans can trust is to have a democratic, constitutional
government, therefore a State committed to the protection of the rights of all citizens without
1294ld.
1295 In fact, 80% of Rwandan judges and prosecutors died during the massacres from 1990 through the genocide in
1990, were imprisoned or forced into exile. See Donatella Lorch, Peace in Rwanda is Ugly, Too, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27,
1995, par. 4, at 3, although she contends, without clear evidence, that the exile was self-imposed.
1296 Matata, 1996.
1297 AI Report, 1998.
1298 See for example his letter to the Governor of Bukavu and to the UNHCR delegate to Bukavu, 23 August 1995.
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discrimination whatsoever, because "it is not merely of some fundamental importance but is of
fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly
be seen to be done .... Nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has been
improper interference with the course of justice".1299
3.7 The judiciary in the stranglehold of the executive and the army
A limitation on judicial power is that the judiciary still depends on the non-law-abiding executive to
carry out its decisions or put its orders into effect, or simply get its job done. The coercive forces of
the State are controlled by the executive who may at any time order the gendarmerie and police
judicia ire and the prison authorities not to execute any decrees of the court.
In September 1994, Judge Gratien Ruhorahoza found that some forty detainees brought before him
did not require further preventive detention and he ordered them freed.130oThey were released, but
shortly after most or all of them were re-arrested and sent to the military prison at Rilima. The judge
disappeared soon after. At one time he was thought to be in prison himself, but he was presumed
dead thereafter.1301
The following month, a judge gave an order to free' a young man because the prosecutor had been
unable to locate the persons who had accused him. The detainee was not released. He appealed to
the judge-president of the tribunal, who confirmed his liberation, but was never freed.1302
In early February 1995, the priest of the Byimana parish, Joseph Ndagijimana, was arrested on
charges of having killed several people. Four widows and a widower of his supposed victims said
that he was not involved and four others declared that he, rather, had saved their lives. Another
person confessed to killing some of Ndagijimana's supposed victims. On the basis of this
information, the judge ordered his release but the soldiers who had him in their charge refused to let
him gO.1303
Following the 1994 genocide and subsequent mass arrests, the Minister of Justice created a
1299Lord Hewart in R v Sussex Justice, Ex parte McCarthy (1924) 1KB 256 259.
1300SeeRP 6867/84.Cya; RP 1210/87.But; RP 5210/90. Kib.
1301Human Rights Watch/Africa & Fédération Internationale des Ligues des droits de I'homme, vol. 7, NO.1, April 1995,
p.7.
13021bid.
13031bid.
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"Commission of Liberation" in mid-October 1994 to examine cases of persons who might be eligible
for release. Clearly irregular according to Rwandan legal procedure, the commission was apparently
meant to protect judges from eventual reprisals. Under this new arrangement, the responsibility for
the decision to liberate would rest with the prosecutor, a representative of military intelligence, and a
representative of the police. In January 1995, the commission was expanded to include a
representative of the secret service. It examined just over one hundred cases and freed fifty-eight of
the persons presented. Soon after, others on the commission objected to the participation of the
representative of the secret service and the commission ceased all formal meetings. Informal
consultations continued between the prosecutor and the two military members. A second
commission was created in late March 1995 to examine cases of judges and burgomasters who had
been detained. The commission included the Prosecutor-General and representatives of the Ministry
of Defence and the secret service.1304 These commissions had no basis or authority in Rwandan law,
and violated provisions that required a judge to rule on cases of preventive detention. By intervening
in the process, the commissions undermined the work of the judge, delayed judicial review of the
detention and violated Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
states: "Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge
or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power .... " Furthermore, since they were not
bound to operate according to the code de procédure pénale, the commissions were left free to rule
as arbitrarily as they wished, according to personal, political or other criteria. As a result, the judges
were all engaged in a mere semblance of judicial activity since they had been led to understand that
they were not to liberate anyone. Several judges, speaking at different times and in different places,
informed Human Rights Watch that they did not dare liberate anyone because of threats, explicit or
implicit, made by military officers.1305 The situation reached is such that accusation and arrest suffice
to establish guilt and that no one in jail could be innocent, no matter how fair the judge would be.
Recently, observers have remarked on what some call an 'ethnic cleansing' of the judiciary, Hutu
judges and prosecutors being dismissed and those who were not killed being arbitrarily arrested or
threatened and forced into exile.1306 For example, on the night of February 14, 1998, the judge-
president of the Conseil d'Etat and vice-president of the Supreme Court, Vincent Nsanzabaganwa,
was shot dead in his home in Kigali by RPA soldiers.1307 He was one of the rare Hutu left in the
1304ld., at 8.
13051bid.
1306Aliro, 0., 'Lack of justice in Rwanda', Press Agency, 20 April 1998.
13071bid.
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higher courts of the country. Another vice-president of the Supreme Court, Augustin Cyiza, was
dismissed for unspecified reasons on 12 February 1998.1308
On 24 April 1998, assistant public prosecutor, Silas Munyagishali was publicly executed following an
unfair trial in which he was sentenced to death on 22 August 1997 for allegedly having participated in
the genocide.1309 It was only when he attempted to release former central bank employees for lack of
evidence for their prolonged detention that he was dismissed forthwith and accused of genocide.
During his trial in Gitarama in 1997, several defence witnesses were threatened and intimidated and
effectively prevented from testifying by RPA soldiers and intelligence agents. His wife Anonciata was
so terrified by threats to herself that she took refuge with other families and quit her job so that the
aggressors would not locate her. She did not testify during the hearing on 3 May although she was
the principal witness for the defence, and neither did two other terrified witnesses. The latter had
requested that the tribunal consider their written testimonies, but the request was turned down.1310
Célestin Kayibanda, prosecutor of Butare, was arrested in May 1997, allegedly for taking part in the
genocide and murder. Shortly before his arrest, however, he had denounced interference in the
judiciary by political and military officials and had received threats from the army commander. Fidé/e
Makombe, prosecutor of Kibuye, was beaten by the army commander of that prefecture after
protesting against interference by the prefect in the functioning of the judiciary and refusing to order
arrests and imprisonment of genocide suspects in the absence of sufficient evidence.P"
According to Amnesty International, most of the judges and prosecutors claimed to be victims
themselves, almost all of them were RPF members and sympathisers, and most of them did not
have adequate qualification and were not jurists.1312 It would be right to conclude with Ntampaka that
the positions they occupied in the judiciary were a favour, not a right,1313which impacts on the
independence of the judiciary.
As regards the legal profession, a law establishing a Bar in Rwanda was published and forty lawyers
were sworn in to the newly established bar in 1997. However, almost all of them refused to defend
130Blbid.
1309Amnesty International, AI INDEX: AFR 47/12/98,22 April 1998.
1310Ntampaka, C., 'Rwanda: Une justice qui cherche sa voie' in: ANB-BfA SUPPLEMENT, No. 337, JanU81'¥ 1998, p. 2.
1311Amnesty International, Report, 1997.
13121bid.
1313Ntampaka, Rwanda: une justice qui cherche sa voie, at 4.
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persons accused of genocide. One of the three, who had agreed to do so, Innocent Murengezi,
"disappeared when he left a court building at the end of January 1998 and has not been located. The
two who remained were terrified and did not want to be involved with the defence of genocide
suspects".1314 One commentator said "the genocide issue remains in the hands of the army and
some members of the executive".1315
3.8 International neglect
International human rights law has its historical antecedents in a number of international legal
doctrines and institutlons.Pvlhe most important of these are humanitarian intervention, State
responsibility for injuries to aliens, protection of minorities, the Mandates and Minorities Systems of
the League of Nations, and international humanitarian law. These doctrines and institutions were
designed to protect different groups of human beings, including, but not limited to, slaves, minorities,
certain native populations, foreign nationals, victims of massive violations, and combatants. That law
and practice provided the conceptual and institutional underpinnings for the development of
contemporary international human rights law differing most significantly from its historical
antecedents in that individual human beings today are deemed to have internationally guaranteed
rights as individuals and not as nationals of a particular State. There now also exist a growing
number of international institutions with jurisdiction to protect individuals against human rights
violations committed by states of their own nationality as well as by any other states. Although these
remedies are often still quite inadequate or ineffective, the vast body of international human rights
law now in existence - as well as the mushrooming of international institutions designed to implement
that law - have internationalised the subject of human rights. This development has in turn produced
a political climate in which the protection of human rights has become one of the most important
items on the agenda of the contemporary international political discourse involving governments,
1314HumanRights Watch, Report, 1998.
1315Kamanda, The RPF reveals its image, 25 June 1998. Besides, unlike in other countries, there is still no institute for
graduates to train properly in the practice of law. In Zambia, for example, most law school graduates proceed to the Law
Practice Institute where they spend one year. In South Africa, depending on the degree or other experience (for
instance, a course in practical legal work), a term of articles between one and five years is necessary before one can
practice law as an attorney. The South African legal profession is regulated by the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979 (as
amended). Graduates from other countries are also provided for in Chapter one of the Act. For admission as an
advocate, see Admission of Advocates Act 74 of 1964. See also Recognition of Foreign Legal Qualifications and
Practice Act 114 of 1993. Without complying to these qualifications, one cannot practice as an attorney and open a trust
account for one's clients. It is a criminal offence if one does endeavour such practice without being admitted as an
attorney. See Statutes of the Republic of South Africa, Vol. 27.
1316See generally Henkin, L., The Ages of Rights 13 (1990).
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inter-governmental organizations, and a vast international network of non-governmental
organizations.
As a result, human beings around the world have increasingly been led to believe that states and the
international community have an obligation to protect their human rights. To some extent, the
international system of human rights protection translates the failure of the State itself to do what it is
supposed to do naturally, which is the protection of basic rights and fundamental freedoms of its
citizens. This failure is fundamental for Rwanda, as the developments presented in this dissertation
have shown that the State has always failed to serve its citizens equally and as of equal status
before a coherent system of law. In order to provide for the protection of all citizens, writes Erasmus,
"also in a State with a heterogeneous population, legal certainty about their rights and status is
required. This is probably best achieved by a supreme Constitution based on the idea of the
democratic constitutional State and including fundamental rights. Within this framework, provision
can be made for individual freedom, tolerance, diversity and freedom of association. Hopefully this
will inspire a constitutional patriotism"1317which comprises loyalty to that constitutional value system
which protects them as citizens, and which the government of the day is bound and restrained to
respect. "The equality of all citizens is central to this concept of the State".1318The failure of states to
perform their primordial duty of protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms is unfortunate
and in the case of Rwanda, it seems difficult for international organizations to do for Rwandans what
their State has failed to do. But be it as it may, the expectations that the international protection of
human rights phenomenon creates makes it politically ever more difficult for growing numbers of
states to deny that they have such an obligation which, of course, should facilitate the efforts of
those who promote the international protection of human rights. The gains are many, but they remain
to be consolidated. Much of the needed law is already on the books. Unfortunately, however, the
institutions to enforce the law are still quite weak.1319This section deals with the United Nations
Organization (UN) whose mandate to act in defense of human rights is a product of compromise. It is
clear that the governments which established the UN wanted it to contribute to a higher level of
observance of human rights. But it is equally clear that these "founding fathers" wanted to prevent
the UN's involvement in human rights from seriously intruding on their national sovereignty. The UN,
1317 Although Erasmus applies this idea to the South African State, it can fit for Rwanda, mutatis mutandis, due to the
ethnic heterogeneity factor underlying its development. Erasmus, G., "Nationality and Citizenship". South African
Citizenship in a Constitutional Context, 1998.
1318 Ibid.
1319 See Buergenthal, T., "The Human Rights Revolution", 23 St. Mary's LJ. 3 (1991).
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in other words, was to be a champion of human rights, but one with strictly limited powers.1320
The major purpose of the UN is conveyed in the Charter's provisions empowering the UN to deal
with threats to or breaches of international peace and security. Since violations of human rights have
been held to be capable of creating situations endangering peace and security, the UN's jurisdiction
in these matters implies a mandate to respond to situations involving human rights.1321
3.8.1 Background
In fact, the UN was established as a peacekeeping institution in the aftermath of the depression and
World War II. The Charter of the UN was written from April to June 1945 when conceptions of peace
were being developed as a counterweight to the racist ideas of Nazism practiced in colonial
societies. All colonial societies were by definition undemocratic. In the fifty-year existence of the UN,
African and other Third World societies have identified colonization as a threat to peace.
There has been considerable debate and discussion within UN agencies as to the real content of
peace. One author notes that, "by peace we mean the absence of violence in any given society, both
1320 For a review of the background to and development of human rights provisions in the UN Charter, see Ruth B.
Russell and Jeanette E. Muther, A History of the United Nations Charter (Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution,
1958). This source notes the unsuccessful effort of some delegations to give the UN a stronger mandate by using such
terms as "protect" or "assure" the observance of human rights, rather than "promote and encourage" this observance.
1321 The measures which the Charter authorizes the Security Council to take, and with which member states are
obligated to comply, include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of (all) means of communication,
severance of diplomatic relations, and "such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security". (Articles 41, 42). The authorization for UN human rights action also stems from non-
Charter sources. Judicial decision making, for example, is authorized in a number of conventions that grant power to the
International Court of Justice. One example is the Genocide Convention, an instrument that also illustrates the limitations
placed on this procedure. Thus the Court has no jurisdiction over persons charged with genocide (Article 6) and functions
only in cases of disputes between Parties over the interpretation, application, or fulfillment of the Convention, and then
only on the request of any of the parties to the dispute. (Article 9). Other functions are provided for the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which authorizes its Committee on Human Rights to review reports submitted by
Parties and make general comments on the basis of review reports submitted by Parties and make general comments on
the basis of such reviews. The Committee is also empowered to offer good offices and to act as a conciliator when one
Party accuses another of non-compliance with the Covenant. The Committee's procedures also include fact-finding. An
extra-Charter instrument may also mandate recommendations, which may be general or specific in nature and may be
addressed to a UN organ or to states. Finally, it may include provisions for the reception and consideration of petitions
from individuals complaining of infringements of their rights, as do both the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with its Optional Protocol. Resolutions provide a
second non-Charter source of authority. The Economic and Social Council's Resolution 1503 of 1970, for example,
prescribes steps to be taken by the Commission on Human Rights and its subsidiary bodies in reviewing all
communications alleging violations which are received by the Secretary-General. The purpose of this review is to
determine whether these communications reveal consistent patterns of gross verifiable violations of human rights. Any
such situations thus revealed may become the subject of a Commission-authorized investigation, and the Commission is
further empowered to make recommendations to ECOSOC on the basis of its study of situations. An investigation may
be undertaken only if all available national means of resolving the problem have been used, the consent of the State
concerned obtained, and similar consent given to the appointment of the investigating committee. The committee is to
strive for a friendly solution before, during, and after its investigation.
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internal and external, direct and indirect. We further mean the nonviolent results of the equality of
rights, by which every member of the society, through nonviolent means, participates equally in
decisional power which regulates it, and the distribution of resources which sustains it".1322
Nearly every year since the United Nations designated 1986 as the International Year of Peace, the
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has mounted
conferences to refine the concept of peace. UNESCO took the lead from the UN General Assembly
by declaring that "every nation and every human being, regardless of race, conscience, language or
sex has the inherent right to live in peace". Since 1982, UNESCO has adopted a position that peace
is indistinguishable for fundamental human rights and is therefore incompatible with extreme poverty,
malnutrition and the refusal of the right of self-determination.
The experience of misguided "humanitarian intervention" in Somalia crippled the UN to the point
where it evacuated its personnel from Rwanda at precisely the moment when UN peacekeepers
were most needed in April 1994. For two months, the UN equivocated over the issue of deploying
peacekeepers after an estimated one million people had been killed. The Secretary General of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU), Salim Ahmed Salim, was critical of the decision and said:
The decision to pull out troops from Rwanda is a sign of lack of concern for Africa when the
world's body was increasingly involved elsewhere. This is particularly so when account is taken of
the fact that the United Nations is increasingly involved in situations affecting peace and security
in other regions.1323
The deployment of peacekeepers by the UN has been at the behest of the major powers. In reality,
the deployment of peacekeepers must go through the long bureaucratic channels of the UN
Department of Peacekeeping. When France or the US wants to deploy troops under the banner of
the UN, however, they can do so in a matter of days. But the logistical requirements of mobilizing the
support and funds for peacekeeping ensure that the UN will be paralyzed when real peacekeepers
are needed.1324This is the concrete lesson of the genocide in Rwanda.
The attitude of the international community in the face of this problem has so far been absolutely
disastrous even with regard to UN observers. On 2 August 1994, José Ayala Lasso, UN Human
Rights commissioner, asked for 147 observers to monitor past and present abuses of human rights
1322 Brock-Utne, B., Educating for Peace (New York: Pergamon Press, 1985).
1323 Quoted in Horace Campbell, "The United Nations and the Genocide in Rwanda", in Napoleon Abdulai (ed.),
Genocide in Rwanda (London: Africa Research and Information Center, 1994).
1324 "United Nations Peace Keeping", The Economist, January 25, 1994, p. 19.
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in Rwanda. He intended to deploy them by late September, at the cost of about US$2.1 million and
received pledges for US$2.4 million.1325By early September there was one observer, Karen Kelly,
and she had no budget, no car and no local staff. The disbursements received by the commissioner
amounted to a grand total of US$420,000.1326Ayala Lasso, who had meanwhile realized the almost
total disappearance of the judicial system in Rwanda1327,returned to the subject and asked this time
for US$10.5 million, in order to be able to supply ten prosecutors, nine doctors and twenty lawyers
over and above the 147 observers, and provide all these people with minimum supplies and logistics.
Still the money did not arrive. By mid-November, there were four observers, without any means and
Karen Kelly resigned in disguSt.1328 Slowly, more observers came, but they were mostly
inexperienced young people who often spoke no French, and no Swahili or Kinyarwanda, of
course.1329They were mostly unable to communicate with the population except through interpreters
who probably told them what they felt like telling them. The whole thing was a disaster, especially
since 'according to the 1948 convention on the repression of genocide, it is not enough for
prosecutors to offer the evidence of mass killings to secure a conviction: they must also prove
genocidal intent'.133oIn the meantime, hundreds of Hutus were also being massacred by the RPA in
Kabutare, Kibeho, Kivumu, Byangabo, and many other areas.1331 On 8 November 1994, UN
Resolution no. 955 went ahead and created an international tribunal anyway.1332
3.8.2 War, peace and national borders
Although the title of this section looks beyond the subject matter of the dissertation, the author's
concern here is the silence of the international community on the invasion of Rwanda. The genocide
and other gross human rights abuses would probably not have occurred if Uganda and Tutsi
13251ncludingUS$233,OOO from France.
1326US$380,OOO from the United Kingdom and US$40,OOO from New Zealand. Human rights in Rwanda are, in deed, an
Anglo-Saxon plot.
1327Prunier, G., The Rwanda Crisis, at 343
1328SWB/Radio France Internationale, 11 November 1994.
13291nKibuye, Prunier found a Human Rights Observer Station manned by five people, none of whom spoke any French.
They said that a Togolese had been assigned to their team; but 'he had gone on leave'. In Kigali several UN volunteers
had resigned in disgust at the ineptitude of the way the whole operation was run. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, at 344.
For an unsparing assessment of this dismal performance, see African Rights, Rwanda: A waste of hope, London: UN
Human Rights Field Operation (March 1995).
1330Andrew Jay Cohen, 'On the trail of the genocide', New York Times (7 September 1994).
1331See Desouter and Reyntjens, Les Violations des droits de I'homme par le FPRIAPR, 1995.
1332See supra sub-section 3.
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refugees had not attacked the country, or at least, if the attack had been condemned and stopped in
good time.
A country must not invade its neighbor.1333 The Charter of the United Nations establishes the
sovereign equality of nations. The supreme crime in international law is the planning and
implementation of a war of aggression as was held in the Nuremberg trials and it supersedes all
other war crimes committed in the execution of war.1334 The Charter of the Organization of African
Unity1335,the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights1336, and the 1969 OAU Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa1337 establish the inviolability of
national borders and require states to prevent refugees in exile from using their country as launching
pads to invade the country of origin.
The crisis began with the October 1, 1990 invasion of Rwanda from Uganda by part of the Ugandan
army. The invasion was organized with Rwandan Tutsi exiles that, as already shown, had left
Rwanda after independence in 1962. The rallying cry of the war was human rights, justice and
democracy for Rwanda. The reality was rather a stop-start military invasion from Uganda and the
massive slaughter of Hutu populations in power in Rwanda since independence by the Rwandan
Patriotic Army (RPA) having as its political wing the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Their principal
leader, General Paul Kagamé, had been chief of military intelligence for the Ugandan National
Resistance Army (NRA) and was trained by the US at Fort Leavenworth.1338
There is credible evidence that the Ugandan government played an important role in the invasion by
providing troops, allowing the RPF to move arms, logistical supplies and troops across Ugandan soil,
and providing direct military support to the RPF in the form of arms, ammunition, and military
equipment. Troops, trucks and weapons left Kampala to gather in the local football stadium in
Kabale, 300 kilometers southwest of Kampala and 20 kilometers north of the Rwandan border. This
movement began on September 29, 1990.1339 Ugandan president, Yoweri Museveni, agreed himself
1333 UN Charter, art. 1 (1); 2 (4); 39; and 51, reprinted in Rifaat, A. International Aggression, 1979, p. 117-23. See also
Goodrich and Hambro, "Charter of the United Nations", 3rd ed., p. 23; 342-53.
1334 Goodrich and Hambro, p. 245.
1335 OAU Charter, art. II (2), reprinted in Cervenka, Z., The OAU and its Charter,1968, p. 232.
1336 Art. 23.
1337 Art. 4.
1338 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1995.
1339 Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Arming Rwanda, The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan
War, Vol. 6, Issue 1, January 1994, p. 20.
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that these people were deserters from his army1340but documents seized from the war dead soldiers
by the Rwandan army proved that they were on "official mission".1341Besides, none has ever been
charged with desertion nor retired. Moreover, many arms used in the Ugandan army, and which
were not found in the Rwandan army, were seized from RPF fighters.1342
During the February 1993 RPF offensive, government soldiers confiscated a Mercedes-Benz truck
with an Ugandan license plate, number UWT-868, in Rwanda between Ruhengeri and the Ugandan
border. Inside the vehicle was a document with a general order from the NRA's Military Police
Headquarters. The order identifies the truck by its license plate, and reads: "It is on special duties.
Assist them where necessary". Dated November 21, 1991, the order indicates that the truck had
been operating under official NRA authorization 15 months before the offensive.1343
On several occasions throughout the war, journalists, diplomats and international military observers
say that wholesale numbers of RPF troops operating in organized units have crossed back into
Uganda, and have camped in border areas for months. Despite their claims that ex-NRA soldiers in
the RPF would face charges "punishable by death", Ugandan authorities made no effort to arrest,
deter or otherwise control these RPF forces.1344It would be hard to prove how a foreign force of over
10,000 troops can maintain itself at the border of a country and fight the neighbouring country for
about four years without the agreement or complicity of the first country (Uganda). Besides, family
members of war dead RPA officers received compensation and accommodation from the Ugandan
government, according to the Ugandan legislation on war.1345
Several messages intercepted by government forces attest the role played by Uganda:
"...the NRA is with us and the morale of our troops is high. The supply by air is very efficient and
must be continued ...";1346
"We continue our operations together with the NRA and the white elements ...";1347
1340 Interview on the BBC in the program "Focus on Africa", 14 May 1991.
1341 République Rwandaise, Ministere des Affaires Etrangéres et de la Coopération, Donnees sur I'lmplication de
l'Uganda dans I'aggression contre le Rwanda, p. 3.
1342 ld.
1343 Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Arming Rwanda, at 20.
1344 ld., at 21.
1345 République Rwandaise, Données sur !'implication de l'Uganda dans I'aggression contre Ie Rwanda, at 4.
1346 Message 15 A 755 B APR 94 from Mbarara (South Uganda) to Gatuna (North Rwanda).
1347 Message 22 11 20 B APR 94 from Mbarara to Kamwezi (Uganda).
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... The back up as well as the war and food supplies will continue to reach you from the NRA. Will
reach you without problem ...";1348
"In the country of the chief [Museveni], the social, economic and political situation improves
progressively. The chief backs us 100% and 10,000 men have been officially made available to
us ... Land and air transport means are provided by the chiefs channel .... The movements of the
White mercenaries must be always covered by NRA elements in the country ..."1349
The support of the RPF by Uganda was also acknowledged by a senior NRA operations officer. He
affirmed that, after the failure of the RPF's October 1990 invasion, the NRA provided even heavier
weaponry including artillery. He said that throughout the conflict, the NRA provided a steady stream
of ammunition, food and logistical supplies, and that the two armies shared intelligence
information.135o Moreover, the fact that the high-ranking officers in the RPA were also high ranking in
the NRA puts out of doubt the planning by Uganda and its active participation in the invasion. For
example, Major-General Fred Rwigyema who led the invasion on October 1, 1990 had successively
been NRA Deputy Army Commander and Deputy Minister of Defence.1351 Major Paul Kagame was
Director of the Division of Military Intelligence in the NRA, while Major Bunyenyezi was commandant
of the NRA Brigade in the East of Uganda. Major Bayingana was Head of NRA Health services while
Colonel Mateka was Head of the Administration of NRA staff.1352 Other sources indicate that
between 70% and 80% of the foot soldiers in Rwanda from 1990 were genuine Ugandans, especially
the Baganda, Basoga, Acholis, Madi, Banyoro, etc. Ugandan nationals were taken to Rwanda
through different schemes. A large number serving with NRA were deployed to Rwanda whenever
the RPF was losing the war. NRA mechanized battalion from Masaka was among the first to go in
November 1990.1353 Many Acholis detained in concentration camps were taken by force as a
continuation of their incarceration. Ex-soldiers, who were laid off as a result of an IMF-backed
military reduction programme, were rounded up and re-employed as mercenaries to Rwanda.
According to returning soldiers, Museveni paid each one in this category 500,000 shillings up front,
plus big salaries.1354
1348 Message 091205 B APR 94 from Mbarara for Kisoro-Kamwezi-Kasese (Uganda).
1349 Message 04 11 30 B APR 94 from Mbarara for Kisoro-Kamwezi-Gatuna-Kasese.
1350 Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Arming Rwanda, at 21.
1351 He was also a particular friend of Museveni since 1972. When he got married in 1978, the reception for the wedding
was organized at the Presidential Palace in the presence of Museveni. République Rwandaise, Données sur /'implication
de /'Uganda dans /'aggression contre Ie Rwanda, at 12.
1352 Ibid.
1353 UDC Newsletter, Vol. 5, NO.3, April 1995, p. 6.
1354ld.
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At occasions, President Museveni contradicted his earlier declarations. For example, during a press
conference, he said, denigrating the Rwandan army, that "I doubt very much that the troops that are
there can defeat the rebel force by force. Some of them are our best people".1355
The participation of Uganda in the invasion of Rwanda is an act of aggression defined in resolution
3314 (XXIX) of the UN General Assembly, largely based on Article 2(4) of the UN Charter which
prohibits the threat or use of force.1356According to Article 1, aggression is the "use of armed force
by a State against another, the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this
definition". Article 3 of the definition, listing seven specific cases of the use of armed force, states, in
sub-paragraph (g), that the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State is an act of aggression. The
second paragraph of Article 5, dealing with the legal consequences of aggression, followed the
principles of the Nuremberg Tribunals after the Second World War. In this regard it was stated that "a
war of aggression is a crime against international peace", and that "aggression gives rise to
international responsibility".1357 It is unfortunate that the Security Council remained silent on the
Rwandan petition in early 1994.1358This was perhaps due to the fact that the petition was presented
by a government which was involved in the genocide, but the fact still remains that the prosecution of
Ugandan and Rwandan individuals involved in this matter would have played a great role in deterring
impunity prevailing in Rwanda and in the sub-region. Instead, the United Nations military mission
aided and abetted the RPF to take power: when the airplane carrying the two Hutu Presidents,
Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda, and Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi was shot down at the Kigali
airport in April 6, 1994, ethnic violence broke out and many thousands of Tutsi and Hutu died before
the cameras of the Western media and in the presence of the UN military mission. It is during the
ethnic carnage that the UN decided to withdraw from Rwanda, leaving its military equipment to the
RPA, after the Security Council had voted an arms embargo against the Hutu government. As a
consequence, the absolutist Hutu Government was replaced by an absolutist minority Tutsi with no
proposed majority rule and provisions for minority rights, no prospect for elections - they are
1355 Press conference, Kampala, 10 October 1990.
1356 It was also a violation of the OAU Charter which provides for the non-interference by a State in internal affairs of
another State (par. 2), the respect of State sovereignty and territorial integrity (par. 3), and the condemnation of
subversive activities from neighboring States ... (par. 5).
1357 Article 5(2) of the definition. See comments on this provision in Ferenscz, B.B., UAProposed Definition of Aggression:
By Compromise and Consensus", 22 l.C.L.O. (1973), p. 43-5.
1358 For details about this petition, see République Rwandaise, Données sur I'implication de l'Uganda dans I'aggression
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specifically forbidden - and the imprisonment of over 130,000 Hutu men and children (and some
women) all "accused" of genocide.
Meanwhile, there was complete silence in most circles about the military intervention from Uganda in
violation of the basic principles of international and African law. Nothing has been done about the
crime of planning and waging a war of aggression as defined in the Nuremberg trials, in spite of the
omnipresent propaganda about war crimes. The search for and prosecution of war criminals was a
common theme in the media: "never again", it was repeatedly stated. 1359 Reference was made to the
legacy of Nuremberg but almost no one spoke of the major crime defined by Nuremberg: that of
planning and waging of aggressive war as undertaken against Rwanda.1360 Crimes alleged are
limited to international humanitarian law, which deals only with violations committed in the conduct of
war, and which puts its head in the sand with respect to the crime of planning and waging war.1361
The same violation of international law occurred in former Zaïre. Under the rallying cry of democracy,
human rights and the protection of the rights of the Tutsi minority, the Ugandan-Rwandan army
covertly invaded eastern Zaïre, beginning in September 1996. The apparent target was the ailing
dictator, Mobutu. The first victims were the virtually defenseless Hutu in the refugee camps in
Eastern Zaïre. After intensifying the invasion and bombing the refugee camps with heavy artillery in
November 1996, the invading army chased most of the refugees into eastern Zaïre. Some 500,000
returned to Rwanda under the guns of their enemies and the abandonment by the HCR and other
international aid organizations. In eastern Zaïre, hundreds of thousands of men, women and children
were starved, killed by illness or systematically massacred in cold blood out of sight of the
international media excluded from the area.
The international non-governmental organizations actively supported the RPF military invasion of
Rwanda and then of Zaïre (Democratic Republic of Congo), all in the name of human rights and
democracy. Instead of human rights and democracy and the rule of law after the horrible interethnic
violence of April to July, 1994, we have seen more war, military dictatorship by the Tutsi minority in
Rwanda, concentration camps for the Hutu population in Rwanda, and the racist murder of hundreds
of thousands of Hutus. As a consequence, the fundamental principle of the right to peace and the
right to life has been held up to ridicule, which makes the concept of human rights in the UN suspect.
contre le Rwanda, p. 12-43.
1359 La Libre Belgique, 24 May 1994; Le Soir, 9 October 1990; Le Monde, 7 October 1982.
1360 Even the next war against Zaïre will not be echoed in the United Nations.
1361 See Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Art. 4.
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It would seem that there is a new right of intervention by foreign powers supported actively by the
organizations of the United Nations in Geneva and elsewhere.
3.8.3 Refugee law
The area of refugee law came to maturity after the Second World War with the establishment of the
High Commission for Refugees and the adoption of the Geneva Conventions in 1951 and 1967. The
High Commission for Refugees (HCR) has as its primary role the protection of refugees. According
to Section 32 of the Convention on the Statute of Refugees, refugees under no circumstances are to
be returned to the country they have fled without their consent. Refugees enjoy political and civil
rights.
The same shameless abandonment of principle in international law is present in the treatment of
refugees: Hutu refugees have been attacked militarily by the RPA they had fled with the complicity of
the High Commission for Refugees whose primary duty is to protect them. The HCR illegally
repatriated Hutu refugees against their will into the arms of the Tutsi dominated Government.1362
In late 1996, the HCR and the RPF jointly asked the Government of Tanzania to expel the hundreds
of thousands of Hutu refugees by force. 1363 This was done. As early as September 1995, the HCR
had suggested forced repatriation of refugees. In November 1996, the largest refugee camp in the
world in Eastern Zaïre was shelled by the heavy artillery of the Rwandan and Ugandan armies under
the pretext that it hosted 40,000 former Rwandan soldiers and militia who had participated in the
genocide. The international community and the HCR abandoned these refugees to the oncoming
armies. Amnesty International was one of the few international organizations to condemn this
mistreatment of the Hutu refugees.1364 Some 500,000 were forced to return to Rwanda: young men
as well as many others were sorted from these returnees and killed or imprisoned.1365 The majority
fled the camps further into Eastern Zaïre, one of the most inhospitable jungle areas in the world.
President Yoweri Museveni was quoted in Africa International in February 1997 as saying that they
had to be destroyed: "it was not enough to drive them from the border.1366 Hundreds of thousands of
1362 Griggs, 1997, at 8.
1363 Matata, Report 1997.
1364 AI Report 1997.
1365 ld.
1366 Africa International, quoted in Griggs, 1997, at 7.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
332
men, women and children were starved or killed using some of the extermination tactics alleged
during the RPF invasion of Rwanda some years earlier".1367
According to many sources, a favorite tactic was for the HeR to group the fleeing refugees from
Eastern Zaïre together and then the Rwandan-led army would attack and exterminate them. For
refugees, it is imperative to point out that the HeR failed to protect them. It adopted and promoted
the RPF propaganda that the refugees were "hostages of the former Rwandan army and the Hutu
militias". This propaganda was repeated by the RPF government in many instances in the UN, to the
donor community and to diplomatic mission in order to gain international sympathy. It is certain that
the former army and government needed support of the Hutu population to legitimize its return into
power, as the RPF needed Tutsis to do so, but it is an exaggeration to say, as the Tutsi government
and some NGO's have been doing, that all of the two million Rwandans who lived in exile in the DRe
were "manipulated" by that army and the militia to remain in exile as a shield to facilitate the
regrouping, rearming and launching of the incursion into Rwanda. Such an exaggeration conceals
the fundamental reason for fleeing and remaining in exile for Hutus. Being a refugee himself, the
author of this dissertation and his family, as well as many other people he knows, were never forced
by any former Rwandan army soldier or Hutu militia to leave their country and remain in exile. Exile
was due, in general, to the insecurity resulting from the RPF massacres of the Hutu population since
1990, followed by the 1994 genocide of Tutsis by Hutu elements. As there was no sign of peace
should the RPF seize power or the then ruling Hutus remain in it, there was high risk of losing one's
life by not fleeing. Unfortunately, the entire Hutu population in exile was presumed génocidaire. For
example, in April 1995, Salgado wrote that "these Hutus had left Rwanda fleeing reprisals or simply
justice".1368He described the camps as "the highest concentration of murderers" worldwide.1369 As a
result, even those who did not stay in camps for a long time where considered by some outsiders as
"murderers". For example, during his interview by the Zambian department of refugees, the first
question the author was asked was "how many people did you kill?" Not surprisingly, the same
question was repeated by some individual Zambians who were led to believe that every Hutu had
participated in the killings. However, the slaughter of thousands of Hutus by the RPF was alleged to
1367 Matata, Report 1997.
1368 Sébastien Salgado, "Les Camps des Tueurs" in Paris Match, 27 April 1995. Author's translation.
1369 ld. Human Rights wrote that "The former government led some two million Rwandans into exile". Human Rights,
World Report, RWANDA, 1999.
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be "isolated exceptional acts by a few members" of a generally disciplined and principled army.1370At
the time of writing this dissertation, these "few members" are still in the RPA, many of them have
been promoted to upper echelons while evidence is growing of their continuous elimination of
innocent people in Rwanda1371and the DRe.1372Besides, the author has interviewed at least 50
Hutus in different countries1373who managed to re-flee after the forced repatriation.
That the HeR illegally participated in the forced repatriation of the Hutu refugees against their will
was a violation of international law guaranteeing refugees the right to return home only when they,
themselves, think that there is no more "fear of being persecuted". Finally, the HeR has now
ostensibly decided to try to protect some of the refugees who have returned to Rwanda and, as
reported, help the RPF sort out génocidaires from the retumees.v" This is outside the mandate of
the HeR, since these people are no longer refugees. In spite of the good will of some of the HeR
"helpers", the HeR carried out part of the RPF plan to have Hutus under its control and treat them as
it wishes. The HeR role as a protector has been transformed to its opposite and it has become an
agent of the RPF in the persecution of the Hutu majority.
These activities and the apparent politicization of the HeR in favour of the winning party in the
conflict is a bad precedent which bodes ill for refugees in future conflicts. Moreover, it brought under
suspicion the international protection of human rights among Hutus whose attitude towards the UN is
"we have no right in this world at all".1375
3.8.4 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and impunity
The response of the international community to the massacres and genocide was at times
"reluctant"1376 and "inadequate".1377 This can partly be explained by the amount of human and
1370 During a press conference in Kigali in June 1995, Major-General Kagame rejected the responsibility of the RPA,
saying that "one or two isolated incidents should not involve our army". Asked what he thought about "isolated cases"
which had become common for the majority of RPA soldiers, he said "this is polemic".
1371 For example, the author's sister was murdered with her husband and their four children, while his mother was
murdered in Zambia by a death squad organized from within the RPA to eliminate the members of that family in order to
eliminate evidence of the murder of his father in 1994 by Tutsi soldiers, as well as to avoid any possible claim against
the illegal occupation and exploitation of their properties by high-ranking military officers in government.
1372 Matata, May 1999.
1373 Most of them are found in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, Ivory Coast, Kenya,
New Zealand, Nigeria, South Africa, United States, Zambia, etc. For their own security, their names are not given here.
1374 Matata, May 1999.
1375 See Karemano, C., "The Defenseless Hutus", Rwandafor, July 1998.
1376 The international community largely stood by and watched the atrocities in Rwanda. Human Rights Watch, The
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
334
material resources that would have been required to restore peace and address the more
fundamental issues of the failure of the State itself.1378The Rwandan experience does, however,
also raise serious questions about the adequacy of international and regional structures responsible
for maintaining and restoring peace.
By resolution No. 9551379, the United Nations Security Council determined to establish an
international tribunal with the objective of prosecuting and, where appropriate, sanctioning certain
violations of international humanitarian law. This has been one of the most significant international
responses to the genocide and other violations of international humanitarian law that took place in
Rwanda. The international community apparently hoped to do in court what it had not been able to
do in time. According to Shattuck, "the establishment of criminal responsibility for genocide is crucial
if we are to differentiate victims from aggressors, foster social reconciliation and overcome the
cynical argument that ethnic conflicts cannot be resolved".138oHowever, the statute has established
some limitations (ratione loci, ratione temporis, ratione personae and ratione materiae) which
frustrate the realisation of the Tribunal's goal of ensuring "effective redress", in particular by
hampering exploration of complicity in what may have been a carefully orchestrated campaign in
Rwanda. These limitations do not find any justification in international law.
aftermath of Genocide in Rwanda. Absence of Prosecution, Continued Killings 1 (1994).
1377lna report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General wrote that the international community's delayed reaction to
the genocide "demonstrated graphically its extreme inadequacy to respond with prompt and decisive action to
humanitarian crises entwined with armed conflict". In his opinion, the entire system needed to be reviewed to strengthen
its capacity to react. The United Nations and the situation in Rwanda, UN reference paper, April 1995, p. 13.
1378MariamMeier Wang, "The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Opportunities for Clarification, Opportunities for
Impact", Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 27: 177, 1995, p. 183-226; Lauras, D., "Le Fossé demeure entre le
Tribunal International d'Arusha et le Rwanda, Agenee France Presse, 10 October 1997; Erasmus, G., and Fourie, N.,
'The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter ICTR). Are all issues addressed? How does it compare to
South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission?' in: International Review of the Red Cross, No. 321, Nov-Dec 1997,
p. 705. According to estimates of the situation in late 1994, of a total population of approximately 7 million, as many as
500,000 Rwandans had been killed, 3 million had been internally displaced and over 2 million had fled to neighbouring
countries. The United Nations and the Situation in Rwanda, 1995, at 17; See also Guy Vassall-adams, Rwanda: An
Agenda for International Action (1994); Robert Block, The Tragedy of Rwanda, N.Y.Rev. of Books, Oct. 20, 1994, at 3;
Human Rights Watch Africa, Genocide in Rwanda: April-May 1994 (1994) [hereinafter Genocide in Rwanda]; Human
Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of Special Rapporteurs and Representatives: Situation of
Human Rights in Rwanda, U.N.GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 100(c), U.N.Doc. 0/49/508 (1994) [hereinafter Report of
Special Rapporteur]; Preliminary Report of the Independent Commission of Experts Established in Accordance with
Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125 (1994) [hereinafter preliminary report].
1379S.C.Res. 955, U.N SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., November 8, 1994, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994)
(hereinafter Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).
1380JohnShattuck was the US Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labour. Shattuck, J,
Testimony before the House of Representatives subcommittee on Africa, 22 February 1995, quoted in Karemano, The
Rwandan tragedy, at 82.
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The shortcomings: The Statute of the ICTR describes the mission of the tribunal and places at least
four significant restrictions on the Tribunal's authority. First, in Articles 7, 8, and 15, it limits the
ratione loci competence of the Tribunal to serious violations of international law committed in
Rwanda itself, or those violations committed in neighbouring States by Rwandan citizens, thereby
excluding consideration of other crimes directly related to the 1994 massacres but that were
committed outside Rwanda and its neighbouring States.
Secondly, in the same Articles, the ratione temp oris competence of the Tribunal is too restrictive, for
it covers only the period between January 1 and December 31, 1994. Third, as regards the ratione
personae competence, in Article 5, the Tribunal is foreclosed from addressing wrongdoing committed
by entities commonly treated as persons before the law and subject to legal constraint (such as
international organisations, States, and public and private enterprises) because its purview is limited
to jurisdiction over "natural persons." Lastly, concerning proceedings and punishment, the statute
provides only for criminal proceedings and imprisonment.
It should be pointed out that these four restrictions are not required by the rules of international law
that the Tribunal is entrusted with enforcing. Following the Genocide Convention, Article 3 of the
statute charges as punishable not only the crime of genocide per se, but also "conspiracy to commit
genocide", "direct and public incitement to commit genocide", "attempt to commit genocide", and
"complicity in genocide".1381 In theory, persons committing genocide or any of these acts must be
punished, whether they, constitutionally, are rulers, public officials or private individuals.1382 As noted
by the United Nations Commission of Experts reporting on the situation in Rwanda, "the prohibition
on genocide has achieved the status of jus cogens, and accordingly binds all members of the
international community, regardless of whether their States have ratified the Genocide
Convention".1383
The four restrictions severely constrain the Tribunal's authority to address complicity in the genocide
and other crimes committed in connection with Rwanda. The author agrees that the Article makes
practical sense, especially when examining the circumstances surrounding the atrocities of the
Rwandan situation. Given the general history of the Banyarwanda diaspora,1384 and the effect of
1381 Art. 2 (3)
1382 Art. 4.
1383UN Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 (1994) on Rwanda, Final Report,
Geneva, 25 Nov. 1994.
1384 The genesis of the Banyarwanda diaspora is complex and at least threefold in origin: the Hutus and Tutsis who found
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those cross-border connections and attachments that partially caused crimes to spill over borders in
1994, it seems only logical to allow the Tribunal to prosecute atrocities that occurred both inside and
outside the borders between Rwanda and Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, or Zaïre. But while retaining
some flexibility for the Tribunal by referring to "neighbouring countries" generally, rather than
specifying a list of countries, the Statute also carefully limits the jurisdiction of the Tribunal over
crimes in neighbouring countries by specifying that the violators be Rwandan citizens. However, this
qualifier may be less clear than it first appears. Given the many years of Hutu and Tutsi movement
throughout the area of Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zaïre, and Uganda, determination of who is a
Rwandan citizen is not at all clear.1385Laws regarding citizenship, particularly for refugees who fled
Rwanda during the Hutu regime, have been constantly in flux; indeed, this was one of the issues
over which the RPF and the former Rwandan government disagreed.1386The author contends that, if
Rwandans and persons of every nationality are bound by the principles of international law in
question, they are so bound, no matter where their acts were committed. As a consequence, the
geographic limitation on the Tribunal's competence has no justification. It prevents the ICTR from
investigating and prosecuting acts committed elsewhere that relate directly to the 1994 massacres in
Rwanda and are otherwise punishable under the statute as crimes against international law. For
example, people from Burundi and Zaïre who came to Kigali and other areas to help Hutus kill
Tutsis1387 are not covered. Also, Rwandan Ambassadors who, before 1994, negotiated and
facilitated the purchase and shipment of arms to be later distributed to the interahamwe militia would
not be prosecuted and punished.1388
Second, covering only the period between January 1 and December 31, 19941389constitutes a
handicap for the Tribunal in punishing all the crimes violating international humanitarian law and
themselves in Uganda and Zaïre when colonial powers determined Rwanda's borders in 1910; the Hutus (and some
Tutsis) who were economic migrants in the early twentieth century and went to work on plantations in Uganda and Zaïre;
and the Tutsis who fled their homes because of the violence directed against them in Rwanda. See, Guichaoua, A, Le
Probleme des Réfugiés Rwandais et des Populations Banyarwanda dans la Région des Grands Lacs Africains, Geneva:
UNHCR, 1992; Vassall-Adams, Rwanda: An Agenda for International Action, at 14.
1385 Ibid.
1386 One of the requests from the Rwandan Banyarwanda was "a sense of national identity, to have citizenship, and the
protection of the Rwandan flag". See Human Rights Watch, Arming Rwanda, 1995, at 7. Meetings with the heads of
State of Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zaïre, as well as with representatives of the Organization of African Unity and
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, eventually resulted in the 1991 Dar-es-Salaam Declaration which gave
Rwandan refugees. the choice of becoming citizens of Rwanda or of their host countries. Vassal-Adams, Rwanda: An
Agenda for International Action, 1994, at 22.
1387 During the genocide, this was called "gutanga umuganda".
1388 The names of these ambassadors are not given here for security reasons.
1389 leTR Statute, art. 1.
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eradicating the culture of impunity in Rwanda. Under Article 2(3) of the Statute, as well as under
Article 3 of the Genocide Convention, wrongs punishable on the same terms as genocide - including
conspiracy to commit genocide, incitement to genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity
in genocide - necessarily include acts committed prior to, and after, the genocide itself. Furthermore,
irrespective of the ratione temporis competence, Article 6 of the Statute concerning individual
criminal responsibility would presumably cover acts such as planning, instigating, ordering, or
otherwise aiding and abetting a crime that commenced prior to January 1, 1994, so long as there
was a causal nexus between those acts and the completion of the crime during 1994. That is, there
is a continuum of criminal responsibility that extends from the planning and preparation phases to
the execution phase of the genocide.139oCertain sources indicate that the Rwandan genocide was a
carefully orchestrated event, for which planning had begun earlier than 1994. In 1993, several
NGO's1391 had notified the international community of "massive and systematic human rights
violations," and in July 1994, the United Nations Commission of Experts found that public and private
parties were openly encouraging genocide.1392 This is corroborated, according to the Commission,
by, inter alia, a statement made on November 26, 1992 by Dr Léon Mugesera, one of the advisers of
President Habyarimana, in which he called for the extermination of the Tutsis in what is described as
a "final solution, Rwandan-style."1393 This statement could be seen as an incitement to genocide as
provided for under Article 2(3) of the Statute. It would seem far more appropriate to cover an earlier
period during which the planning, organisation, and perpetration of genocide acts were alleged to
have taken place. Moreover, while the RPF arguably was in control of the country by July 17, 1994,
there is no guarantee that atrocities suddenly stopped on that date or even on December 31, 1994.
Crimes by the former government against Tutsis and opposition members could certainly have
continued, even if only in "neighbouring states".1394
According to the United Nations Commission of Experts report, "extremist militias from the majority
Hutu tribe attempted in a three-month campaign to exterminate the Tutsi minority before they were
1390Akhavan Payam, 'The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: the politics and pragmatics of punishment' in:
American Journal of International Law, vol. 90, July 96, p. 506.
1391Africa Watch and Amnesty International published the details of these human rights violations, and in March 1993, an
International Commission on Human Rights produced more findings. See Africa Watch, Talking Peace and Waging War
(1992); Amnesty International, Persecution of Tutsi Minority and Repression of Government Critics 1990-1992 (1992);
Africa Watch, Beyond the Rhetoric: Continuing Human Rights Abuses in Rwanda (1993).
1392The UN and Rwanda 1993-1996, at 12, par. 44.
1393/bid.
1394ICTR Statute, art. 1.
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defeated by a Tutsi-led guerrilla force" in July 1994.1395The fundamental reason why the militias
suddenly decided to do this, and how the Tutsi-led guerrilla force arose, are not explained. In the
United Nation's official interpretation the context of the war - a struggle for State power between
opposing political forces - was ignored altogether. Earlier developments presented in this dissertation
showed that the RPF, instead of fighting for 'democracy and human rights', fought to establish a de
facto one-party Tutsi-controlled state. It will shortly be shown that the Tutsi army has massacred
thousands of Hutus. Furthermore, the Commission stated that acts committed by Tutsi elements
were not intended to destroy the Hutu ethnic group.1396For Hutus who have been experiencing the
atrocities, this would mean that 'Hutus wanted to destroy Tutsis whereas Tutsis wanted to spare
Hutus during the civil war launched in October 1990'. The ICTR and Rwandan courts have been
working in this climate of mutual suspicion among Rwandans and no Tutsi has been arrested and
prosecuted so far. However, the Rwandan Patriotic Army, in power since July 1994, has committed
odious crimes since October 1990, when the RPF started the war and those crimes were reported as
"against humanity" and even as "genocide" by some sources.1397It is sufficient to skim through some
subsequent reports to show that prosecution of the only Hutus, as the leTR is currently doing, is
selective justice in the eyes of Hutus and is not conducive to reconciliation and peace.
On 19 February 1993, the academic and administrative staff of the University of Rwanda appealed to
the UN Secretary General, the Pope and several Western powers to convince the RPF to stop the
"genocide" against Hutus in the areas it had conquered. They reported 48,500 people
massacred.139BThe letter received no answer.1399In 1992, a Rwandan human rights organisation,
1395SeePreston, J., Washington Post, November 11,1994.
1396TheUnited Nations and the Situation in Rwanda, at 19.
13971d.See also Africa Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, Report, September 1994. Although the genocide
and political massacres committed by the former Rwandan government were fairly documented and adequately reported
by international news media, little has been said on odious crimes committed by the RPF before, during and after the
resumption of the war in April-July 1994. This is due to many reasons among which the main one is that the genocide
committed by the adversary of the RPF contributed decisively towards this silence: ill-informed people reasoned in terms
of "good ones" and "bad ones", and since the bad ones were known (i.e. Hutu), the others were the good ones. What if
both sides were "bad"? In fact, as said, the RPF committed odious crimes since October 1990, when it started the war.
Although this was reported by some International Human Rights Organisations (See (Letter to) "Imo. Sr. D. Boutros
Boutros Ghali, Secreta rio General de la ONU" Madrid 30 May 1994 by Groupo "Solidaridad y Ayuda Humanitaria a
Rwanda"; Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Immediate Communiqué", June 6, 1994; Amnesty International, "Rwanda:
Reports of Killings and Abductions by the Rwandan Patriotic Army, April-August 1994, October 20, 1994; Human Rights
Watch/Africa, "The Aftermath of Genocide in Rwanda", September 1994; Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Rwanda: A New
Catastrophe?", December 1994; European Parliament, "Report of the European Parliament Mission to Rwanda, 27-31
July 1994" in Documents of the European Parliament Session, August 23, 1994), the human rights violations by RPF
were never subjected to serious investigations.
1398According to the letter, "". nous assistons avec impuissance a un génocide des milliers de civils innocents dans les
préfectures de Ruhengeri et Byumba dont les estimations s'élévent a 48,500 répartis comme suit: RUHENGERI: Kinigi
(3,000 personnes); Kigombe (9,000 personnes); Nkumba (3,500 personnes); Kidaho (5,000 personnes); Butaro (7,000
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
339
Association pour la Oéfense des Oroits et Libertés (ADL) had already published a list of 790 victims
of the attacks by RPF1400 and Groupo Solidaridad had mentioned that RPF was committing
"genocide" against Hutus1401. Human Rights Watch confirmed the kiliings1402 and Amnesty
International specified that the RPF invited people at several occasions since 1991 through July
1994 to a 'pacification meeting' and gunned them as they were gathered. Corroborating Refugee
International, Amnesty International indicated that RPF had deliberately killed people since April
through August 1994 in Kigarama, Nyamugali, Gisenyi, Nyarubuye, Rushinga, Musasa, and all
Rusumo.1403
Priests refugees in Goma affirmed in a letter dated August 2, 1994, addressed to Pope John Paul II,
that the RPF targeted "particularly Hutu intellectuals but also killed people who did not know how to
read and write''.1404
In August 1994, the UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Boutros Ghali, opposed the Gersony findings
that established crimes perpetrated by the RPF.1405Thus, the document was embargoed and was
simply shelved.1406
personnes); Cyeru (2,500 personnes), Nyamugali (2,500 personnes); BYUMBA: Tumba (2,000 personnes); Kivuye
(1,900 personnes); Muvumba (3,000 personnes); Cyumba (1,500 personnes); Cyungo (900 personnes), Kiyombe (700
personnes); Sous-préfecture de Ngarama: 6,000 personnes. Leiter entitled 'Dénonciation du Génocide perpétré par le
FPR au Rwanda', Université Nationale du Rwanda, Butare, 19 February 1993.
1399This was confirmed by 5 of the signatories that the author interviewed. For their own security, their names are not
mentioned here.
1400Desouterand Reyntjens, Les Violations des droits de I'homme par Ie FPR/APR, 1995.
1401Seealso Africa Rights, Report, September 1994; HRW/Africa, Rwanda: A New Catastrophe?, December 1994.
1402HumanRights Watch/Africa, Communiqué Immédiat, 6 June 1994.
1403Amnesty International, Rwanda: Report of killings and abductions by the Rwandan Patriotic Army, April-August, 1994,
20 October 1994.
1404Theauthor is in possession of a copy of the letter.
1405Afterthe RPF victory, the UNHCR sent a three-person mission headed by Robert Gersony to find ways to speed the
repatriation of the over two million refugees who had fled the country since April 1994. They became convinced in the
course of the work that the RPF had engaged in "clearly systematic murders and persecution of the Hutu population in
certain parts of the country." Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés, "Note, La Situation au Rwanda,"
Confidentiel, September 23, 1994, p. 4. Although few in number and pressed for time, the team covered more of RPF
territory and spoke to a wider number and variety of witnesses than any other foreigners working in Rwanda during this
period. They were permitted to travel freely by the RPF, which may have expected the results of their work to support
their efforts to bring the refugees home. From August 1 through September 5, the team visited ninety-one sites in forty-
one of the 145 communes of Rwanda and gathered detailed information about ten others. In these places, as well as in
nine refugee camps in surrounding countries, they conducted more than two hundred individual interviews and another
one hundred discussions with small groups. They found the information provided by witnesses detailed and convincing
and they confirmed the most important parts of accounts by independent sources in other camps or inside Rwanda. Ibid.,
pp. 1-2. In the northwest, they gathered data on an alleged RPF massacre on August 2 of some 150 persons who had
been trying to return to Rwanda from Zaire and they noted systematic and arbitrary arrests and "disappearances" of adult
men in the prefecture of Gisenyi. But their harshest criticism dealt with the prefectures of the south and southeast: Butare,
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On December 9, 1994, the UN Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council a report of the
Commission of Experts that concluded, inter alia, that "crimes against humanity and serious
violations of international humanitarian law were committed by individuals of both sides of the
conflict". He recommended that "an international tribunal should be established and that investigation
of violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights law attributed to the Rwandan
Patriotic Front be continued by the Prosecutor of the ICTR''.1407
On 27 February 1996, Libération established the "responsibility of the RPF for killing over 100,000
Hutu within 22 months since it had seized power".140B
In October 1997, Human Rights Watch reported that the RPA had gone to the ORC where its
soldiers proceeded to a systematic selection of Rwandan Hutu refugees that resulted in young men,
former military or militia, former members of government, and intellectuals being selected for
execution.1409 Rwandan Vice-President, Minister of Defence and President of the RPF, Paul
Kagame, had earlier confirmed that his troops were "operating" in Cong01410 and, later, reports
stated that about 200,000 Hutus were killed in the ORC.1411In this regard, Human Rights Watch
listed a number of alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed between October
1996 and May 1997. It accused the Rwandan Patriotic Army of having carried out massive killings of
civilian Rwandan refugees camped in the former Zaïre and the international community, including the
United Nations, of having "deliberately turned a blind eye to the killings in Rwanda and the ORC". It
"urged the international community to desist from glossing over human rights abuses in both Rwanda
and the ORC but to ensure that all the culprits account for their atrocities". For those atrocities
part of Kigali, and Kibungo, particularly those communes adjacent to the border. They reported massacres following
meetings convoked by the authorities, and the hunting down and murder of people in hiding. They also reported
ambushes and massacres of persons trying to flee across the border to Burundi. They stated that the victims were killed
indiscriminately, with women, children, the elderly, and the handicapped being targeted, as well as men. They concluded
that "the great majority of these killings had apparently not been motivated by any suspicion whatsoever of personal
participation by victims in the massacres of Tutsi in April 1994." Ibid., p. 3. They added that in some cases, repatriated
Tutsi refugees had joined the RPF in attacking local Hutu. They stated that during the last week of August and the first
week of September, some five bodies a day on the average had been pulled from the Akagera River, many of them with
their hands and feet bound. Ibid., p. 3. See also Desouter and Reynljens, Les Violations des droits de I'homme par Ie
FPRIAPR, 1995, at 6; La Lettre du RDR, No. 6-7, 1-15 April 1996, p. 1.
1406Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 120.
1407UnitedNations and the Situation in Rwanda, at 19.
1408Libération,27 February 1996, quoted in La Lettre du RDR, Nos. 6-7, 1-5 April 1996, front page.
1409HumanRights Watch/Africa and Fédération Internationale des Oroits de I'Homme, October 1997, Vol. 9, NO.5 (A), p.
14.
wOJohn Pomfret, 'Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo', Washington Post, July 9, 1997.
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committed after 1994, it even suggested that the powers of the ICTR be extended to cover those
who committed similar atrocities in the neighbouring DRC.1412
In September 1997, it was reported that "Rwandan Intelligence agents", in connection with certain
Zambian immigration and police officers, were "abducting Hutus in Zambia".1413 Frustrated, a number
of refugees fled Zambia to seek asylum in other countries.
In stead of trying to understand what happened, the UN limited the Tribunal's competence to events
immediately preceding or following the Rwandan genocide, which inappropriately undermines the
scope of complicity and prosecution of other crimes against humanity that should be explored. As
only Hutus are subjected to criminal trials, one has reason to fear that the ICTR will not achieve what
it is supposed to do, that is, contribute "to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration
and maintenance of peace".1414 It is feared that justice will not be seen to be done, that the process
will be viewed as partisan and that it will not be able to contribute to stability.1415 A number of
Rwandans agree that by prosecuting one side of the conflict, the ICTR is conducting a "show
trial"1416which, to a certain extent, supports those Tutsis in the army and. probably in government,
who are walking free despite their responsibility in the massacres. "There will be no faintest glimmer
of reconciliation as one party is [demonised] while the other is cherished by the UN [who is]
supposed to safeguard peace and security in the world".1417
While atrocities, as shown, began with the invasion of northern Rwanda by the RPF at the beginning
of 1990, and culminated in the RPF's assumption of State power in July 1994, the tribunal's time
span of investigation is different: "from 1 January 1994 to 31 December 1994". While there is ample
evidence to show that atrocities were committed on both sides, only those committed by the Hutu
militias are being investigated, since, the argument goes, only they constitute 'genocide and crimes
against humanity'. One of the more grotesque consequences of the differential treatment of RPF and
Hutu militia massacres is that the corpses at the sites of militia massacres have been left as found
some "months ago" as a permanent display for fact-finding missions, while those resulting from RPF
1411Seefor example Matata, Une épuration ethnique en République Oémocratique du Congo, CUR, May, 1998; GEAPO,
Rwanda: Quel Avenir?, Kivu, February 1998.
1412PANA, 15 March 1998. For acts committed in 1994, the ORC should be covered as a "neighbouring State".
1413ThePost, No. 815, Tuesday, September 23, 1997; Amnesty International, Urgent Action, September 1997.
1414Res. 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994, Preamble.
1415SeeJohan Scheers, quoted in Agence France Presse, 12 September 1997.
1416See discussions on Rwandanet, 1996-May 1999.
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atrocities, for example at Kibeho in 1995 where about 8,000 people were gunned down by the RPA,
were hastily disposed of in all-night burial sessions.1418Moreover, regarding people dumped in the
rivers or burned1419,the author has interviewed Hutu survivals who affirmed that Tutsi army soldiers
threw hundreds of Hutus in the Akagera river and burnt many others in their houses and in the
bushes where they had taken refuge.142o If the UN is to be neutral and fair in meting out its
punishments, it certainly must care to examine potential atrocities committed by both sides in the
conflict. Both the late January 1, 1994, commencement date and the early 31 December 1994,
closing date could prevent investigation and prosecution of certain crimes.
Apart from the allegations already indicated, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees
published a report in September 1995, subsequently supported by Amnesty lntemationat'<" in which
it held that the RPF had conducted revenge killings after taking power "on a systematic basis", with
at least 30,000 casualties. The other allegation, made by journalists and non-governmental
organisations workers, was that "the RPF killings of refugees at Kibeho camp were unprovoked
massacres".1422 Furthermore, the author has received 31 letters from different Rwandan individuals
from 6 préfectures affirming that RPA targets have been "Hutu males, educated, former politicians,
civil servants, or army soldiers, and physically fit".1423All these facts establish that the RPF/RPA has
been responsible for considerable killings.
According to Article 2 of the statute of the ICTR, repeating provisions of the Genocide convention,
genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such:
(a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
14171d.
1418Thevictims were, however, under the 'protection' of UN forces. See Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 59.
1419Africa Rights (1994), Rwanda: Death Despair and Defiance, September 1994.
1420The names of the interviewed cannot be disclosed.
1421Amnesty International, Report, 1995.
1422LaLettre du RDR, No. 6-7,1-15 April 1996.
142323 of these letters emanate from persons who have lost their relatives in such killings, whence this source is reliable.
For the security of these persons, their names are not given here.
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In addition, the tribunal, under the terms of Article 3, has wider powers to prosecute individuals guilty
of crimes against humanity, which are 'committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds'. Those crimes
are: murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecutions on
political, racial and religious grounds; and other inhumane acts.1424 The ICTR should investigate,
prosecute and punish, where possible.
The third limitation of the Statute is found in Article 5 that unjustly excludes from liability entities other
than "natural persons". Although international law rejects the criminal liability of States and legal
persons, these have long been held responsible for breaches of international obligations. Where
international obligation in question is one of essential importance, such as the prohibition against
genocide, it is a serious breach of that obligation by a State to constitute an international crime.
While States have been reluctant to acquiesce in the jurisdiction of any international court to
consider such charges, and have interposed sovereign immunity defence in national courts, the
assertion of State prerogatives in the face of universally-recognised norms is increasingly dubious.
This can also apply to corporations and other legal organisations that are subject to criminal liability
under national legal systems for which international law is increasingly recognising the role in
international affairs and the need to subject them to the provisions of international law. In fact it has
been reported that some states and some organisations based in those states or elsewhere have
been providing arms and military equipment to the former Rwandan government and to the RPF,
despite evidence of their intended purpose.1425 It is therefore appropriate for the Security Council to
consider the possibility of States' criminal liability as regards the Rwandan genocide.
However, given the complexity of the criminal liability of States and other legal persons, the issue
should be examined together with the fourth restriction whether imprisonment is the only criminal
sanction that should be applied by the Tribunal. It should be taken into account the fact that there is
no provision nor principle of international law suggesting that imprisonment or even criminal
sanctions must be the exclusive remedy for the crimes the Tribunal is presently charged with
investigating. For example, under Article I of the Genocide Convention, parties to the Convention
confirmed that they undertook to "punish" genocide, and under Article V further pledged to "provide
effective penalties" for persons found guilty of acts proscribed under the Convention. In addition to
1424Res. 955 (1994), 5 November 1994.
1425Human Rights Watch gives a detailed report on arms flows to the Government of Rwanda and to the RPF. See
Human Rights Watch, Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in Rwandan War, New York,
January 1994, p. 20-22.
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enacting national penalties, parties may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to
"take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the
suppression" of such acts. For example, the ICTR should be empowered to fine juristic persons
having played a role, directly or indirectly, in the genocide and other crimes against humanity. This
money would be affected to national reconstruction of Rwanda and to compensate victims of the
atrocities in the form of 'class claims': victims with similar situation1426 would be grouped and part of
the money would be affected to their common benefit.1427
The foregoing analysis has shown that important basic tensions exist within the mandate of the
ICTR. On one hand, it has to ensure individual responsibility and deal with the problem of "the
culture of impunity". On the other hand, there is a more basic requirement, namely to ensure
reconciliation and to "reconstruct" the Rwandan society and State. Whether these aims are fully
compatible is doubtful, at least if one is to consider the way they have been pursued by both the
ICTR and Rwandan domestic courts. Indications have been that the tension has not yet been
resolved. It has rather been exacerbated by the demonisation of Hutus by the international
community and the Tutsi government. The elimination of the bias in the UN legislation and practice
would be one of the solutions to the Hutu-Tutsi problem.
3.9 The challenge of reconciliation and reconstruction
After the genocide in 1994, some analysts have suggested the partition of the country into Hutuland
and Tutsiland as a solution for long-term peace.1428 In this section, the author shows that this idea is
based on a poor analysis of the country and its history. It is argued that what is needed is national
reconciliation and construction of a peaceful society and a viable State. However, as Rwanda stands
like a tree of which balance is precarious because its roots have been eaten into by insects,
reconciliation requires some challenging but healing forces committed to democracy. Indeed,
reconciliation means far reaching reconstruction of the State, and far reaching new formulae on how
power is exercised, how the resources of the State have to be used, how they have to be distributed,
how jobs are offered, how education is going to be given to the people. The failure of the Rwandan
State to solve those problems pertains to the failure of democracy. And democracy has failed
1426For example, widows, orphans, etc.
1427Avocats Sans Frontiéres, Letlre Ouverte, June 1995.
1428SeeMazrui, A., 'United States of Central Africa' in The Monitor, December 5, 1996; Moi, A., 'Hutus versus Tutsis' in
The New Vision, December 14, 1997; Griggs R., The Great Lakes Conflict: Strategies for Building long-term Peace,
Center for World Indigenous Studies, 4, World Atlas, 1997.
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because of its misinterpretation by political actors who have been using the State itself to tyrannise,
thus holding the reconciliation process in check. The fundamental reason for the failure of the
Arusha Peace Accord particularly has been the suspicion between both parties which showed itself
through the search by both blocs to at all costs achieve ability of the majority to impose its will
through government. Hutus wanted to translate their will into law just because they are the majority,
while Tutsis hold on to power because of their traditional role in the society and their fear of
oppression through the application of majoritarianism. In this regard, the central problem Rwanda
has been facing pertains to the mistaken belief that majorities have an inherent right to rule and the
myth that Rwanda can have a democratic system based on majority rule that is not ethnic as well. As
both Hutus and Tutsis have fallen into the traps laid by the attractive, but dangerous, myths of
majoritarianism, this dissertation proposes an alternative understanding of democracy, its application
to and implications for Rwanda. This, together with other proposals contained in this dissertation,
would be the main sources of lasting peace and respect for human rights in Rwanda, mainly since
most of these proposals offer a legitimate rationale for limiting majority will. The impact of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the protection of human rights in Africa is also assessed.
3.9.1 The Hutuland and Tutsiland formula
The idea of partitioning Rwanda into Hutu and Tutsi zone~ was once suggested by Rutsindura in his
analysis of power in Rwanda.1429 It was then supported by President Bagaza in Burundi while
considering the problem in the two countries, but he soon retracted the idea under public
pressure.1430 Today, it is hard to find a Hutu or Tutsi who supports this idea. It has had some appeal
among extra-regional actors. Herman J. Cohen, Senior Associate at the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies and former US ambassador, for example, suggested this idea in 1996 in an
interview on the Cable News Network.1431
The chief problem of the partition is that it would be nearly impossible to operationalise. First,
segregation within Rwanda [and Burundi] is a very local matter: either by rural hillside community or
by rural/urban division [more Tutsis in the cities]. As far as land is concerned, the fertility is not
evenly distributed, it is not clear who would move to Kibuye or Gikongoro where almost nothing
grows, nor who would leave Bugesera or Mutara or Ruhengeri where the land is fertile. Second,
1429 See Rutsindura, K., 'Partition as a Way of Restoring and Maintaining Peace in Rwanda', Working Paper, Nairobi,
June 1997.
1430 Griggs, The Great Lakes Conflict: Strategies for Building long-term Peace, 1997.
1431 CNN, cited in Griggs, The Great Lakes Conflict: Strategies for Building long-term Peace, 1997.
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there is widespread intermarriage and an overwhelming 85-90% Hutu majority. Thus, who would
move where would be as deep a political crisis as the current one. To which side would mixed
people go? Third, the mass movement of people could be destabilising, as was the case in India and
Pakistan in 1948.1432Thus, partition would be no solution since "separating fighters has never
permitted to bring peace".1433The result might be continued violence, as people would always be
looking forward to regaining their lost better place. The violence would also be in the form of State to
State war as far as Rwanda and Burundi are concerned.
3.9.2 National reconciliation
The discussion in various parts of this dissertation revealed that the Rwandan society has not been
peaceful and that the stability of the State has been in jeopardy. The first step in any solution
obviously is in negotiating. As human rights do not apply in a vacuum but in a viable State, the
prerequisite in Rwanda is to tackle the factors of tension and disintegration which have led to the
1990s catastrophe, so as to build a peaceful, harmonious and reconciled society. In this regard, it is
in the interest of Hutus and Tutsis to negotiate a lasting solution and for any solution to be
transparent, and appeal directly to affected people or it will lack legitimacy. Secret negotiations
among elite actors are unlikely to eliminate the structural factors and discursive practices that foment
conflict. Delegations to Arusha in 1992-3 comprised only a political elite and their efforts ended in
genocide, ethnic massacres, and confiscation of power - not entirely surprising since it included only
the groups with a history and interest in exploiting ethnicity. Thus, negotiations must recognise all
concerned actors including Hutu and Tutsi intellectuals, civil servants, businessmen, refugees, and
other members of civil society, many of whom have been united against violence but consistently
ignored because they lack a militia.
3.9.2.1 The prerequisite for reconciliation
The comparison of Rwanda with South Africa shows that there is a long way to go for reconciliation
and reconstruction to come into being in Rwanda. While the apartheid State in South Africa was
weakened from within by officials and elected representatives who engaged in actions beyond the
limits set by the laws of the State, the Tutsi State has been strengthened by the elimination of
1432 Griggs, The Great Lakes Conflict: Strategies for Building long-term Peace, 1997.
1433 See Jean Pierre Gontard, cited in Nsengiyaremye, The unknown tragedy, at 119. As regards the grouping of Hutus
and Tutsis into two distinct states of Rwanda and Burundi, Jean Claude Chrétien observes that it "would ratify ethnic
purification and snaps fingers at the history of the region. Le Soir, 12 December 1994.
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'troublesome' elements who would have the courage to point out the wrongdoings of the ruling class.
Corruption - the use of public funds in contravention of the laws of the State itself - was a
widespread phenomenon in South Africa. Most widely known was the scandal about the use of
secret funds by the then Department of Information, which led to the resignation of the State
President, B.J. Vorster, in 1978.1434 During the course of 1980s allegations of the misuse of public
funds in the course of the subordinate 'homelands' of Transkei, Ciskei, Kwa-Ndebele and Lebowa
became the subject of official Commissions of Inquiry, with the allegations being confirmed in the
latter two cases.1435 Such commissions are not instituted in Rwanda despite evidence of corruption
and embezzlement.1436
Dirty tricks by a State, in the form of illegal actions against the political opposition, are not easily
verifiable. However, circumstantial evidence pointing to such actions by the South African State is
not hard to find. Most infamous are deaths in detention of political prisoners, with the death of Black
consciousness leader, Steve Biko, in 1977 being the most notorious. According to one source, sixty-
eight such deaths occurred from September 1963 to August 1988.1437 Illegal actions by the security
forces in the form of 'death squads' have persisted into the 1990s, but an official inquiry, as well as a
Standing Commission of the National Peace Accord, could not find evidence of such operations.1438
The most well substantiated action of this kind by members of the State in their personal capacities
thus far was revealed in the so-called Trust Feed murder case. A police officer was found guilty on
eleven counts of murder after admitting to executing an attack on a United Democratic Front (UDF)
stronghold in 1988.1439 Less violent, but still in the realm of dirty tricks, was the admission of the
government to the clandestine funding of the Inkatha Freedom Party in 1991.1440 Many people die in
detention places in Rwanda and, in fact, as explained in earlier discussion, there is no political
prisoner in that country, at least in the South African sense, since almost anyone involved in politics
1434 Davenport, R.R.H., South Africa - A Modern History, Johannesburg: Macmillan, 3 ed., 1987, p. 435-437; Loraine
Gordon (ed.), Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1979, Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations,
1980, p. 7-9.
1435 Cooper et al., Race Relations Survey 1989/90, p. 74-84; 125, 130; Cooper et al., Race Relations Survey 1989/1990,
p., 484, 503, 512, 518; Carole Cooper et ai., Race Relations survey 1992/93, Johannesburg: South African Institute of
Race Relations, 1993, p. 26, 33.
1436 Read for example Nkundiyaremye, A., Note sur la situation socio-politique du Rwanda actuel - Le bilan
catastrophique de 5 ans du regime FPR, unpublished paper, Brussels, May 1999.
1437 Cooper et ai., Race Relations Survey 1988189, p. 554.
1438 Cooper et ai., Race Relations Survey 1991192, Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1992, p.
492-494; Cooper et ai., Race Relations Survey 1992/93, p. 27, 28.
1439 Coombe, D., '''Of Murder and Deceit": The Trust Feed Killings'
1440 Cooper et aL, Race Relations Survey 1991192, p. 483, 484.
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during the Habyarimana regime is considered as 'génocidaire' by the ruling RPF. However, a
number of prisoners were arrested simply because of their ethnic affiliation. Therefore, the RPF
government does not seem to have any significant threat from within, apart from a handful of Tutsis
opponents, supporters of the restoration Tutsi kingship in Rwanda.1441 As this is a Tutsi-Tutsi affair, it
would change nothing in the Hutu-Tutsi socia-political problem.
From outside, the South African State was weakened by a number of forms of resistance. Organized
civil disobedience took the form of the 1989 Defiance Campaign, targeting segregated hospitals,
beaches and buses.1442 Far more extensive was the gradual but persistent unorganized civil
disobedience of thousands of ordinary Black South Africans who simply stopped following the
apartheid prescriptions in an attempt to devise workable survival strategies for themselves. Civil
disobedience of this order served to accelerate the collapse of urban and communal apartheid, as
much as organised resistance did.1443 It also stimulated the rapid growth of a parallel economy,
operating beyond the control of the State. According to one estimate released in 1992, up to 3.5
million people, out of an economically active population of 14.3 million, were employed within this
informal sector of the economy.t= Because of the tight vigilance of the RPF and the resultant killing
of any recalcitrant, civil disobedience is not easy to practise in Rwanda at the present time. Under
the pretext of "local defense", the RPF has organized a militia with mission to control every daily
activity of Hutus or their Tutsi relatives in all quarters of the country. For each of the 10,000 cells
(administrative unity of about 150 families each) that are numbered in Rwanda, five militiamen, well-
trained and armed with guns, have been appointed. This makes in total over 50,000 militias called
Inyangamugayo1445 who, if needs be, can eliminate any element judged dangerous for the RPF
survival.1446
1441 Some sources affirm that King Kigeri V, defected in 1959 and in exile in the USA, is contesting the Republic and
would like to return to Rwanda and restore the kingship. See for example, Matata, J., Le Retour a la Royauté, Brussels,
March 1999.
1442 Cooper et aL, Race Relations SUNey 1989/90, p. 222-227.
1443 Kane-Berman, J., South Africa's Silent Revolution, Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations
&Southern, 2nd ed. 1991, p. 25-58.
1444 Cooper et al., Race Relations SUNey 1992/93, p. 110. An in-depth analysis of this sector of the economy can be
found in Eleanor Preston-Whyte and Christian Rogerson (eds.), South Africa's Informal Economy, Cape Town: Oxford
University Press, 1991.
1445 Can be compared to Interahamwe of MRND.
1446 Nkundiyaremye, A., Note sur la situation socio-politique du Rwanda actuel - Le bilan catastrophique de 5 ans du
regime FPR, unpublished paper, Brussels, May 1999. From the abroad, however, the Rassemblement pour Ie Retour
des Réfugiés et la Démocratie au Rwanda strives to challenge the RPF. The RDR is a political organisation, whose aim
is to struggle for a rule of law, justice, democracy, republican values and to establish the whole truth about the Rwandan
tragedy. These are undoubtedly the corner stone to true reconciliation, long-lasting peace and sustainable development.
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The toleration of private armies and paramilitary forces which challenge the claims to State
sovereignty also indicates a weakening of State power. With the un-banning of the Pan Africanist
Congress (PAC) and African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa in 1990, neither disbanded
their military wings, the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) and Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK),
respectively. The ANC did suspend the armed struggle in 1990, but refused to reveal its arms
caches, while the PAC continued its armed campaign, despite its newly acquired legalised status.
The ANC announced in December in 1990 that so-called 'people's defense committees' would be
established in black townships to ensure the physical safety of residents. The white right-wing
Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) followed suit in early 1991 by establishing a new military
wing, the Ystergarde (Guards of Steel), to be recruited from the ranks of former defense force and
police personnel.t-" The National Peace Accord, signed in September 1991 by the National Party
(NP), ANC, South African Communist Party (SACP) and Inkata Freedom Party (IFP), but not by the
AWB and PAC, explicitly prohibits the maintenance of private armies,1448but by early 1994 had not
yet been effective in the disbanding of anyone of these units. Such a situation does not seem to
prevail in Rwanda where the only Peuple en Armes pour la Libération du Rwanda (PALIR) organized
by Hutus in the DRC has been dismantled by the Tutsi army in its invasion and occupation of eastern
Congo.1449Besides, in order to attract international sympathy, the RPF is hiding behind the 1994
genocide, trying to find false or true evidence against potential political challengers, thus hindering
any opposition initiative in and outside Rwanda. Under such conditions, it would take a very long
time for PALIR and other armed opposition to organize, to get international credibility, and indeed
make a strong challenging element.
Another crucial challenge to the State in South Africa was in the form of so-called 'people's courts',
erected as a set of institutions to enact informal justice within the black townships. These were not
merely bodies running parallel and complementary to the formal judicial system of the State, as were
some of the earlier informal township courts. The courts established by UDF affiliates were parallel
and antagonistic to the State, ' ... part of a broad national movement that sought to transform the
The RDR reiterates the need of a rule of law and a society managed without any kind of exclusion, based on freedom,
justice and peace and respecting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It condemns the Tutsi genocide and the
genocide perpetrated against Hutus.
1447 Cooper et al., Race Relations Survey 1991/92, p. 484.
1448 Section 3.7, par. 3.7.3.
1449 The only pretext put forward by the RPF for the invasion was that the PALIR was formed and composed of elements
of the former Rwandan army involved in the genocide.
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State itself,145o through '".a deliberate effort to replace the organs of the State and in so doing
transform political relationships' .1451The State recognized this challenge and with some measure of
success sought to suppress the continued existence of these courts, which during 1985 were
estimated to number more than 400.1452 In Rwanda, instead, the government is setting up the
gacaca (extra-judicial tribunals) with competence to prosecute, judge and punish those Hutus that
have not been 'punished' in the formal judicial system. Certain analysts point out that these tribunals
have been thought up in order to counteract any political opposition initiative, like the 'people's courts
of South Africa', to challenge the RPF.1453They will certainly make use of the Inyangamugayo militia
for investigation and arrests.
The most tangible success of the insurrectionary project against the South African State, and the
most visible indicator of the weakening of the State, was the extent to which the State structures of
Black Local Authorities (BLAs) collapsed. These bodies, set up to administer African townships, were
constituted with elected councils; elections were held in 1983 and 1988. The councilors became a
prime focus for attack by the UDF/ANC allied township organizations, and there was sustained
hostility towards the persons and institutions of the BLAs. The 1988 elections were countered with a
boycott so successful that only a 25.1 percent official turnout was registered.1454 Individual councilors
and their property were subjected to physical attacks, with 111 such attacks being recorded in the
first half of 1990.1455 Coupled to the campaign by CAST (Civic Associations of the Southern
Transval) to bring about the collapse of these bodies, large numbers of councilors resigned. By the
end of 1990, 40 percent of BLAs had ceased functioning, and by March 1991 the number had risen
to 48 percent.1456The masquerade of the local authorities' election organized in Rwanda in March
1999 went unchallenged. Candidates were presented by political and military authorities at the very
1450 Seekings, J., 'People's Courts and Popular Politics', in Glenn Moss and Ingrid Obery (eds.), South African Review 5,
Johannesburg: Ravan, 1989, p. 119-135 at 132.
1451 Lodge, T., 'Ideology and People's Power', in Lodge et al., All, Here and Now, p. 127-140 at 135.
1452 Seekings, 'People's Courts and Popular Politics', p. 123. For general analyses of these structures, see Sandra
Burman, 'The role of street committees: continuing South Africa's practice of alternative justice', in Hugh Corder (ed.),
Democracy and the Judiciary, Cape Town: Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa, 1988, p. 141-166;
Sandra Burman and Wilfried Scharf, 'Creating People's Justice: Street Committees and People's Courts in a South
African City', Law and Society Review, vol. 24, no. 3, 1990, p. 693-744; Wilfried Scharf, 'The role of people's courts in
transitions', in Hugh Corder (ed.), Democracy and the Judiciary, Cape Town: Institute for a Democratic Alternative for
South Africa, 1988, p. 167-184.
1453 See for example Nkundiyaremye, Note sur la situation socio-politique du Rwanda actuel, p. 6.
1454 Cooper et al., Race Relations Survey 1988/89, p. 512.
1455 Cooper et al., Race Relations Survey 1991/92, p. 490.
1456 Anthea Jeffrey (ed.), Forum on Mass Mobilization, Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1991, p.
11.
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time of the vote, and voters were requested to queue behind the candidate.1457 Some of the
politicians interviewed responded that "we still need to live for sometime and cannot dare to point out
the rampant injustice in this country"1458and the international community remained silent.
In making an overall assessment of how weak the South African State had become by the early
1990s, one has to consider the extent to which insurrectionary goals and counterrevolutionary
targets failed to be achieved on both sides. The ANC was successful in its military campaign as
'armed propaganda', but failed to achieve a generalised insurrection.1459Nor were liberated zones
established or dual sovereignty achieved on a more or less permanent basis.146oThe State was
strong enough to protect its core interests and institutions against the insurrectionists,1461 but little
more "although security action weakened the extra-parliamentary opposition and welfare action won
the hearts and minds of a small number of blacks, this low-intensity conflict phase of total strategy
succeeded in managing rather than destroying political opposition".1462
Perhaps time can teach us many on the Rwandan situation. Will it remain as it is now? Will the RPF
be able to keep its minority rule? It is possible that Hutus in exile will not remain silent. Political
organizations are being created and are trying to demand support from the international community
"for reconciliation" and reconstruction in their country.1463
In South Africa, a mutually hurting stalemate set in. The resilience of the State in meeting the
challenges was ascribed to its capacity for innovation, as well as to the modification and adaptation
of apartheid institutions to changing conditions of adversity.1464However, the inability of the State to
1457 Nkundiyaremye, Note sur la situation socio-politique du Rwanda actuel, p. 2.
1458 Interview with Nkeramugaba, Member of Parliament. This mode of ballot was illegal: absence of legal provision on
election, non-participation of political parties, absence of secret of vote; absence of a law on election of and by
foreigners, absence of the right of appeal or any other challenge of irregularity, and negation of the role of the Conseil
d'Etat.
1459 Lodge, T., 'The African National Congress in south Africa, 1976-1983: guerrilla War and Armed Propaganda', Journal
of Contemporary African Studies, vol. 3, no. 12, 1983/84, p. 153-180; Lodge, T., 'The African National Congress in the
1990s', in Moss and Obery (eds.), South African Review 6, p. 45.
1460 Mayiam, P., 'The Rise and Decline of Urban Apartheid in South Africa', African Affairs, vol. 89, no, 354, 1990, p. 57-
84 at 81.
1461 Sarakinsky, I., 'State, Strategy and Extra-Parliamentary Opposition in South Africa 1983-1988', Politikon, vol. 16, no.
1, June 1989, p. 69-82.
1462 Hansson, 'Changes in counter-revolutionary state strategy in the decade 1979 to 1989', in Hansson and Smit (eds.),
Towards Justice, p. 55. Original emphasis
1463 See for example RDR, Plateforme Idéologique du Rassemblement pour le Retour des Refugiés et la Démocratie au
Rwanda, Paris, 23 August 1998, FRD, Communiqué de Presse, Nos. 3, 5, 6, 8, 11, and 13.
1464 There is a sound body of literature arguing this line. Foremost is certainly the early analysis of Herbert Adam,
Modernizing Racial Modernization - The Dynamics of South African Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press,
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maintain its almost omnipotent position of the late 1960s was accounted for by a combination of
manpower shortages, declining resources,1465 and weakening resolve.1466 The RPF seems to
maintain its position since it has succeeded to gain international support, using the genocide as a
trump card to hinder every political initiative from Hutus.
The fact remains that the mechanics of reconstruction and reconciliation are not matters of emotion:
Rwandan people will not go to sleep to wake up the following day liking each other. They will only
trust secure deals at a certain point and the process will probably be extended in the future. In South
Africa, reconciliation and reconstruction of the State did happen because the war was dragged out to
the point of mutual exhaustion. It was also due to the change of the international cold war paradigm
and the relatively smooth transition to majority rule in Namibia. There is no convincing framework in
the region of east and central Africa that can influence the Rwandans to initiate the settlement of
their problem. Today, the situation for people in Burundi, the eastern region of the DRe and in
Rwanda is quite severe and it is receiving minimal media attention and insufficient humanitarian aid.
First, in the rural areas much of the population now live in government 'regrouping camps' of five to
fifteen thousand people, some of which rely entirely on humanitarian aid. The extent of this is
unknown but based on recent interviews conducted by the author, two million people at the very
minnimum live in this manner.1467They are unable to reach their farms and those that do may be
shot by the army because anyone found outside a regrouping camp in certain areas, is assumed to
be a rebel. In these camps people are malnourished and - with luck - eat one meal a day. They do
not have enough water to drink, let alone maintain sanitary conditions. They need clothes, blankets,
mats to sleep on, and food. They also desperately need some monitoring because no one is
focusing on these conditions. The UN does some monitoring only in areas close to major cities. The
few people who can get to the interior areas - where there are roadblocks and clearances are
required - report appalling conditions, with people subjected to massacres by both rebels and the
army.146BHundreds of women and children are dying every month, but outside of a few reports
1971.
1465 These two sets of factors are highlighted by Merle Lipton and Charles Simkins, 'Introduction', in Merle Lipton and
Charles Simkins (eds.), State & Market in Post-Apartheid South Africa, Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press,
1993, p. 1-34 at 9-13.
1466 The weakening resolve can be traced back to the decline of intellectual support for apartheid from within Afrikaner
ranks, as noted by Hermann Giliomee and Lawrence Schlemmer in From Apartheid to Nation-building, p. 59,120.
1467 In addition to the letters received from Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC, the author has interviewed different refugees
from those countries [Burundi (8), the DRC (13), and Rwanda (6)) as well as journalists who visited some of the different
regions of those countries (Jean Moussart of Reporters Sans Frontiêres, Stan Tossou of Channel Africa, and Joseph
Mumtaz of SABC).
1468 Jean Moussart, 12 March 1999; Stan Tossou, 21 March 1999.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
353
usually picked up on the wireless services, there is no sustained investigative reporting to reveal who
is doing the killing. The rebels blame government soldiers and the government blames the rebels.
Tutsi and Hutu journalists follow suit-distorting stories in terms of their own particular political and
ethnic persuasions. After the genocide in 1994 many analysts suggested that the lack of media
attention in the months prior to the killings contributed to international indifference and inaction. For
months, vitriolic hate messages were pumped out over the State-owned radio (Radio Rwanda),
Radio Muhabura, and the print media, but very few journalists chose to cover that story. Later, when
journalists covered the refugee camps in Goma, it refocused international attention and the world
community responded to the plight of the refugees.1469
A third reason to pay attention to Burundi and Rwanda is that there still is a potential of a
conflagration in this area that could involve a large number of States. Kabila's drive toward Kinshasa
has been the beginning rather than the end of troubles because of the political alignments in the
region. Indeed, he has failed to stabilize the ORe within the region and the country has collapsed
into fighting among various movements. The reverberations are felt all across Africa in the form of
refugee movement, large-scale war, and newly inspired moves for self-determination. New
international alignments, a reconsideration of African boundaries,1470 massive refugee movements,
destabilization in ten neighboring countries, and neo-colonialist forms of economic occupation are all
potential aspects of a new African portrait that could follow on the heels of the ORC's present
unstable position at the heart of the continent.
Part of understanding either the stability or instability of the ORe depends on understanding Rwanda
and Burundi. The current war in the ORe is clearly linked to instability there. The crisis of ex-
Rwandan and ex-Burundian soldiers who used refugees as human shields and launched cross-
border raids into Rwanda and Burundi in the past years was compounded by terrible policy errors on
the part of the then Zaire. In late September 1996, the governor of Zaire's Kivu Province asked that
the so-called Banyamulenge or ethnic Tutsis of the Mulenge Mountain in Eastern Zaire "return to
Rwanda" despite at least two centuries of ancestry in Zaire.1471The Zairian governor's order of
ethnic expulsion was ill-timed, poorly informed and deplorably bad strategy. It led to the immediate
military mobilization of the Banyamulenge, provided Rwanda and Uganda with allied forces that
1469 See Amnesty International, Annual Report, 1996.
1470 Read Speech of the Rwandan President, 15 April 1998. According to him, African boundaries should be reviewed
because "they do not correspond to the current situation".
1471 For details about the Banyamulenge, see Mulaba, A., Tribes in Zaire, Bukavu: Alfajiri, 1997.
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could stop cross-border incursions from opposition militias with limited direct involvement, and it
allowed Laurent Kabila and other anti-Mobutu forces an opportunity to piggy-back this into a
revolution. In just eight months this group of allied militias that included many Tutsis occupied one-
third of this huge central African country.1472
A geopolitical understanding that is fundamental to any effort to bring long-term stability to this region
is to understand that the ethnic distribution of Hutus and Tutsis is not confined within political
boundaries. Of some thirteen million people within the two States, over 85% are Hutus and about
14% Tutsis.1473However, two million of an estimated fifteen million Hutus and Tutsis are located
across the boundaries of Rwanda and Burundi in neighbouring States. Some 400,000 Tutsis [and
some Hutus] trace their ancestry to either eastern ORC's North Kivu province [the 'Banyarwanda1 or
its South Kivu province [the Tutsis]. Between 750,000 and one million Hutus are located on the
Tanzanian boundary with Rwanda and Burundi. Tens of thousands of both Tutsis and Hutus reside
along the Rwanda/Uganda boundary in the Kisoro sub-district. Ethnic ties have created alliances
such as the particularly strong one between President Museveni of Uganda whose revolutionary
movement included many Tutsis, the minority Tutsi regimes in Rwanda and Burundi, and Kabila's
forces. The Hutus have had the sympathies of other neighbouring States such as Tanzania, Kenya,
and even Sudan. In fact, most of the region is aligned in the Hutu/Tutsi conflict in a delicate yet
explosive web of alliances. At the beginning of the war in the ORC, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and
Kabila were in one camp allied with the Tutsis, while Tanzania, Kenya, Mobutu's Zaire, and Sudan
formed a camp more aligned with the Hutus. Now Kabila has switched side to the Hutus, following
the Tutsis' attempts to overthrow him. The possibility exists that the fighting in Sudan could become
interlinked with fighting in the Great Lakes region. To some degree, that process has begun. Sudan
already supports rebel movements inside the ORC that launch attacks into Uganda.1474
Consider another scenario. The minority Tutsi regimes in Rwanda and Burundi, both of which are
unstable, are now fighting to seize power in the ORC, or at least in the eastern part of that country
with the support of Uganda. Imagine that they succeed and that there is a shift to democratic rule in
Burundi and the Hutus come to power thereafter, pushing the Tutsis aside. There would be a mutual
deep hostility between these countries that would manifest itself in covert military aid to warring
militias in a new civil war or even direct military action.
1472 Mulaba, Tribe in Zaire, p. 21.
1473 Griggs, Geostrategies in the Great Lakes Region, p. 6.
1474 Lord's Resistance Army, West Nile Liberation Army.
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A third scenario is that Tanzania invades Burundi in order to restore a Hutu democracy. Tanzania
has been offering direct support to Hutu rebels in terms of training bases and a location from which
to start cross-border raids. It has deep ties with Hutu leaders, many of whom serve and have
influence in Tanzania's army. That could also see this region explode into conflagration because of
existing alliances and this fact does not inspire Rwandan people to negotiate, though that seems to
be the only way forward through the crisis in the country. The UN five-point peace plan has the merit
of cease-fire and negotiations and there is little to criticize with regard to international diplomatic
efforts. However, some warnings about the evolution of these negotiations must be offered. At some
point negotiations must be regional or they will fail because of the complex alliances already
described in addition to a vast number of other issues related to cross-boundary social, political,
economic, and physical linkages requiring regional consideration. On the other hand, however, the
Rwandan crisis, in the first place, concerns Rwandan people, and can only be solved by them. It
does not depend on the solution of the crisis in the DRC or Burundi. It can rather be catalystic for the
solution of crises in those and other countries of the region. A truth and reconciliation process could
be one of the major steps to reach the solution.
3.9.2.2 The need for truth and reconciliation doctrine
Since 1994, justice in Rwanda has become a topical theme, as well as one of research and
international politics and co-operation. Governments, development agencies, the press and
academic institutions, have invested considerable human and financial resources in this domain.
This investment sought to respond to the important challenge posed by the genocide and crimes
against humanity which took place in Rwanda in 1994: how can justice be rendered to the victims of
these crimes and to the Rwandan society itself, and, at the same time, contribute to the creation of a
context which is conducive to sustainable human development?1475 The expectations imposed on
the Rwandan judicial system and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were, and
still are, enormous. This section seeks to examine whether and how an alternative non-judicial
approach could complement the individual judicial procedures that are currently applied before the
courts and tribunals1476.
1475 See, for example: Government Of Rwanda, Rwanda Round Table Conference - Medium-Term Policy Framework
Document (1996 - 1998), Geneva, June 1996, p.43.
1476 This will be limited to the initiatives at the level of the State, leaving aside the traditional reconciliation mechanisms,
which, at the local level, could play an extremely important role outside of the context of public administration and
national politics.
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3.9.2.2.1 An overview of the judicial approach
As of early April 1999, some 501 persons have been convicted or acquitted by the Specialised
Chambers of the Tribunaux de Premiere Instance in Rwanda. The ICTR passed two verdicts1477.
Other national jurisdictions, whose competence regarding acts of genocide ensues from the principle
of universal jurisdiction, have neither convicted nor acquitted anyone1478. Some 150,000 persons are
held in prisons or other places of detention in Rwanda1479; the large majority of them is accused of
acts of genocide or other crimes against humanity committed during the months of April, May and
June 1994. Tens of thousands of Rwandans are still outside the country1480. Although the impact of
their possible return and this new diaspora on the prison population1481 is hard to assess, their
return, according to some estimates1482 (in addition to the arrests of previous returnees and others)
could raise the number of the detained to some 200,000 persons. No judicial system, whether in
Rwanda or in a so-called "developed" country, has the capacity to judge such a high number of
persons within an acceptable time frame1483.
1477 Jean Kambanda, former Prime Minister, and Jean Paul Akayesu, former burgomaster of Taba commune, have been
sentenced to life imprisonment. In his report to the Security Council on June 4, 1995, the Secretary-General of the UN
had announced that the investigations by the Prosecutor's office of the ICTR would cover 400 suspects who had been
properly identified. In reality, to date, 35 persons have been indicted. (UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, S/1995/457, 4 June 1995, par. 30).
1478 Fully aware of the primacy of the ICTR, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission for Human Rights, Mr. Degni-
Ségui, had nevertheless hoped that the ICTR would not be the only institution to prosecute the «big criminals» who were
outside Rwanda's territory. (COMMISSION DES DROITS DE l'HOMME, Rapport sur la situation des droits de I'homme
au Rwanda soumis par le Rapporteur spécia/, M. René Degni-Ségui, en application du paragraphe 20 de la résolution S-
3/1 du 25 mai 1994, E/CN.4/199617, 28 juin 1995, p. 50).
1479 The latest report of the UNHCHR on the HRFOR includes figures, as of 31 December 1997, of 77,349 for central
prisons and around 48,863 for other detention centres (excluding military and sector-level civilian lock-ups). This adds up
to 126,212 detainees (UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda. Report of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, E/CN.4/1998/61, 19 February 1998, p. 7).
1480 Some reports suggest that approximately 75,000 Rwandan refugees are scattered throughout the region (XINHUA,
UNHCR ends three-day visit to Rwanda, 17 February 1998). Nkundiyaremye (Note sur la sITuation socio-polftique du
Rwanda actuel, p. 10); and the Centre de Lutte Contre I'lnjustice et I'lmpunité au Rwanda (Communiqué No. 47, May
1999), indicate many other detention areas, including private homes, and estimate the total of detainees at 150,000
people.
1481 In January 1998, the president of the Commission for the Repatriation and Reintegration of Refugees declared that
"the Government of Rwanda is seeking, by all possible means, to ensure that these persons, whether innocent or not,
return home" (AFP, 27 January 1998) (Translated by Steff Vandeginste in The Reconciliation Approach to the Genocide
and Crime Against Humanity in Rwanda, Centre for Studies on the Great lakes Region, University of Antwerpen, May
1998).
1482 Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik, Improving African and International Capabilities for Preventing and Resolving
Violent Conflict. The Great Lakes Region Crisis, Berlin, July 1997, p.17. The document even refers to an estimate by the
Government of Rwanda: "The Rwandan government has a projected figure of 200,000 persons subject to imprisonment".
(p.98).
1483 Numerous calculations have been made to estimate the number of years needed to bring all detainees to trial at the
present rate of progress. See, for example, Currin, B., "Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference Delegation to
Rwanda" in Justice and Peace Annual Report, 1997, p.32: "It could take up to 500 years to process all the cases".
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Nevertheless, the Rwandan government sought to organise the prosecution of acts of genocide and
crimes against humanity which had destroyed the country along the lines of individual trials of each
suspected genocide perpetrator. The international community supported it, in this way to meet its
stated objective, which consists of putting an end to a culture of impunity that had reigned for too
long in the country. Several donors even took the first steps in this area of co-operation for
rehabilitation of a judicial system and promotion of the rule of law: court buildings have been
rehabilitated, legal personnel have been trained, although for a short period, and institutional support
has been provided to the Ministry of Justice and the judiciary. The aim of all these interventions was,
above a1l1484,to contribute to the trial of genocide suspects by the Rwandan justice system1485.
During all of 1996, diplomats and other representatives of the international community continuously
insisted that the Organic Law of 30 August 1996 on the organisation of prosecutions for offences
constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity committed since 1 October 1990, be
published as quickly as possible in the Official Gazette "so that trials may start''1486. This was
considered by donors as an essential and indispensable instrument for establishing the truth and for
promoting reconciliation. Several human rights organisations have, for a long time, insisted on what
the Rwandan government is trying to achieve, namely, identifying and prosecuting those responsible
for human rights violations, which is indispensable for rendering justice to victims, their families and
to the society as a whole. The strategy in itself can therefore be legitimate and justified.
Several elements may help explain why, to date, this judicial approach based on individual trials has
not succeeded in coming to terms with the past.
Firstly, there is the magnitude of the problem. The number and intensity of the crimes committed is
enormous. As a result, the number of potential suspects to be brought before the Rwandan justice
system is extremely high. Arrests have continued until today, and consequently, the number of
detainees (and, hence, trials) greatly exceeds the one of February 1996, when the above-mentioned
1484 Another equally important objective was obviously the long-term rehabilitation of the "normal" judicial system, outside
of the context of the trials of suspected perpetrators of genocide. This strategy which aims to combine both objectives
was not supported by all the experts in this field; see for example: Schabas, W., Battling Impunity for Genocide in
Underdeveloped States: The Crisis in Rwandan Justice, ICHRDD Occasional Paper, April 1996, p.3-7.
1485 See: Vandeginste, S., Justice for Rwanda and International Cooperation, Working Paper, University of Antwerp,
September 1997.
1486 As seen, the law came into effect on the day of its publication, 1 September 1996. The first trial hearings actually
took place on 27 December 1996.
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draft Organic Law was adopted by the Council of Ministers1487 and presented to the international
community1488.
Secondly, the capacity of the judicial system was reduced to almost zero. Even if a remarkable effort
of reconstruction had been accomplished and the number of human resources Uudges, public
prosecutor's offices and judicial police inspectors) exceeded the one of the situation prior to April
1994, the capacity of the judicial system is inadequate and will continue to be so, even after new
training sessions for legal personnel.
Thirdly, the mechanism provided for under the Organic Law to pass tens of thousands of judgements
in a reasonable time frame (without having to resort to expeditious justice) has not worked. The
confession and guilty plea procedure1489which includes a penalty reduction in case of a confession,
has not led to numerous confessions, nor to sufficient evidence to prepare the tens of thousands of
case-files149o needed. Among the possible reasons why detainees have not confessed in large
numbers, one could cite, for example: large numbers of detainees are not guilty or, in any event,
consider themselves "innocent", having "simply followed orders"; and the complexity of the procedure
entails difficult access to it for detainees.
Finally, trials will face important difficulties contributing to the realisation of the main objective in the
medium and long term, namely, the reconciliation of the Rwandan society. Three main problems can
be identified within this context: (1) some suspected perpetrators of genocide continue their activities
in the form of a rebellion: survivors are threatened and attacked; (2) a large part of the population
perceives a lack of representation of the ethnic majority in the new State institutions1491, including at
the level of the judicial system; (3) those responsible for human rights violations committed by the
RPA enjoy selective impunity; identifying and prosecuting these persons would constitute the real
test of the fight against the impunity of the present regime1492.
1487 The draft was adopted on 16 February 1996 (UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Monthly Information Report
Rwanda. February 1996, Geneva, March 1996, p. 17).
1488 By the end of January 1996, the number of detainees registered by the ICRC stood at about 65,000 persons. (UN
Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Monthly Information Report Rwanda. January 1996, Geneva, February 1996, p. 14).
1489 Articles 4 and 5 of the Organic Law of 30 August 1996
1490 The Human Rights Field Operation estimates that case files formally bringing genocide charges have been opened
for around 65 percent of detainees (UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, E/CN.4/1998/61, 19 February 1998, par. 6).
1491 For representation of Hutus and Tutsis in State institutions, see Prunier, G., The Rwanda Crisis, Columbia University
Press, New York, 1997, p. 369.
1492 Some soldiers of the RPA have in fact been taken before military tribunals. In September 1997, for example, 2
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This overview leads to an inevitable conclusion: the purely judicial approach, be it at the national or
international level, cannot solve the problem. Even if the capacity of the judicial system were doubled
or tripled, even if tens of thousands of detainees decided to confess1493, even if case-files were
prepared in large numbers, thereby enabling the trials to continue at a faster pace, a complementary
non-judicial alternative would be needed. This need is even more pressing, given the conditions to
which detainees, including, undoubtedly, thousands of innocent people, are subjected in detention.
This observation is by no means new. In this section, the author will try to go beyond the observation
and to contribute to a debate that should be placed on the national and international agenda. Other
countries have also experienced periods during which massive violations of human rights were seen
as a way of capturing and maintaining State power. Numerous studies have been undertaken
concerning the way in which countries such as South Africa, EI Salvador, Ethiopia, Mozambique,
Cambodia, Chile and others have succeeded or failed to come to terms with their past, to establish
the truth and promote reconciliation in their societies. Two of these studies serve as reference theses
for this section. Their observations, conclusions and recommendations will be summarised to
introduce the notion of a truth and reconciliation approach. Next, an attempt will be made to apply
the theory to the Rwandan situation, in order to identify certain opportunities and constraints.
3.9.2.2.2 The truth and reconciliation approach
It is impossible to study the transition process through which the above-mentioned countries have
passed or are passing through in detail within the framework of this dissertation. Other authors have
examined these in detail. Two of these have been selected here to describe the elements of a truth
and reconciliation process, in order to be able to recount what separates the Rwandan situation from
other cases and also to contribute to a more in-depth analysis of how common elements from other
experiences could be applied in the Rwandan context. Reference will be made to the works of Daan
Bronkhorst1494 and Naomi Roht-Arriaza.1495
majors and 2 second lieutenants were accused of murder and complicity to murder of some 110 civilians killed during an
RPA operation in Kanama (in Gisenyi prefecture) in September 1995. The Military Tribunal sentenced them for failure to
assist persons in danger. It ruled that the massacre was neither ordered nor intentioned by the military system, but was
rather the consequence of individual actions of a few soldiers. The court, therefore, did not place responsibility within the
command of the RPA (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The trial of Majors Rwigamba and Ruzibiza
and of Second Lieutenants Sana and Rutayisire, RPA Officers, in connection with the 12 September 1995 incident in
Kanama commune, UNHRFOR Status Report, 30 October 1997).
1493 The confession and guilty plea procedure, initially provided for by the Organic Law of 30 August 1996 for 18 months,
has been extended by the Presidential Order n° 05/01 of 10103/1998 to another 18 months from 1 March 1998 onwards.
See Journal Officiel, 15 March 1998.
1494 Bronkhorst, D., Truth and Reconciliation. Obstacles and opportunities for human rights, Amsterdam, Amnesty
International Dutch Section, 1995.
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Both authors are aware of the unique character of the experiences of each country, the repression of
its people, its history, economic development, old and new political powers, traditional values and
legislation.
"I have been forced to relinquish the hope that from my findings I might be able to distil some
model in the process of achieving truth and reconciliation. No one State has closely followed
the example of another .... I believe, however, that it is within the scope of a relatively
modest book ... to show how in all this diversity there are certain elements which constantly
reappear - and that a few basic patterns can be distinguished" .1496
Roht-Arriaza notes that countries which face a heritage of human rights violations often take
inspiration from the successes and failures of other experiences, while bearing in mind the unique
character of their particular situation.
Bronkhorst tries to place the role of justice in the truth and reconciliation process. The truth helps to
shed light on the past. Who are the victims? Who should be held accountable? Reconciliation seeks
to heal the society and to help it to come to terms with its past. The place of justice (the identification,
prosecution and punishment of perpetrators) in this context seems more controversial. In some
countries, justice is, to a large extent, an instrument used to discover the truth. In others, the
abdication of justice (Le. the absence of legal proceedings against suspected perpetrators) is an
essential pre-condition for reconciliation. In still other cases, perpetrators are tried and convicted, but
then pardoned (and released).
a. Political transition
Generally speaking, truth and reconciliation initiatives are part of a wider framework of political
transition to democratic rule. Bronkhorst distinguishes three phases of political transition: genesis,
transformation and readjustment. The genesis is usually characterised by internal armed conflicts, a
repression, an international war, and, in any event, by the extremely limited participation of the
population in State affairs. The transformation is marked by efforts towards reconciliation and
reconstruction, armed groups forming political parties and rebels becoming government officials.
Readjustment could, after some time, lead either to more violence and oppression, or to a more
democratic and open society in which human rights, security and democratic participation are
respected. In the country in question, this third phase, which forms an integral part of the transition,
1495 Roht-Arriaza, N. (ed.), Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice, New York, Oxford University
Press, 1995.
1496 Bronkhorst, D., Truth and Reconciliation, p. 13.
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will eventually have to confront numerous challenges: the heritage of past human rights violations,
new forms of violence and insecurity, the massive return of refugees, the lack of a democratic
tradition, the frustration of the population faced with limited economic and social benefits after the
transition.
Where might one place Rwanda in such a chronology of transition? Firstly, earlier parts of this
dissertation showed that the genesis criteria have been found in the case of Rwanda since the
revolution of 1959 through the war of 1990. Concerning the second phase, the negotiations and the
Arusha Accords seem, to some extent, to comprise a first attempt at transformation, which has
unfortunately failed. According to a first thesis, the Arusha process had no chance of success from
the beginning, and could only lead to a stillbirth. According to another thesis, internal divisions in the
unarmed opposition parties, stirred up by events in Burundi at the end of 1993, completely
destabilised the tripolar mechanism of Arusha. According to yet another thesis, the Arusha Accords
could even have succeeded in the hours following the attack on the presidential plane on 6 April
1994, which was, in reality, the trigger for a genocide which had been planned well before this date.
A second attempt at transformation and readjustment is presently under way: rebels have become
political authorities with reconciliation and rehabilitation as stated objectives. Some elements such as
the massive return of refugees, the lack of security and economic take-off are also present in the
current Rwandan scenario. Concerning the outcome of this process in the Rwandan case, it is
undoubtedly too early to pass a final judgement. However, earlier sections have pointed out the
continuation of the leadership, hidden behind the facade of an apparently change of regime1497. In
fact, there seem to be no guarantees that this second attempt at transition will lead to the democratic
and open society referred to above.
Truth and reconciliation initiatives are usually found in the second and third phases. In fact, the first
attempt at transformation, namely the Arusha Accords, included the establishment of an International
Commission of Inquiry to investigate human rights violations committed during the war without,
however, elaborating mechanisms for judicial proceedings, the compensation of victims, amnesties,
etc. This is important because the Arusha Accords are part of the current Fundamental Law. The
1497 See Le Tribun du Peuple, a private newspaper supporting the regime, according to which the "revolution failed
because, once we arrived in power, we plagiarised the methods of the government which we were fighting .... If we look
closely, the liabilities of the management of the country by Habyarimana & Co. at the end of the first 15 years of his
reign, were largely attained by the new rulers of the country during the past three years". (Mugabe, J.P., "Le FPR s'est
abjuré", Le Tribun du Peuple, n° 97, August 1997 - text reprinted in Dialogue, September-October 1997, p. 87-90)
Translated by Stet Vandeginste, The Reconciliation Approach, 1998. See also Reyntjens, F., "Rwanda. Evolution
politique 1996-1997" in Centre d'étude de la Région des Grands Lacs d'Afrique, L'Afrique des grands lacs. Annuaire
1996-1997, Paris, L'Harmattan, p. 51.
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current, second attempt at transition only foresees trials organized on the basis of the Organic Law
of 30 August 1996. The preceding section has indicated why a complementary alternative is needed.
Bronkhorst ends his analysis of the different types of transition with the observation that a genesis in
the form of a military dictatorship leads more easily to prosecution of perpetrators of human rights
violations, than a one party system, where a large part of the population may be considered as being
co-responsible for the repression. The latter scenario applies to Rwanda. However, a radical political
change (e.g. after a military victory, as was the case in Rwanda) is generally more favourable
towards initiatives of justice, truth and reconciliation, than a progressive transition (which was, for
example, the scenario under the Arusha Accords). Assuming that this analysis also applies to
Rwanda, the Rwandan context of political transition seems to present pros and cons for a truth and
reconciliation initiative.
b. The conciliation methodology
Although a universal model of a truth and reconciliation process is not available, Bronkhorst
introduces in his work, as a heuristic instrument, the industrial conciliation modei1498, which
comprises 4 elements: investigation, mediation, arbitration or settlement and adjudication. This
model is not at all prescriptive, but is, rather, an instrument of analysis, which seems useful to better
understand the different components of a truth and reconciliation process.
Investigation includes the inquiry and publication of the facts. Often, a special institution, a truth
commission or another institution, is set up by the government or by a parliament to this end.
Bronkhorst cites numerous examples: Uganda (report published in 1994), Argentina (1984), Chile
(1991), Chad (1992), EI Salvador (1993)1499,Sri Lanka (report finished but not published in 1993)1500,
etc. Current circumstances obviously have an enormous impact on the work of such a commission,
which, in principle, only examines the past with the aim of building foundations for the future. Thus, in
Chad, the author of the report of the Commission of Inquiry into crimes and irregular activities
committed by ex-president Hissen Habré or his accomplices highlighted that at the time when the
inquiries were undertaken, the population was gripped by fear because the actions of the ex-
1498 As described in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 1968.
1499 In EI Salvador, one week after the publication of the report, the government adopted a presidential proposal granting
a general amnesty.
1500 However, in September 1994, the government of Sri Lanka announced that the reports of the three commissions of
inquiry would be published and that trials against those prima facie responsible would follow (Amnesty International,
International News, November 1997, p. 8).
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president's entourage had not yet come to an end. This case presents an interesting precedent for
the Rwandan scenario. In other cases such as EI Salvador and Guatemala, the establishment of a
commission was immediately preceded by a peace accord. Very often other unofficial institutions
also conduct parallel inquiries which feed into the work of the official institution: victims' families, local
(human rights and other) NGOs, professional lawyers associations, etc. Nevertheless, Roht-Arriaza
rightly points out that an official imprimatur is needed to give authority and credibility to the
investigations and their results. The systematic and complete documentation of previous violations is
extremely important: it constitutes proof against oblivion; it is at the basis of a collective reminder of
events and could help resolve individual complaints submitted. Bronkhorst makes reference to the
examples of Argentina, Chile, South Africa and the Philippines. To this, one could add the condition
that the inquiries should, above all, be reliable, with results that are widely accepted, thereby lending
a moral authority, a unique character and a reference value to the investigation conducted.
Mediation comprises all attempts at dialogue between adversaries, possibly under international
patronage. Although Bronkhorst makes no reference to this, it seems clear that, in order for there to
be a dialogue between adversaries, it is necessary, first of all, to identify the adversaries, and,
moreover, to clarify their representativeness, which may turn out to be extremely difficult in the
Rwandan context. In this context, some key persons can have symbolic value of such weight that
they can easily undermine all mediation initiatives. Bronkhorst cites the example of the former head
of the South African army, Constand Viljoen: "He once declared that he "was the man who made the
elections possible", which is not entirely an exaggeration: just a week before the elections he openly
refused to support an attempted coup d'état which might have been successful".1501
Arbitration or settlement comprises efforts to redress violations (by compensating victims, taking
disciplinary actions against police officers, soldiers, etc.). The report of the National Commission on
Truth and Reconciliation in Chile makes reference to the public rehabilitation of victims (in the form of
a monument, a death certificate for persons who disappeared, a lump sum pension and houses for
the families), as well as to prevention (in the form of the ratification of international treaties, a publicly
accessible database concerning all detentions, human rights education programmes in schools,
etc.). At the level of the United Nations, the former Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Theo van Boven, elaborated "The Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Reparation for Victims of (Gross) Violations of Human
Rights and International Humanitarian Law', which were submitted to the 53rd session of the Human
1501 Bronkhorst, D., Truth and Reconciliation., p. 65.
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Rights Commission in 1997. These stipulate, among other things, that reparation may be claimed by
the victims or their relatives, that it should be proportionate to the gravity of the violations to which
they were subjected and should include elements of restitution, compensation and rehabilitation, as
well as guarantees of non-repetition.1502 Restitution will help to re-establish the situation prevailing
before the violations, including at the level of employment, citizenship and property. Indemnity will
cover all assessable damages, including material damage, lost opportunities of education and loss of
earning potential. Rehabilitation will include medical and psychological care, as well as access to
legal and social services. The guarantees of non-repetition will include, among other things, the
cessation of continuing violations, the verification of the facts and the full and public disclosure of the
truth, apologies and acceptance of responsibility, the commemoration of victims, human rights
education, the strengthening of the independence of the judiciary, etc.1503
Adjudication comprises the prosecution and judgement of perpetrators. In the next section, reference
will be made to international law, which, for that matter, is not all that developed at the level of legal
proceedings and punishment. Besides the legal perspective, the question is raised of the political
expediency to prosecute, judge and punish all those who have committed crimes, even if these are
sanctioned by national legislation. How does one prevent the judicial proceedings from plunging the
country into long-term political instability? How does one prevent the trials from serving other
objectives such as political interests, personal vendettas, ethnic or regional discrimination?1504 How
does one elaborate a strategy for legal proceedings in cases where repression has been more or
less widespread and evidence against the numerous perpetrators will be hard to find? In a military
but also administrative context, what is the responsibility of a superior for the acts committed by a
subordinate, and that of a subordinate for acts ordered by his superior? Under this same chapter,
matters relating to amnesty and pardon also need to be dealt with. The difference between the two is
1502 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Question of the human rights of all
persons subjected to any form of detention or imprisonment. Note by the Secretary-General, E/CN.4/1997/104, 16
January 1997, p. 3.
1503 The debate concerning these principles and directives is far from over. The Secretary General presented the
comments and observations of several states on the text elaborated by van Boven to the 54th session of the Human
Rights Commission, (E/CN.4/1998/34, 22 December 1997).
1504 The legal proceedings of a "new regime" could create the occasion to detain not only those who are really
responsible for past crimes, but also the current opposition who are not guilty of anything. In Ethiopia, after the departure
into exile of the former president Mengistu in 1991, the bodies of thousands of persons who were killed or "disappeared",
were found, exhumed and buried. Trials of those responsible only really started in March 1995. The majority of those
accused were members of the security forces, the former party in power or from the government of Mengistu. In July
1996, some 1,700 other persons were detained without being charged; some persons for over 5 years. According to
Amnesty International, some of these persons were arrested without being indicted because of their criticism of and
opposition to the new government (Amnesty International, Ethiopia. Human rights trials and delayed justice. The case of
Olympic gold medallist Mamma Walde and hundreds of other uncharged detainees, London, July 1996).
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essential, to the extent that amnesty erases the offence in question and can, among other things, put
an end to ongoing investigations. Pardon, on the other hand, only comes into play after the
prosecution and judgement and only has consequences at the level of execution of the sentence.
c. In international law
In international human rights instruments, there are, generally speaking, few explicit references in
covenants or conventions regarding the prosecution of those responsible for human rights violations
or regarding the corresponding penalties. Nevertheless, Roth-Arriaza finds that since the second
world war, the principle of universal competence, which offers any State the possibility to bring any
suspected perpetrator to trial, is being applied to an increasing number of crimes. Moreover, this
competence is no longer simply authorised, but is becoming increasingly obligatory (in the form of
domestic prosecutions or extradition). This principle is applied to, among others, war crimes and
crimes against humanity, including genocide.1505 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide explicitly requires that the Contracting Parties "enact, in accordance with
their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present
Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide ...".1506
Moreover, the application of some international human rights standards that do not explicitly require
the prosecution of suspected perpetrators has given rise to more progressive interpretations
regarding the prosecution of suspects and the compensation of victims. In this context, this
dissertation will be confined to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which was
ratified by Rwanda in 1975. In Article 2, the Covenant provides that "each State Party to the present
Covenant undertakes to respect and ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present Covenant ...". In a number of cases of torture,
summary execution and/or disappearance, the Human Rights Committee, established under Article
28 of the Covenant, interpreted this article in the sense that investigations against those responsible
and compensation of victims are included in the obligation to guarantee the recognised rights. In
addition, protection from torture or from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (article 7) requires
that individual complaints are examined, that those responsible be held accountable and that victims
have a right to redress, including a right to compensation. The Committee is also opposed to the
1505 For more details see, Joyner, C., "Arresting Impunity: the Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to
Accountability" in Bassiouni, C. and Morris, M. (eds.), Accountability for international crimes, Special Issue of Law and
Contemporary Problems, Vol. 59, No.4, Autumn 1997, p. 148-167.
1506 Article 5.
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granting of amnesty for acts of torture.1507 In some provisions, the Covenant is even more explicit
concerning a victim's right to compensation. Article 9 specifies that "Anyone who has been the victim
of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation".
Roht-Arriaza also devotes a chapter to measures of amnesty, not only from a perspective of political
expediency, but also from a legal perspective. On one hand, there are very few explicit bans on
amnesty in international law instruments. Moreover, the second protocol of the Geneva Convention
dealing with the issue of internal armed conflicts, which came into effect in 1978 and was ratified by
Rwanda, invites states to consider amnesty for participants in an armed conflict: "At the end of
hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to
persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons
related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained". (Article 6(5). 1508 On the other
hand, however, the above-mentioned, more recent interpretations of the obligations of a State to
guarantee fundamental rights, seem to limit the possibilities to grant generalised amnesties to those
responsible for more serious violations of human rights.
d. Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity
In the context of international law, reference must also be made to a recent development which,
given the date of publication of her study, was obviously not examined by Roht-Arriaza, namely the
report regarding the question of impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations which Special
Rapporteur Joinet submitted to the 49th session of the UN Sub-commission on prevention of
discrimination and protection of minorities.1509 In his report, the author proposes 50 principles which
should guide states in their action to combat impunity. He groups them in three categories: the right
to know, the right to justice and the right to reparations.
The right to know goes beyond an individual victim's right to the truth. The right to know is also a
collective right of a society, drawing upon history to prevent violations from recurring in the future.
The duty to remember on the part of the State corresponds to the right to know. In order to achieve
1507 Roht-Arriaza, N., Impunity and Human Rights, p. 29
1508 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), UN Doc A/32/144, Annex II (1977). For some problems concerning the
application of this article, see Roht-Arriaza, N., "Combating Impunity: Some Thoughts on the Way Forward" in Bassiouni,
C. and Morris, M., Accountability for International Crimes, p. 91.
1509 UN Commission on Human Rights, The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees. Question of
the impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations (civil and political). Final report prepared by Mr. Joinet pursuant to
Sub-Commission decision 1996/119, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20, 26 June 1997.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
367
this collective right, Joinet considers that, in the context of mass violations, a judicial system is often
not capable of rendering justice by identifying, prosecuting and sentencing perpetrators within an
acceptable timeframe. He proposes, henceforth, the prompt establishment of an extra judicial
commission of investigation, with certain principles to guarantee its independence and impartiality
and to protect victims, witnesses and suspected perpetrators. As a result, the names of the latter
may only be published if they had the opportunity to be heard before the commission or to exercise a
right of reply in writing. In order to contribute to the collective memory of the society, the
commission's report should be distributed as widely as possible.
The right to justice implies that a victim can assert his or her rights and receive a fair and effective
remedy. If forgiveness is to be granted, it must first have been sought. The right to justice entails
corresponding duties of the State to conduct investigations, prosecute perpetrators and punish them
if their guilt is established. The trials before the judicial authorities, should, in any event, be in
conformity with human rights, and meet the fair trial standards. Matters such as prescription,
amnesty, the right to asylum, extradition, due obedience as a mitigating circumstance, procedures of
repentance and confession and military jurisdictions cannot be conceived and/or applied in such a
way that they harm the fight against impunity. The instrument of amnesty, has, in fact, rarely been
envisaged by the UN, which corresponds to the above-mentioned tendencies in the interpretation of
the State's obligation to protect human rights. The UN's policy on this point, does not, however,
seem to follow an all too consistent line. In August 1992, for example, after the publication of the
report of the Goldstone Cornmisslon's" in South Africa, the Secretary General of the United Nations
recommended that amnesty be granted to all those perpetrators of political crimes committed in the
period covered by the Commlssion.P"
The right to reparation is situated at both the individual and collective levels. At the level of the
individual victim, including relatives or dependants, this right includes his restoration, to the extent
possible, to his situation preceding the violations, compensation (for physical and mental injury,
including lost opportunities, physical damage, defamation and legal aid costs) and rehabilitation
(including medical care and psychological treatment). At the collective level, one finds
commemoration and public homage to the memory of victims, as well as some steps to avoid the
reoccurrence of these events: the dismantling of armed parastatal groups, the repeal of emergency
1510 The commission's official name was "the Commission of Inquiry into Public Violence and Intimidation". It was set up
following violent incidents which, between July 1990 and June 1992, cost the lives of about 6,200 persons.
1511 Roht-Arriaza, N., Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice, New York, Oxford University Press,
1995, p. 271.
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legislation and abolition of emergency courts, the removal from office of senior officials implicated in
serious violations.
In his report, Special Rapporteur Joinet tried to elaborate rather general principles, without bearing in
mind the specific situation of any particular country. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that in the
conclusion of his report, the author explicitly refers to the Rwandan situation, and leaves little hope
for an immediate solution:
In concluding, the Special Rapporteur would like to draw attention to a number of particularly
alarming situations for which he must admit he has no solutions to propose, though such
situations - albeit largely for technical reasons - help to perpetuate impunity. How is it
possible to combat impunity and ensure a victim's right to justice when the number of people
imprisoned on suspicion of serious human rights violations is so large that it is technically
impossible to try them in fair hearings within a reasonable period of time. Mention can be
made of the case of Rwanda .... 1512
To sum up,
No society can come to terms with the past unless what really happened has been generally
acknowledged .... Reconciliation between opposing classes or other groups can only be
realised once the facts, the background, motives and emotions have been recognised and
admitted by both sides.1513
The element of truth is essential and has great value. Therefore, although a general amnesty has
been declared in the days following the publication of the report of the Truth Commission in EI
Salvador, its chairman nevertheless considers the report to be of great value, more particularly given
the popular support which was expressed in an opinion poll: 45% approved, 27% disapproved while
27% had no opinion.1514 At the same time, the element of truth constitutes a prerequisite sine qua
non for all other steps or initiatives of mediation, reconciliation, compensation and justice. In order to
define the concept of truth in this context, Bronkhorst refers to the theories of Jurgen Habermas,
who, in his Theory of Communicative Action, distinguishes three main elements: (1) a
communication intended to convey the truth must correspond to the facts; (2) the message should
comply with a normative system which allows those for whom it is intended to understand it and to
make a judgement; (3) the message should be sincere or truthful. The body charged with
establishing the truth should therefore, first of all, reconstruct and describe the events in an accurate
manner. Next, it should communicate and present its message in a language that is accessible to a
1512 UN Commission on Human Rights, The Administration of Justice and Human Rights of Detainees, p. 9.
1513 Bronkhorst, D., Truth and Reconciliation, p. 150.
1514 The approval rate was particularly high among the working class (Bronkhorst, 0, Truth and Reconciliation, p. 149).
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large section of the population, which is not, in fact, necessarily the legal language of a magistrate,
for example. Not only the language but also the context in which it is presented, could determine the
degree of truth which the population attaches to the message: depending on local culture, the
normative system could possibly require some type of ceremony, for example. Finally, the
investigators, and also preferably those responsible for the follow-up, should, at all times, emulate
truthfulness and a personal commitment.
The investigations are usually conducted by a commission set up by the executive or legislative
power. Operational independence, widespread support and the respect of the population both at the
level of national political actors and international partners, are prerequisites for the success of the
commission in its efforts to reconstruct the collective history of the nation. This could require the
involvement of persons representing all political tendencies, and, possibly, the auspices of an
international organisation, as was the case in EI Salvador, for example. Various factors can
complicate the tasks of such a commission. Its effectiveness seems dependent on the timeframe
established for the presentation of its report. On the other hand, this should in no way limit
painstaking inquiries. The legal powers of the commission to interrogate witnesses, to have access
to locations and to consult documents are often limited, not only by the mandate of the commission,
but also the conditions in the field. To this, one could also add the problem of defining and co-
ordinating interaction with the official judicial investigations. What is extremely delicate is determining
the ratione materiae mandate: should one only concentrate on the most serious and systematic
violations? Should an inquiry be conducted into the abuses committed by the (former) armed
opposition?
All truth and reconciliation processes should also contribute to strengthening the rule of law. All
measures taken should ensure better protection against arbitrary violence by those in power. The
process of truth and reconciliation should be democratic and transparent. It should be based on the
major involvement and participation of the population. It should take place in all openness and under
the watchful eyes of the national and international communities. The victims have the right at least to
moral and, if possible, material compensation. This does not mean that the group that was victimised
under the old regime, can, by definition, exercise moral superiority vis-a-vis the others. The trial of all
perpetrators of violations will often be impossible because of the large number of crimes committed,
or because of the political motives surrounding the trials of highly placed officials. However, in order
to be successful, the reconciliation process requires the sentencing of those persons who ordered
the most serious violations. Reconciliation has trans-border implications. The international
community should assume its responsibility, because, quite often, crimes have been committed
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against humanity. All of the truth and reconciliation process should take place within the confines laid
down by international law. Unfortunately, Roht-Arriaza notes that not only the national authorities, but
also peace and mediation initiatives under the auspices of an international agency, do not
systematically refer to this international legal framework.1515
Bronkhorst notes that unfair trials or the reversal of judicial decisions by the executive power have a
disastrous effect on the credibility of the institutions. On this subject, Roht-Arriaza rightly observes
that past human rights violations were often tolerated by the old judicial system that did not have
sufficient independence to be able to constitute a real counter power. It may easily give way to a
popular perception of a partial and dependent judicial system, steered by political considerations.
This past can also weigh on the "new" judicial system. Finally, Roht-Arriaza notes that the number of
crimes committed often (not only in the case of Rwanda) exceeds the capacity of the judicial system.
This in itself generally requires that a selection be made of the crimes to be prosecuted. The problem
therefore arises of determining a prosecution strategy: should priority be given to the highly placed
instigators and organisers of violations, or should one adopt an approach which is more focused on
the victim, thereby prosecuting those who have visibly committed the violations? Non-criminal but
civil, administrative and/or disciplinary sanctions may provide for a somewhat easier solution. This
may entail, among other things, a demotion in the military or administrative hierarchy, the suspension
of the right to vote, the loss of employment or of the entitlement to pension, etc.
3.9.2.3 Application to Rwanda
In this part, an attempt will be made to try to apply the above-mentioned findings to the Rwandan
scenario, starting with some characteristics of the Rwandan situation that will indicate similarities and
differences vis-a-vis other case studies.
3.9.2.3.1 A unique context of political transition
The analysis presented by Bronkhorst and others concerning certain models of political transition is
not necessarily applicable to the Rwandan situation. In a simplified manner, one could summarise it
as follows:
1515 It follows that the directives as proposed by Rapporteur Joinet and based, among other things, on international law,
are important and should be integrated into the international diplomatic and mediation efforts (Roht-Arriaza, N.,
"Combating Impunity: Some Thoughts on the Way Forward" in Bassiouni, C. and Morris, M., Accountability for
International Crimes, p. 93).
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1. As in many of the other cases, the numerous human rights violations took place during a period of
intensified political transition, which was spurred on by internal and international factors.
2. Contrary to the other cases, like Benin and Malawi for example, a situation of war, which coincided
with the start of a wave of political liberalisation in Africa, interfered with the domestic process of
political transition.
3. This combination led to a unique, tripolar situation (comprising the former single party, the armed
opposition and the unarmed internal opposition), which was reflected in the negotiations and the
Arusha Accords, which, at the same time, sought to meet not only the national and international calls
for political liberalisation but also to put an end to the war. In fact, although the signatories to the
accords only represented two parties, the tripolar system is explicitly reflected in some protocols.v"
4. This new political "equilibrium" was destroyed, first of all by internal divisions within the unarmed
opposition and subsequently by, on the one hand, the planning and implementation of the genocide
and political massacres by the former regime (and its supporters) and on the other hand, the
resumption of war and massacres of Hutu people by the former armed opposition.
5. The tripolar system is no longer in existence. The unarmed opposition has been almost totally
eliminated. The former single party and its 'supporters' are almost totally identified with the genocide,
and, consequently, have lost all credibility in the eyes of the international community. This only
leaves the "victor" who has lost nearly all of his internal popular base.
6. Nevertheless, the final pole remaining has continuously stated its intention to build on the
Accords, which are tripolar in nature and origin. The implementation of these Accords, especially the
political aspects, is increasingly difficult, if not impossible.
3.9.2.3.2 The Arusha Accords and the truth and reconciliation approach
As an instrument and the translation of political transition, the Arusha Accords cover a wide range of
subject matters. First of all, they constitute a peace agreement. Within the context of this
dissertation, however, the author will focus on matters relating to the promotion and protection of
human rights, reconciliation and the fight against impunity. This section therefore constitutes a first
confrontation of the Rwandan context with the findings in the preceding sections. It should be
1516 Therefore, articles 55 and 56 of the Protocol of Agreement on power-sharing within the framework of a broad-based
transitional government refer to the distribution of government portfolios among the 6 political parties (the MRNO, RPF,
MOR, PSO, PL and the POC).
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repeated that, in this context, the Arusha Accords have more than a purely historical value: to date,
they form an integral part of the fundamental law of the country.1517
a. The judiciary
The Protocol of Agreement on power sharing within the framework of a broad-based transitional
government reaffirms the independence of the judiciary. It plans the creation of a Supreme Court,
comprising a Department of Courts and Tribunals, a Court of Cassation, a Constitutional Court, a
Council of State and a Public Accounts Court (Article 28). The protocol also foresees the creation of
a Supreme Council of Magistrates which decides on the appointment, termination of services and, in
general, the administration of the career of judges (Article 39). The protocol authorises the legislator
to create specialised courts of law, but prohibits the creation of special courts (Article 26). In
accordance with the Arusha Accords, the new regime has effectively established the Supreme Court
and the Supreme Council of Magistrates.1518 The creation of specialised chambers within the
tribunals of first instance and the military courts by the Organic Law of 30 August 1996 is not in
contradiction to the Arusha Accords.
The "new" judicial system has inherited the popular perception of the former judicial system as being
a dependent institution guided by political and personal interests and motives. Generally speaking, at
the level of the State, justice has never been perceived as a source of truth, but rather as an
instrument in the hands of those in power. This goes against the traditional justice system (non-
State) of which the objective was mainly to re-establish social harmony.1519Given this reputation and
the experiences to which the population had been subjected for numerous years, why would people
expect it to be different this time? To this, can be added the new regime's gradual monopolisation of
power along ethnic lines, the judicial system being seen as one of the emanations of this power.1520
1517 On the occasion of the third anniversary of the installation of the Transitional National Assembly, its president is said
to have stated that Arusha remains the basis of the Constitution in terms of power sharing. However, according to some
observers, one section of the political class would prefer to do away with the Arusha equilibrium. (Lauras, D., Le partage
du pouvoir issu des Accords d'Arusha remis en question, AFP, 25 November 1997).
1518 Loi organique n° 03/96 du 29 mars 1996 portant organisation, fonctionnement et compétences du Counseil
Supérieur de la Magistrature (Journal Officiel de la République Rwandaise, 1 avril 1996); Organic Law n° 07/96 of 6th
June 1996 relating to the organisation, working and competence of the Supreme Court (Journal Officiel de /a République
Rwandaise, 10 June 1996).
1519 On the occasion of a conference "La justice nationale et internationale devant le génocide rwandais", organised by
ASSEPAC, the International centre for the study and the promotion of human rights and information, in November 1997,
Professor Charles Ntampaka illustrated how the challenges which the judicial system faced in the past, continue to date:
thus, he distinguished between the need to reconcile justice with the law, with the population and with the separation of
powers.
1520 A sociological field research would be necessary to give a more scientific character to this assertion.
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Whether or not this corresponds to reality, this perception, above all nurtured under the former
regime, is extremely important in the context of truth and reconciliation. This undoubtedly reduces
the role the judicial system can playas an instrument to discover the collective truth and to promote
reconciliation.
b. The specialized commissions
The Protocol of Agreement on power sharing includes the creation of 3 broad-based specialised
commissions (Article 24). The Commission of National Unity and National Reconciliation would be
charged with the preparation of a national debate on unity and reconciliation and the preparation and
dissemination of information aimed at educating the population and achieving national unity and
reconciliation. This commission was indeed established by presidential order in October 1997.1521 It
consists of 12 members appointed by the president on the advice of the cabinet. This commission
should sensitise Rwandans with regard to national unity, promote the culture of reconciliation, fight
all forms of sectarianism and division, prepare a national programme for unity and reconciliation and
sensitise Rwandans to their rights (Article 5). The Legal and Constitutional Commission would be
responsible for drawing up a list of required amendments to render national legislation to conform to
the provisions of the Arusha Accords, in particular those relating to the rule of law. This commission
would also prepare a preliminary draft of the Constitution that will govern the country after the
transitional period. The Electoral Commission would be charged with preparing and organising local,
legislative and presidential elections.
The Protocol of Agreement on the rule of law foresees the establishment of an independent National
Commission on Human Rights, responsible for investigating human rights violations committed on
Rwandan territory, instituting legal proceedings where necessary, as well as for sensitising and
educating the population about human rights. In October 1995, the government introduced a draft
law for the establishment of this commission. This was withdrawn for revision two months later,
because of comments received from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, among
others.1522 In November 1997, however, a Commission on Human Rights was nevertheless created,
not by a law, but by a presidential order. According to Article 2, "the Commission is independent".
1521 Article 5 of Presidential Order n025/01 of 25/10/97 establishing the Rwanda National Unity and Reconciliation
Commission, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, 1 November 1997, modified by Presidential Decree n001/01 of
10/01/1998, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, 15 March 1998.
1522 The draft law was checked against the "The Paris Principles", which contain intemational guidelines concerning the
structure, functioning and the independence of national human rights commissions (Report of the Special Representative
of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Rwanda, A/52/522, 22 October 1997, p. 8).
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Nevertheless, according to Article 8, "the members of the Commission are chosen by the National
Assembly out of 10 candidates nominated by the Government. They will serve a three year term
which can be renewable".1523
The establishment and the mandates of the above-mentioned commissions correspond fairly well to
some of the elements of truth and reconciliation initiatives that Bronkhorst and Roht-Arriaza have
analysed. These mainly concern elements such as the prevention of future violations, by, for
example, strengthening the rule of law, sensitising the population and ongoing monitoring of human
rights protection. On the other hand, aspects concerning investigations, trials, punishment and
compensation of victims do not seem to have been addressed.
c. The International Commission of Inquiry
Article 16 of the Protocol of Agreement on the rule of law stipulates that "the two parties also agree
to establish an International Commission of Inquiry to investigate human rights violations committed
during the war". This commission seems to correspond to the first element of a truth and
reconciliation process as described by Bronkhorst and Roht-Arriaza: reconstruction of the collective
truth of past events. Article 16 gives but a few explicit indications regarding the mandate and
functioning of the commission:
- Firstly, it is anticipated that everything will take place under international auspices, which
undoubtedly corresponds to the need for independence and absolute moral authority essential for all
investigative and truth commissions. Such was also the case in EI Salvador, for example, where an
Argentine national was president of the Truth Commission, established following the peace
agreement in 1991.
- Next, the ratione temporis mandate of the Commission seems limited to the period of the war,
presumably, therefore, between 1 October 1990 and 4 August 1993, the date when the peace
1523 Presidential order n026/01 of 11/11/97 establishing the National Human Rights Commission, Official Gazette of the
Republic of Rwanda, 1 December 1997. With respect to the composition of a national commission on human rights, the
Paris Principles prescribe that "the appointment of its members, whether by means of an election or other system, shall
be established in accordance with a procedure which affords all guarantees to ensure the pluralist representation of the
social forces (of) civilian society involved in the protection and promotion of human rights" (Principles relating to the
status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights, Annex to General Assembly Resolution
AlRES/48/134, December 20, 1993). The Special Representative for Rwanda of the UN Commission on Human Rights
had strongly recommended that there be a full and open debate on the creation of a Commission before it was actually
brought into being. He was therefore "surprised to learn" that the above-mentioned presidential order had been published
(UN Commission on Human Rights, Report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda submitted by the Special
Representative, Mr. Michel Moussali, pursuant to resolution 1997/66, E/CN.4/1998/60, 19 February 1998, par. 38).
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agreement was signed between the president of the Rwandan Republic and the president of the
RPF
- Can one assume that the human rights violations committed by both sides were implicitly covered
by the ratione materiae mandate of the Commission? A positive answer seems most logical and
obvious.
Many other implementation modalities of this provision require clarification: nothing is mentioned
concerning prosecution of perpetrators, possible amnesty measures, possible compensation for
victims, possible disciplinary or administrative sanctions, etc. Regarding the latter aspect, reference
should, however, be made to Article 46 of the Protocol of Agreement on power sharing, which states
that "as a matter of urgency and priority, the Broad-Based Transitional Government shall rid the
administrative apparatus of all incompetent elements as well as authorities who were involved in the
social strife or whose activities are an obstacle to the democratic process and to national
reconciliation". Although human rights violations are not explicitly mentioned, the wording of this
article also seems to cover them.
Imagine a situation in which no genocide has been committed and an international commission
would need to be set up in accordance with the Arusha Accords. This would be the context which
corresponds to most of the situations analysed by Bronkhorst and Roht-Arriaza and, consequently, in
which their conclusions and recommendations would be more applicable to the case of Rwanda. In
fact, there is no doubt that, in such case, the international community, beginning with Amnesty
International and others, would have insisted on fighting impunity, the need to prosecute and punish
those responsible for violations, the unacceptability of an amnesty and other modalities. This is also
the situation in which the international community would probably have had difficulties in convincing
the new transitional government, and avoiding that the past is forgotten and that the truth is not
sacrificed in the interest of short-term stability and the new balance of power. In reality, a genocide
did take place and a process of truth and reconciliation must confront a totally different context than
that which was initially foreseen. The next section examines these differences as well as the
constraints and specificities which make it even more difficult to apply the conclusions and
recommendations of both reference works.
Before concluding this section on the value of the Arusha Accords in a context of truth and
reconciliation and on the creation of the various commissions, reference can be made to part of the
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prime minister's declaration, entitled "The Democratization Process", on the occasion of the Round
Table conference held in Geneva in June 1996:
The Rwandan Government intends to set up shortly, the different commissions foreseen
under the Arusha Peace Agreement, beginning with the National Commission on Human
Rights and the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate human rights violations
committed during the war, the massacres and genocide. Both commissions will mainly
examine the various human rights violations committed by anyone on Rwandan territory and
in countries hosting refugees, particularly by State organs or organisations under State
control or other organisations.1524
In his speech, the Prime Minister thus seems to indicate that his government has decided to extend
the ratione temporis and ratione loci mandate of the International Commission of Inquiry. Moreover,
he explicitly states that, ratione materiae, the International Commission of Inquiry will investigate the
violations committed by all parties involved in the conflict.
Finally, it goes without say that this Commission, or, in more general terms, a truth and reconciliation
initiative could also rely on the work and numerous reports published by national and international
human rights NGOs1525and by the United Nations Special Rapporteur. An excellent job was
accomplished by the International Commission of Inquiry, composed of representatives from four
international NGOs1526,whose report was published in February 1993, after a two-week field visit in
January 1993. Contrary to some analyses1527, this commission of inquiry was independent,
established at the request of Rwandan NGO associations, and had "nothing to do with the official
proposals of the government and the RPF"1528, agreed in the above-mentioned protocol of
agreement.
1524 "Déclaration de S.E.M. Pierre Célestin Rwigema, Premier Ministre de la République Rwandaise" in PNUD,
Conférence de Table Ronde pour la République Rwandaise. Rapport de la Conférence, Geneva, June 1996, p. 66.
Translated by Vandeginste in Truth and Reconciliation Approach, 1997
1525 Some NGOs have already made an appeal in the sense of this study: It is vitally important that the truth be told about
the crime of genocide committed in Rwanda. This report is a first exercise in doing this; African Rights hopes that it will
be followed by other investigations by Rwandans into what has happened .... Truth telling is the most basic form of
justice .... Exposure is also, in itself, a measure of punishment for those responsible". AFRICAN RIGHTS, Rwanda.
Death, Despair and Defiance, London, 1995, p. 1162.
1526 The Fédération Internationale des Oroits de I'Homme (FIDH), Africa Watch, the Union Inter-Africaine des Oroits de
I'Homme et des Peuples and the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development.
1527 "The roots of the Rwandan Truth Commission lie in an agreement between the government and the armed
opposition to establish a commission of inquiry into past atrocities - agreed to in the Arusha Accords negotiated in
Arusha, Tanzania, in the fall of 1992". Hayner, P., Lessons from the Past: Thirteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1993,
Colombia University, 1993, p. 56.
1528 FIDH, Violations massives et systématiques des droits de I'homme depuis Ie 1er octobre 1990, Paris, 1993, p. 6.
Translated by Vandeginste, Truth and Reconciliation Approach, 1998.
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3.9.2.3.3 Specific constraints
Undoubtedly, it is difficult to compare the Rwandan case to other experiences. In the preceding
section, reference has already been made to the unique character and context of political transition.
Other particularities give rise to certain constraints requiring a more detailed study in view of the
development of a truth and reconciliation initiative for Rwanda. In this context, we have tried to
identify some key questions, which are by no means exhaustive.
a. The ratione materiae mandate
Any truth and reconciliation initiative would need to address not only massive human rights violations
and war crimes, but also acts of genocide. This was not the case in the large majority of case studies
in the reference works. Furthermore, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crimes of Genocide explicitly requires that contracting parties (including Rwanda) enact effective
criminal sanctions for persons guilty of genocide. Despite this fundamental "qualitative" difference,
one can, however, hardly imagine that a non-judicial initiative would only be addressing those
violations which are not classified as genocide and that it is excluded for all acts of genocide
(including for example, the violations committed by persons covered by Category three of the
Organic Law of 30 August 19961529).1530
To this "qualitative" constraint, one may add the "quantitative" challenge: the number of victims and
the number of crimes committed largely surpasses those in the other case studies1531. This does not
only constitute a major constraint for the current judicial approach, it also makes truth telling of what
happened on every hill and the compensation of victims all the more difficult in a non-judicial truth
and reconciliation approach. This would therefore require the deployment of numerous roving sub-
commissions of a truth commission.
These qualitative and quantitative specificities also mean that there has been an enormous
destruction within the society itself. The challenge of rehabilitating this society and reconciling its
members is therefore gigantic.
1529 "Persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation make them guilty of other serious assaults
against the person". Reference is made to any serious assault not causing death.
1530 According to Landsman, on the other hand, a truth and reconciliation process should not be used for certain
violations of human rights, including genocide (Landsman, S., "Alternative Responses to Serious Human Rights Abuses:
Of Prosecution and Truth Commissions" in Bassiouni, C. and Morris, M., Accountability for International Crimes, p. 84).
1531 Reyntjens has estimated that approximately 1,100,000 person were killed: 600,000 Tutsi and 500,000 Hutu
(Reyntjens, F., "Estimation du nombre de personnes tuées au Rwanda en 1994" in Centre d'étude de la Région des
Grands Lacs d'Afrique, L'Afrique des Grands Lacs. Annuaire 1996-1997, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1997, p. 182).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
378
b. The ratione loci and ratione temporis mandate
On several occasions, authors have proposed a regional approach to the different crises in the Great
Lakes region. This approach could take the form of a regional conference1532 or an extension of the
ICTR's mandate1533, etc. This idea effectively corresponds to real interdependence and interaction at
the political, military and economic levels. Nevertheless, the ad hoc and short-term nature of regional
alliances seems to indicate that the crises in the region, while having regional repercussions, are first
of all composed of internal crises at the domestic level. Already in the past, the idea of a purely
regional approach has been used as a pretext to avoid all national initiatives.1534 In any case, the
ratione loci mandate is an important question to be resolved. Some answer has been given by the
Prime Minister in his above-mentioned declaration at the Round Table conference in Geneva in June
1996: "Both commissions will mainly have to examine the various human rights violations committed
by anyone present on 'Rwandan territory and in countries hosting refugees', particularly by State
organs or organisations under State control or other organisations". 1535 The violations committed on
non-Rwandan territory and mentioned in the speech of the Prime Minister, were mainly carried out
by former soldiers of the Forces Armées Rwandaises and members of the Interahamwe militia. To
these violations must be added those committed by the RPA in its operations during and after the
period under study inside and outside Rwanda.
This brings us to the question of the ratione temporis mandate. The mandate of the Commission of
Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights in Uganda, covered the period between October 1962 and
January 1986. In many other cases, beginning with South Africa, the period covered by a truth and
reconciliation initiative has been relatively long. A long history or even tradition of repression and
human rights violations should not, in itself, limit the possibilities of such an approach. There is little
doubt that determining the ratione temporis mandate would give rise to a major discussion in the
Rwandan context. One could, for example, include the events of 1959, but also the RPA operations
in eastern Zaire in 1996 - 1997, and in the northwestern part of Rwanda in 1997 - 1998. From a
1532 See, for example, Frere des Hommes, Une seule terre, Numéro Spécial Zaïre-Rwanda, December 1996, p. 6.
1533 See, for example, UN Commission on Human Rights, Initial report on the human rights situation in Burundi submitted
by the Special Rapporteur, M. Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, in accordance with Commission resolution 1995/90,
E/CNA/1996/16/Add.1, 27 February 1996, par. 69.
1534 See International Crisis Group, Great Lakes Exploratory Mission, Working Document, 1997, p. 2; see also, the
comments of Reyntjens concerning the idea of a regional conference in: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Improving
African and International Capabilities, p. 131-132.
1535 "Déclaration de S.E.M. Pierre Célestin Rwigema, Premier Ministre de la République Rwandaise" in PNUD,
Conférence de Table Ronde pour la République Rwandaise. Rapport de la Conférence, Géneve, June 1996, p.66.
Translated by Vandeginste, Truth and Reconciliation Approach, 1998.
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comparative perspective, one should note that the ICTR's mandate covers, as already seen, the
period between the beginning of January and the end of December 1994. The Organic Law of 30
August 1996, on the other hand, deals with the period between 1 October 1990 and 31 December
1994. The International Commission of Inquiry, provided for by the Arusha Accords, logically covered
the period between 1 October 1990 and 4 August 1993, but its envisaged mandate seems to have
been explicitly extended by the Rwandan Government, as indicated in the declaration of the Prime
Minister at the Round Table conference in Geneva in 1996.
c. The relation with the judicial approach
This dissertation does not, in any way, constitute a plea to abandon the judicial approach. On the
contrary, the Rwandan Government and its international partners should strengthen and accelerate
their efforts in the judicial domain (both at the level of training human resources, institutional capacity
building, detention conditions, the right to legal counsel, etc.), while certain conditions should be
imposed and their non-respect should be sanctioned (like, for example, the unconditional access of
international observers to detention centres in military camps, the condemnation of the activities of
the so-called syndicates of denunciation, etc.).1536
A complementary non-judicial approach in the form of a truth and reconciliation initiative should, from
the outset, elaborate a working relationship with the judicial system. Nevertheless, it seems
important that this initiative avoids, at all costs, being presented or perceived as having its origins in
the same judicial system. As an illustration of the delicate relations to be defined between both
approaches, reference is made to Sarkin concerning the role of a possible truth commission in the
context of the confession and guilty plea procedure, established by the Organic Law of 30 August
1996. Sarkin presents the general lines of two options regarding the confessions which detainees
would present to the commission: the commission would either have to submit this confession to the
judicial system, which would do the follow up, or, the commission is given the power to impose
sanctions or civil compensations or grant pardon. According to him, even in the scenario of a more
limited mandate of the commission, an individual perpetrator may more easily make a confession
before this non-judicial authority, which would serve as a facilitator.1537 In this regard, it can be
1536 See, Vandeginste, S., Justice for Rwanda and International Cooperation, Working Paper, Antwerp University,
September 1997, also published on CD n04 and 5 of the Geneva-based International Documentation Network on the
Great African Lakes Region.
1537 Sarkin, J., "Lessons from other Commissions around the World. The Mechanics of a Commission for Rwanda.", in
Newick Park Initiative, Le role de I'église dans la Restauration de la Justice au Rwanda (Rapport de la Conférence tenue
a Kigali du 19 au 21 aoOt 1997), Cambridge, September 1997.
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suggested that both options be maintained and applied in accordance with the categorisation
foreseen under the Organic Law.
Once again, emphasis can be put on the added value that this non-judicial initiative would bring to
the treatment of individual cases, apart from increasing the institutional capacity to deal with larger
numbers of dossiers. The identification, prosecution and sentencing of perpetrators of human rights
violations through the judicial approach are, in fact, of vital importance, but will they help to achieve
the traditional objective of justice, notably, the re-establishment of the social order and harmony,
which has collective rather than individual dimensions? This is another level where a non-judicial
alternative could complete the present judicial approach.1538
d. The situation of rebellion and war
We have seen that even after the so-called end of the war in July 1994, violence continued in
Rwanda, initially, on a very reduced scale, gradually increasing during the years of 1996, 1997 and
the beginning of 1998, especially after the massive return of refugees in November and December
1996. In June 1997, the Phases and Security Procedures of the United Nations considered a third of
communes to be "inaccessible" to UN personnel, and another third of the communes as requiring "a
military escort". The current situation, at the beginning of 1998, pits the Rwandan army against a
hardly identified rebellion1539, without a clear programme1540 or political spokesperson; it is not at all
clear whether it concerns a well-organised structure or what the role of certain former leaders of the
former armed forces or militia might be. The number of human rights violations is increasing1541. In
such a context, it is difficult to protect and promote human rights. The problems that the High
1538 "These issues ( individual trials against genocide suspects), while important, have little to do with reconciliation or
'righting' the situation so that the survivors can re-establish congenial relations with other Rwandans who mayor may not
have participated in the genocide". Waters, T., "Conventional Wisdom and Rwanda's Genocide: an Opinion", African
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 1, n° 3,1997. See also: Ayindo, B., "Retribution or Restoration for Rwanda", Africanews, Nairobi,
15 January 1998.
1539 In fact, the rebels rarely identify themselves. The leaflets which the ALiR (Armée pour la libération du Rwanda), the
armed branch of PALIR (peuple armé pour la libération du Rwanda), left behind during a rebel attack at Nyabikenke (in
Gitarama prefecture) on 5 January 1998, is an exception. More recently, an organisation called "Abatabazi. Forces
combattant pour la démocratie et les droits de /'homme au Rwanda", would have distributed pamphlets (Cros, M.F., "Le
FPR se réorganise et place Kagame a sa tête", La Libre Belgique, 17 February 1998.
1540 A spokesperson gave a vague indication of the objective of the rebellion, following an attack on a lock-up in the
Gisenyi prefecture on 2 December 1997: "The aim of the insurgency is the control of the two prefectures - the traditional
home of Hutu nationalism - as a precursor to negotiations over power sharing with the authorities in Kigali. Amnesty for
génocidaires would be one of the preconditions for a peace deal" UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, IRIN Update
for Central and Eastern Africa, W 305, Nairobi, 3 December 1997.
1541 See, for example, Amnesty International, Rwanda. Civilians trapped in armed conflict. "The dead can no longer be
counted", London, 19 December 1997.
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Commissioner for Human Rights faced in the field illustrate these difficulties.1542 The same is also
true for a possible truth and reconciliation initiative, which will require the deployment of teams to the
field throughout all prefectures, as well as effective witness protection schemes.
The present situation, however, should not serve as a pretext to rule out the need for placing a truth
and reconciliation initiative on the political agenda. The conditions which all truth and reconciliation
initiatives should meet, whether in times of war or peace, could, at the same time, help to create a
climate which would allow it to function. In fact, if the mandate and the composition at the level of the
personnel of a truth and reconciliation initiative are fairly representative and supported by the
population, civil society and, to the extent that there are any, by the big political leanings (which, in
all circumstances, constitutes an essential condition), is it then excluded that the rebellion (and, a
fortiori, the army) condones the deployment of a truth and reconciliation initiative? On the side of the
armed forces, everything will depend on the genuine political commitment of the current regime. On
the side of the armed opposition, this also presupposes the existence of an organised rebellion
controlled by one or more structures in command of its activities. If, on the contrary, the rebellion is,
above all, made up of an amalgamation of more or less "spontaneous" actions of some unstructured
small groups, this hypothesis may be more difficult to materialise.
In this context, it should be reiterated that both the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and the International Commission of Inquiry foreseen under the Arusha Accords,
formed part of a political negotiation process and agreement deemed to represent a large consensus
within the diverse leanings of the political class. This in fact also seems to be a prerequisite in the
present Rwandan context. It is therefore essential to be able to first identify and then select the
national and international actors who should be involved in developing such a non-judicial approach.
In an increasingly violent context, this could be very difficult.
e. The unipolar detention of persons accused of violations
In nearly all the cases studied in the two reference works, the situation at the time when a truth and
reconciliation initiative was launched, was such that the suspected perpetrators of violations,
1542 See, for example the evaluation report prepared by Ian Martin concerning the human rights field operation in
Rwanda, annex to the report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights presented at the fifty-second session of the
General Assembly (A/52/486/Add.1/Rev.1, 12 November 1997). In the meantime, but more for political than for security
related reasons, the day-ta-day operations of HRFOR have been suspended since early May 1998 (Statement by Mary
Robinson United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 9 May 1998,
htlp:/lwww.unhchr.ch/news/dpipress9.htm).
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targeted by the activities of this initiative, were at large, and were even carrying out functions within
the public administration, including the armed forces.
This would also have been the context in which the International Commission of Inquiry foreseen
under the Arusha Accords would have had to operate. In the present situation, this is still the case
concerning violations committed by the former armed opposition, Le. the present government. With
regard to the genocide, the initial situation is very different: an unprecedented number of detainees
(guilty or innocent) are languishing in prisons and lock-ups.
This situation has important consequences for and repercussions on the establishment and
operation of a possible truth and reconciliation initiative:
- First of all, it is extremely urgent, given the presumption of innocence of detainees. In some other
cases, the time elapsed between the establishment of a commission of inquiry and the publication of
its report and follow-up is extremely long.1543 This time of operation allows an entire society to cover
the process at its own pace. At the political level, it possibly allows a more gradual transition. In the
Rwandan context, the urgency of the situation, given the current conditions of detention, would,
without any doubt, reduce the time frame available for the launch of such an initiative.
- The initial imbalance (between violations committed by the former regime and those committed by
the RPF/RPA) as a consequence of the above-mentioned "qualitative" specificity of genocide, is
further increased by this state of affairs. A truth and reconciliation initiative could, in fact, give rise to
sanctions (criminal, disciplinary, administrative or other) against some persons who are currently at
large and who possibly at present are carrying out some public function and, at the same time,
improve the situation of those who are punished de facto by being in detention. Consequently, at first
sight, the government's interests would not appear to be served by a possible truth and reconciliation
initiative which they should accept, or, at least, tolerate. In the medium and long term, the objectives
of reconciliation, peace and rehabilitation of the society which the present government has set itself,
will require such an approach.
f. The State's responsibility
The suffering of victims of genocide and other human rights violations is irreparable. Nevertheless, a
financial compensation (even partial) for loss incurred not only constitutes a right in itself, but at the
1543 In Uganda, for example, the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights was established on 16 May
1986. Its report was presented on 10 October 1994.
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same time an instrument of reconciliation and of settlement of past scores. It is in this context that
one places the responsibility of the State. It is impossible to go into all legal details of the question
regarding the responsibility of the State1544, vis-a-vis the survivors of genocide and other victims of
human rights violations within the framework of this dissertation. The author will confine his scrutiny
to some of the major themes of the debate regarding the responsibility of the State.
The genocide was perpetrated, by, among others, military and civil servants, who could be held
accountable for paying damages and interest to victims. This is also true for violations committed by
the RPA after they seized power and installed the new government in July 1994. On the other hand,
the State does not seem to have any responsibility for the human rights violations committed by the
RPF as an armed opposition. Did the RPF have legal personality during the rebellion? Furthermore,
the State also suffered losses and could possibly be a civil claimant against individual perpetrators,
both in the context of the genocide, as well as other human rights violations. Similar questions could
be asked concerning the responsibility of third statesl545 and the United Nations.1546 There is no
unanimous doctrine concerning the duty of the international community to prevent and combat
genocide and the possible responsibilities of the UN and of Belgium with regard to the Rwandan
genocide.1547
In any event, a minimal responsibility of the third states concerned and the UN would be the hand-
over of all documents and all information deemed useful by a possible truth commission.1548 This
could, in fact, indicate the genuine commitment of third States vis-a-vis the truth about the events in
Rwanda. The refusal of the United States to hand over some 12,000 documents to the international
commission in the case of EI Salvador sets a highly regrettable precedent.1549
1544 See, in this regard, Verhoeven, J., "Le crime de génocide: originalité et ambiguïté", Revue BeIge de Droit
International, 1991, n° 1, p. 1-26.
1545 A proposal to extend the competence of the ICTR in this sense, was formulated by the president of Attorneys without
Borders; see Cool, B., Letfre ouverte sur la nécessité d'étendre la compétence du Tribunal International pour le Rwanda,
n.p., 1995, p. 7.
1546 See, for example, regarding the "Commission permanente des réclamations", provided for by the Accord entre
/'ONU et le Gouvernement de la République Rwandaise sur le statut de la Mission des Nations Unies pour /'Assistance
au Rwanda du 5 novembre 1993: Gasana, N., Génocide contre les Batutsi du Rwanda et crimes contre /'humanité
perpétrés il I'encontre d'opposants. Que peut faire la justice intemationale?, Brussels, 15 January 1998, p. 9.
1547 See, for example, the studies on the responsibilities of different international actors in the case of Rwanda (Senat de
Belgique, Commission d'enquête parlementaire concernant les événements du Rwanda. Rapport. Annexe 6, 1-611/13,6
December 1997).
1548 Hayner, P., "International Guidelines for the Creation and Operation of Truth Commissions: a Preliminary Proposal"
in Bassiouni, C. and Morris, M., Accountability for International Crimes, p. 175.
1549 Huyse, L., Jonge democratieën en de keuze tussen amnestie, waarheidscommissie en vervolging, Leuven, 1997, p.
48.
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At the domestic level, reference should be made to the law establishing a National Assistance Fund
for needy victims of genocide and massacres committed in Rwanda between October 1, 1990 and
December 31,1994155°, which is in part based on the fact that "the Government in place during the
genocide and massacres, and the administrative institutions played an essential role in the
commission of these crimes, and by way of consequence, the obligations of the Rwandan State to
help the needy citizens have particularly increased". Especially orphans, widows and disabled
persons are intended as beneficiaries of the Fund. As a priority, its assistance should cover
education, health and housing needs. The Fund will operate parallel to the judicial approach:
"Claiming or receiving compensation from courts does not prevent the Fund to assist needy
survivors" (Article 16).
3.9.2.3.4 The truth and reconciliation approach in declarations and ongoing initiatives
The need for a truth and reconciliation process, or at least certain aspects of such an initiative, has
been raised on several occasions by different actors and authors in the Rwandan context. At no
point, however, does it seem to have found an important enough place on either the national political
agenda, or that of the international partners. Here, the author will try to make an undoubtedly
incomplete inventory of some declarations, proposals and requests that pursue the same direction
as this dissertation. This will induce persons interested in the idea to come together and elaborate
and harmonise their various proposals, as well as their follow-up strategy towards the actors
concerned.
a. Declarations of cabinet members or senior civil servants
Without much ado, reference can first of all be made to the above-mentioned declaration of the
prime minister during the Round Table conference in Geneva in June 1996, when he confirmed the
government's intention to establish the commissions foreseen under the Arusha Accords, including
an International Commission of Inquiry to investigate human rights violations committed during the
war. In the logic of the Arusha Accords, it seems obvious that the mandate of such a commission
should include not only the violations committed by the government, but also those of the former
armed opposition, which has become the new government.
The Rwandan vice-president, Major General Paul Kagame, does not seem opposed a priori to an
alternative approach for some categories of detainees:
1550 Law n° 02/98 of 22/01/1998, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, 1 February 1998, p. 217.
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With regard to justice, we have to forge ahead, separate the cases of direct perpetrators of
genocide from all the others. For the latter, we have to be innovative: they could contribute
to the reconstruction of the country, repair roads, construct houses for the survivors, and
cultivate their own fields. Heavy labour could also be a punishment. Presently, the
maintenance of 120,000 prisoners costs US$ 20 million per year, for which we receive
assistance from the international community! This cannot continue in the long-term: we have
to find other solutions; we will explain this to the survivors!1551
Following an initial mission from the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission to Kigali in
September 1996, a delegation from the Rwandan government, headed by the Minister of Labour and
Social Affairs, Pie Mugabo, visited South Africa in January 1997. The Minister of Transport and
Communication, Charles Muligande, and the Prosecutor General of the Supreme Court, were also
part of the delegation. The mission, which received financing from Belgium, sought to have Rwanda
benefit from the experience of South Africa in the domain of national reconciliation and the
compensation of victims of human rights violations.
On the occasion of a conference in Kigali in August 1997, the Minister of Justice, Faustin Ntezilyayo,
commented on the South African model, by saying that:
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the South African model is an attractive option.
I echo the desire to see such a Commission established, but I feel that it is premature. It is
hard to say what is the official view. I am not the Prime Minister so I cannot give you the
government view. My own view is that we want mechanisms over and above the institutions
of justice, something that is in line with social justice, which is indispensable for society. I am
far from feeling that a Truth and Reconciliation Commission is not useful. I think that it is
necessary, whether it is done through a Unity and Reconciliation Commission or not. It is
just as necessary as a Commission for Human Rights. Whichever way one approaches this,
anything that helps to bring healing will be helpful. Would a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and a Unity and Reconciliation Commission be incompatible? Justice must
have roots. We are not opposed to initiatives from outside the government. Initiatives from
within the government and outside the government can come together.1552
Reference should also be made to the remarks of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Justice,
Gerald Gahima, on the occasion of the same conference:
The Government has previously considered a Truth and Reconciliation commission but has
considered it not appropriate for current conditions in the Country. No one has come forward
to take responsibility for the genocide .... However this issue of a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission can be revisited. I am not saying that we shall necessarily strictly apply the law
because there are such large numbers that it would never be possible to try them all, nor
1551 "Les Belges sant les bienvenus au Rwanda", Interview with vice-president Kagame by Colette Braeckman, Le Soir,
20 January 1998. Translated by Vandeginste, Truth and Reconciliation Approach, 1998.
1552 "Comments in the Discussion of the Paper by the Minister of Justice", in Newick Park Initiative.
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punish them with the sanctions that the law normally applies. We have to take the situation
as we find it in reality.1553
However, the Secretary General feels that:
Justice is not just an issue for the Ministry of Justice in this Country: it is an issue for the
Cabinet. That is why it is not possible to delegate decisions about justice to a body which is
outside the government.
Gahima rightly underlines the differences between the Rwandan and South African contexts:
There are differences between South Africa and Rwanda in terms of the nature of the
crimes, the number of those involved, and the consequences for those who were the targets
of the violence.1554
b. Declarations of the political opposition
More of a movement than a real political opposition party, the project Nouvelle Espérance pour Ie
Rwanda (NOUER or "New Hope for Rwanda") made an appeal to the president and vice-president of
Rwanda for the installation of a truth commission:
At nearly 18 months before the political deadline you set for your transitional government,
you should take at least two major initiatives .... The second would be the establishment of a
Truth Commission that would bring out of anonymity all the victims of war crimes, crimes
against humanity and the Rwandan genocide from 1 October 1990 to date. This institution,
of which the role would be neither criminal nor judicial, would allow to find out the
circumstances of the victims' death, tediously dismantle and patiently reconstruct the
mechanisms, responsibilities, the ingredients and behaviour which led to the humanitarian
catastrophe. This Truth Commission would be all the more necessary as it could dispel the
climate and tendency of globalisation of criminal guilt between the ethnic groups.1555
The royalist party UNAR, considers the South African approach as one of the instruments to resolve
the present war in the country:
... the war should be resolved through the political willingness on the part of the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF), which should prove its ability to adapt to the process of reconciliation,
criminal justice and democracy. Having been one of the pillars of the fight for independence
1553 "What is understood by Justice in Rwanda today? What can be justified in Rwanda today by reference to lack of
means, technical and human and what cannot. Paper presented by Gerald Gahima, Secretary-General of the Ministry of
Justice", in Newick Park Initiative.
1554 "Points made by Gerald Gahima in response to points raised during discussion of his paper" in Newick Park Initiative.
1555 NOUER, Letter to the President and Vice-Président of the Rwandan Republic, Lausanne, 20 December 1997. The
letter is signed by promotors James Gasana et Nkiko Nsengimana. In its "Propositions pour la relance du processus de
réconciliation nationale", published in May 1996, NOUER had already proposed the establishment of a Truth
Commission (NOUER, Les voies pacifiques de la résolution de la crise politique rwandaise, Lausanne, 1995, p. 22).
Translated by Vandeginste, Truth and Reconciliation Approach, 1998.
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and national unity, the UNAR party demands that the government in Kigali overcomes its
distrust of the Hutu rebels and makes the promotion of justice and reconciliation a historic
occasion, following the example of the people of South Africa.1556
Some persons have put forward the idea of a collective confession from the Hutu community for the
genocide against Tutsis as one of the prerequisites to a process of political negotiation. This
proposal is not realistic or opportune, as hundreds of thousands of Hutus were also killed - Which
collective confession would be needed for these crimes against humanity? - and many Hutus are not
guilty of anything. Moreover, who would be representative of such a diverse community? On the
other hand, it seems necessary, in this context, for all movements and political parties to recognise
the existence and to unconditionally condemn the genocide. This would not entail any collective
responsibility nor would it reduce the gravity of the other crimes against humanity. On this point,
Prunier has stated that the Resistance Forces for Democracy (FRO), holds a special position among
the other Hutu opposition movements:
The originality of the FRD ... has been their strong and clear talk about the genocide and
their condemnation of it without hesitation. This position, which seems morally obvious for an
outside observer, is in fact very rare in the Hutu community .... But the FRD straightforward
condemnation of the genocide, if it has satisfied foreigners, has not attracted much support
within the Hutu cornmunity.t="
The political platform of the FRO also foresees that a truth commission be set up,
to determine, with the aim of reconciliation based on the truth, the responsibilities of all
parties in the Rwandan tragedy. The work and mandate of the Truth Commission are
situated outside the judicial process, but constitute a valuable complement to it.1558
Reference must also be made to the press release of Rwanda Pour Taus on 21 November 1995, in
which this association
reiterates its condemnation of the genocide and all the crimes against humanity which were
and still are committed in Rwanda.1559
In a letter to the Rwandan president, Rwanda Pour Taus
1556 Rukeba, C., UNAR. Communiqué de Presse, 15 décembre 1997. Id.
1557 Prunier, G., The Rwanda Crisis, p. 372.
1558 Forces de Resistance pour la Democratie, Plate-Forme Politique, Brussels, March 1996, p. 72. Translated by
Vandeginste, Truth and Reconciliation Approach, 1998.
1559 RWANDA POUR TOUS, Communiqué de Presse, Brussels, 21 November 1995. Id.
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appreciates the steps taken by the international community to recognise the Tutsi genocide
and to bring suspected perpetrators before the International Tribunal for Rwanda. It is also
imperative that an international inquiry be held to classify the crimes committed by the
RPF/RPA and its government since October 1990, and especially since April 1994.1560
c. Declarations of the international community
The following section presents an attempt to summarise some positions and proposals of
governments and intergovernmental actors. The national and international non-governmental
organisations will be examined in the subsequent section.
The special envoy of the European Union, A/do Ajello, seems undoubtedly among the proponents of
an alternative and complementary non-judicial approach. He draws his inspiration partly from his
experience in Mozambique between 1992 and 1994:
A discussion must be started, together with the Rwandan government, to find a solution, and
more than a judiciary solution, as there cannot be solely a judiciary solution to genocide.
One good example is the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, but there are
many other mechanisms in the African tradition and culture. We must combine punishment
and forgiveness. We must create and consolidate the culture of forgiveness while we put an
end to the culture of impunity. Stopping the sense of impunity would entail that the
masterminds of and the instigators of the genocide are punished. The rest, the broad mass
of people implicated in the genocide, should be forgiven. In a sense, they themselves can be
considered a secondary group of genocide victims, as they were misled by bad leaders.1561
Belgium explored the idea of creating a Commission of Reparation for Rwanda, and has, in this
context, financed the respective missions and exchanges between the Rwandan authorities and the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Along with Switzerland and the Netherlands,
among others, Belgium has also financed the above-mentioned Newick Park Initiative that led to the
organisation of a conference on the role of the church in the restoration of justice in Rwanda in Kigali
in August 1997.
The first (in 1997, to the General Assembly) and second (in 1998, to the UN Commission on Human
Rights) report of the Special Representative of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Michel
Moussa/i, only refer to the judicial approach and recommend that the international community
1560 Gasana, J., Letfre au Président de la République Rwandaise, Brussels, 21 March 1996. Id.
1561 Ajello, A., "Opening Statement" in Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik, op. cit., p.38. See also: CROS, M.F., "La petite
idée d'Aldo Ajello pour ramener la paix entre fréres ennemis", La Libre Belgique, 24 December 1997; Beiriant, B.,
"Rwanda heeft nood aan cultuur van vergeving", De Standaard, 12 January 1998.
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provides technical assistance so that all detainees may obtain legal dossiers in the shortest time
possible, and so that the trials against the genocide suspects can take place at a faster pace,
without, obviously, violating fair trial standards. No reference is made to a possible complementary
non-judicial approach.1562
In its resolution of 15 April 1997, the UN Human Rights Commission
reiterates its request that all states concerned co-operate fully ... to ensure that all those
guilty of the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and other grave violations of human
rights committed in Rwanda are brought to justice .... 1563
In its resolution of 21 April 1998, the UN Human Rights Commission did not make any reference to a
truth and reconciliation initiative either.1564
In his 1996 and 1997 reports, the former Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human
Rights, Degni-Ségui, makes no reference to possible complementary non-judicial approaches to the
legal proceedings against presumed perpetrators of genocide and crimes against humanity.1565The
idea is not mentioned neither in the High Commissioner for Human Rights report to the UN
Commission on Human Rights of March 19971566nor in the report to the General Assembly of
October 19971567,nor in the report to the UN Commission on Human Rights of February 1998.1568
d. Private initiatives
In December 1996, a group of 24 Christians from different Rwandan and foreign churches met in
Detmold (Germany) and published the "Detmold Confession". The underlying idea of this initiative
was that a reconciliation of the Rwandan people is only possible when its different components
recognise the suffering of others, confess their own crimes and ask the victims for pardon. Therefore,
1562 Report of the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in
Rwanda, A/52/522, 22 October 1997 and UN Commission on Human Rights, Report on the situation of human rights in
Rwanda submitted by the Special Representative, Mr. Michel Moussali, pursuant to resolution 1997/66, E/CN.4/1998/60,
19 February 1998.
1563 UN Commission on Human Rights, Situation of human rights in Rwanda, Resolution 1997/66, 15 April 1997, par. 18
1564 UN Commission on Human Rights, Situation of human rights in Rwanda, Resolution 1998/69, 21 April 1998.
1565 Documents E/CN.4/1996/68 of 29 January 1996 and E/CN.4/1997/61 of 20 January 1997.
1566 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the activities of the
Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda, E/CN.4/1997/52, 17 March 1997.
1567 UN General Assembly, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human Rights
Field Operation in Rwanda, A/52/486, 16 October 1997.
1568 UN Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights field operation in Rwanda. Report of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, E/CN .4/1998/61, 19 February 1998.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
390
the Hutu Christian participants recognised that "their people" ("les leurs') had oppressed the Tutsis in
different ways since 1959 and confessed to the crime of genocide. The Tutsi Christians asked to be
pardoned for the repression and blind revenge which "their people" ("les leurs') carried out against
the Hutu population, outside the context of the right to self-defence. The Western Christians
confessed to having discriminated among persons, to have favoured violence and to have
abandoned the Rwandan people on numerous occasions.1569The Detmold Confession gave rise to
numerous reactions.157o From the perspective of this dissertation, the Detmold Confession has at
least this major merit: it shows that the "truth" in the Rwandan context, comprises different elements
(and not only genocide against Tutsis for example), for which different actors have a certain
responsibility. Each should assume his or her responsibility in order to enable a real reconciliation
within society. Despite some interpretations, it seems clear that, by juxtaposing certain violations and
responsibilities, the Confession did not at all seek to justify or equate the genocide and other
massive human rights violations. However, the truth behind the various atrocities at the centre of this
collective confession has not been told: which acts are included, committed when, where and by
whom?1571As the two reference authors have pointed out, determining the truth constitutes the first
step in the entire process. This seems to be the main handicap1572of the Detmold Confession as an
instrument of reconciliation .1573
The Newick Park Initiative, the international branch of the Relationships Foundation has been
mentioned several times throughout this chapter. Meetings were held in June 1996, December 1996
and August 1997. The latter focused on the role of the church in the restoration of justice in Rwanda.
The participants, in this context,
took notice of the existence and operation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in
South Africa and found this experience interesting. They recommend that the churches in
1569 The Detmold Confession has been published in Dialogue, n° 195, January 1997, p. 58.
1570 Gasana, J.K.; Nzacahayo, P., La Confession de Detmold. Une réponse creuse il un probleme profond, Lausanne,
July 1997. See also 8 reactions published in Dialogue, n° 197, March - April 1997, p. 34-62.
1571 See also, the comments of René Lemarchand in Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Improving African and
International Capabilities, p. 93-95.
1572 Others are: the Confession seems to isolate the ethnic dimensions of the violent acts committed without indicating
how the ethnic group is used as an instrument in a fight for political power. Moreover, it makes no reference to the crimes
committed within the same ethnic group: for example, the president of the Interahamwe, Robert Kajuga, was Tutsi. It
does not state either that numerous Tutsi civilians survived the Rwandan genocide thanks to a Hutu.
1573 After the second meeting of the signatories to the Detmold Confession, the clarification was made that "the
confession does not generalise culpability in the criminal sense. The latter can only be individual". Declaration published
in Chimay on 31 December 1997.
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Rwanda and the Rwandan State considers the need for, and the possibility of, setting up a
similar process in Rwanda.1574
Sarkin launched some concrete ideas with regard to the implementation of "this similar process". In
order to set up the Commission, he emphasised that it should be established by law. Consequently,
this initiative cannot only be limited to the civil society. In order to guarantee its legitimacy towards
diverse sections of the population, the composition and appointment of members of the Commission
should not be in the hands of the Government. The commissioners should be appointed by a panel
made up of a representative of the Secretary General of the UN, the Secretary General of the OAU,
the President (of the Commission) of the European Union, the government, the Catholic church, the
Anglican church and human rights organisations. The committee should also take a decision
concerning the objectives of the commission's tasks, the ratione temporis, ratione loci and ratione
materiae mandate. Sarkin rightly adds that the international community should allocate important
financial resources to the activities of such a commission, in order for it to attain its objectives.1575
Within the context of a study concerning conflict management in Central Africa, COPRI
(Copenhagen Peace Research Institute) published a study on, among other things, the needs of a
judicial system in transition.1576The study first examines the possible role of customary law, and in
the first place, the gacaca, in the settlement of past scores and reconciliation, in a context of
genocide and crimes against humanity.1577According to the author of the study, Christian Scherrer,
this would, in any event, require that the gacaca remains independent of the public administration,
but is modified to meet present needs, including the participation of women and youth
representatives in the system, which is traditionally monopolised by "wise old men". The forum of the
gacaca would serve as a basis for the local activities of the truth and reconciliation commissions. In
the meantime, a national truth commission would be set up, initially through the establishment of an
advisory and consultative body composed of respected independent personalities. COPRl's proposal
to develop this project did not receive donor financing. Traditional justice in the form of the gacaca
may indeed be able to play an extremely important role in grassroots conflict management,
especially in cases concerning the ownership of houses, land and cows, including conflicts directly
1574 "Déclaration" in Newick Park Initiative.
1575 Sarkin, J., "Lessons from other Commissions around the World. The Mechanics of a Commission for Rwanda", in
Newick Park Initiative.
1576 Scherrer, C., Central Africa: Conflict Impact Assessment and Policy Options, Working Paper Copenhagen Peace
Research Institute, n025, 1997.
1577 The traditional gacaca system can be useful in reconciling the local population as long as it is not manipulated by
politicians.
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linked to the events of the genocide. This inspired the drafters of Article 14 d of the Organic Law of
30 August 1996, which only provides for civil compensations by means of an amicable settlement, as
a "punishment" for persons in Category four (persons who committed offences against
properties).1578Traditionally, however, the gacaca only played a limited role in criminal matters.1579
Consequently, the gacaca seems poorly placed to determine responsibilities for acts of genocide. All
the more so since it is a collective process, one can hardly imagine how one could involve the killers
in this traditional justice.158o One could also wonder if major changes (such as those proposed by
COPRI at the level of the composition of the gacaca) would be compatible with the traditional
character of this justice (and therefore, with its popular support).
Attorneys without Borders (ASF), through its project "Justice for Ali", is one of the most actively
involved actors in the present judicial approach. In its annual report for 1997, ASF states that there
was a considerable reduction in the pace of trials at the end of 19971581and the association adds
that "whether it is civil parties or defendants, the parties to the trials suffer, in any case, from the slow
pace of proceedings".1582 ASF concludes, among other things, that
the total number of persons detained in Rwanda, cannot be tried in a reasonable time frame.
Alternative solutions must be put into place so that the judicial power may focus on more
serious offences .... Justice cannot form the only response, but should be placed in a more
global political context of prosecution and compensation. The implementation of
complementary mediation procedures should be a priority for further study.1583
To sum up, throughout the above-mentioned analysis and proposals of truth and reconciliation
initiatives, truth telling is seen as a key issue. Discovering this "collective truth" through a truth and
1578 According to article 14, in the event that an amicable settlement cannot be found, "the rules pertaining to criminal
proceedings and civil actions shall apply. If the accused is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the sentence is
suspended". Some authors have denounced the impunity which property offenders enjoy: see, for example,
Nsanzuwera, F.X., La justice traditionelJe rwandaise et la Commission "vérité et réconciliation": pistes de solutions pour
que la justice au Rwanda lutte contre /'oubli et cimente la réconciliation nationale, Brussels, May 1997, p. 6.
1579 "The gacaca, therefore, deals with minor criminal cases, and decides as if it were cases of civil responsibility".
(Reyntjens, F., "Le gacaca, ou la justice de gazon au Rwanda", Politique Africaine, December 1990, p.34) (Translated by
Vandeginste, Truth and Reconciliation Approach, 1998).
1580 "Our main goal is to have society reconcile with itself. There is no room for the killers in the process," an elderly man
in Rusororo said, "I do not think that the 'Gacaca' would have the power and means to arrest them or have them
recognise the crimes committed" (Kayigamba, J.B., Rwanda-Politics: Courtyard Justice Heals the Nation, IPS, 13
October 1997.)
1581 In some way, this is also due to an improvement in the competence of magistrates who are becoming increasingly
demanding with regard to forms and principles, often causing hearings to be postponed (Avocats Sans Frontieres,
Rapport Annue11997, Brussels, 1998, p. 10).
1582 Translated by Vandeginste, Truth and Reconciliation Approach, 1998. ibid., p. 6.
1583 Id., p. 27.
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reconciliation initiative is not only necessary, but can also differ from the "juridical truth" of an
exclusively judicial approach. As an example, reference can be made to the presumption of
innocence, one of the core fair trial standards in a judicial approach. Even if tens of persons died on
a hill, the "juridical truth" of innocence will remain intact as long as the guilt of one or more individual
perpetrators has not been established. The judicial approach (whether at the national level or that of
the ICTR) may therefore eventually not lead to the establishment of any criminal responsibility for the
events which took place on this hill. The non-judicial approach would be totally different: it would be
perfectly possible, even without passing judgement on the criminal responsibility of certain
individuals, to try and reconstruct the truth surrounding the events and to record them for the
collective memory of the nation. In other words: the task and approach of a judicial police inspector
could be very different from the activities of a truth commission, even if they are dealing with the
same reality. This "non-judicial" truth, on condition that it is determined by a respectable and
independent organisation, is not only a prerequisite for reconciliation and the re-establishment of
social harmony, but is also a protection against all forms of revisionism and/or negationism,1584 thus
a way of reconstructing a failed State.
However, it should be pointed out that even if a number of Rwandans, Hutus and Tutsis alike,
support the truth and reconciliation philosophy, it is not clear who would initiate the process and how
long it would last, especially since the fear persists among both groups. The question here pertains
not only to a mediator but also to a facilitator/instigator, someone whose equipment, money, human
resources and diplomacy could help Hutus and Tutsis, northerners and southerners, to come
together to establish lasting peace and reconstruct their society.
There is no question that the international community can play an important role in this regard. There
may be some truth in the argument by American officials that they and other outsiders have little
influence on what goes on in this part of the world,1585but it is also true that governments outside
Africa have considerable leverage which they could have applied against Rwanda and the rest of
Africa. The United States, for example, buys almost all the coffee produced by Rwanda and the
country would be bankrupt without foreign aid from Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United States, and the United Nations. Perhaps a coffee
boycott or the withdrawal of aid would not have stopped the slaughter in the country, but this weapon
has never been used.
1584 African Rights, op. cit., p. 1164.
1585 Meisler, S., 'Flashback: Violence and Unrest in Central Africa', The Atlantic Monthly, September 1973.
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Those industrialised countries have now made foreign aid conditional upon multi-party democracy
and respect for human rights in recipient countries. This is a welcome departure from previous
practice when the United States and other Western countries backed African despots such as
Mobutu of Zaïre, Arap Mai of Kenya, and Siad Barre of Somalia in order to contain the spread of
Soviet influence in Africa.1586 However, the continuous support to the oppressive and absolute
government in Rwanda is questionable.
The industrialised countries could also have put pressure on the other African countries to face the
problem of Rwanda and other countries. They could have, for example, refused to support all African
resolutions on Southern Africa in the United Nations unless these resolutions also condemned the
disaster in Burundi and Rwanda. Perhaps this would only have infuriated Africa. But it might also
have shamed Africa into dealing with its problems. At the least, it would have exposed African
hypocrisy.
There is the question of whether countries like the United States have the moral right to remain silent
while all the killing goes on. Perhaps it is true that condemnation would have been futile in Rwanda
in 1994. But no one knows for sure. All that is known is that, while everyone kept quiet, more than a
hundred thousand people died. Keeping quiet obviously has not saved anyone. Perhaps shouting
might have.
The most important course remaining for the UN is the implementation of a long-term special mission
to Rwanda with regard to reconciliation and reconstruction as long as resources are not wasted and
the mission is not one sided as has been the case so far with regard to the UNAMIR and the ICTR.
One of the duties of the UN Organisation being the maintenance of peace and security in the world,
the world organisation can, for example, in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, work out
a 15-year plan in which it can play an active role. During this period, Rwandans would have enough
time and support for truth telling and reconciliation. As the problem pertains, inter alia, to positions in
government, the judiciary, the army and parastatals, high ranking positions in these institutions
should at least be occupied by UN personnel, at least during the first years, as long as reconciliation
is pursued. Particularly, however, the army should be entirely UN blue helmets who would withdraw
little by little until the end of the mission. Fifteen years is a sufficient period to form a national army. It
1586 A lot has been written on this subject. See, e.g.: Pamela Constable, Africa's Shift to Democracy Forcing Change in
US Policies, Boston Globe, Nov. 11, 1991 at 1; Paul Chintowa, Development: Sweden Ties Aid to Democracy, Inter
Press Service, April3, 1992; Barbara McDougall, Defending Human Rights, Ottawa Citizen, Feb. 26,1992, at 10; Lynda
Chalker, Giving Aid to the Third World, With Strings Attached, Sunday Times (London), Aug. 18, 1991.
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is also sufficient for Rwandans to agree on the meaning of democracy in their country. During this
period, a new generation of Rwandans can be provided with formal education and education on
democracy, human rights and the rule of law without exclusion. It is especially on this new
generation that one can place great hope for the future of the country, as the current one has failed
to build a reconciled and democratic society. A Constitution can also be studied, drafted and agreed
upon. Great emphasis should be laid on ethnic and regional problems, a popular government, a
constituent assembly, the electoral system, prevention of tyranny and safeguarding of rights,
defence of public interests, establishment of a liberal society with equal chances in the management
of resources, the ombudsman institution, directive principles of State policy, an independent human
rights commission, and a legal aid department. The following sections are designed to be
provocative rather than a watertight piece of UN organisation. They will therefore not examine the
steps to be taken by the UN to set up the mission in details, but rather analyse those means and
institutions that can be set up for the process of reconciliation and reconstruction during and after the
UN mission.
3.9.3 Understanding democracy
3.9.3.1 The fundamental idea
Any legitimate attempt to place checks on apparent majority power depends on finding a new way to
think about ends and means of democratic government. Such a basis can be found in a very old way
of thinking about democracy; this approach is reflected in the writings of the authors of the American
Constitution. This dissertation does not argue that the specific institutional arrangements of the
United States Constitution are applicable to Rwanda. Rather, the way the framers of that document
thought about self-government and representative democracy is extremely useful for solving the
problems just set forth.
In 1787, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, writing under the pen name of
"Publius", composed an impressive series of essays designed to gain popular acceptance of the
proposed Constitution. As they wrote, Publius encountered some of the same fundamental problems
that confront Rwanda today. Relatively speaking the United States of the 1780s was a developing
country ridden by significant division as landowners, farmers, commercial traders, merchants and
rural peasants struggled for power and control over the destiny of the new nation. The chief
dimensions of this struggle were the appropriate amount of mass popular control over government,
the relative power of the central versus regional governments, and fundamental questions of
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economy such as the rights of contract, taxation and debt. In essence, Pub/ius confronted the
competing tasks of ensuring popular rule, checking its excesses and preventing contending groups
from depriving others of their rights. Yet this was no mere exercise in conflict resolution. They
wanted to do all these things and create a government strong enough to provide for the pressing
needs of a developing and modernising country. At their most basic level (and without pushing the
analogy too far), these competing demands sound very similar to the fundamental, essential tasks
confronting Rwanda's leaders.
The author's interest here is not with the particularities of Publius' arguments, but rather with the
fundamental understanding of democracy embodied in their thinking. Most importantly, this basic
understanding1587offers a legitimate rationale for placing checks on majority rule. In addition, such
an understanding of democracy may provide other benefits because it implies a certain institutional
arrangement that could help limit violence, protect liberty, and forward the common interests of all
Rwandans.
Pub/ius proceeded from the fundamental assumption that human behaviour was motivated by both
reason and passion. Yet human nature had to be confronted as it was because any attempts at
amelioration entailed an unthinkable violation of individual liberty.1588Thus, the challenge was to
ensure that human reason, and not passion, would 'not conform to the dictates of reason and justice
without constraint".1589Therefore, passion (or to use its modern equivalent- irrationality) had to be
controlled and regulated by government in order to prevent people from violating each other's
rights.159oYet Publius sawall humans as flawed, not just "the masses". All people were corruptible,
especially by power. Thus, human nature also meant that government itself had to be controlled to
prevent it from oppressing citizens.
Consequently, aristocracy, monarchy and oligarchy were dangerous forms of government because
they placed undue faith and power in the hands of the few. This made popular control over
government an absolute necessity.1591Yet direct majoritarian democracy was dangerous because it
placed undue faith and power in the hands of the many. Therefore, popular control over government
needed to co-exist with checks on popular influence and guarantees of individual freedom. As
1587 In contrast to Westminster parliamentary or consociational approaches.
1588 Federalist, #10.
1589 Federalist, #15.
1590 Federalist, #49.
1591 Federalist, #51.
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Publius noted in that memorable phrase: "If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be
necessary .... You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself."1592
The main threat to liberty and the common good was seen to arise from groups within society called
"factions". Publius saw factions as any group motivated by passion or interest which attempted to
influence policy in a way that was "adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community".1593 Factions were unavoidable and resulted from natural
differences in interest, reason and ability. Different opinions and unequal accumulation of wealth and
property created division and animosity, and rendered people "much more disposed to vex and
oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good".1594Yet destroying the cause of
factions entailed either the equalisation of all people and/or the destruction of liberty. Instead,
Pub/ius decided to regulate the effects of factions.1595
Finally, while the authors of the Constitution were interested in securing popular rule and individual
rights, they also envisioned a government which ruled, not in any group's particular interest, but in
the common or public interest. They were convinced that it was possible to create a government that
would enact the best policies for the nation as a whole. Truth was not relative, nor unknowable, to
these founders. Far from it, it was truth and reason which dictated that people had certain inalienable
rights in the first place.
But the best policies and the best government did not result from the aggregation of individual or
group preferences. Rather, they emanated from dialogue and reflection. And the time and space
necessary for such reflection was not secured by a democratic government understood only as a
means for majorities to translate their will into law. In a democracy conceived as such, "the public
good is disregarded in the conflict of rival parties, and measures are too often decided, not according
to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and
overbearing majority."1596
1592 Federalist, #51.
1593 Federalist, #10.
1594 Federalist, #10.
1595 Federalist, #10.
1596 Federalist, #10.
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Thus, democracy had to be more than a resolution of the clash of interests and desire. Popular self-
government demanded "that the deliberate sense of the community should govern the conduct of
those to whom they entrust the management of their affairs; but it does not require an unqualified
complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion; or to every transient impulse which the people
may receive from the arts of men, who flatter their prejudices to betray their interests".1597
Accordingly, Publius understood democracy as an open, popular system that controlled government
and protected the fundamental rights of all individuals. Such an understanding stands in sharp
contrast to a democracy conceived only as a mechanism to reflect the current balance of power
among contending groups and translate the will of the stronger group into law. Seen through Publius'
eyes, democracy has more to do with how people govern themselves according to the dictates of
reason than it does with translating majority will into public policy. Yet it also stands in contrast to
consociational approaches which protect the rights of groups as defined by ascriptive traits.1598
How do we govern ourselves within the limits dictated by reason? Pub/ius' task was to constitute an
arrangement which rested on popular self-government, which protected individuals from oppression
by others as well as by the government, and yet which created a government strong enough and
effective enough to produce the best national policy possible. They needed to combine in
government the energy and wisdom necessary to complete great projects and rule in the public
interest, with the necessity of securing individual liberty and popular rule.1599
3.9.3.2 The basis
Publius' understanding of democracy was based fundamentally on the principle that all office holders
should be subject to direct, or at least popular, election. As opposed to majoritarian conceptions,
voting and elections were seen as a method of controlling officials - not of creating policy mandates
or policy demands. It was necessary that officials were popularly selected, and it was sufficient that
1597 Federalist, #71.
1598 Consociational democracy is built on the principle of executive power-sharing and a certain degree of self-
administration for each group, whether they live together or separately. This notion which stands among the many
variations in democratic experiences which seek to accommodate a degree of pluralism has been developed in recent
political science by aren't Lijphart. It is a form of power-sharing through a multiple balance of power among the segments
of a plural society which, according to Lijphart, allow for decision-making by the "grand collation method". Lijphart sees it
as "an alternative to the majoritarian type of democracy, and more suitable for good government in plural societies
divided by ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural differences, where the groups are clearly identifiable". Lijphart, A.,
"Majority Rule versus Democracy in Deeply Divided Societies", in Politicon 4 (2), 1977.
1599 Federalist, #37.
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this was done on a regular basis with fixed terms of office.16oo Thus, election results did not have to
"mean" anything in terms of giving policy guidance or creating a mandate.1601 It is on this point,
especially, that Publius' understanding of democracy is more in accordance with logic and reality
than any other conception.
Yet once sovereignty and control were located in people, how was factional tyranny to be
prevented? First, minority factions which may from time to time control government would be
prevented from infringing on others' rights by the threat of being voted out of office. Minority factions
within society would be prevented from such behaviour by government action.
Yet what happens when a majority faction controls government and declines to use State power to
protect minorities against abuse from other elements in society? More importantly, what happens if
that majority decides to use the State itself to tyrannise? Indeed, Pub/ius saw the prevention of
tyranny by majority faction as the more demanding task. For when "the stronger faction can readily
unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where
the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger" .1602
To prevent this, Publius relied on an extended, diverse society, which allowed the multiplication and
proliferation of interests and sects to make it more difficult for anyone faction to dominate over the
rest or infringe on their rights. They also devised a number of institutional arrangements to splinter
and break majority factions. In order to capture government completely, potential majorities were
forced to prevail vertically over the existing federal nature of the political system. They also were
forced to prevail horizontally because independent and separate powers were assigned to the
legislative, judicial and executive branches of the government. Finally, they were forced to prevail
over time because the elections of the various branches of government were staggered so that any
numerical majority would have to dominate over a series of elections in order to capture the
government. These features were intended to: make "an unjust combination of a majority of the
whole very improbable if not impracticable"; make it less probable that any majority would "have a
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens"; and, if that failed, to render majorities unable
to oppress.1603
1600 Federalist, #39.
1601 Riker, w., Liberalism against Populism, San Francisco: WH Freeman, 1982, Chap!. 10.
1602 Federalist, #51.
1603 Federalist, #10 and #51.
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Yet besides preventing tyranny, many of these arrangements were also designed to ensure
consideration of the public, or common, interest. Institutions such as the Senate and Presidency
were assigned large, diverse constituencies that would force them to pursue the common interest
rather than that of particular interests that might dominate smaller constituencies. In addition, these
institutions were given important checks on the House of Representatives which, with smaller and
more numerous constituencies, was expected to be more prone to parochial concerns. Furthermore,
while powers were separated between branches of the national government, the legislative,
executive and judiciary, functions were partially combined among the branches to foster co-operation
and compromise.
Yet separation of powers, staggered elections and federalism were not intended to preclude popular
influence over government. Rather they were designed to ensure that such influence would be more
deliberate and considered rather than based on momentary passion and whim. These institutions
were intended to: "refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a
chosen body of citizens" ,1604and enable those officials to "withstand the temporary delusion" of an
apparent public opinion that was at variance with the public interest and to create the time and
opportunity "for more sedate reflection".1605
3.9.3.3 Application and implications to Rwanda
To restate, the prime relevance for Rwanda of Publius's understanding of democracy is the
legitimate rationale that it offers for the necessary task of limiting majority will in democratic
government. Thus, Publius, offers a way out of the dangerous traps laid by the myths of
majoritarianism. This understanding also achieves this without assigning veto powers to ascriptively
defined minority groups. Moreover, such an understanding of democracy may provide additional
benefits for Rwanda by ensuring individual and group rights, as well as enabling government to
address pressing social problems.
What would be the implications of such an alternative understanding of democracy if it was ever
embraced by relevant constitutional planners and negotiators?
3.9.3.3.1 Non-ethuicity and non-regionalism
First of all, understanding democracy as an open system rather than as majority rule would allow
1604 Federalist,#10.
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Rwanda to abandon the potentially ethnic definition of majority rule. It would shift the criterion of
legitimacy for a future government away from the composition of the ruling party to the process by
which it can be selected. Limitations on the majority party in government would not result from
allocating vetoes to minority groups defined by ethnicity. Rather, the Constitution would structure
incentives for groups to coalesce naturally on issue to issue to protect their vital interests.
The polarisation of ethnic groups together with reflexes of automatic solidarity between individuals on
ethnic basis, the use of the 1994 genocide by the RPF regime as a political trump card to
marginalise Hutus and to savagely repress them in case of resistance, the miserable conditions of
life of refugees outside Rwanda, while their properties are occupied by dignitaries of the government
and army officers, maintain a climate of hatred and rejection and could lead to the repetition of
tragedies in the future. Understanding and practising democracy as an open system, Hutus and
Tutsis can accept each other in their multiple similarities and their differences and can develop a
culture of tolerance, open-mindedness, love and mutual acceptance. The adoption of democracy as
an open system would result in pacific cohabitation in the strict respect of equality and without any
hegemonic pretension of one group over the other on the basis of worn historic considerations and
cultural, military or numerical superiority. In this regard and in conformity with the Constitution agreed
upon, legislation would be enacted outlawing ethnic and regional behaviours, as is the case in "anti-
racism" laws existing in other countries such as South Africa and the United States of America. At
local levels, mixed groups of mature, respected Hutus and Tutsis can be set up to address certain
problems of land reform and reduce the conflict producing discursive practices.
A non-ethnically-based and non-absolute political system would, therefore, be established. In view of
healing the evils afflicting the Rwandan society it is important to fix pluralism into political practices.
Pluralism must transcend the current conception of multipartyism to encompass all the spheres of
civil society in the form of multiplicity of trade unions, religious, socia-professional associations,
peasants' organisations, youth and women's organisations, etc. Authoritarian attempts to fit people
into one political straitjacket would not be revived.
The Constitution and ordinary laws would recognise the existence of opposition not only as a
safeguard but also as a guarantee of a possibility of alternation in the management of public affairs.
Clear statutes would confer honour and privileges on the opposition and their representatives.
1605 Federalist, #71.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
402
As regards the army, instead of being in the pay of one ethnic group, one region or one oligarchy, it
would have as a mission, the defence and the protection of the integrity of the country and the
population. The history of violence has led to great fear of the opposite ethnic group. The Tutsis
refuse to give up their control of the army because they see it as a form of security against genocide.
The Hutus cannot imagine a stable democracy as long as the Tutsis control the army. Concretely,
there is need of a national army composed of Hutus, Tutsis and women recruited from all the
communes of the country. Its relative composition would be inspired by criteria applied in democratic
regimes for representation in parliament. It is not impossible to determine minima and maxima for
each ethnic group, each sex and each region. However, the principle of merit and competence
should be of prime importance in the process of selection.
The gendarmerie and the police would be decentralised. Recruited in the same way as soldiers, the
gendarmes and police officers have to prevent crime, ensure that people are safe, and ensure that
people are able to use their democratic rights freely and peacefully. They will work with the
community to decide what the policing needs of the community are.
Independent groups outside the police would investigate complaints about the way the police work or
behave. If a member of the police has a complaint, s/he could ask an Ombudsman1606 to solve the
problem.
Members of the police and the gendarmerie would be allowed to join associations that serve their
interests.
In any case, as regards the number of people in the armed forces, the gendarmerie and the police
should correspond to the economic possibilities of the country. An oversized and budget-consuming
army like the one set up by the end of the Habyarimana regime or by the RPF is characteristic of an
oppressive regime which does not command the trust of the. population.
The weight of the military in public affairs other than the defence and protection of the territory and
the population would be suppressed. The primacy of civil power over armed forces would be
guaranteed.
Moreover, a national security council dominated by civilians would be established to deal with
orientations and important questions regarding peace and security. It would be responsible for
1606 See infra 3.8.3.3.8 The Ombudsman Institution.
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collecting information about anything that threatens Rwanda's peace and security. The people would
have a right to this information as long as it does not threaten the country's security. Parliament
would watch over the national security council, which must follow the democratic Constitution and
the bill of rights. The national security council would respect the rights of all people to take part in
political life, as long as they did not break the law.
Understanding democracy as an open system would also solve the regionalism problem. It has
already been indicated that the ruling elite made use of their region of origin to marginalise others
and hold power, wealth and privileges in monopoly. To prevent such a situation in the future, the
management of public affairs could be decentralised to the benefit of regions, local communities and
associations. Important domains such as education, agriculture, public health, tourism, national and
regional development would fall within the competence of regions but, of course, not be divorced
from the larger vision of national and sub-regional development. UA truly decentralised democracy is
the only one able to prevent the totalitarian temptation of rulers to want running the whole show to
their own profit, that of their families or region''.1607
The system of local government should not only assert non-ethnicism, but also non-sexism and will
actively build non-ethnicism and non-sexism into processes designed to counter decades of
discriminatory government. Mechanisms could be built into the system to enable women to
participate in decision-making and administrative structures at all levels of regional and local
government. In this regard, programmes would be designed and launched to equip women with skills
enabling them to do so. Special attention has to be paid to the rural areas where the greater number
of women is located.
Democratic local government means more than just having the right to vote in a local election. It also
includes facilitating the creation of a strong, independent civil society, a high degree of
accountability, transparency and the right to participate in decision-making processes which affect
communities between elections.
However, participation and accountability are meaningless if people do not have access to
information. The public disclosure of all information pertaining to any policy, decision or activity for
which any local authority is responsible would be guaranteed. In particular, meetings of the local
government council and of council organs would, in principle, be open to the public.
1607Kazadi, E., Instability in the Great Lakes Region, Nairobi: CRIN, 1993, p. 13.
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The independent office of the Ombudsman is to be created to investigate allegations of partisanship
in the allocation of resources, maladministration and corruption.
3.9.3.3.2 A popular government
Secondly, the institutional limits to majority power implied by this new understanding should not be
seen as checks on Hutu aspirations or on their legitimate civil rights and liberties. They should rather
be seen as a check on the potential for any political group or party to act as if it were the sole
authentic representative of those aspirations. With the advent of free and fair elections based on
universal suffrage, Hutus should and will come to govern Rwanda; they constitute the bulk of the
sovereign electorate and will ultimately comprise the majority of office-holders. This is the
fundamental essence of popular self-government. But neither Hutus, nor Tutsis should be
conceptually seen, or actually allowed, to rule as a corporate identity. Even though majority rule is a
myth, parties and governments will (consciously or unconsciously) use this myth to pass themselves
off as the true oracle of the Voice of the People. Cloaked in the majoritarian mantle, they would
accrue unwarranted power in the absence of constitutional checks.
3.9.3.3.3 A constituent assembly
Demands for a constituent assembly to negotiate and frame the new Constitution have been
rationalised largely in majoritarian rhetoric. Such demands usually call for a national, unitary election
based on proportional representation.1608 The basic assumption is that such an election will produce
an assembly that is a true reflection of public opinion on a new Constitution. They are also based on
the assumption that this will be a more legitimate and fair process than an all-party conference
consisting of elites sent by contending groups and parties. Presumably elected delegates would
produce a truer picture of public opinion than the elite selected by contending groups.
Yet the problems of using elections to reflect public opinion outlined earlier mean there is no reason
to assume that an elected constituent assembly would truly reflect popular will. Nor is there reason to
assume that it would significantly enhance popular power in the making of the Constitution. In
addition, those voted into the assembly would still be elites; and they would probably be many of the
same ones who would sit around the bargaining table if they were sent as group representatives.
The only difference would be that their proportional numbers - and hence political strength - would
1608 See for example, RDR, Plateforme Idéologique du Rassemblement pour le Retour des Refugiés et la Démocratie au
Rwanda, Paris, 23 August 1998.
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be different. This reveals something about the nature of many of the demands for an elected
constituent assembly: they may be proposed as much as a means of increasing the constitutional
bargaining strength of some groups as to increase actual popular influence. They may be based as
much on calculations of political power as on (albeit misguided) principle.
Yet one might argue that even if constituent elections could not reveal popular will, they would at
least make people feel better and more efficacious about the system; that, in turn, would increase
the legitimacy of the negotiators and the final product of those negotiations. This is a legitimate
concern. Yet these goals could as easily be accomplished through other methods such as a post-
hoc national referendum on the proposed Constitution, or elections within each constituency of the
delegates sent to the all-party conference or of their negotiating platforms. In many respects,
accountability to one's own constituency is how many reformers legitimate the idea of a fully
sovereign interim government. Thus, if such means could legitimate a non-elected interim
government, they should be sufficient for the all-party conference.
Finally, a constituent assembly may pose a threat to the very real and legitimate need to limit
apparent majority influence discussed earlier. A constituent assembly elected on the premise of
majority rule and operating on the basis of majority rule in internal votes and resolutions would mean
that the numerical majority in the assembly would be entrusted with placing potential limits on
majority power and guaranteeing minority rights. There would be strong incentives within the
assembly to resist placing limits on itself.
The involvement of the international community is obvious in the establishment of a consistent
constituent assembly. Undoubtedly, the Namibian experience would, mutatis mutandis, provide great
incentives to find a solution.1609
The manner and degree of international involvement in making peace in Namibia, in providing clear
guidelines, in monitoring the actual transition and the first election, and in influencing the writing of
the Constitution, directly contributed to the successes achieved in 1989-90. Transition to peace and
independence was preceded by a long struggle and in 1976 the Security Council adopted Resolution
385 introducing the important new concept "that in order that the people of Namibia be enabled to
freely determine their own future, it is imperative that free elections under the supervision and control
of the United Nations be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity".
1609 For details about statehood in Namibia, see particularly Erasmus, G., The Constitution: Its Impact on Namibian
Statehood and Politics, Working paper, 1999.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
406
Security Council Resolution 435, which eventually became the basis for an elaborate international
plan for the solution of the Namibian problem, was adopted in 1978. It provided for, inter alia, the
establishment of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) "to ensure the early independence of
Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations". It
took several more years of negotiations and confidence building before this resolution was
eventually implemented in 1989.1610
The elections for the Constituent Assembly and the drafting of the Namibian Constitution became
part of the international settlement plan. It is important to realise that the international plan gained an
important element when it was decided to determine the basic content of Namibia's Constitution in
advance.1611 Constitution-making became part of an international peace-making operation. This
happened through the adoption in the Security Council of another important document in July 1982,
namely the "Principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an independent
Namibia". This document introduced two sets of important conditions: the rules and procedures for
the election, under UN supervision, of the Constituent Assembly; and several Constitutional
Principles determining the content of the Constitution and the nature of the future political
dispensation in Namibia.1612
One of the most obvious explanations for the basic features of the Namibian Constitution and its
liberal-democratic values lies in the framework that the Constitutional Principles constituted and
1610 The withdrawal of Cuban soldiers, a condition on which South Africa insisted, removed a final hurdle. The
international political climate and the global picture also started to change dramatically with the cold war coming to an
end. This impacted quite directly on the regional security picture as viewed from Pretoria. For an excellent account of
the politics behind the scenes, see Robin Renwick Unconventional Diplomacy in Southern Africa Macmillan London
1997, p. 127-135. Renwick was the British ambassador in Pretoria during this period.
1611 Erasmus, The Constitution: Its Impact on Namibian Statehood and Politics, p. 3.
1612 The full text is to be found in Security Council Document S/15287 of 12 July 1982. The principles therein provided
for a unitary, sovereign and democratic State; a supreme and entrenched Constitution; parliamentary democracy,
separation of powers, judicial independence and constitutional review, regular and "genuine elections"; an electoral
system based on universal, adult franchise, a secret ballot, and proportional representation; an enforceable and
comprehensive bill of rights; the outlawing of retrospective criminal offences; a balanced public service, police and
defence service, and fair administration; and elected local and/or regional councils. With the implementation of these
principles a unique process unfolded and it meant that Namibians actually did not enjoy a completely free hand in writing
their own Constitution. For a discussion of the meaning and significance of these principles, see M Wiechers "Namibia:
The 1982 Constitutional Principles and their Legal Significance" in Namibia: Constitutional and International Legal Issues
Unisa 1991, p. 1-21. The Constituent Assembly, consisting of 72 members, was elected at the end of 1989. It now had
to draft and adopt, with a two-thirds majority, the Constitution. No single party gained this majority. SWAPO had 41
members, the DTA 21, the UDF with 4, the ANC with 3 and the NPF, FCN and NNF with one member each. What
followed was a remarkable process of compromise and reconciliation. This process has been described in several
publications (see inter alia Van Wyk, Schmidt-Jortzig, Wiechers, Szasz 44 and Erasmus, "Die Grondwet van Namibië"
Stellenbosch Law Review Vo13, 1990277) and the outcome was a document which was accepted as fully reflecting the
previously adopted Constitutional Principles.
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which could not be deviated from. Namibia had to become independent in terms of a pre-ordained
international scheme. This was not a typical decolonisation process with a departing colonial power
emancipating its colony, often in haste and without sufficient preparation. The arrival of
independence was a joyous occasion, but also reflected pragmatism. It was nationhood through a
"strong Constitution", delivered under international surveillance, without one dominant player
completely controlling the process, and without military conquest.1613
There is no reason to fear that the liberal-democratic values of the Constitution would be foreign to
Rwandans and that the Constitution would not last because of the great influence of foreign powers
in the process. It is true that the blueprint of Constitutional Principles in Namibia had originally been
drafted by the "Western Contact Group" consisting of Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain and
the USA. The Namibian parties did, however, accept these principles as the framework for gaining
their independence. During the 15 years of the UN mission in Rwanda, democracy would not arrive
as a sudden and unexpected development. The parties' own ideas would be refined over time. This
can happen in both the internal and exile groupS.1614Besides, refugees can return home and play
politics there since security would be guaranteed after Tutsi and Hutu armies are disarmed. One of
the effects of the UN Mission during the 15 years would be the change of political conditions and the
general atmosphere. This would result in the disappearance of oppressive stratagems and would
contribute to new initiatives and progress. Therefore, the Constitutional Principles will not be a
sudden and completely foreign implant as the subsequent Rwandan leaders are to be associated to
their elaboration, thoroughly debate and understand them in order to write them into their
Constitution.
The most important contribution of the constitutional principles would probably be their legitimating
effect on the compromises to be reached by opponents and the face-saving that this would allow. In
Namibia, the international community had always been called upon by SWAPO and other
movements to bring about change. The same has been done by the Rwandan newly born opposition
groups such as the RDR, FRO, and UNAR. Once the international community responds to the call
and establishes the UN mission and the Constitutional Principles are part of the deal, it would be
1613 The actual transition was quite peaceful. Once the crisis caused by the SWAPO invasion of 1 April 1989 was
defused all parties respected the international monitoring. Some incidents of assassination and reactionary terror
happened early on but ceased soon.
1614 VanWyk, "The Making of the NamibianConstitution: lessons for Africa" 1991 CILSA Vol. XXIV 342.
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quite difficult to reject them as being too accommodating or "liberal". These Principles would be "part
and pared of the reconstruction deal".1615
As has been the case in Namibia, the Constitutional Principles should not be viewed as only
focussing on the content of a constitutional document. They should be the pinnacle of a larger
process, backed up by international machinery of considerable resolve and commitment. The
process should aim, inter alia, at bringing lasting peace, democracy, human rights and the rule of law
to Rwanda. These principles also would provide some comfort to the smaller parties because they
would create a system of limited government. A future under the rule of a given political party thus
would become less uncertain as far as they are concerned. The fears about a repetition of another
African failure would at least be formally addressed.v"
3.9.3.3.4 The electoral system
As free and fair elections have never taken place in Rwanda, this new understanding of democracy
would also allow Rwandans to rethink the function of elections. As noted previously, majorities
cannot logically rule as a corporate body. Officials may govern by the good grace of the electorate,
but they do not represent any popular or majority will. Publius' view of elections offers an appropriate
solution. Elections should be designed as a way to control officials and guard against their tyrannical
behaviour, not as a method to reveal or measure policy preferences.w" Thus, rather than allowing a
victorious party to rule on the basis of a mythical electoral "mandate" and itself pick the date at which
it will next stand for election, officials should have fixed terms and be subjected to frequent elections.
If the next election is the relevant horizon for leaders, that horizon needs to be visible.
Furthermore, the tradition of disciplined parties offering supposedly distinct and internally consistent
policy platforms to the electorate also rests on the myth of the electoral mandate. But the main
function of a new electoral system would shift towards one of controlling the individuals who make
and execute public policy and away from creating the bases for a party to reflect and articulate
popular will. Hence, a new electoral system should investigate ways to create more freedom for
candidates to forward their own ideas and stand on their own accomplishments and integrity, and be
less bound by rigid party doctrine.
1615 For a comparative approach, see Erasmus, The Constitution: Its Impact on Namibian Statehood and Politics, p. 5.
1616 Compare to Mudge, in Weiland and Braham (eds) The Namibian Peace Process: Implications and Lessons for the
Future, Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, Freiburg, 1992, p. 166.
1617 Riker, Cho 10.
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And as the function of elections might be re-conceptualised, the apparent legitimacy granted to
certain groups by the grassroots consultation process would also need to be reassessed. While this
appears to be a healthy component of a democratic system, consultation should be recognised for
what it is: the approval of activist minorities, especially Tutsis, and not the blessings of "the people"
at large. This means, inter alia, that the president-far-life syndrome that has characterized the
country is correctly perceived to be incompatible with democratic practice. Democracy in Rwanda will
benefit from turn-over in presidential tenure to demonstrate that this position in particular is not
established for particular individuals, as Rwandan leaders in the one-party ethnically-based State
believed. Also, laws should be enacted providing for benefits for former heads of State. Thus, the
incumbent has the assurance that he will not become economically desperate.
3.9.3.3.5 Preventing tyranny and safeguarding rights
Such an understanding of democracy would also prevent a government from acting as if there were
no real differences of interest and opinion among Hutus (as well as among Tutsis). One of the great
tragedies of both the MRND and the RPF has been that they forced the people to ignore or explain
away any differences of taste or political preference that exist among them. They assumed that the
recognition of any difference was a betrayal of 'national unity'.
Recognition of these differences would, in turn, entail an unqualified right of political association and
freedom of speech in order to allow the proliferation and multiplication of groups to represent any
natural interests or groupings of opinion and preference which may exist. Yet this does not mean
that Tutsis should be granted special protection as an ethnic group. However, the Constitution would
have to create incentives for them to form and protect vital interests.1618 This means multiple points
of access to government (especially the legislature) to influence public policy; it means recourse to
the courts to prevent infringement of fundamental rights.1619
1618 The Hutu government has not been noted for its protection of minority political views, and the RPF has proved
committed to stratagems aimed at limiting opposition of rival groups and parties.
1619 The power sharing formula suggested in the Arusha Peace Accord cannot work and coalition government in Rwanda
indeed does not have a good record. It has been a tried and failed plan that has ended in genocide, self-proclaimed
government, and destabilisation of the population. As seen, it was introduced in the early 1990s owing to internationally
sponsored negotiations (Arusha 1992-3. See Chapter two, section I) and because 'democratization' was one of the key
terms of international aid. Part of the reason for the failure is that there is so little power and resources to share. There
must be something to distribute and an ability to create a viable middle class and this is missing in Rwanda. The country
has the highest percentage of disturbed, overpopulated land in Africa. Discounting uninhabitable areas like parks and
lakes, the population density within Rwanda exceeds 400 persons per square kilometre. UN, United Nations and
Rwanda, 1993-1996, Document 20, at 209. In recent times, the country has been numbered among the poorest ten
countries in the world. Griggs, R., The Great Lakes Conflict: Strategies for Building long-term Peace, Center for World
Indigenous Studies 4 World Atlas, 1997. Today, it relies almost entirely on international aid for sustenance and the per
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Such a conception would also require checks against factional tyranny. Like any other country,
Rwanda is chock-full of factions. To take two recent examples: the UNAR's proposals for a new
Constitution and an interim government epitomise the unabashed intention to hold on to power at all
costs, even if that brings about hobbled, ineffective government; and the Alliance pour la Libération
du Rwanda (ALlR)'s rhetoric on Hutu exclusion threatens to launch a war and wreck the national
economy and reflects a desire to obtain political power at all costs without regard for the larger
consequences of that path to power.
The goal would be to prevent any faction (regardless of its apparent minority or majority status) from
pursuing policies inimicable to the interest of the entire country.
It is a fact that governments have been burying their heads in the sand, negating the existence of
diversity as a weapon to monopolise all the levers of power mostly on ethnic and regional bases.
However, it should be agreed that forcing a problem to the back of the mind is not solving it and
Rwandans must address the diversity problem. What happened in neighbouring Burundi should
serve as an example of problems arising out of "free and democratic" elections in a country where a
tiny minority is over-represented in the army, the security services and the administration. As long as
the minority unfairly dominates everywhere, the elected President from the overwhelming majority is
capita income average is less than $US100. Id. This situation leads to competition for limited resources. Of course,
demagogues find this quite convenient as an escalator to power. Demagogues have consistently mobilised masses in
one ethnic group against the other through the promise of gaining land. In 1994, some Hutus massacred Tutsis in an
attempt to reclaim land, and after the genocide, Tutsis claimed houses, farms, plots, and property of nearly three million
Hutus expelled by the RPA. Since the Tutsis and Hutus compete for control of State and scarce resources, there exists
a dangerous win/lose situation where the loser always seeks retribution. Since independence this cycle of violence has
escalated to the degree that a number of Hutus accept a philosophy of genocide. In their minds, the Tutsis are still
represented as 'immigrants' or 'Ethiopians' who enslaved them, took their land and killed them without justification.
Mahmood Mamdani, "When Does a Settler Become a Native", Inaugural Lecture, University of Cape Town, May, 1998.;
Griggs, The Great Lakes Conflict, 1997. The basic tenet of this philosophy is that by killing every member of every Tutsi
generation, the Hutus will regain the land they lost in the sixteenth century Tutsi invasion. This is why there has been no
distinction between civilians and soldiers in war and a 'strike first' policy. Tutsis engage more often in selective
massacres. Perhaps this is owing to the hopelessness of eliminating about 90% of the population and the Tutsi social
need for Hutus to serve them. The selectively exterminated Hutus are generally the leaders, the better educated, and
the elite. The youths up to the age of 35 years are also often targeted because they are likely to be enrolled in a
rebellion. We have seen that the Tutsis today occupy the urban areas, own most businesses, and dominate the
government, justice system, security forces, and army. The Hutus have had few economic alternatives other than
subsistence farming, labouring on plantations run by the Tutsis - just like in the pre-independence era, or fighting their
way back to power. For some, this means genocide. This has been the reason alleged by Rwanda to invade the
Congolese territory in order "to defend Rwanda against the génocidaires of the former army and interahamwe militia".
Under these conditions there is little or no hope of maintaining coalition government for long. Any power sharing must be
coupled with strong commitments from outside countries to help assist in both economic development and to help restore
balance within civil society, government, and the armed forces. Otherwise, power-sharing arrangements present a false
hope.
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likely to be assassinated, which is likely to lead to gross human rights abuses amounting to
genocide.
Frequent elections with universal suffrage would prevent the sort of minority tyranny that has
characterised Rwanda before independence and after the genocide and of the majority tyranny that
resulted in the genocide. Strong government action to enforce civil rights and prevent discrimination
would prevent the continuation of tyranny within the Rwandan society.
Yet what if a government, elected through free and fair elections, decided to act only in the particular
interests of one particular group? Pub/ius's understanding of democracy would entail a government
so devised as to make it extremely difficult for one faction to dominate all parts of the State. This
could mean, at least, a firm separation of powers among different spheres of government. But it
would also entail the creation of more than one source of legislation with independent and
overlapping constituencies, as well as the sequentially staggered elections of various parts of
government. This would force any punitive majority faction to prevail across so many areas and over
so many elections that it would have to make coalitions, thereby broadening its view towards the
common interest, if they wished to control government.
3.9.3.3.6 Defending public interests
Obviously, pursuing the status quo is not an option for a new Rwandan government. The conception
of democracy advocated here would entail devising ways to force groups to look towards the national
interest. Yet, in contrast to consociational models, it would also require the creation of a government
strong enough and effective enough to do so. A new government will have to move quickly and
wisely if it is to reverse reigning ethnic discrimination, bring an end to factional violence and address
the widespread poverty which threatens to ruin any shared future the country might have. This
emphasis on energy and dispatch would mean that the government must have a unitary executive.
Yet all branches of the national government (executive, legislative and judiciary) would need to
possess strong powers to address the pressing social ills. It would have to be able to stop and
reverse existing patterns of ethnic discrimination in education and other areas. And it would have to
be able to raise sufficient revenue to pay for some social services.
Beyond these general principles, any specific institutional arrangements have to be relevant to the
Rwandan context. It is the larger understanding of democracy that underpins the American
Constitution that may offer general solutions to several potential problems confronting a new
Rwandan Constitution.
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Some might argue that such an understanding of democracy is inappropriate to either of the
contending visions of Rwandan society. As Compton has recently written, if Rwanda is a deeply
divided society based on ethnic cleavages, a new Constitution must provide Tutsis and other
minorities with "effective representation at all levels of government" and check Hutus' attempt to
impose their identity on others.162oHowever, what if the new Rwanda is a "normal, nearly
homogeneous society", as the Rassemblement pour Ie Retour des Réfugiés et la Démocratie au
Rwanda believes?1621As Karenga asks, in a Rwanda "deemed to be a regular society suited to a
normal form of majority rule, how can the MOR accept a Constitution in which the minority parties are
protected through numerous checks and balances?"1622
The understanding of democracy advocated in this dissertation is necessary, regardless of whether a
society is "nearly homogeneous" or "deeply divided". If Publius's understanding of human nature is
correct, societies do not have to be fundamentally divided along ethnic lines in order to require
checks on the human capacity for tyranny. On the other hand, this philosophy of democracy is
appropriate in a deeply divided society like Rwanda because it would prevent any group from
imposing its identity on others. But, more importantly, the policy to be adopted would have to shift
away from a primarily strategic bias to a fully developed human rights priority. What is involved is not
a token gesture but a genuine breaking of new ground. A settlement is not possible unless it
simultaneously recognises the interests and rights of the parties involved while moving them all to a
new relationship. This new relationship must create the prospect for fulfilment of the aspirations of
the majority, while protecting the rights and interest of the minorities.1623 In this regard, this
philosophy of democracy does not mean the protection of Tutsis by giving them ethnically defined
legal status; this would only exacerbate and perpetuate the existing divisions in society. Rather, it
would offer protection through individual rights (especially the unqualified rights of political
association and speech) and by offering all groups multiple points of access to government. This
would facilitate the natural development of a multiplicity of interests and sects that would come to
compete with and eventually damp down ethnic cleavages. Indeed, to some extent, it is the lack of
1620 Compton, S., 'Can Democracy Bring Peace to Rwanda?', Rwandanet, 29 Oct. 1999.
1621 RDR, Plateforme Idéologique du Rassemblement pour le Retour des Réfugiés et la Démocratie au Rwanda, Paris,
23 August 1998.
1622 Karenga, M., Hutus and Tutsis Peuvent Vivre Ensemble, Interview on Channel Africa, 10 April 1997. Author's
translation.
1623 Welch and Meizter affirm that "the basic principles derived from a human rights strategy are: (1) majority rule with
constitutional protection for minorities; (2) economic justice and development for all; and (3) strategic self-reliance".
Welch, C.L and Meltzer, R.I., Human Rights and Development in Africa, New York: State University of New York Press,
1984, p. 252-3.
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such protection that has led to authoritarian repression. The difficulty has been how to guarantee
these in the face of majority tendencies to override them. That is why the ombudsman should be
created with the power of, infer alia, arbitration in case of dispute.
3.9.3.3.7 A liberal society and equal chances in the management of resources
A new understanding of democracy would result in the balanced development of a liberal society
guaranteeing equality of chances in the management of resources. As already seen, poverty and
under-development are incompatible with democracy, human rights and the rule of law. In some
aspects the war which devastated Rwanda in 1990 and its related massacres by the former army,
the RPF and the militia can be seen as a Malthusian phenomena of adaptation of the population-
resources balance in a limited geographic area. Many people lost their lives because of their
properties. The appropriation of movables and real estate of the dead and refugees by dignitaries of
the government and army officers can prove that phenomena.
Democratization of mechanisms of access to resources, and fighting against the monopoly by some
(ethnic group, region, religion, etc.) of the mechanisms of social distribution -of wealth is an essential
factor to prevent that the struggle for political power (normal in every society) degenerates into
bloody conflict. This suggests that, in order to assure social peace and public security, it is important
to conceive and establish a political and economic system allowing rapid development of the private
sector and civil society. The government should playa minor role as employer. The majority of
people would live and fulfil themselves away from the government and its dependencies. Free NGOs
and a strong civil society would flourish.
The result would be that the struggle for the control of the State and, thus, of economic resources,
would be civilised and people will cease to resort to violence and war. In any case, legal and
institutional mechanisms would be set up to avoid that cupid individuals or groups monopolise the
national economy.
In the final analysis, such an understanding of democracy corresponds well with logic as well as with
our experience of human nature. It may provide Rwanda with benefits such as a way to curb
factional tyranny and construct a government that would advance the national interest. But most
importantly, recent developments have reflected an awareness of the necessity to curb majority rule.
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Publius's philosophy of democracy offers a legitimate basis on which to locate such arguments.
Significantly, it also offers a resolution to the potential tensions between majoritarianism and non-
ethnicism within the Rwandan context.
Government is always conducted by elites and we only fool ourselves at our own risk by thinking that
public masses can rule through these elites. The essence of popular self-government in Rwanda
should be to control elites while safeguarding human dignity and freedom regardless of peoples'
ethnic group or belief. That is the only kind of democracy that will get Rwanda out of the impasse.
3.9.3.3.8 The ombudsman institution
The institution of the Ombudsman was first established in Sweden in 1809 and was adopted by
Denmark in 1954. However, since that time it has been adopted by many other countries such as
New Zealand, Canada, Norway, Australia, Britain, Guyana, Mauritius, India, Malaysia, Ireland,
Switzerland and the United States of America. The first country to adopt it in Africa was Tanzania in
1966,1624 followed by Ghana (1969 and 1980)1625 and Zambia in 1973.1626 Such an institution has
never been established in Great Lakes countries in general and in Rwanda in particular.
The function of the Ombudsman is to protect the individual citizen against maladministration or
against administrative partiality, favouritism, or unfair and unjustified decisions that frequently arise
from the business of administration. Chomba has described the purpose of the Ombudsman as
follows:
... in so far as the Commission will have a duty to see that the bureaucracy does not act arbitrarily
to the detriment of the citizen, it can be said to have been established for the protection of human
rights. In the process of protecting such rights it will simultaneously promote the rule of law.
Moreover, since in its remedy-seeking role on behalf of the common man the Commission will
contribute to good government and as good government is a sine qua non in the advancement of
democracy, by having a right to make complaints against public officials, the common man will
thereby participate immediately in the system of government.1627
It would be very helpful if Rwanda had the Ombudsman under any appellation. Like in many different
systems, it should be composed of four members: an Investigator-General (who would be the
Chairman) and three persons schooled and experienced respectively in law, investigative technique,
1624 It was called the Permanent Commission of Inquiry. Dlamini, Human Rights in Africa, at 42.
1625 Zimba, The Zambian bill of rights, at 220.
1626 It was called the Commission of Investigations. See the Zambian One-Party Constitution, part IX.
1627 Chomba, F.M., An Explanation of the Functions of the Commission of Investigations, 1974, p. 8.
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and criminology and corrections.1628 To make the Ombudsman institution more accessible to all
people even in the rural areas and small towns, there should be one representative in each
'commune' with office at the 'bureau communal'. His mandate would be to register complaints and to
present them to the Investigator-General for investigation or follow-up. This would avoid the
confinement of the Ombudsman's operations to the major urban areas only and complainants who
do not live in these areas would not have to travel long distances at great cost and inconvenience to
present their cases to the Ombudsman.
The Investigator-General should have the qualifications of a Court of Appeal Judge and enjoy the
same tenure as a Court of Appeal Judge. Him and his staff would be chosen by the parliament after
each general election, to serve for the period until the next election, unless removed earlier by
vote.1629 Their salary should be fixed by Parliament.
The category of persons who may be investigated for abuse of power or office should be very wide.
As is the case in Tanzania1630 or in France1631, it should be possible to investigate the conduct of any
person in the service of the Republic of Rwanda (Le. all departments of the central government, all
local authority functions, corporate bodies established by statute and public authorities or boards)
who makes decisions influenced by improper motives, who is influenced by irrelevant considerations,
who causes unnecessary or unexplained delays, or who makes obviously wrong decisions. It is
important that the Ombudsman be empowered to challenge any legislation that may violate human
rights or to challenge any action of the President that violates human rights. The Ombudsman's role
should extend to investigating torture, killing, arbitrary detention or violations of other civil and
political rights. As shown, a good number of the human rights violations that have occurred in
Rwanda have either been perpetrated by Presidents themselves and their close collaborators, or
have been encouraged or tolerated by them.
1628 See for example art. 90 of the Constitution of Zambia Act 1991; for the New Zealand example Weeks, M.,
Ombudsmen Around the World: A Comparative Chart, 1973, p. 62-63; see also Fitzharris, T.L., The Desirability of a
Correctional Ombudsman, 1973, p. 48.
1629 Gellhorn, W. ,Ombudsmen and Others, 1967, p. 158.
1630 Weeks, K.M. , Ombudsmen Around the World: A Comparative Chart, California: Institute of Governmental Studies,
1973, at 74.
1631 The French law is even more explicit for it provides that the 'Médiateur' can investigate complaints about Uie
fonctionnement des administrations de I'Etat, des collectivités pub/iques territoria/es, des établissements publics et de
tout autre organisme investi d'une mission de service pub/ic'. Article 1 of the Loi No. 73-6 of January 1973 instituting a
'Médiateur'.
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The Ombudsman should initiate an investigation at the instance of an aggrieved individual or on his
own initiative. In order to make the Ombudsman's institution accessible to the ordinary person, its
procedures should be as simple and as informal as possible. Lawyers should not participate in the
deliberations and the rules of evidence should be extremely liberal. Thus, ordinary people can invoke
the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman at minimum expense and without being intimidated by
technicalities, as is the case in proceedings before the ordinary courts.
The Rwandan courts, as a branch of public administration, should be subject to examination and
criticism. Therefore, the Ombudsman should have power over them and, unlike in the American
system where judges' independence is equated with their being unsupervised except by other
judges;1632he should look at what judges have been doing. In this regard, however, the Ombudsman
should not be concerned with the content of courts decisions (which, in any event, he cannot revise
in any way), but only with the question of whether a judge has been acting illegally by, for example,
denying justice, delaying a trial, or accepting bribes. It is the author's contention that since illegality
concerns any citizen and, a fortiori, any office bearer, consideration of the judge's decisions should
be an inescapable necessity. This assertion is supported by the Swedish example where an
appellate judge was found guilty of having accepted compensation to help a lawyer prepare
documents for use in litigation; the judge was not himself related to the litigation and no corruption of
justice entered into the case, but the defendant was simply accused of improper behaviour in acting
as a lawyer's assistant. The Supreme Court, before which his trial occurred, convicted him and
imposed a heavy fine. At about the same time, three trial court judges were successfully prosecuted
because they had heard and decided a forfeiture case without first giving an interested person the
prescribed formal notice; the judges had thought that formalities could be waived because the
interested person's legal representative was actually present in the court when the case came before
the court. In this instance, by contrast with the example previously discussed, the Ombudsman was
acting as a critic of judicial work rather than of a judge's personal behaviour.1633
1632 Weeks, K.M., Ombudsmen Around the World, at 39; Gellhorn, W., Ombudsmen and Others, at 237.
1633 The judges' decision on the merits of the forfeiture case, incidentally, was affirmed on appeal. Moreover, the person
from whom the required notice had been withheld did not recover the property in controversy, nor were any damages
awarded in the proceedings against the judges. The judges were, however, fined approximately half a month's salary.
One of them used to become almost explosively red in the face when discussing the matter. He thought, moreover, that
his work in the community was made more difficult for a time by reason of his having been convicted as a malefactor,
though the difficulty was not long-lived because, as he said, the public had no choice in the matter. He also thought that
press publicity about complaints to the Ombudsman against a judge tend to be harmful to judicial administration even
after the judge has been exonerated, because the newspapers, he said, "blow up the charges out of all proportion."
Despite all this, he characterised the Ombudsman as "really very pleasant fellow" and regarded his work as "highly
useful". Gellhorn, Ombudsmen and Others, at 238.
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Furthermore, since, as seen in Chapter two, human rights and the rule of law apply to all without
distinction, the Ombudsman should watch against abusive treatment of military personnel. He should
have jurisdiction over matters directly involving relationships within the armed forces. This should
include disagreements between inferior and superior ranks and his power should consist in criticising
and suggesting.
As can be gathered from the discussion above, the Ombudsman can consider, not only whether a
public authority has acted in a systematically obstructing or hasty manner, but also whether it has
acted without due equity or humanity. In this regard the role of the Ombudsman is to be clearly
distinguished from that of the Conseil d'Etat which is concerned with the legality of action taken by
public authorities. It can rule not only that there has been use of power beyond legal authority1634, but
also abuse of power by a government department or agency.1635 Nevertheless, the Ombudsman can
go further than the Conseil d'Etat and can complement its role by saying that, although a public
authority has not acted illegally, it has not acted fairly or with proper humanity. One example, from
the French Médiateur, even though a very minor one, can illustrate this difference: in his Annual
Report for 1973, the French Médiateur described a case in which a citizen complained to him that he
was being required to pay charges for the supply of water for a house in which he was not living. The
authority had replied that the charges must be paid because the complainant had not informed them
that he had vacated the house. The complainant had no case in law, but the Médiateur argued that it
was not reasonable to require payment of the charges since the authority did not dispute the fact that
the house had been standing empty during the period in question.1636
The Ombudsman's wide frame of reference should appropriately be matched by power to
recommend improvements in administration and legislation. In case the Ombudsman should find a
complaint justified, he should not only recommend redress for the individual complainant but also
suggest ways in which the administration of the service concerned should be improved. He should
also propose changes in legislation where he finds that the law is working inequitably.
If, having made his recommendations following an investigation, the Ombudsman would not receive
a satisfactory reply from the public authority concerned, he should, as is the case in the French
system, publicise his recommendations in a special report which he should send to the Parliament.
1634 This is the 'exces de pouvoir' in the Loi of 23 February 1963, as modified, instituting the d'Etat.
1635 This is the 'détournement de pouvoir' in Rwandan law.
1636 See Stacey, F. , Ombudsmen Compared, 1978, p. 97, citing the Rapport Annuel du Médiateur, Paris, 1973.
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He should also have another sanction if the authority concerned is not willing to act on his
recommendations. He should invoke a disciplinary procedure against the official concerned or take
judicial action against him.1637
In any case greater publicity should be secured for the office of the Ombudsman through a
systematic campaign. This campaign should be conducted under four principal forms. First, the
Ombudsman should establish and maintain links with the national and regional press and with radio
and television. He should take part in several radio and television programmes in order to get his
office known as widely as possible. Second, he should make a series of visits to different regional
centres where he could meet prefects, burgomasters, parliamentarians, chairpersons of chambers of
commerce, industry and agriculture, bodies concerned with regional development, representatives of
trade unions and voluntary associations, students and the press. Considering the smallness of the
Rwandan territory and the facilities to reach every corner of the country, it is certain that almost every
citizen would be reached and the Ombudsman should be concerned in all these meetings to give
information about the scope and working of his office, and to acquire information about the impact he
would or would not be making in different sectors. Third, he should commission opinion polls to try to
find out how widely known he is and how he could best increase public knowledge of his work.
Fourth, his office should produce annual reports that should be given wide circulation. The
combination of these four forms would reduce the possible gap between the public perception of the
Ombudsman and the potentialities of his office.1638
It follows from the above discussion that the Ombudsman would playa useful role in alleviating the
suffering of a number of individuals. The author, however, submits that the Ombudsman cannot be a
viable alternative to the bill of rights in view of the various problems discussed above.
3.9.3.3.9 Directive principles of State policy
Directive Principles of State Policy are found in a number of constitutions of some countries like India
and Nigeria. Directive Principles stipulate certain economic and social goals to be pursued by the
State, and impose certain obligations on the State to take positive action in certain directions in order
to promote the welfare of the people and achieve economic democracy.
1637 Articles 9,10, and 14 of the 1973 French Act.
1638 Stacey, Ombudsmen Compared, at 101-102.
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The incorporation of Directive Principles in the Constitution arises from a recognition that the duties
of a modern State are no longer confined to the maintenance of law and order, but extend to the
promotion of prosperity and wellbeing of its people. Directive Principles do not only have an
educative value but they also serve as a restraint on the government which, in exercising its power,
has to take them into account. Failure to abide by the Directive Principles may cost the government
the next elections.1639
Directive Principles are non-justiciable because, while the judicially-enforceable bill of rights imposes
negative obligations on the State, Le., what it should not do, the directive principles of State policy
impose positive obligations on the State, i.e., what it should do, and for such type of actions, the
State faces all kinds of practical constraints, the most critical of which is the issue of resource
mobilisation.
The Indian Example: In the Indian Constitution the principles have been drafted in flexible and
general language, thereby leaving enough scope for the government to from time to time frame its
policies in accordance with its own thinking and prevailing circumstances to achieve the results and
ideals stipulated in the Directive Principles.164o Although the principles do not designate any
particular form of economic or social order, they lay down the goals which the society has set for
itself. In enacting the Directive Principles the framers of the Indian Constitution sought to give some
guidance to the future legislature and the executive vis-a-vis the manner in which they should
exercise their power. 1641
The Directive Principles in the Indian Constitution, unlike the bill of rights, do not create justiciable
rights in favour of individuals and, therefore, cannot be enforced by the courts. Since the principles
1639Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, Bombay, 1962, p. 669.
164°These principles are contained in Art. 38-51 of the Indian Constitution (1949). Art. 38 directs the State "to strive to
promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may asocial order in which justice,
social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life". Under Art. 39 the State is required, in
particular, to direct its policy towards securing (a) that all citizens irrespective of sex, equally have the right to an
adequate means of livelihood; (b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so
distributed as best to serve the common good; (c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the
concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment; (d) that there is equal pay for equal work for
both men and women; (e) that the health and strength of workers, men and women, and children of tender age are not
abused and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter vocations unsuited to their age or strength; (D
that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment. Other
principles require the State: to make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public
assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, etc. (Art. 41); to endeavour to provide free and
compulsory education for all children until the age of 14 (Art. 45); to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living
of its people and to improve public health (Art. 47); and to take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the
public services of the State (Art. 50), etc.
1641ld., at 669 & 670. The Directive Principles are modelled on those of the Irish Constitution (Id., at 3).
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are merely directory in scope and operation the legislature may enact legislation that is inconsistent
with them.1642 Moreover, a directive principle cannot override a fundamental right and the latter takes
precedence in the event of a conflict between them.1643
Although the principles are not justiciable they have nonetheless served as an aid to the
interpretation of the bill of rights. As Jain notes,
Without making the Directive Principles justiciable, courts do not seek to implement the values
contained in these principles to the extent possible. Accordingly, the Directive Principles have
been regarded as a ready and dependable index of what a public purpose is intended to be.
Though the term public purpose is not synonymous with the Directive Principles, yet where the
purpose of any restriction is identical with any of these principles, the court considers the law
containing such restrictions as having been passed for a public purpose ... The Directive
Principles are also regarded as relevant for considering what are reasonable restrictions under
Art 19. A restriction, which promotes any of the objectives of the Directive Principles, may be
regarded by the courts as reasonable.1644
It would be helpful if Rwanda incorporated Directive Principles along the Indian model in her
Constitution. Apart from guiding the government in its formulation of economic and social policy, they
would be invaluable as regards interpretation of the bill of rights. As Chapter two has shown, most of
the fundamental rights and freedoms are subject to numerous restrictions, many of which involve the
protection of public interest. To ascertain what constitutes public interest, for example, the courts
could refer to the Directive Principles for guidance.
Moreover, the incorporation of Directive Principles in the Rwandan Constitution would be a good way
of incorporating the economic, social and cultural rights enshrined in the United Nations Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, which Rwanda acceded to on February 12, 1975.1645
1642 Deep Chand v UP, AIR 1959 se 648,664.
1643 Madras v Champakam Dorairajan, AIR 1951 SC 226, 228. In this case the Supreme Court of India held that the
fundamental rights would be reduced to "a mere rope of sand" if they were to be overridden by the Directive Principles
and that Legislation made to implement Directive Principles should not take away or abridge the fundamental rights.
According to the court the Directive Principles have to conform, and run as subsidiary, to the fundamental rights.
However, the Indian Supreme Court In re Kerala Education Bill, AIR 1958 SC 956, stated that in determining the scope
and ambit of fundamental rights invoked by a litigant the court may not entirely ignore the Directive Principles but should
adopt the principle of harmonious construction and should endeavour to give effect to both as much as possible.
1644 Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, at. 671. He cites Bihar v Kameshwar, AIR 1952 SC 252; Suryapal Singh v UP, AIR
1951 All. 671, 684; and Buddhu v Municipal Board, AIR 1952 All. 753, in support. Art. 19 guarantees to every citizen the
right to move freely throughout India, and to reside and settle in any part of India. But the State may impose reasonable
restrictions on these rights by law in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any
Scheduled Tribe (Art. 19(5)).
1645 J.O., 1975, p. 230; Human Rights Law Journal, vol 19, No. 2-4.
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This is because many of the Directive Principles of State Policy in the Indian Constitution are similar
to the rights in the aforementioned United Nations Covenant.
As can be gathered from the discussion above, the Directive Principles of State Policy, being non-
justiciable, cannot be a viable or effective alternative to the bill of rights. Taken by themselves they
are incapable of protecting human rights, as they depend for their implementation on the ultimate
sanction of public opinion as expressed at the polls.
For this reason it is submitted here that, as in India, the Directive Principles should complement,
rather than replace the bill of rights which, despite its many weaknesses, limits government power
towards the individual. By directing the government to strive to promote economic development, and
to eliminate poverty, illiteracy, disease and ethnic rivalries, the Directive Principles would contribute
to the promotion and enforcement of human rights. It is these factors, among others, as seen in
Chapter two, which have had such an adverse impact on the protection of human rights in Rwanda.
3.9.4 Impact of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
The question for consideration here is: to what extent can the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights (also known as the Banjul Charter), of which Rwanda is a party, be used to
challenge human rights violations in States that have ratified it?
The African Charter has been hailed as a unique and amazing instrument among the systems of
human rights protection. Unlike the European and American Conventions which provide only for the
protection of the first generation rights, the African charter guarantees the protection of all the three
generations of rights. Apart from the civil and political rights otherwise known as the first generation
rights, the charter also guarantees the protection of economic, social and cultural rights, specifically
the right to work, health and education, which are generally known as the second-generation rights.
As regards enforcement, however, the African Charter is hopeless. The basic obligation of the State
parties to the Charter is spelled out in Article 1. It provides that they "shall recognise the rights, duties
and freedoms enshrined in this Charter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to
give effect to them". This obligation is complemented by Article 62, which requires State parties to
report biennially "on the legislative or other measures" they have "adopted to give effect to the rights
the Charter guarantees". In practice, there has been no concrete action to make the process
work1646, while the European Convention on Human Rights was supplemented by the European
1646 Although the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (see infra) sometimes reviews reports from States,
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Social Charter1647 and its Additional Protocol, which protect fundamental social and economic
rights.1648
In addition, the African Charter has provided guarantees regarding collective rights, as well. These
are group rights communities may claim against communities, States, the international community,
etc.1649 They include freedom from foreign domination, the right to development, the right to
international peace and security, the right to a generally satisfactory environment, etc. In
international law, these rights are known as the third generation rights. In the context of these
provisions, articles 2 to 14 of the Charter protects civil and political rights while Articles 15 to 17
guarantees education, work and health. Article 18 guarantees protection to the family in Africa as the
custodian of morals and traditional values. Collective rights are guaranteed in Articles 19 to 24.
Significantly, the Charter also enjoins the individual with duties such as the duties towards the family
and the State: duty to respect others; duty to accord respect and dignity to all without discrimination;
duty to respect the family and ensure its development, etc.
The civil and political rights which are guaranteed in Articles 2 to 14 and which should be protected
by State parties to the Charter are the same as those that usually attract protection under other
human rights instruments. These include the right to be different, Le. to speak a language different
from others, to be of a different colour, to be of a different sex, religion, ethnic group, etc; the right to
equality before the law; the right to life and the integrity of the person; freedom from slavery,
inhuman cruel or degrading punishment and treatment; the right to the security of the person;
freedom of conscience; the right to receive information and to express and disseminate information;
the right to association and the right to freedom of assembly; the right to freedom of movement and
the process is apparently not working well as yet (see "African Commission on Human and Peoples's Rights" 47 I.C.J.
Rev .. 51, 53 (1991) mostly since its main function is to "give its views or make recommendation to governments" (Art. 45
(1) (a).
1647 The European Social Charter is a treaty signed in Turin in 1961, which protects fundamental social and economic
rights. It guarantees these rights to the citizens of its contracting parties. During the 2nd Council of Europe summit
(Strasbourg, 10-11 October 1997), the heads of State and government of the member states made the commitment to
"promote social standards as embodied in the Social Charter and in other Council of Europe instruments" and called for
"the widest possible adherence to these instruments". For details, see Council of Europe, The Council of Europe's Social
Charter, Strasbourg, December 1997.
1648 The Charter and its Additional Protocol of 1988 guarantee a series of rights pertaining to the conditions of
employment and social cohesion. Council of Europe, The Council of Europe's Social Charter, Strasbourg, December
1997.
1649 For a comprehensive account of the development of a system of human rights protection in Africa, see Mbaye, M.
and Ndiaye, B., The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), in International Dimensions of Human Rights, Vasak, K. and
Alston, P., (eds) 1982.
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residence; the right not to be deported in a mass expulsion and the right of an individual to
participate freely in the government of his country.
These guarantees bind all members of the Organisation of African Unity and are to be implemented
from the date of effect of the African Charter on 21 October 1986. According to Article 1 of the
Charter, membership is open to all members of the OAU. This means that a member State of the
OAU is obliged to respect the Charter stipulations whereas, in contrast, membership to the European
Convention is dependent upon the country's commitment to democracy. The weakness of this clause
is that even undemocratic States that disrespect human rights are assured of membership of the
Charter, merely on account of their membership of the OAU. Admission to the OAU is not based on
the countries' respect for human rights or its democratic composition. As a result, countries that have
some of the most disastrous human rights records enjoy membership of the Charter on human and
peoples' rights.
Moreover, the Banjul Charter is significant because it marks a departure from previous OAU practice,
which had stressed the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member States as
enshrined in Article 3 of the OAU Charter. Prior to the creation of the Banjul Charter "that principle
had been used to prevent the OAU from dealing with situations within member States which
threatened or actually involved grave violations of human rights".165oFor example, the OAU did not
condemn the massive violations of human rights (which included the torture and execution of people
perceived to be a threat to the government) perpetrated by such infamous African dictators as Idi
Amin in Uganda, Macias Nguema in Equatorial Guinea, Bokassa of the Central African Republic,
Hastings Banda of Malawi, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaïre. Moreover, it has never questioned the self-
proclaimed RPF government and mass execution and abduction of Hutu inside Rwanda, in refugee
camps and elsewhere in Africa.
The Charter indicates that African leaders for the first time have acknowledged that human rights
violations are a matter of concern for the international community.1651
The Charter requires State parties to recognise the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in part 1
(Chapters 1 and 2), and to undertake to adopt legislation or other measures to give effect to
them.1652
1650 Hansungule, M., Regional Human Rights Law, lecture, University of Zambia, 1995.
1651 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, preamble.
1652 Id., art. 1.
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However, it is unlikely that the Charter will have a great impact on the protection of human rights in
Africa for a number of reasons.
First, many of the provisions of the Charter contain "clawback" clauses, which offer even less
protection than derogation clauses contained in other covenants and conventions. Derogation
clauses restrict a State's conduct by limiting the circumstances in which derogation may be
permitted. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, for example, permits derogation only "in time of war and other public emergency
threatening the life of the nation." Moreover, derogation clauses limit a State's conduct by defining
rights that are non-derogable and must be observed, even when derogation is permissible.
Therefore, the effect of derogation clauses is to carefully define the limits of State behaviour toward
its nationals during times of national emergency, when individual rights are most vulnerable.1653
Clawback clauses, unlike derogation clauses that allow the suspension of previously granted rights,
restrict rights ab initio.1654 Consequently they are often less precise than derogation clauses because
the restrictions they allow are almost totally discretionary. Under the African Charter the rights
granted may be limited by domestic law or the existence of a national emergency. It is apparent that
by virtue of these very ambiguous and limitlessly broad standards, clawback clauses do not provide
the external control over State behaviour that derogation clauses provide.1655 This is exemplified by
Article 6 of the Charter which provides that,
except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law, every individual shall have the
right to liberty and to the security of his person. No one may be deprived of his freedom.
Unfortunately, the Charter does not define these reasons and conditions. In this regard, it is actually
not in any way different from the Rwandan Constitution, especially in Articles 12 and 13 which
provide respectively for the liberty and security of the person "sauf dans les cas prévus par la 10i".1656
Thus, the State may conceivably violate its citizens' right to liberty and not be in violation of the
Charter, provided that it does it under the colours of the law. In contrast other regional human rights
conventions specify the minimum conditions that must be met by the State before it can deprive an
individual of his liberty. For example, although the first three clauses of Art. 7 of the American
Convention on Human Rights closely parallel Article 6 of the African Charter, the Article goes further
1653 Hansungule, Regional Human Rights Law, at 33.
1654 Ibid.
1655 For a detailed discussion of this subject, See Guitllemen, R., The Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: A
legal analysis in human rights and development, 1284, p. 157-159.
1656 Codes et Lois du Rwanda, Vol. I, at 24.
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by stipulating the following additional procedural safeguards for a detained person: that he be
informed of the reasons for his detention and promptly be notified of the charge or charges against
him; and that he be brought promptly before a judge and be tried within a reasonable time or be
released. Moreover, a detained person is entitled to have recourse to a competent court, in order
that the court may promptly decide on the lawfulness of his arrest or detention and order his release
if the arrest or detention is unlawful.
Article 5 of the European Convention provides that no individual shall be deprived of his liberty,
except in certain specified situations. It also provides the same procedural safeguards as those
contained in Article 7 of the American Convention. In addition, it grants anyone who has been
deprived of his liberty in violation of the article an enforceable right to compensation.
Thus, it is apparent that by providing comprehensive procedural safeguards vis-a-vis the right to
liberty, both the American and European Conventions aim at imposing external restraints upon
governmental behaviour. These restraints not only ensure that a country's laws conform to the
minimum standards stipulated by the convention but also ensure that governmental activity, if it
violates both national law and the convention, is reviewed in a forum more sympathetic to the victim
than the courts of the breaching State party.
In light of these safeguards it is needless to say that the African Charter is miserably inadequate with
regard to the right to liberty. Since that right is subject to national law, the Charter cannot supply
even a scintilla of external restraint upon a government's power to enact laws contrary to the spirit of
the rights granted.
Undoubtedly, the fact that the guarantees contained in the African Charter are subject to clawback
clauses means that the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Charter is
dependent on the ordinary enactment in domestic systems of member States which do not always
assure these rights. For example, freedom of association in Article 10 of the African Charter requires
that the individual, when enjoying his right to associate or assemble abides by the law, which, in
Rwandan context means the right conferred in Articles 19 and 20 of the Constitution on freedom of
association and assembly, which is itself subject to a clawback clause involving various exceptions.
Two of those exceptions include the requirement to obtain a permit under the Loi No. 33/911657
before people may assemble for a public meeting. Similarly, the right to association has been made
subject to the administrative powers of government bureaucrats to register the association, a
1657 J.O., 1991, p. 1132.
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statutory requirement under articles 2 and 3 of the Edit sur les associations sans but lucratif (1962).
Both the Loi No. 33/91 and the Edit are restrictive of the rights to associate and assemble. This pre-
empts the guarantees that may have been provided for in the Constitution or Charter.
The issue of the nation and nationalities in Africa has been manipulated in the context of multiparty
politics, so that in many countries, the democratization process has reinforced the concepts of ethnic
conflict in Africa. Shivji, in his critique of the African Charter, noted that, "taking into account the
notorious authoritarian practices of African states, it is clear that what is demanded of the African
people in the catalogue of duties is absolute allegiance to the existing State and the family - both of
which represent, politically and historically, retrogression. This retrogression is most evident in the
absence of the rights of African workers to organize independently of the State and State-supported
trade union centers".1658
The right to organize, or the freedom of association, is one of the most important contentions of
international human rights statutes. Even in the Western industrialized countries, the right of workers
to organize continues to be the site of the most intense social struggles. It was the struggles of the
workers in the Western industrialized countries which cemented the principal rights of trade unions,
which were incorporated in the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention on the Freedom
of Association and the Right to Organize.
Such rights, which were promulgated with respect to trade unions, were articulated in 1948 when
most of Africa was under colonial rule. Colonialism did not support the right of African workers and
peasants to organize. One of the primary impetuses behind the independence struggle in Africa was
the democratic right of African workers to organize in trade unions to demand better working
conditions, but we have seen that trade unions were hindered by the State in Rwanda.
Thirty years after independence, the standards of the ILO with respect to the rights of trade unions,
are hardly met in Africa. Even in the countries that reinforce multiparty democracy, the rights of
workers are daily being eroded by structural adjustment programmes. Up to the present, one of the
basic rights which are demanded by African workers is the freedom to form and join trade unions.
The African Charter does not provide for this right. In essence, when arguing for individual rights, the
African charter is so weak that it does not solve the question of collective rights for workers in
Rwanda.
1658 Sviji, I., The Concept of Human Rights in Africa, (Dakar: CODESRIA Books, 1989), p. 80.
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With reference to the silence in Africa with respect to the ILO conventions for workers' rights, there is
an even greater silence on the provisions of the ILO conventions and recommendations concerning
women workers. These conventions include the right to paid work; equal training and career
opportunities; equal pay; equal treatment; the right to share work and family responsibilities; the right
to maternity protection; and minimum wages.1659 One of the greatest abuses experienced by women
is sexual harassment.166o In some African languages, there is a code for coercing working women to
provide sexual favors for employers. In Rwanda, before the genocide, some employers, public and
private, had established what was commonly known as the "interview". This had nothing to do with
the usual interview, but was a stratagem to get the lady job-applicant to a secret place, or in some
cases, to the office after hours in order to have sex with her as a sine qua non to get the job.1661
Since the genocide, women, especially Hutus, are requested by some employers "to give the
'intsinzi'.1662 These women without clear protection in the domestic legal system, as is the case for
other minorities, are hopeless before the African Charter.
Second, some rights guaranteed by the international bill of human rights and the American and
European Conventions are not mentioned in the African Charter. Among the rights not guaranteed
by the African Charter are the right to privacy, the right to a nationality, the right to vote in periodic
and genuine elections, the right to form and join trade unions, the right to equal protection for all
children whether born in or out of wedlock, the right to marry with the full and free consent of the
intending spouses and the freedom to change one's religion. In connection with these two latter
rights, that is the right to marry with the free consent of the intending spouses and the freedom to
change one's religion, it is interesting to underline that Egypt, one of the four then independent
African States, voted in favour of the universal declaration of human rights but stipulated two
reservations concerning those rights in 1948. And again, in 1984, it ratified the African Charter with
almost the same kind of reservations.1663 However, Rwanda made no reservation.
Furthermore, unlike the American and European Conventions, the African Charter does not contain a
provision on capital punishment and does not provide for the right of a national not to be expelled, or
1659 International Labor Organization, ABC of Women Workers' Rights, A Practical Guide (Geneva: International Labor
Office, 1993).
1660 Taylor, J., and Stewart, S., Sexual and Domestic Violence: Help, Recovery and Action in Zimbabwe (Harare: Women
in Law in Southern Africa, 1991).
1661 Interview with two women, 10 February 1998.
1662 ld.
1663 Ouguergouz, F., La Charte Africaine des droits de I'homme et des peuples - Historique, portée juridique et
contribution á la protection des droits de I'homme en Afrique, Geneva: U.U.H.E.!., 1991, P. 311.
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the prohibition of forced labour.
Third, the Charter lacks effective enforcement machinery, as it does not provide for the
establishment of a Human Rights court. In contrast, a Human Rights court is created, both under the
American Convention and the European Convention. Article 45 of the African Charter establishes an
eleven-member African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights whose functions are:
(1) To promote Human and Peoples' Rights and in particular: (a) to collect documents, undertake
studies and researches on African problems in the field of human and peoples' rights, organise
seminars, symposia and conferences, disseminate information, encourage national and local
institutions concerned with human and peoples' rights, and should the case arise, give its views
or make recommendations to Governments; (b) to formulate and lay down, principles and rules
aimed at solving legal problems relating to human and peoples' rights and fundamental freedoms
upon which African governments may base their legislation; (c) co-operate with other African and
other international institutions concerned with the promotion and protection of human and
peoples' rights; (2) Ensure the protection of human and peoples' rights under conditions laid
down by the present Charter; (3) Interpret all the provisions of the present Charter at the request
of a State party, an institution of the OAU, or an African organisation recognised by the OAU; and
(4) Perform any other tasks which may be entrusted to it by the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government.
A State party to the Charter that has good reasons to believe that another State party has violated
the provisions of the Charter may, by written communication, bring that matter before that State or
before the Commission. In either case, the communication must be addressed to the OAU
Secretary-General, the Chairman of the Commission, and the accused State. The accused State is
given 3 months to respond to the enquiring State. If the parties fail to resolve the matter amicably,
either party may submit the matter to the commission and notify the other State of such action. The
commission will only deal with the matter after satisfying itself that all local remedies have been
exhausted.
Under Article 46 communications made by individuals or non-governmental organisations may be
considered by the commission provided that a simple majority of its members so decide and the
communications conform to certain criteria. However, such private communications can only be
considered if, after deliberation, the commission concludes that the communications pertain "to
special cases which reveal the existence of a series of serious or massive violations of human and
peoples' rights". In such cases the Commission cannot independently investigate them unless it first
secures a specific mandate from the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. This strongly
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suggests that the commission merely functions as a sub-committee of the Assembly with no
independent authority of its own.1664
The impotence of the Commission is further underscored by provisions regarding the results of its
investigations. Once the Commission has investigated a State-communicated matter and determined
that an amicable solution is impossible, it sends a report to the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government, stating the facts, and its findings. It may also make such recommendations as it deems
useful. The Commission cannot make its recommendations public without the prior approval of the
Assembly. Neither can it publish its report (regardless of the source of the communication) without
prior authorisation from the Assembly.
It is apparent that the effectiveness of the Commission is undermined by the provisions that shroud
its work in secrecy. Publicity is indispensable for exposing and checking human rights abuses.
ScobIe observes that,
... the persistence of official secrecy - the refusal of intergovernmental human rights agencies to
publicise the fact that they have taken official cognisance of well-documented violations - is one
of the governmental face-saving procedures that most human rights NGOs have sought to
banish, on the grounds that secrecy encourages the violators, delaying the ending of violations or
even more substantial internal political change. Furthermore, the potential impact of NGOs has
been described as "the mobilisation of shame", and this cannot be accomplished without the
widest publicity on violations and violators alike.1665
The heavy reliance on States to initiate complaints of human rights violations, and on the Assembly
of Heads of State and Government to take remedial action is a fatal flaw of the African Charter. This
is because African leaders have not in the past been enthusiastic about protecting human rights as
most of them have violated the rights of their citizens at will. In fact, some of the worst human rights
violators such as Amin and Mengistu Haile Mariam were elected chairmen of the OAU, a post that
has also been held by many military dictators.1666 The sad history of African leaders failing to criticise
egregious human rights violations and honouring gross abusers of human rights does suggest that
the commitment to human rights by African governments is, at best, minimal. Besides, governments
everywhere are often reluctant to criticise the human rights records of other governments for fear
1664 ld., at 39.
1665 Scobie, H.M., Human Rights Non-Governmental Organisations in Black Africa: Their problems and prospects in the
wake of the Banjul Charter in Human Rights and Development in Africa, p. 196-7.
1666 Ouguergouz, La Charte Africaine des droits de I'homme et des peuples, at 317.
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that they themselves will be criticised.166?Thus, it is highly likely that few, if any, complaints will be
communicated to, and investigated by the African Commission.
Another major flaw in the enforcement mechanism of the African Charter is that no sanctions are laid
down for States that violate the rights of their citizens. This, coupled with the fact that the
proceedings, report and recommendations of the African Commission remain confidential at the
discretion of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, will probably result in sanctions not
being applied against the rogue State.
As far as the organisation of the Commission is concerned, it is important to point out that the
Commission is still not yet really operational insofar as it lacks an efficient secretariat to back its
different activities. As a matter of fact, the secretariat is dramatically understaffed, the total staff
numbers only 9 persons: a bilingual secretary, a filing clerk, a receptionist, two drivers, one
photocopier and the secretary of the Commission itself who is the only lawyer but who is dealing
mainly with organisational issues. There is still no permanent legal officer who can assist the
Secretary with the fulfilment of his legal tasks. There also is no information officer who can publicise
the work of the Commission.166BIn comparison, the European Commission has a staff of around fifty
lawyers.1669
Moreover, the credibility of the Commission is at stake. "Some of the commissioners are holding
governmental positions" which might affect their impartiality. In fact, some members of the
Commission are sitting in the high court of their respective countries and others were or still are
Attorney Generals or Ambassadors. The previous Commissioner from the Congo simultaneously
held the position of Minister of the Interior of his country.16?OOne could imagine what the position of
such commissioners would be if they had to decide on a case in which they had previously been
1667 Ibid.
1668 Ibid.
1669 "The total established staff of the secretariat at the end of 1995 comprised 49 lawyers, 35 administrative or
secretarial assistants and 4 translators, Le. a total, excluding the Judges [sic) of 88, to which must be added a further 24
temporary staff. All the senior staff, including the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, are lawyers. These include 5 Deputies
to the Secretary (to be distinguished from the Deputy Secretary hirnseff who are respectively Secretary to the First and
Second Chambers or in charge of case programming or of personnel/budget, or advisor on case law and external
relations. Others are in charge of publications and of research. The remaining 40 lawyers are spread over 11
Applications Units and are responsible for examining complaints and supporting the work of the Commission
Committees, Chambers and Plenary at the admissibility stage of the proceedings. As the vast majority of petitions fail to
pass the admissibility test, this is the stage at which the bulk of the Commission's work takes place", Neville March
Hunnings, The European Courts, London, Catermill Publishing, 1966, p. 264-265.
1670 Ouguergouz, La Charte Africaine des droits de I'homme et des peuples, at 342.
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directly involved. Indeed, the African Charter did not prevent such a situation and lacks a provision
on incompatibility of positions.
In order to reinforce the African machinery of human rights protection, there is need for an
operational human rights commission and an efficacious human rights court. As far as the
opportuneness of such a court is concerned, the OAU. Assembly of Heads of State and
Government adopted resolution AHG/Res. 230 (XXX) by which it requested the Secretary-General of
the O.A.U. "to convene a Government experts' meeting to ponder, in conjunction with the African
Commission and to consider in particular the establishment of an African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights" in June 1994.1671 Consequently, a couple of Government experts' meetings were
convened. Finally, on June 1998, in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), the OAU Assembly adopted a
"Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples'
Rights". This protocol, however, is not in force yet; it shall come into force thirty days after fifteen
States have ratified it or acceded thereto.1672 But the main problem with the creation of an African
court on human and peoples' rights is the question of funding. The OAU. is facing a serious
financial crisis and the author fears that, if it is established, the African court will not have the
material means to fulfil its mission.
With regard to the creation of an African court, the author would suggest amending the constitutive
Charter of the O.A.U. This is feasible, provided that the principle of respect, promotion and protection
of human rights becomes one of the basic principles of the organisation. Thus, any State which
would persistently violate human rights should be deprived of its rights as State member of the
Organisation, in addition to other political and economic sanctions to be determined in the Charter.
Whereas the Council of Europe is based on the principles of pluralistic democracy, rule of law and
respect for human rights, the 1963 OAU. Charter emphasises the principles of the State's
sovereignty and non-intervention.
In light of some of the flaws discussed above, the author's considered view is that the African
Charter is unlikely to have a significant impact on the protection of human rights in Africa, and in
Rwanda, in particular.
1671 Two government legal experts' meetings took place respectively in Cape Town (September 1995) and Nouakchott
(April 1997). A third Government legal experts' meeting, enlarged to include diplomats, took place in Addis Ababa from 8
to 11 December 1997; this third meeting received a mandate from the 66th Ordinary Session of the OAU. Council of
Ministers to finalise the draft and to submit it for adoption to the Ministers of Justice. The Assembly of Ministers of
Justice approved the draft on 12 December 1997 in Addis Ababa and recommended its adoption by the O.A.U. Council
of Ministers and the OAU. Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
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3.9.5 Improving the existing machinery
3.9.5.1 Re-drafting of the bill of rights
It has been suggested by some 1673 that African countries should abandon Bills of Rights because
they do not work and they merely generate unnecessary conflict between the political branches of
government and the judiciary. According to limba, alternative ways such as the institution of the
ombudsman, which does not involve confrontation between the judiciary and the other organs of the
government, should be adopted.1674 Jain suggests that Directive Principles of State Policy are better
and more effective methods of protecting human rights than a bill of rights.1675 As seen, these
methods have some useful elements. But they suffer from major defects and cannot by themselves
effectively protect human rights. They can rather playa useful role in supplementing the bill of rights.
A bill of rights is of critical importance in a country like Rwanda which is ethnically polarised, has a
strong presidential form of government, and lacks a democratic tradition and commitment to the
protection of human rights. The history of the world has shown that a government that possesses
enormous power which is not subject to review by the courts is more likely to violate individual rights
than one whose powers are limited by, inter alia, a bill of rights.1676 It is naive to expect that the
government will, in the absence of a justiciable bill of rights, voluntarily protect human rights.
1672 Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 39.
1673 Zimba, for example, has written that "in the context of the African situation protection of human rights through their
entrenchment in the Constitution and making the courts agents for their actual enforcement cannot work, or at least it has
not proved to be an effective means of their protection, given the operative factors prevailing in Africa .... Indeed this
may prove to be the surest way of destroying them completely. Some other ways must therefore be recommended. The
best approach to the problem would be to look for a system of protection which would not, in its practical operation,
manifest itself in the form of a challenge to the authority of the government in its exercise of the legislative and executive
powers. Protection through constitutional guarantee of a bill of rights offends against this requirement since when the
procedure under it is invoked, it invariably needs an individual ... to challenge the wisdom of a government policy or the
validity of a certain law or laws passed by the government. What is even worse is the fact that the institution vested with
the power to review government acts is itself not part of the legislative or executive machinery - Le. the courts which the
Constitution purports to remove from the political arena ... On the contrary, a viable system for the protection of human
rights in Africa must not present itself as controlling or checking the activities of the government, and of being apart from
the political process as such. Such a system must recognise the unhappy practice of non-reviewability of State actions,
at least to the extent of not invalidating them at the instance of their repugnancy with some superior law; further, such a
scheme of protection must also be part of the political process and must enjoy the support of the 'party and its
government". limba, The Zambian bill of rights: Historical and Comparative Study of Human Rights in Commonwealth
Africa, 1984, at 214-229.
1674 Ibid.
1675 Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, at 474-475.
1676 One important exception is England, which does not have a written Constitution and a bill of rights. Parliament is
sovereign, that is, it can pass any law even though it abridges, modifies or abolishes any fundamental right or freedom.
However, the executive cannot interfere with the rights and freedoms of the individual without the sanction of law.
Therefore, the protection of individual rights does not rest on constitutional guarantees but on public opinion, good sense
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It is inevitable that, in many situations, the operations of political branches of the government will
come into conflict with individual rights. Such a conflict can only be resolved fairly by an independent,
impartial body, i.e., the judiciary. Moreover, in the absence of a bill of rights there is always a danger
that the majority in the legislature may enact legislation that may be oppressive to individuals or
minority groups. Justice Jackson explained the purpose of a bill of rights in the United States as
follows:
The very purpose of a bill of rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, to establish them
as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty and property, to free
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.1677
What can be done since the bill of rights in its present form has failed to protect human rights in
Rwanda?
The discussion of the bill of rights in Chapter two revealed that almost all the rights guaranteed by
the one-party Constitution contained clawback clauses that have been so numerous and broad as to
render the protected rights meaningless. As indicated elsewhere, that bill of rights has been
reproduced almost verbatim, both in form and content, in the 1991 Constitution. It is suggested that
the bill of rights should be drafted in such a way as to remove most of the clawback and derogation
clauses, and to vest the power to decide on how far the legislature can interfere with the guaranteed
rights in the courts. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms would be a good model for a new
Rwandan bill of rights. Most of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Canadian Charter, like the
United States bill of rights, are stated broadly, without qualifications. For example, Article 2 provides
that,
Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (a) freedom of conscience and religion; (b)
freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other
media of communication; (c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and (d) freedom of association.
Regarding permissible derogations, Article 1 provides that,
of the people, strong common law traditions favouring individual liberty and the parliamentary form of government. The
reason why human rights thrive in England is that the country is a small and homogenous nation, having deep-rooted
democratic traditions. These conditions, however, do not exist in African countries which are composed of people of
diverse ethnic, racial and religious groups, having no deep-rooted traditions of individual liberty and democracy. As
Bowie notes, "The unique English situation is not simply exportable, and other nations have generally felt that their
governments need the constant reminder which a bill of rights provides, while their people need the reassurance which it
can supply." Bowie, Studies in Federalism, 601. See also Wase and Bradley, Constitutional Law, 591.
1677lnWest Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624.
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The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society.
This provision imposes on the State the burden of proving that the limits placed on the exercise or
enjoyment of a particular right or freedom are reasonably justifiable in a free and democratic society.
Thus, an aggrieved person need only show that his rights or freedoms have been violated under a
particular law. This makes it much easier for an individual to bring a human rights suit against the
government than is the case under the Rwandan Constitution.1678
One of the merits of the Canadian Charter is that by protecting the rights and freedoms in broad
terms (in most cases without qualifying them) it allows courts ample latitude to enforce them. Another
significant aspect of the Charter is that it declares that the guarantee of "certain rights and freedoms
shall not be construed as denying the existence of any other rights or freedoms that exist in
Canada.1679 Such a provision is not contained in the Rwandan bill of rights and, although Rwanda is
party to most of the international human rights instruments of general application its legislation is
silent on whether these instruments are self-executing, and jurisprudence and diplomatic practice are
non-existent.1680 This would result in the violation of the international bill of human rights by the
Rwandan judge or other competent organ confronted with a problem involving a provision of
international law. The Constitution should therefore, expressly make provision for the application of
all international human rights instruments to which Rwanda is, or shall be, a party by ratification or
accession.1681
1678 See for e.g. MP v Kalinda, RPA 231/CYA, 1987 (unreported).
1679 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982, Part I, Art. 26.
1680 The notion of dualism or monism is still obscure in Rwandan law unlike the French law which explicitly provides for
the monism. Article 55 of the French Constitution provides that Les traités ou accords régu/ierement ratifiés au
approuvés ont, des leur publication, une autorité supérieure a celie des lois, sous réserve, pour chaque accord au traité,
de son application par I'autre partie.
1681 Apart from the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(which Rwanda acceded to on 12/2/1975) Rwanda is a party to the following Human Rights Instruments with the date of
accession or ratification presented in brackets: Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965
(12/2/1975); Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 1973 (10/11/1980); Slavery
Convention 1926 as amended by the Protocol 1953 (18/7/1927); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women 1979 (10/11/1980); Convention on the Punishment of War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity 1968 (12/2/1975); Convention on the Punishment of Genocide 1948 (12/12/1975); Convention and Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 (22/10/1979); Convention on the Political Rights of Women 1952 (22/10/1979);
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 1981 17/5/1983); and the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problem in Africa 1969 (22/10/1979). See Centre for Human Rights, Status of International Instruments (UN,
1987); Codes et Lois du Rwanda, Vol. I., 1995.
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It is submitted that the new bill of rights should be elaborated in such a way as to prevent the
government from passing amendments aimed at undermining it. The present procedure by which
any constitutional amendment can be passed as long as it is approved by two-thirds of the members
of parliament, is clearly inadequate, especially since it is easy to obtain the two thirds from the ruling
party. Given the history of repeated abuses of this procedure by the successive regimes it would be
best to require that any proposed amendment of the bill of rights should be initiated by a special
commission comprising an equal number of Hutu and Tutsi members of parliament and approved by
the people in a fairly conducted referendum.
The new bill of rights should also enshrine non-justiciable Directive Principles of State Policy based
on the Indian model and establish the Ombudsman institution.
3.9.5.2 An independent human rights commission
It has been noted that the Rwandan government appointed a human rights commission in February
1999. A number of Rwandans have criticised this appointment as "one-sided",1682 "partisan",1683and
"émanation du FPR",1684while The Netherlands' delegation concluded that "it is not independent,
whence the lack of investigative power concerning government services and officials, and the power
to offer guarantees to witnesses.1685 This criticism was based on the assumption that Rwanda had
disagreed with the UN Human Rights Commission, which Rwandan authorities qualified as
"investigative" .1686According to Rwandan authorities, the UN should concentrate their work only on
human rights promotion by education and thus should not investigate abuses. The disagreement
resulted in the deportation of the Commission's agents and in the closure of their office in Kigali and
the subsequent appointment of the Rwandan Commission.168? Without going into details, this
controversial view on the appointed Commission is suspect, and thus, its work is not likely to
produce positive results for all Rwandans.
1682 See "Letter to the Rwandan President" written by Rwandan members of 'Zambia-Rwanda Friendship Association',
10/3/1999.
1683 Kamanda, B., 'A Human Rights Commission?', Rwandafor, 1 June 1999.
1684 Rugege, 'A Human Rights Commission?', Rwandafor, 2 June 1999.
1685 Rudakubana, G., Main Findings of The Netherlands Delegation to the Great Lakes Region, Rwanda and Burundi,
Rwandanet, 26 August 1999.
1686 Radio Rwanda, News bulletin, 19 April 1998.
1687 HRW Report 1998.
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Given the rampant human rights abuses that have occurred in Rwanda since independence and the
failure of the majority of victims of such violations to obtain redress for various reasons, it is
suggested that a permanent and reliable human rights commission should be created. Its main
function should be to investigate human rights abuses and to investigate how far law enforcement
agencies respect the rule of law. It should have broad inquisitorial powers, including power to seize
documents, conduct a search, subpoena witnesses and to issue warrants of arrest for failure to
comply. Moreover, it should have power to sue human rights violators and to publicise the results of
its investigations. In this way those whose rights have been infringed but lack the means to
challenge the violations will be assisted.
The Commission should be independent and its members should be nominated by a variety of
independent bodies such as the Barreau National du Rwanda, women's organisations, the Church,
trade unions and other civic and human rights organisations and should enjoy security of tenure
equivalent to that of Court of Appeal judges. Further, its members should be immune from criminal
prosecution during and after their tenure of office with respect to their work in the Commission. It
should be funded by the government and by private national and international donors.
Such a commission will operate alongside the Ombudsman, who should continue to receive and
investigate complaints of official maladministration or abuse of office.
The suggested Commission should play a significant role in checking human rights abuses and
ensuring that the people responsible for the abuses are brought to account. It could also play an
important role in educating the public about their rights.
A few countries in Africa, such as Uganda, Togo and South Africa, already have Commissions with
some of the features outlined above. In Uganda, for example, an Inspectorate of Government was
established by the Inspector-General Statute in 198? .1688 Its functions are: to inquire into allegations
of human rights violations, particularly arbitrary killings, arbitrary arrest and detention, denial of fair
trial, torture and unlawful acquisition of or damage to property; to investigate how far law
enforcement agencies respect the rule of law; to detect and prevent corruption; and to investigate
maladministration and abuse of office. 1689
1688 Inspector-General of Government Statute, Statute 2, 1987.
1689 ld., par. 7.
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Although the Inspector General has extensive inquisitorial powers1690 his effectiveness is
compromised by his lack of independence from the Executive, and the fact that the results of his
investigations are cloaked in secrecy. He is appointed by the President, to whom he submits regular
reports, covering each inquiry, together with his conclusions and recommendations. The reports are
confidential and are not released to the Public. The Legislature only receives summaries of the
reports every six months, with names of the investigated officials omitted. Moreover, the President
has power to terminate any investigation if he thinks that it may prejudice national security or involve
the disclosure of cabinet secrets.1691For these reasons the Ugandan scheme, in its present form,
would not therefore be a good model for Rwanda. Instead, the South African model would fit.
In South Africa, the Human Rights Commission is an independent institution subject only to the
Constitution and the law. "No person or organ of State may interfere with its functioning".1692 It is
accountable only to the National Assembly, and must report on its activities and the performance of
its functions to the Assembly at least once a year.1693Its competence goes further than that of the
Ugandan Inspector General. It has to promote the observance of, respect for and the protection of
fundamental rights. It also has to make recommendations to organs of State at all levels of
government where it considers such action advisable for the adoption of progressive measures for
the promotion of fundamental rights. It may also recommend appropriate measures for the further
observance of such rights. Moreover, it has to undertake studies relating to fundamental rights which
are considered advisable for the performance of its functions. It is also empowered to request any
organ of State to supply it with information on any legislative or executive measures, which it adopts,
relating to fundamental rights. If the Commission is of the opinion that any proposed legislation by a
legislature might violate fundamental rights, it has to report that fact to the said legislature. It is also
competent to investigate on its own initiative, or after receiving a complaint, any alleged infringement
of fundamental rights. If the Commission is convinced that there is substance in the complaint, it has
to assist the complainant and other persons adversely affected thereby, to obtain redress. It may
also arrange for, or provide financial assistance to enable proceedings to be taken to a competent
1690 ld., par. 8-9.
1691 ld., par. 12. For an insightful discussion of how the Ugandan Inspector-General has fared in practice and how other
human rights Commissions in Africa operate, see Richard Carver, The role of the Inspector-General, 1987.
1692 Read Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Section 181, (2), (4) and (5).
1693 ld. The Commission has the powers, as regulated by national legislation, necessary to perform its functions,
including the power to investigate and to report on the observance of human rights; to take steps to secure appropriate
redress where human rights have been violated; to carry out research; and to educate. Id., Section 184, (2).
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court for relief. 1694 Each year, it must require relevant organs of State to provide the Commission with
information on the measures that they have taken towards the realisation of the rights in the bill of
rights concerning housing, health care, food, water, social security, education and the
environment.1695
Furthermore, a Commission on Gender Equality is provided for by the South African Constitution. Its
purpose is to promote gender equality and to advise and to make recommendations to parliament or
any other legislature on laws or proposed legislation which affects gender equality and the status of
women.1696 There is no doubt that a commission of this kind would have an important role to play in
Rwanda owing to the rampant discrimination against women studied in Chapter two.
3.9.5.3 Education
As pointed out earlier, one of the most serious obstacles to the protection of human rights in Rwanda
has been the fact that most of the people are ignorant of their rights. However, education has a
direct relevance to democracy and human rights. It is the educated who have time for discussing
political issues, who will worry about freedom of speech or assembly and other freedoms or who will
be critical of what the government does. The illiterate and semi-literate are too concerned with bread-
and-butler issues to have time to take an active interest in political issues. This does not mean that
they do not have an interest in politics; it simply means that lack of education inhibits their political
awareness and participation. Illiterate or semi-literate people often do not know what their rights are
or how to exercise those rights. Instead they have to rely on the educated and knowledgeable for
this purpose.
If the educated are government officials like those referred to in this dissertation, they may mislead
the illiterate and ignorant people who do not know their rights. As more than 65% of Rwandans are
illiterate, they need to seek guidance and advice from those who are in favour of the promotion of
human rights and democracy. This does not mean that all educated people know their rights and
how to exercise them. They are, however, in a better position to seek knowledge about those rights
and to exercise them. It is therefore necessary that there are courts to enforce rights once violated or
threatened with violation, and also specialised commissions to promote the protection and
observance of human rights.
1694 ld., Section 184, (5).
1695 ld., Section 184, (3).
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Clearly, there is need for a massive campaign to educate people about their rights. A lesson from the
African experience is that the provision of a bill of rights does not automatically lead to its success in
practice. To tackle that problem for Rwanda, people should be educated about a bill of rights and its
provisions. They have to be educated concerning the meaning and the role of a bill of rights. Such a
campaign could be conducted through seminars, public meetings, workshops, symposia, radio
programmes, TV and the print media. Workshops on the various aspects of a bill of rights should
involve lawyers, both practising and academic, magistrates, judges, politicians, government officials
and lay people. With regard to magistrates and judges, emphasis should be on the approach to the
interpretation of a bill of rights and legislation in general which has an impact on a bill of rights. In
educating the public concerning a bill of rights, people have to be informed of what rights they have
and on how to have those rights enforced. This education is needed because Rwandans have not
lived under a bill-af-rights dispensation, whence they have to acquaint themselves with this new
dispensation.
The idea of democracy and a bill of rights must be inculcated in young people at an early stage.
Democracy and democratic values take a long time to strike root. In this regard, human rights should
be incorporated in the curricula of educational institutions at all levels. That is, education about a bill
of rights should not simply end at school. The university could obviously incorporate a course on it,
either in constitutional law or as a component of a course on human rights. Not only should the
university offer a course on a bill of rights, but the provisions of a bill of rights will have to permeate
other courses as well, as in the United States of America. It will result in the constitutionalisation of
the law. Whereas, according to the traditional conception, the law was based on "private law", the
law of the Constitution must become the very centre of the legal system under the new conception.
Human rights also ought to constitute a strong component of the training given to the police and
other branches of security. The Bareau National du Rwanda, the University of Rwanda's Law
Faculty, the Church, the Trade Union Movement, the press, and other organisations concerned with
human rights could play an important role in this campaign. International human rights organisations
such as Amnesty International, the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, Africa Watch and the
International Commission of Jurists, etc., could be of great assistance in this endeavour for they
have both the expertise and financial resources that the program would entail.
1696Id., Section 184, (6).
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There also is need for private citizens to form human rights advocacy organisations similar to the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the National Association for the Advancement of
Coloured People (NAACP). Such organisations could play an invaluable role in human rights
education and challenge human rights violations perpetrated against the most vulnerable sections of
the population.
Finally, there is need to formulate the Constitution's provisions in non-technical language so that the
majority of the people can have access to it.1697 At the moment all the laws, including the
Constitution, are written in highly technical language.
3.9.5.4 A legal aid department
Included in the Rwandan bill of rights is the idea that all people shall be equal before the law without
discrimination. This is all very well as an idea. But it does not mean much if the people who have
these equal rights do not know what their rights are or how the law affects them in their dealings with
other people, the government, businesses, etc.
As seen, the law itself can be quite complicated and involves many areas of life. So, in a case
between two people, or between a person and a company, it may be that the person who is
represented by a lawyer in court has an advantage over the person who does not have a lawyer to
represent him. A further problem is that lawyers charge for the time they spend on a case and the
majority of people cannot afford their services. Thus, the majority of people who are arrested and
appear in the criminal court are not represented and a number of them are even sentenced to death.
Also, many people are not able to go to a civil court to get their money back or their rights enforced.
There is urgent need for the establishment of a legal aid department to provide assistance to people
who cannot afford to pay a lawyer. In order to be more effective, the department should have enough
staff and should post lawyers to every commune, and people should be taught how to make use of
these services. This would naturally involve a significant increase in funding. Money for this can be
found, provided the government is committed to the protection of human rights. At the moment
significant amounts of money are being wasted on defence, invasion of the Democratic Republic of
1697 In Namibia, e.g., the Legal Assistance Centre has issued a booklet entitled "Know Your Constitution: The Republic of
Namibia March 1990", which explains the various provisions of the Constitution, including the bill of rights, in very simple,
non-technical language. The booklet has been translated in all the major African languages. See Legal Assistance
Centre, Know Your Constitution, The Republic of Namibia, Windhoek, March 1990.
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Congo and a bloated bureaucracy. The international community could also be asked to help with
funding.
The University of Rwanda's Law Faculty could also set up a Legal Aid Clinic. Such a Clinic could,
apart from increasing access to legal services for people who cannot afford lawyers, provide an
opportunity for law students to gain practical experience in helping indigent people at an early stage
of their career. Such clinics have been set up in many Universities in other countries.169B
As indicated elsewhere in this dissertation only the tribunal de premiere instance and the Cour
d'Appel can hear and determine cases arising under the bill of rights. But there are not enough
judges and courtrooms to cover all the criminal and civil cases that arise. Moreover, the bulk of
judges are located in towns. From time to time these judges travel to communal capitals to hear
cases. That means the majority of the people who live in rural areas have virtually no access to the
tribunal de premiere instance. It therefore goes without saying that the tribunal de premiere instance
should be expanded in terms of personnel and infrastructure. The ideal situation would be to station
a tribunal de premiere instance in each of the 150 communes in the country and a Cour d'Appel in
each of the 12 prefectures.
3.10 Conclusion
The genocide has created a new type of State in Rwanda, a State marked by two convictions. First,
the post-genocide State considers itself morally, though theoretically in some cases, responsible for
the safety and security of every living Tutsi. Second, this State believes that the pre-condition for
Tutsi survival is Tutsi power. That is, if the Tutsi lose power, they will also lose life. In this sense, the
post-genocide State is an ethnic security State.
The practical implication of this is that if Tutsi power is indeed the pre-condition for Tutsi survival,
then Tutsis and Hutus will continue to be reproduced as separate and even antagonistic political
identities in Rwanda. In that case, the only peace possible between Tutsis and Hutus will be an
armed peace. This seems, indeed, to be the case now.
1698 For example, at Stellenbosch University, the Law Faculty links law students with individuals in need of legal help who
are too poor to afford private attorneys. Students, supervised by Faculty Professors and participating attorneys,
interview clients, write briefs, and prepare witnesses. Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic, interview, 1998.
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Moreover, those called upon to take decisions -or to elect the representatives who are to take
decisions- will not be offered real alternatives and will not be in a position to choose between these
alternatives. There will still be violation of such basic rights as life, liberty, freedom of opinion, of
expression, of speech, of assembly, of association, etc. These are, however, "the rights on which the
liberal State has been founded since its inception, giving rise to the doctrine of the Rechsstaat, or
juridical State, in the full sense of the term, Le. the State which not only exercises power sub lege,
but exercises it within limits derived from the constitutional recognition of the so-calted 'inviolable'
rights of the individual".1699
The other crucial fact is that when the RPA crossed the border into Rwanda, it lost its political
innocence. There were hardly any people in the 'liberated' areas because the very peasants they
claimed to 'liberate' were running away from them. They could have remained in exile should not
they have been repatriated forcefully under the complicity of the UNHCR, thus violating international
law. Henceforth, liberation for the RPF meant not the liberation of people, but of territory.
However, this dissertation has showed that the world of Hutus and Tutsis, of northerners and
southerners, was less a world of two different cultures, not even a world of poverty and wealth. It
was, first and foremost, a political world. Yet, Hutu and Tutsi exist not as market-based identities,
nor as deeply cultural identities, but as political identities.
The tension that characterizes post-genocide Rwanda resembles more a volcano than anything else.
The sequence of events from the early 1990s, in fact, seems to indicate a trend that is bound to
place the country quite beyond the reach of democratization. The distinction between order and
anarchy is more fundamental than the one between democracy and dictatorship. The former is
inextricably bound up with the latter. Rwanda, as some other African countries, appears to hover on
the edge of anarchy, quite remote from any democratic threshold. The spectacular and catastrophic
explosions of domestic violence in 1994 reveal the collapse of the very institution that is required to
maintain this order -the State. Developments such as those analyzed in this dissertation do raise the
question of whether Rwanda can be expected to produce any truly significant change towards a
democratic constitutional State.
In the author's opinion, should we assert that in every true democracy, fundamental rights and
freedoms -especially political rights- ought to be guaranteed. After all, a democratic political system
presupposes that individuals can express themselves, that they can exercise their right to vote, to
demonstrate, to associate, etc., in order to prevent the momentary majority to force its will upon
dissidents and relapse into tyranny. Democracy presumes the existence of people with differing
1699 Bobbio, N., The future of Democracy, A Defense of the Rules of the Game, Oxford, 1987, p. 25.
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opinions, minorities. In other words, in every democracy the positive freedom of individuals is
guaranteed by way of individual freedoms, which allow people to participate in the political system
(the same holds true for groups). The individual (and the group) should have the opportunity to
express himself, to unite and to assemble with others for a common purpose. In this case only
though, can the minority of today become the majority of tomorrow. Only when individual rights and
freedoms -that are presupposed in a democracy- are constitutionally entrenched, can individuals
really claim these rights. We should keep in mind though, that the individual is playing different roles
in diverse situations: employee, voter, concert-lover, etc. Because of this, he will be a member of
another minority or majority every time he accepts another role. Democracy, from this point of view is
not static; it is made up of constantly changing majorities and minorities. At last, then, the State's
obligation under human rights law requires them to assist all inhabitants in enjoying their human
rights, and to fulfill their justified claims as spelled out in human rights instruments. This means that
equal enjoyment of human rights must be achieved through active legal regulation and its
administrative implementation.
Clearly, the perspective on democracy that we have taken as a point of reference is constitutional
democracy. Only when the decisions of the majority are also limited, can democracy as such exist (in
other words: constitutional democracy is not an oxymoron). Not only is there the obligation to respect
individual rights and freedoms, but there are also other notions included in the idea of
constitutionalism: the conviction that all governmental power, even democratically legitimated power
should be limited by law.17oo In this notion, the negative aspect of freedom emerges; the individual is
free to do whatever he wants, that is, he will not be thwarted by others.
In other words, constitutional democracy presupposes a negative view of human beings; the gist of
constitutional pre-commitment is that the individual (in a community) should be guarded against
herself. At the same time, however, by binding themselves to a Constitution, human beings can
realize a form of self-government. From this point of view, constitutional democracy also expresses a
1700 This view on constituonalism and democracy is also held by Kanté, who writes that: "constituonalism is the
expression of the attachment of a political society to legal mechanisms which determine its organization and
performance. These mechanisms serve in principle as instruments for the political power, yet at the same time they
correspond to a specific area in which individual rights and freedoms should find protection. Kanté, B., 'Le
constitutionalisme il /'épreuve de la transition démocratique en Afrique' in Zoetbout, C.M. et al. (eds.), Constitutionalism
in Africa - A quest for autochthonous principles, Gouda: Sandars, 1996, p. 17-32. Jembere underlines the close
relationship between constitutionalism and democracy: 'Constitutionalism is, in brief, a method by which the democracy
purposefully guides its activity in the light of certain expressed principles, and restricts its own actions now and in the
future. Constitutionalism was surely meant as a limitation on the unbridled exercise of legislative power. And by that very
fact, it was also a conscious limitation on the ordinary power of the popular will itself.' Jembere, A., 'The functions and
development of parliament in Ethiopia' in Zoetbout, C.M. et al. (eds.), Constitutionalism in Africa - A quest for
autochthonous principles, Gouda: Sandars, 1996, p. 63.
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positive view of mankind. We may regard it as a combination of correlative concepts rather than a
conjunction of apparent contradictions.
What is intriguing, but not entirely surprising, however, is that attempts to re-enact fresh constitutions
in Rwanda showed no clear understanding of what the necessary and sufficient principles of a
constitutional order should be. Repeatedly, what the rulers came up with were remarkably similar to
what they were rejecting. The exception always was that the power structure in the new Constitution
was carefully re-arranged so as to remove the fetters upon central authority that characterized the
old. Competition has been ruled out through the establishment of the one-party State.
The result is that constitutional structures became dangerously perched on a coercive legal and
administrative order. Appeal to constitutional structure by ruling elites, thereafter, has been made
only if it reinforced their own narrow view of State power. In other words, the constitutional structure
has been quickly turned into a shield for the protection of elite interests, rather than a framework for
the enhancement of human rights and the rule of law.
There is no doubt that the general public needs a new political order different from this perverted.
What they hope for is, at the very minimum, a less oppressive, more distributive, and economically
proactive system, than has been in existence under previous regimes. What they have ended up
with after nearly 38 years of independence has been a country reeling under the burden of broken
promises and a shattered economy and constitutional structures without any normative content.
The hindrance of civil society has not changed. Indeed, organs of civil society have not, in the last
several years, been given opportunity to force themselves into the arena of politics as regards
especially, the formulation of the overall national agenda for social, economic and political
development. Should they have flourished, they could have gone further and asserted the right to
call the State and its organs to account in respect of policies, practices and activities that may be
considered injurious to the social welfare. Their entry point, hence basis of legitimacy, as political
agents, could have been the realization that development is in a very real sense, a function of
political relatlonsblps.t/" They could have thus sought and demanded that the State should create
an enabling environment for development though, inter alia, responsible political behavior, fidelity to
rules, respect for human rights, economic policies which minimize resource wastage due to
bureaucratic excesses, and transparent government.
Important to note is also the need to establish a distinction between State and regime in Rwandan
politics. In organizational terms each should be insulated from the other, so that a distinctive
corporate character can emerge in the ranks of the personnel who occupy the positions within these
1701 Buijtenhuijs, R., Rijnierse, E., Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa (1989-1992), An Overview of the Literature,
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respective sites. Personnel of departments, agencies, and bureaux within the State, which are
organizationally separate from the regime, need to develop a sense of autonomy and distinctiveness
that matches and reinforces the organizational insulation between State and regime, once it has
been established. A change in regime format and the regular personnel within the regime should not
threaten, nor should it be seen to, the occupants of the other sites within the State. A position within
the regime, and a position within the State outside the regime, should constitute two distinct career
trajectories, and should be seen to do so.
Such an institutional and perceptual demarcation within the State lays the basis for effective
democratization of the regime. The other step is to establish constitutional rules which give effect to
the principle of citizenship of equal value; secure the civil and political liberties in terms of which
participation and contestation are delimited; and ensure that these rules remain functional within the
contours of societally based political loyalties that characterize an ethnically divided society.
The steps analyzed here and elsewhere in this dissertation entail the construction of an institutional
and attitudinal arena within which the voluntary organizations that make up the contending 'civil'
societies, so typical of a divided society, can be merged into a civil society. The contest for
hegemony, as conceptualized, provides a framework within which it is possible to return to the
questions raised by Chazan on the role of civil society in the process of democratization.
The question raised (but not answered) by Chazan is which voluntary, grassroots organizations can
be expected to qualify as building blocks for a civil society that can be congruent with and supportive
of democracy.1702 The answer is that no organization that aims to represent only the interests of
people who consider themselves members of an exclusive incipient whole society can qualify. The
pursuit of hegemony is exemplified in the organizational imperatives contained in the endorsement or
denial of group status and esteem; in the imposition of one vision of peoplehood, statehood and
constitutional rules to the exclusion of all other such visions; and in the discriminatory distribution of
public goods. Politics of this nature have precluded the emergence of an inclusive view of the public
interest or the common good from which the notion of a society-wide context for the conduct of
civility could have grown in Rwanda.
The attitude of the donor community have not given impetus to reconstruction of the State along
more constitutionalist and democratic lines despite the fact that donor communities, their agencies
and the Betton Woods institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund, have, in the last few
years insisted that African countries should, inter alia, adopt transparent and responsible political
Leiden: African Studies Center, 1993.
1702 Chazzan, N., 'Africa's Democratic Challenge', in World Policy Journal, vol. 9, no. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 279-307, at 295.
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behavior and undergo political change. It is generally assumed that donor countries that, in the past,
had provided the main backstopping support for repressive regimes in Africa, suddenly realized that
democratic values were universal phenomena and that it was their moral duty to propagate them on
the international plane. But it is also likely that change in donor policies may well have been
motivated by the desire to globalize the market economy. Be it as it may, no concrete action has
been taken as far as Rwanda is concerned. The strategies that the donor community should have
used should have included threats of/or actual aid freezes, proactive diplomacy, observation,
monitoring and reportage of significant political events. These strategies could have been effective in
reducing the level of political excesses in Rwanda. The author believes that with external pressure
positive changes could have occurred. It is, inter alia, the lack of such strategies that ethnic
antagonism remains the main threat to reconstruction.
The collapse of the State as constituted at independence led inevitably to the desire for its
reconstruction. But analysis in this dissertation showed clearly that ruling elites in Rwanda have been
incapable of or unwilling to undertake serious self-diagnosis. They could not, therefore be relied on
to create an enabling environment for the growth of the essential principles of a viable constitutional
and democratic order. The reconstruction of the State, therefore, will require the intervention of new
social forces, the emergence of alternative paradigms, and the design of endogenously propelled
institutional arrangements. Policy makers are urged to aim not only for the establishment of a
democratic regime, but also to work for maintaining, or creating, a strong and autonomous State
during the process of reconstruction.
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General conclusion
4.1 Summary
This dissertation has shown that ethnic polarisation in Rwanda, regardless of whether the majority or
minority are in power, has prevented the development of a stable nation-state and has existed in
symbiotic relationship with ever-increasing human rights abuses. Colonisation itself and the
mismanagement of the de-colonisation process by the Belgians did not allow the elements that form
the bedrock of a functioning democracy - an organised opposition, an independent parliament,
freedom of expression, and freedom of association and assembly - to flourish. Although republican
leaders guaranteed the independence of the judiciary on paper, their one-party ethnically based
system did not allow it to play its customary role of being the sentinel of liberty because of the
atmosphere of fear that pervaded the entire society.
The perversion of democracy was the most striking feature of the 37 years of absolute and harsh
rule in Rwanda. Both the party and government have been completely dominated by strongmen who
ran the country much the way they pleased. All effective power in the country was surrendered to
them. The majority of the people were completely shut out of the political system. The rulers were
not accountable to the people because of the absence of free and fair elections and the severe
limitations placed on freedom of expression, and freedom of association and assembly.
Indeed, the bill of rights was extremely weak and so was its implementation. Thus, human rights
were violated on a wide scale during the period under study. The practice shows that post-
independence leaders learnt no lesson from the pre-colonial and colonial period. The post-colonial
State was not committed to upholding the rights guaranteed in the bill of rights in the post-
independence period.
Early colonial policies interacted with features of the pre-colonial Rwandan system to perpetuate
caste stratification and exploitation. While policies were formulated as if there still was a passive
population accepting a premise of inequality, the colonial experience inadvertently created a small
Hutu elite equipped to protest against inequalities in the system.
Cleavages between the castes existed prior to colonial rule, but these cleavages were exacerbated
under the colonial regime. Belated recognition of the problem of caste stratification, rather than
stratification per se, created obstacles to democratization during the 1950s.
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Since Tutsi superiority had been unquestioned before the advent of UN pressures, the Tutsis had
been given no incentives to co-operate with Hutus; the Hutus had been given no opportunity to
participate in high political positions and thereby gain a stake in the system. The Tutsi elite and the
small Hutu elite had little basis for mutual understanding.1703 When external pressures made
introduction of reforms unavoidable, none of the prior changes had prepared the system for
democratization. Since little had been done earlier to reduce exploitation in the system, the Tutsi
feared that loosening political constraints over the Hutu would lead to the end of Tutsi hegemony.
Thus, Tutsis expected the worst consequences from granting voting power to Hutus. Both Belgians
and Tutsi had misgauged the amount of time remaining for procrastination. The UN pressures made
correction of inequalities imperative, but no one was ready for reforms except the Hutu protesters
who had been deprived of any experience in democracy. That is why they did not fully appreciate the
importance of respecting individual rights and freedoms. This was because colonial rule was
characterised by authoritarianism, absence of democracy and rampant violations of human rights.
But the Tutsis did not do better when they seized power and it is not surprising that they have shown
such scant regard for individual rights and freedoms. The bill of rights has not been effective, partly
because the State has not been fully committed to it.
During both regimes, once the obsolete 'oppressors' were liquidated, new ones were immediately
put in place, without leaving the oppressed much time to breathe. And the new boys were in fact of a
much better model than the previous ones. First of all, they had been oppressed for a long time, and
now they were 'liberated'. It would have benefited the entire society if they had remained more polite
and properly subservient than the old oppressive bunch who were often insolent and thought
themselves irremovable. Now neither had any more to fear. On one side, the 'revolution' had been
carefully stage-managed, the former victims had all been told that they were now free by decree, and
a perfect 'democracy' reigned, since the rubanda nyamwinshi (the 'majority people') were now
supposed to be 'in power'. On the other side, the 'génocidaires' had to be kicked out, killed and/or
kept under control.
As for the mechanics of the genocide, one should mention the unquestioning obedience to authority,
fear of the Tutsi 'devils' and the hope of grabbing something for oneself in the general confusion.
This is exactly what happened when the Tutsis seized power and it is not surprising that the fear of
the Hutu 'génocidaire' and the illegal occupation of properties subsist. The genocide and other gross
1703 Even their educational experiences had been gained from different institutions: Tutsis tended to be educated at the
Astrida Administrative School, whereas the majority of the Hutu elite attended Nyakibanda Seminary. Newbury, The
Cohesion of Oppression, p. 85.
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human rights abuses from either side happened not because the State was weak, but on the
contrary, because it was so totalitarian and strong that it had the capacity to make its subjects obey
any order absolutely, including that of mass slaughter.
The new government has not adhered to its promise to protect human rights. Massacres,
assassinations, abductions, and detentions without trial, and arbitrary searches are still
commonplace. It should be observed, however, that the installation of a new government, by itself, is
unlikely to lead to the elimination of human rights abuses. The new government has inherited all the
institutions, including but not limited to the hated secret police which has been reinforced in such a
way that no undesirable element can escape. The bill of rights remains exactly the same as before,
both in form and content. However, the judges appointed by former regimes have been swept out or
assassinated or have gone into exile, and senior positions in the cabinet, civil service and the
diplomatic posts are filled with RPF associates, some of whom have probably participated in human
rights abuses. Although an independent press has been allowed to operate, the main daily papers
and radio and television are still owned by the government. The opposition has been suppressed
and given its overwhelming parliamentary majority, the RPF government can pass virtually any
legislation it wants. In a way the RPF is in the same powerful position as MRND was during the
Second Republic. In the final analysis, therefore, nothing much has changed in substance.
During both Hutu and Tutsi regimes, the executive was vested with enormous security powers, which
were not subject to effective controls. Emergency powers frequently were grossly abused. Not only
were they used to suppress political dissent so as to maintain the grip on power of MRND's and
RPF's strongmen, but they also subverted the ordinary criminal process. It was much easier to resort
to detention without trial and to assassinations to silence opposition than to compete for power in
free and fair elections. As for suspected criminals, why bother with long, tedious and expensive
investigations when they could be detained without trial?
The fact that the courts in Rwanda, like those of many other countries in Africa, did not interpret the
procedural safeguards in favour of detainees in the tiny number of cases submitted to them was
aggravated by their refusal, in the majority of cases, to inquire into the merits of the detention. Thus,
only the failure by the State to conform to the procedural requirements could result in the release of
a detainee, but this relief was of dubious value because the State, in most cases, would merely issue
a new detention order, correcting the initial flaw. Thereafter, the courts could not intervene on
account of their self-imposed restraint. However, the courts alone, no matter how determined to
protect individual liberty they may be, cannot provide a panacea. The content of the laws that the
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courts must interpret is very important. If the laws bear down heavily on detainees and preclude
judicial review of executive action, the courts are paralysed and cannot effectively protect personal
liberty. However, where the legislation is vague, the courts can live up to their assigned role as
sentinels of individual liberty. The judiciary did not strive to strike a balance between the competing
claims of national security on the one hand and those of individual liberty, on the other.
Furthermore, the courts in Rwanda, like their counterparts elsewhere, are constrained by many
limitations, some of which are self-imposed, and others which are inherent in the judicial function
itself. Moreover, the quality of some of the judges on the Bench has left much to be desired (in terms
of intellectual acumen, training and commitment to human rights). The ineffectiveness of the judiciary
has been reinforced by the absence of an organised bar for a long time and by the newly established
bar to stand up for human rights.
However, it must be recognised that since judges are part of society they can only be effective if the
society in general appreciates the need to preserve and protect individual rights. Courts will not be
effective defenders of rights in the absence of political pluralism, a free press and an alert public that
is conscious of its rights and is willing to fight for them. These conditions were absent in Rwanda
during the whole period under review.
History shows that human rights have been most vulnerable in societies that are torn by ethnic
conflicts, as well as those facing economic ruin, as is the case with most of the countries of the Third
World and East Europe. On the other hand, human rights have generally been better protected in the
Western industrial democracies, which have highly developed economies and generally well-
integrated societies."?'
To some extent, human rights in Rwanda have been adversely affected by economic and social
factors, some of which were legacies of colonialism. The high levels of poverty, illiteracy, and
disease, and fear of instability arising from ethnic rivalries, have created a hostile environment for the
protection of human rights.
The ability of the people to challenge wrongful action by the government has been constrained by
two factors. First, due to the high level of illiteracy coupled with the fact that there is no national
programme to educate people about their rights, most people are ignorant of their rights. A person
will only take legal action against the government if he knows that his rights have been violated.
1704 Sullivan, Democracy and Global Economic Growth, 15 Washington Quarterly 172, No.2, spring 1992.
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Second, most people have been prevented by poverty from challenging the government for infringing
their rights. If people do not have money to feed and clothe themselves and to send their children to
school it is unlikely that they can afford to hire a legal practitioner to take up their cases. As shown,
legal aid has not been provided by the government. Moreover, there has not been a single human
rights organisation to help indigent people to take their cases to court.
The policy of centralization has established institutions that have worked in a way that hindered,
stifled, and even eroded broadly based human development in Rwanda. It attempted to preempt and
erode the local social "tools" or "technologies" of human action; it thus weakened the diverse smali-
scale organizations needed for development. As centralization progressed in the post-independence
era, Rwanda moved to restrict the ability of non-central-state actors to authoritatively allocate values,
to engage in extra-state social organizations, and to engage in private economic pursuits.1705Labour
unions, cooperative organizations, local governments, education, and voluntary organizations were
incorporated into the ruling party. Their roles as rule-governed organizations to structure complex
human relationships, to sustain "self-organization" were restricted. Their capacity to serve as arenas
and structures through which new rules might be developed and new forms of organization might be
spawned was similarly hindered.
The policy of centralization has been an important instrument to keep the Hutu-Tutsi and regionalism
problems unsolved, whence the perpetration of genocide and other gross violations of international
human rights law. There is great fear of the opposite ethnic group. Tutsi srefuse to give up their
control of the army because they see it as a form of security against genocide. Hutus cannot imagine
a stable democracy as long as the Tutsis control the army and security forces, occupy the urban
areas, own most business, and dominate the government and justice system. The total failure of the
ICTR and Rwandan domestic courts to produce anything like a recognisable modicum of justice with
regard to the genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity has reinforced the complementary
attitudes of extremists from both ethnic groups. For the Tutsis it is "we have our backs to the wall.
Unless we maintain absolute control they will finish us next time." And for the Hutus: "We only have
to wait, numbers will play in our favour and the so-called international community will neither want
nor be able to stop us"y06 Under these conditions, there is little or no hope for equal rights and
1705 Bates, R., Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkely: University of
California Press, 1981); Mawhood, P., ed., Local Government for Development: The Experience of Tropical Africa
(Chichester: John Wiley, 1983); also compare to Hyden, G., Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an
Uncaptured Peasantry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980)
1706 Prunier, Rwanda: The Social, Economic and Political Situation, at 9.
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justice for the near future unless moderate Rwandans from both sides are given the opportunity to
negotiate with extremists so as to set up a viable State.
4.2 Recommendation
It is apparent that a number of measures need to be taken to improve the protection of human rights
and the rule of law. It is not suggested that all problems will be solved if human rights were protected
in Rwanda. Many specific suggestions have been made throughout the dissertation and some of
them will be repeated here for emphasis. Through the analysis contained in this dissertation, the
conclusion is that a certain kind of strong autonomous State1707 is a necessary, yet insufficient,
condition for sustaining democracy. State strength and autonomy should be added to the studied
precond itions.
As regards truth and reconciliation, the intriguing dilemma is not to specify the conditions which
enable a sound judgment to be made concerning which outcome will result from the bargaining
process. It is rather to specify the empirical conditions of, and prescriptive guidelines for, inducing
adversaries to engage one another in good-faith bargaining, given that they would prefer not tOy08
The problem thus restated implies that the necessary conditions for bargaining over hegemony in
Rwanda are more stringent than over other issues in different contexts. It implies first and foremost
that the requirements of good faith be expanded to include the joint acceptance by all parties to the
conflict that hegemony for anyone of them, be it Hutu or Tutsi, northerner or southerner, is
unattainable. The present generation of Rwandan rulers seems not likely to agree on this issue.
Another generation is thus needed that would acknowledge that the negotiating process is not to be
used to try and secure unilateral victory on its own terms and unconditional submission by the
others. Negotiation cannot be converted into a tactical device for imposing anyone agenda onto
other parties. Instead, all parties must accept that the aim of bargaining must be the precise
1707 The role of the State as a potential, incipient, partial and wholly de facto autonomous actor in dealing with ethnic
conflict that emerges from society has not been well researched. The work of Donald Rothchild is the major exception.
He examines the state-society relations in contemporary 'Middle African'states and finds a pattern of conflict
management in which the State and a wide range of ethnic groups engage in a process of hegemonial exchange: "As an
ideal type, hegemonial exchange is a form of State-facilitated coordination in which a somewhat autonomous central-
state actor and a number of considerably less autonomous ethno-regional interests engage, on the basis of commonly
accepted procedural norms, rules, or understandings, in a process of mutual understandings. Rothchild, D., 'Hegemonial
exchange: An Alternative Model for Managing Conflict in Middle Africa' in Thomson, D.L. and Ronen, D., (eds.), Ethnicity,
Politics and Development, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1986, p. 65-104, at 72. See also Rothchild, d., 'State-Ethnic
Relations in Middle Africa' in Cart, G.M. and O'Meara, P., (eds.), African Independence - The first twenty-five years,
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985, p. 71-96.
1708 Compare to Du Toit, P., 'Bargaining about Bargaining - Inducing the Self-Negating Prediction in Deeply Divided
Societies - The case of South Africa', in Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 33, no. 2, June 1989, p. 210-230, at 215.
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opposite: it must involve a joint endeavor to search for a mutually acceptable agreement on
establishing a site of hegemony which is located beyond the exclusive control of anyone of the
bargainers.
The first suggestion is the need for the reconciliation of the Rwandan society and the construction of
a viable State. An agreement between Hutus and Tutsis is of primordial importance in creating an
environment that would avoid the rhythm of destructive relations culminating in ethnic violence and
for promoting a sense of security and moderate politics. Having enjoyed a monopoly over power and
access to the resources under the control of the State, Rwanda's absolute rulers have and will
continue to resist the non-ruling ethnic group and the thrust of civil society organizations to expand
the political space, unless a third class of non-extremist Hutus and Tutsis emerges out of strong
negotiations between both ethnic groups. Consequently, a democratic transition a la Rwandaise is
irreversible, but, due to the complexity of the particular ethnic issue, it is likely to be of long duration,
indeed. Quick fixes cannot be expected for what appears to be a victory at some point may turn out
to be nothing of the kind. What is important is the creation of a new political culture in which
democracy may grow and be sustained, and political expression need not be confined to the State
and political parties. Professional associations, NGOs, and independent mass organizations should
flourish in order to challenge the status quo and help develop a viable civil society capable of limiting
State power and of advancing the interests of the broad masses of the people.
In this context, emphasis is placed on the autonomy (and not on the independence) of civil society
from the State: the State should lay down laws which set the outermost boundaries of the autonomy
of the diverse spheres and sectors of civil society; so, civil society from its side should lay down limits
on the actions of the State.1709
Tradition, laws and the Constitution should serve to demarcate and maintain the boundaries of this
autonomous sphere. The criterion of civility serves as a yardstick for the conduct of relations
amongst individuals and groups within society, and between individuals, social organizations and the
State.
The perspective on civil society contained in this context can be explicated by means of Migdafs
model of state/society interaction in the process of state-building. First, not all strong socienes= are
1709 Shills, E., 'The Virtue of Civil Society', in Government and Opposition, vol. 26, Winter, 1991, p. 3-20, at 4.
1710 Strong societies are those which exhibit a high level of social control. The social control which ensured State
predominance in continental Europe entails specific dimension of State power, which Mann identifies as 'infrastructural
power': the ability of the State to penetrate society and to use the infrastructure of the State to direct, and to co-ordinate
societal actions. Mann, M., 'The Autonomous power of the State: Its origins, mechanisms and results', European Journal
of Sociology, vol. 25, no. 2, 1984, pp. 185-213. This dimension of State power is also identified by Lewis W. Snider in
'Identifying the elements of State Power - Where do we begin?', Comparative Political Studies, vol. 20, no. 3, October
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civil, but all civil societies are strong. The civil conduct of both private and public affairs is an
expression of a high degree of social control, which is maintained through tradition, laws and
constitutional rules. The compatibility of this triad of sets of rules of social control not only ensures
civility, but also indicates that a pyramidal structure of social organizations is operative, with the
State at the apex of this pyramid, and where State and societal strategies of survival are congruent.
Citizenship is first and foremost an indicator of an individual's formal membership of a State.1711 It is
also the crucial qualification from which the status of civic persons and the guidelines for the conduct
of relations between them are derived. The existence of civil society requires that the status of
citizenship be invested with a very specific substantive content. Although Shils restricts the notion of
civility to the conduct of good manners, it can be given greater conceptual depth by linking the status
of civic persons to the body of rules subsumed under the category of civil rights. These rights, which
comprise a range of privileges, claims, duties and obligations individuals hold against the State,
1987, pp. 314-356. Migdal argues that effective social control, thus defined, requires high capabilities from states to
extract resources and the penetration of society. Successful social control is reflected by three indicators: compliance
(getting people to behave differently from the way they would prefer to), participation (repeated voluntary action within
institutions run or authorized by the State) and legitimacy (voluntary acceptance of the myths and symbolic imagery with
which the State justifies its rules of behavior). These rules of behavior are constructed from rewards, sanctions and
symbols which, taken together, offer strategies of sutvive' that are supposed to be relevant to the particular conditions
people have to confront in everyday life. The domestic hegemony of the State is secured when compliance with these
survival strategies at the expense of those offered by rival social organizations can be attained. Non-compliance, on the
other hand, cannot be explained only in terms of corruption, criminal intent or mental instability. It may also reveal a more
basic conflict as to whose set of survival strategies is to be followed: those prescribed by the State, or those on offer from
competing social organizations. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, p. 4, 5, 30-33. Strong states are those with
high capabilities. Consequently they are more likely to succeed in achieving this domestic hegemony. The measure of
their success is the establishment of a unified network of social control. This is achieved by means of a universal set of
rules which prescribes the conduct of relations between one individual and another and between individuals and the
State. Indigenous law, if it is allowed to persist, is made congruent with the law established by the State. Thus a single
political status, that or citizenship, valid for all who qualify as members of the State, is established. Ibid., p. 41, 208. By
asserting this status by means of a single jurisdiction within its territorial boundaries, the State is able to assume
hegemonic control over society and to dictate its own survival strategies to all within its domain. Weak State, with smaller
capacities for regulation, extraction, appropriation and penetration, tend to fail in achieving these objectives. In
consequence, other social organizations with their own survival strategies are likely to gain a competitive edge. The
weak State exists alongside these rivals as but one source of political allegiance and loyalty, and individuals and groups
can come under the compulsion of anyone of a range of contending survival strategies. Social control becomes
fragmented between these rivals and although a State may be acknowledged as having the juridical entitlement to claims
of sovereignty (Jackson, R.H., and Rosberg, C.G., 'Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and Juridical in
Statehood', World Politics, vol. 35, October 1982, p. 1-24) (which reflects the hegemonic quality of statehood), the
empirical embodiment of such a claim is absent: jurisdiction over the population and territory is multiple; the rules of the
State are not universally applied; and citizenship is but one form of political status, not necessarily the most legitimate or
most valuable. Elements of Migdal's depiction of the weak State are contained in Gunmar Myrdal's earlier description of
'soft' states, where '...policies (which are) decided on are often not enforced, if they are enacted at all, and in that the
authorities, even when framing policies, are reluctant to place obligations on people', Myrdal, G., Asian Drama: An
Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, vol. I, London: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1968, p. 66. Rothchild relies on Myrdal's
definition of the soft State in his theory of hegemonial exchange.
1711 Krasner, S.D., 'Sovereignty, An Institutional Perspective', in Comparative Political Studies, vol 21, no. 7, April 1988,
p. 66-97 at 74.
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emerged not in abstract, but from specific conflicts in the process of European state-building.1712As
State leaders yielded to these societal demands, essential adaptations to aspects of State
organization and conduct followed. These changes were reflected in the emergence of citizenship
criteria that reflected the demands, and in regime types that allowed for the execution of these
demands. Civil society thus presupposes the salience of citizenship, which can emerge only when
the State has succeeded in drawing the entire population within a single common jurisdiction, with a
shared citizenship status and a law applicable to all. This requires the exclusion of contending
political loyalties, which presupposes the hegemony of the State.
When civility is conceptualized in these terms it can serve as a definitional yardstick within which the
substantive attributes of organizations which are considered to qualify for inclusion into civil society
can be subsumed. The norms of tolerance, co-operation, accountability, openness, trust, respect for
the rule of law within the organization and an appreciation of both procedural and substantive justice
convey the substance of this broader notion of civility. They also serve as definitional criteria for
differentiating from amongst a range of societal units with identical organizational profiles, the uncivil
societies from the civil ones.
Rwanda has failed in meeting the criterion of civility because of the ethnic division of the society, and
this runs counter Shills' contention that the essence of civility lies in the mutual recognition of the
moral dignity of one's opponents in the course of public conduct:
... It means regarding other persons, including one's adversaries, as members of the same
collectivity, Le. as members of the same society, even though they belong to different parties or to
different religious communities or to different ethnic groupS.1713
Civil conduct in these terms presupposes a very solid sense of inclusive collective self-
consciousness' that transcends other social cleavages and from which can emerge a shared notion
of the common good, or public interest. This should be the objective to be attained in Rwanda;
otherwise (in the absence of such civility), the country will remain in cycles of civil war, the very
antithesis of civil society.
Internal conflict and violence between Hutus and Tutsis constitute the main threats to peace and
security in Rwanda. This phenomenon is related to the search for a new social contract between the
State and the society under its control. This involves the well being and security of all Rwandans.
The number of refugees and rebellions has emerged in response to both the State's failure to meet
these basic needs and its oppression of certain groups, particularly non-ruling groups and their
1712Tilly, C., 'Reflections on the History of European State-Making' in Tilly, C. (ed.), The Formation of National States in
Western Europe, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, p. 38.
1713Shills, 'The Virtue of Civil Society', p. 13.
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relatives or affiliates. Just as it is likely to be sustained under conditions of peace and security, the
democratic transition offers the best conditions for national reconciliation and social justice, which
are the foundations of enduring peace and comprehensive security.
In this dissertation the author has not entered into all the details regarding the implementation of a
possible truth and reconciliation initiative for Rwanda, but has, rather, sought to clarify the framework
within which a project for such an initiative would need to be placed.
International (human rights) law must be respected, whether through a judicial or non-judicial
approach. This, therefore, means that the principle of universal jurisdiction over acts of genocide
must be maintained (and, moreover, should be more strenuously applied). An unconditional amnesty
for acts of torture is unacceptable. Additional arrests, ongoing detentions and trials should respect
the standards laid down under international law.
A truth and reconciliation initiative cannot operate at the level of civil society or traditional justice
only. The authorities (at the level of the legislative, executive and judicial power) should at least give
their support and recognise the authority of this initiative.
A truth and reconciliation initiative must remain independent from the public administration and
political actors. This has several consequences at the level of the composition of an initiative as well
as at the level of its mandate, operation, financing and reporting.1714
Information and the wider involvement of the Rwandan population are requrec.v» The civil society
and "respectable" political opposition movements should be allowed to work and should be invited,
from the start, to participate in the elaboration of the truth and reconciliation initiative.
In the Rwandan context, it seems inevitable that the international community would participate in an
active manner in such an initiative. In addition to the UN 15-years' mission for reconciliation and
reconstruction in Rwanda, a comparative study of successes and failures of the international Truth
Commission in EI Salvador would be highly desirable.
1714 Recommendations 2 and 3 correspond to what Hayner summarises as "political backing and operational
independence" (Hayner, P., Lessons from the Past: Thirteen Truth Commissions, p.174).
1715 Some eyewitnesses have denounced the enormous distance between the population and the judicial approach at the
level of the ICTR: "They are incapable of approaching those who have experienced the genocide. They do not know how
to ask the right questions. They have a behaviour and opinions that hurt people. The Rwandans had placed great hope
in the ICTR. They are very disappointed". (Sibomana, A., Gardons espoir pour Ie Rwanda, Paris, 1997, p.166).
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Its mandate should cover violations committed by the former government and the former opposition,
as well as the current government and the current armed opposition. The example of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa is of enormous value. Its objective is to achieve national
unity and reconciliation through the work it is mandated to do, which work includes investigations into
gross violations of human rights, the granting of amnesty for acts, omissions and offences
associated with political objectives and the recommendation of measures for the restoration of the
human and civil dignity of the victims. Some of these issues would apply in mutatis mutandis
Rwanda.
The initiative should include elements such as investigations and reconstruction of events, the
identification and prosecution of (some of) those responsible, redress and compensation of victims,
as well as prevention. The judicial and non-judicial approaches should be combined. One could, for
example, exclude the purely non-judicial approach for those crimes that fall under Category one as
defined by the Organic law of 30 August 1996 (planners, instigators, supervisors and leaders of the
genocide and other crimes against humanity).
Truth telling is a sine qua non prerequisite for any measures of pardon. Releasing detainees on the
basis of their age or their health may be justified for humanitarian reasons, but do not do justice if the
truth concerning the role which these persons played remains unknown. Does this explain in part,
the protests of some survlvorsv» against these releases?
Measures which preclude the discovery of the truth and which impede inquiries or the identification
of perpetrators are unacceptable. On the contrary, solutions could be adopted at the level of
execution of sentences or in the form of a pardon or alternative sanetlons.vv
Unlike in other instances, the pressure of time unfortunately is an important factor in the Rwandan
context. The current detentions make a non-judicial approach urgent.
1716 According to official sources, 48 former prisoners who were released in December 1997 and January 1998 would
have been killed. The majority were in the Butare prefecture. (AFP, Des prisonniers libérés assassinés dans Ie sud du
Rwanda, 6 January 1998, and REUTERS, Rwandans kill 24 genocide suspects in mob justice, 3 February 1998).
Towards 15 October 1997, 1,239 persons would have been liberated because of the decision of the government to free
presumed génocidiares who: were ill, old, minors or did not have a dossier (UNHRFOR, Preliminary information on the
human rights situation and activities of HRFOR in October 1997). There were also demonstrations in Gikongoro in
November 1997 (UN DHA IRIN, Update n° 297 for Central and Eastern Africa, 21 November 1997).
1717 "Punishment is negotiable - the Truth is not". (Werle, G., "Without truth, no reconciliation. The South African
Rechtsstaat and the Apartheid past" in Verfassung und Recht Uebersee, n° 1, 1996, p.72).
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The point of view of some national and international actors regarding a truth and reconciliation
initiative has been summarised. The international community is reproachful in the domain of justice.
The tribunal this international community has put in place to try those responsible for genocide and
crimes against humanity has not (yet) met the expectations of the Rwandan population.
Nevertheless, the present situation is too serious to refuse high priority to the development of a
complementary non-judicial approach. Donors should seize the opportunity of a round table
conference, a thematic consultation, bilateral negotiations or diplomatic initiatives, to get this process
to develop further.
Another point of consideration is the economic situation. The question is whether or not democracy
is sustainable under the current conditions of economic crisis in Rwanda. There is a notion that poor
economic conditions will make it difficult for democracy to take root. The poor will make demands
that the State cannot meet. Military elites, no longer receiving the privileges they had during easier
times, will turn on elected leaders and remove them from office. Given the long-established tide of
regionalism and ethnic particularism, both ethnic communities are likely to perceive political power in
zero sum ways and thus continue interethnic competition for State power. What then can be done for
the success of the democratization process? The democratic transition cannot be held hostage by
the economic situation. For it is only by dealing effectively with four other variables that economic
conditions may improve and thus increase the chances for social democracy. Democracy as a moral
imperative, a social process, and a political practice is not incompatible with low levels of economic
development. However limited they might be with respect to fundamental human rights, the
democratic experiences of Botswana and Mauritius, are there to bear witness to this.1718
Democracy will not be handed down to the people of Rwanda on a silver plate. It can be realized
only through sustained political struggle. Democracy indeed is the main result of this struggle. It is
the ultimate prize won by a determined people who are committed to improving their lives
economically and socially. Democracy is, above all, a moral imperative for any people who care
about their dignity as human beings. It is a continuous social process of expanding political space in
the interest of all, particularly the popular masses. And it is a political practice that empowers people
to rise up against a decadent or oppressive political order to replace it with one likely to improve their
material conditions of life and ensure a better future for their children.
1718 See Du Toit, State-building and democracy in Southern Africa, 27.
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The second suggestion is that the reconstructed State should embody the following principles:
fidelity to rules, respect for human rights, responsible politics, efficient and sustainable management
of resources, and transparent government. Several paradigms are implicit in this statement of
principles. Four of these merit elucidation.
The first concerns the relationship between form and content in Constitution making. One of the
fundamental fallacies at independence was the assumption that the form in which the Constitution
was drawn would, in and itself, generate normative responses. The constitutional format must be
based on or embody shared values; not attempt to create them. The converse dilemma is whether
minority protection has any place in the Rwandan democratic system. Should popular will per se,
expressed at periodic elections, be sufficient reason for overriding minority interests?
In Rwanda where ethnicity or some variant thereof is an important political factor, this dilemma is
very real. In the first instance every ethnic group can, if it wanted to, claim minority status depending
on the configuration, at any point in time, of other groups within the same polity. What is the popular
will or majoritarian opinion is, therefore, equally elusive. The basic tenet of democracy that gives
pride of place to 'popular sovereignty' is therefore problematic in Rwanda.
The second implicit paradigm concerns the relationship between institutions and processes. Fidelity
to rules as an essential element of constitutional government having failed to develop in Rwanda,
there is doubt whether institution building per se, can generate dynamic processes as they interact
with social forces. Indeed actors in the reconstruction process may denounce existing structures and
demand, instead, that legitimate processes be put in place even if on an informal basis only, before
institutional arrangements designed to administer them are established.
The third paradigm relates to the relationship between political behavior and the management of
public affairs, including the economy. One of the earliest misconceptions in economic planning and
plan administration was, that State control was the most effective means of achieving rapid
economic development. The corollary to that was that without economic development, political and
social rights were meaningless or in any event, impossible to attain. This argument is not only widely
discredited globally, but is also an essential cause of Rwanda's underdevelopment. What
protagonists of the reconstitution process should advocate is that the arena of politics must first be
cleaned if development is to occur. In other words, the need for what Okoth-Ogendo calls 'political
hygiene'1719(or good governance) should be seen as a pre-requisite to sustainable development not
merely of the economy but of public affairs in general.
1719Okoth-Ogendo, H.w.O., 'Constitutionalism without constitutions' in Zoetbout, C.M. et al. (eds.), Constitutionalism in
Africa - A quest for autochthonous principles, Gouda: Sandars, 1996, p. 60.
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By 'political hygiene' is meant a condition in which governing elites accept as a basis for decision-
making, certain fundamental principle of political conduct, among which are equity, fair play,
responsiveness to public need and public good, transparency and respect for human rights and
freedoms. That political conduct in Rwanda has been devoid of these principles requires no
documentation. Developments in the last years do indicate that political hygiene is yet a major item
in Rwanda's agenda for social, political and economic reconstruction. The hindrance of plural politics
is one of the main proofs. The other is the lack of shift in public discourse from leadership paradigms
that emphasize the centralization of power in executive organs of government to those that are
designed to encourage and legitimize public participation through organs of civil society. In other
words, the State is still seen as an overlord, a bureaucratic maze that excludes all public scrutiny. It
should rather be seen and indeed act as a trustee of the public good, hence should, in that context
work in tandem with other.social forces.
The fourth paradigm relates to the relationship between the search for autochthony and the fact that
certain principles of constitutional behavior and democratic practice now exist as universal principles.
While the search for endogenously propelled constitutional arrangements and principles must remain
an important and legitimate concern in the reconstruction of the Rwandan State, this must not be
taken to levels where protagonists believe that totally new and novel values and structures good only
for Rwanda are possible. Indeed one of the strongest planks in the reconstruction process should be
the recognition that the search for autochthony must be tempered by universal principles.
What emerges from the above presentation is that the process of reconstruction of the Rwandan
State is concerned more with values than structures; with political conduct than with sterile institution
building. The basic argument is that without commitment to constitutional and democratic values,
constitutional arrangements, per se will remain exogenous to society.
It is understood, of course, that whatever values are accepted, as a basis of governance in the
reconstituted Rwandan State must, ultimately, be embodied in appropriate institutions and
structures. But that stage, reached too quickly, might lead Rwanda back to the paradox of earlier
constitutional arrangements. Social forces and structures should be encouraged and strengthened
through education and offered infrastructural support. It is the author's view that only after the
paradigms implicit in the reconstruction process have become the common currency of society will
the promulgation of a new and written Constitution make sense.
In this regard, the bill of rights must be negotiated and re-drafted along the lines suggested in
Chapter three. The list of rights should be expanded to provide for freedom of the press, to provide
for the right of Rwandan citizens to vote in an election of Members of Parliament and to be qualified
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for membership therein or to elect or be elected President of the Republic. In addition, the
Constitution should specifically make provision for the application of all International Human Rights
Instruments Rwanda has ratified or acceded to. Moreover, the Constitution should provide that the
following provisions can only be amended through a referendum in which 75% of the voters approve,
provided that arrangements are made for the respect of the rights of minorities: the bill of rights; the
provisions guaranteeing a multi-party system of government and universal adult franchise. This will
restrain any government that has an overwhelming majority of seats in Parliament from amending
these crucial provisions at will, as has often happened during the period under study. The
Constitution should also incorporate Directive Principles of State Policy along the Indian model.
Third, as the issue really is State power, the vast appointment powers vested in the President should
be reduced and subjected to more effective checks. For example, most of the Presidential
appointments to the cabinet, statutory corporations and senior civil service posts should be ratified
by the legislature.
Fourth, as regards the judiciary, the Gonseil Supérieur de la Magistrature should become a truly
independent body, not one dominated by the RPF's political appointees, as at present. Appointment
of judges to the Tribunal de Premiere Instance, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Gourt should
be a three-step process. First the Ganse;1Supérieur de la Magistrature should recommend a plurality
of candidates for the position of judge to the President. Second, the President should then nominate
one of the candidates and submit his or her name to the legislature for ratification. Third, before
confirmation the legislature should, as in the United States of America hold public hearings at which
members of the public can express their opinion on the candidate's suitability for holding high judicial
office. In this way the appointed judges will enjoy the confidence of the executive, the legislature
and, more importantly, of members of the public. It is obvious that people will only invoke the judicial
machinery in order to assert their rights if they have confidence in the competence and impartiality of
the judges. Rwandan people have had little confidence in the judiciary, partly because of the manner
in which the judges were appointed, as well as the questionable calibre and impartiality of many of
the judges. There is need for the judiciary to assert itself and be active with regard to the protection
of human rights. As was indicated elsewhere in this dissertation, the judiciary has taken a low profile
in politically sensitive cases and is far from asserting itself, partly because there is no evidence that
autocracy is on the way out. Without an active judiciary determined to protect human rights, the bill of
rights, no matter how well it may be written, will be utterly useless.
Fifth, the legal profession needs to playa more active role in: human rights education; protecting
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human rights violations and the enactment of laws that undermine human rights; assisting indigent
people with legal services, as well as other victims of the government. The newly created Bar in
Rwanda has acquiesced in the oppression of the people by remaining silent in the face of serious
violations of human rights. Rwandan lawyers need to do more to educate the public about their
rights, to offer legal assistance to the poor and to strongly protest government laws and practices
that are likely to undermine human rights. There also is a need to reorganise legal education in order
to improve the training of lawyers. There is need for well-defined postgraduate programmes at the
Law Faculty of the National University of Rwanda. The Law Faculty curriculum needs to be
expanded to incorporate, inter alia, human rights courses and a legal aid clinic, so that students are
introduced to human rights issues and gain practical experience in solving legal problems of the poor
at an early stage. The method of instruction, as suggested earlier, must emphasise creativity and
critical thinking rather than the memorisation of legal rules, and must also incorporate policy
arguments. If lawyers are trained better, they will be able to argue or (as judges) decide human
rights cases much more effectively than has been the case hitherto.
Sixth, there is need to make the Human Rights Commission free from ethnic colouration and to
entrust it with wide powers to receive complaints, to investigate human rights violations, and to
pursue legal proceedings to enforce human rights. This should be set up along the lines suggested
in Chapter three. In addition, the institution of the Ombudsman should be created and expanded,
both in terms of personnel and geographical location. The Ombudsman should be accountable to the
legislature and not to the President and should enjoy complete autonomy in its operations. It should
also have power to enforce its decisions, unlike in some countries where it can only make non-
binding recommendations to the President. Furthermore, there should be a Department of Legal Aid,
adequately funded, expanded and decentralised so that it may playa more effective role in
protecting human rights.
Seventh, the President's - and the Vice-President's - enormous security powers need to be curtailed
along the lines suggested in Chapter two. Indeed, in addition to a strong judiciary, other measures
are necessary to ensure protection of individual liberty. The Constitution should define what
constitutes an emergency and the circumstances in which it can be declared as precisely as
possible. It is suggested that a state of emergency should only be declared during periods of war,
rampant rioting, mutiny and insurrection. Moreover, a state of emergency should be of limited
duration as there is a danger of it degenerating into an instrument of tyranny and oppression if
continued beyond the contingency that gave rise to it.
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Although the power to declare an emergency resides in the executive, it is submitted that such
declaration should be approved within a short period (for example three days) by Parliament and
should also be subject to frequent review by Parliament after a period of, say one month. It should
expire after one month unless it has been extended by Parliament.
The power to detain should be exercised only when there is clear and present danger to national
security. There should be a sufficiently proximate and rational relationship between the detainee's
activities and national security. It should not be used as an easy substitute for inadequate criminal
laws.
It is submitted that detainees should be provided with reasonable constitutional safeguards. The
safeguards provided under the Ghana Constitution of 1979 offer the best model to cate.v= Under
Article 34 (1) of that Constitution a detainee is entitled to the following safeguards [omitting those
that are contained in Rwandan law):
(a) detailed grounds of detention in writing must be supplied within twenty-four hours of the
commencement of the detention; b) the spouse, parent, child or other available next of kin must
be informed of the detention within 24 hours and be permitted access to the detainee within
seventy two hours of the commencement of the detention; c) a notification of the detention giving
particulars of the relevant provisions of law and the grounds of his detention must be published in
the gazette within ten days; d) his case shall be reviewed not more than 10 days after the
commencement of his detention and thereafter at intervals of three months by a Tribunal
composed of at least three Supreme Court Judges appointed by the Chief Justice and presided
over by the Chief Justice of a Supreme Court Justice. The Review Tribunal has power to order
the release of the detainee and the payment to him of adequate cornpensafion.ro
Furthermore, the Ghana Constitution under Article 34 (3) requires the executive to make monthly
reports to Parliament of the number of people detained and the number of cases in which it has
acted in accordance with the decision of the Review Tribunal. These provisions, if incorporated in the
Rwandan Constitution and if authorities respect them, would protect the rights of detainees.
The Constitution should prescribe the maximum period of detention. In India, for example, a detainee
cannot be detained for more than three months unless an Advisory Committee approves the
detention but even in such a case, a detainee must be released at the expiration of one year unless
1720 The Constitution of Ghana Act 1979, reprinted in Hins, N., The constitutions of 5 States compared, Nairobi: Djima,
1990, p. 21-30.
1721 ld., art. 34 (2).
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convicted.w In Rwanda, it is common to find people who have been interned for over five years, if
they have not been assassinated or starved in prison. As far as the state of emergency is concerned,
it is not clear how a person could still constitute a threat to public security after having been detained
for such a long time.
Eighth, the public has to be made fully aware of its rights and the means of enforcing their rights
through the various education devices suggested in Chapters two and three. The effective protection
of human rights does not rest on fine laws and institutions alone but on whether the people are
willing and able to utilise them to challenge human rights violations. As Justice PT Georges aptly
said,
In the final analysis, the only safeguard is an alert public opinion, quick to show its resentment
when restrictive measures are proposed which are not reasonably justified in a democratic
society.v»
The press can, and should, playa significant role in raising public awareness, and exposing and
criticising human rights violations.
Finally, the various economic and social problems identified in this study need to be addressed. As
long as massive poverty and the inequitable distribution of the country's resources remain, a large
part of the population will have little chance for exercising their civil and political rights in any
meaningful manner.
To sum up, what is needed for the success of international human rights standards and the rule of
law in Rwanda is a combination of a variety of devices and measures. The implementation of many
of the recommendations made above would require a vast sum of money and commitment. But
freedom and justice for all do not usually come cheap.
1722 Preventive Detention Act 1950, (11A). In Malaysia 2 years is the maximum permissible period under par. 8 of the
Security Act 1960, 3 years is the maximum period of detention in Singapore under the Preservation of Public Security
Ordinance, as amended.
1723Georges,PT, The Rule of Law: Definition and Safeguards in Law and its Administration in One-Party State: Selected
Speeches of Telford Georges, Mimeo, Faculty of Law, University of Dar-es-Salaam, 1984, p. 39.
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